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Differential psychologists rightly identified evolutionary theory as a unifying framework for
explaining the origins and persistence of individual differences in a wide array of human
psychological characteristics. Psychological diversity occurs on multiple levels, including be-
tween species, populations, generations, and individuals. Each level reveals the outcome of
evolutionary processes at different temporal scales. I embrace a range of methods and results
from quantitative and population genetics, developmental evolution, and phylogenetically-
grounded comparative psychology to explore how personality evolves in humans and non-
human primates. At the level of species, I compared personality structure derived from
rater assessments for four species of macaques and found a consistent, core set of personal-
ity dimensions (Dominance, Confidence, and Friendliness) describing these species. At the
population level, I studied the relationship in humans between fertility/longevity trade-offs
and the average personality of a country and found that Neuroticism and Agreeableness
exhibit adaptively plasticity to life-history conditions. At the level of families, I estimated
the quantitative genetic structure of personality in orang-utans and found that, like humans,
a large portion of the phenotypic variance was explained by non-additive genetic effects. I
examined between generation changes in personality by testing whether personality traits
in humans are genetically correlated with fitness and found that in modern environments
personality evolves very slowly. Finally, I translated current conceptual models of biologi-
cal reactivity and stress response into mathematical models of developmental evolution and
determined that evolution would select highly resilient phenotypes but that variation could
be maintained by skew in the distribution of underlying genetic factors. From these results
I broadly conclude that primate personality structure is generally conserved among species,
mean personality levels change only very slowly between human generations, and that this
xi
xii ABSTRACT
evolution results in a genetic basis of personality that is characterized by epistasis. The evolu-
tion of individual differences has much to gain from the rigorous application of evolutionary
methodology.
Chapter 1
The evolution of the psyche
Personality is what a man really is. — Gordon Allport
1.1 Variety
In the time of Carl Linnaeus, the Swedish naturalist and taxonomist, the essentialist species
concept ruled (Hull, 1975; Mayr, 1983). Under this rubric, an individual organism is simply
the manifestation of a static and unchanging (and unchangeable) essence, a timeless type. A
species was at its core about similarity and the only meaningful difference was that which
marked the boundaries between species. This essentialism served as the basis for the chief
object of the naturalists’ attention: the identification and classification of species. Taking a
species as a category made it possible to treat all members of that species as interchange-
able (Hull, 1965). Individuals from different species could then compared for the purpose
of classifying species together with other species at the level of the genus. Higher level
classifications, such as those in the Linnaean hierarchy (Simpson, 1961) followed the same ar-
chitectural rule. Classification required discovering the shared essence between similar types
of organisms and marking out the taxonomic characters that could best be used to group and
differentiate them. Yet the unit of variability was the species.
Variation between individuals of the same species was accidental in nature and a mean-
ingless deviation (Beddall, 1957; Mayr, 1983). This is not to say that Linnaeus or his forerun-
ners, contemporaries, and successors were unaware of within-species variability. Linnaeus
wrote of variation within a species attributable to living in a specific (climatic, edapholog-
1
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ical) environment, the varieties of domesticated plants and animals, and geographic races.
Mayr (1983) notes that while the term ‘variety’ was in widespread use among biologists of
this time it was applied inconsistently and distinctions such as that between inherited and
non-inherited characteristics, continuous and discontinuous variation, and individual- versus
population-level variability were lost.
This changed with Charles Darwin. Darwin’s name is cemented together with evolution
but his key insights into the mechanism of natural selection and speciation required first
overturning essentialism and adopting population thinking (Mayr, 1983). Species are not
unchanging types but are instead populations composed of individuals (Hull, 1967; Ghis-
elin, 1974; Mayr, 1983). Tellingly, Darwin started The Origin of Species not with geology or
geography but with variation, and not variation in nature but variation in domesticated an-
imals and cultivated plants. After noting the great variety within a domesticated species,
Darwin pointed out that the entire enterprise of animal and plant breeding—particularly for
the study system he focussed his attention on, fancy pigeons—requires the breeder to attend
to individual differences for it is from these differences that they decide which individuals
to breed together.1 This is selection. Individual variability, plus the transmission of this vari-
ability from parents to offspring, was exactly that required by natural selection to act. For
Darwin (1859, p 102) “mere individual differences” were sufficient for natural selection to do
its work.
From the modern perspective on the reconciliation of the studies of evolution and in-
heritance (Huxely, 1974) along with theoretical results from population genetics (Crow &
Kimura, 1970; Rice, 2004), we are in a much better position to demarcate the scale on which
biological—including (my interest here) psychological—diversity is generated. While evolu-
tionary psychology is ‘evolutionary’ in so far as it seeks ultimate, adaptive explanations for
psychological traits, the relative importance of various evolutionary processes for the trait of
interest is highly dependent upon the timescale necessary to understand the trait’s evolution.
Different aspects of our psyche evolved at different times (Gosling & Graybeal, 2007). For
example, psychological adaptations for living in groups have been evolving for the last 52 mil-
lion years, starting when our ancestors transitioned from solitary foraging to social groups
(Shultz, Opie, & Atkinson, 2011). Adaptations for complex combinatorial and referential
1As will be seen, this was not the end of the influence of animal breeding on evolutionary biology.
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language, a trait that debatably distinguishes us from other primates (Hauser, Chomsky, &
Fitch, 2002), could, in contrast, be appropriately studied by only looking at tens or hundreds
of thousands of years of our evolution (Lieberman, 2007). The particular timescale then dic-
tates both the theory and the data necessary to answer the question at hand. Likewise, if a
particular evolutionary process is thought to be important in explaining variation in a trait,
that will also determine the time scale necessary for that process to have an appreciable effect.
Comparing diversity at the species level, for instance, could entail understanding mutational
input that gives rise to species differences. Mutation, however, would play a smaller role in
genetic differences between an island and a mainland population accrued over only a few
generations. Evaluating various approaches to studying the evolution of psychological traits
and their appropriateness as frameworks for analyzing the evolution of individual differ-
ences therefore requires marking out which processes each approach emphasizes and over
what timescales they consider the human mind to have evolved.
Evolutionary psychological perspectives on individual differences
A number of approaches have been taken to study the evolution of human behavior in-
cluding: sociobiology; human behavioral ecology; Evolutionary Psychology2; approaches
inspired by gene and population genetic perspectives, including memetics and gene-culture
coevolution (Laland & Brown, 2002); and, in the last decade, evolutionary genetic driven re-
search (Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007; Keller, Howrigen, & Simonson, 2011). Each of these
approaches finds its origins in workers from different disciplines (Laland & Brown, 2002) and
therefore differ in the way that questions are posed and answered. These research traditions
have differing interpretations of the evolutionary standing of individual differences.
Sociobiology
Sociobiology took as its starting point the ethological approach to the study of behavior,
pioneered by Konrad Lorenz, Niko Tinbergen, and Karl von Frisch, and combined it with
theoretical perspectives on evolutionary processes such as kin selection and reciprocal al-
truism and methods from evolutionary game theory (E. O. Wilson, 1975; Segerstråle, 2000;
2Or EP. Note the capitalization. Here I will use EP to denote a specific theoretical and methodological orientation
within evolutionary psychology sensu lato.
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Laland & Brown, 2002). When studied, individual variation was looked at in terms of ge-
netic differences between individuals (Williams, 1966) or in terms of alternative behavioral
strategies or types (R. Dawkins, 1978; Maynard Smith, 1982). Coming from the ethological
tradition, the focus was on the optimal behavior of an individual given its environment and
the distribution of strategies employed by the individual’s competitors. Like with Darwin,
the availability of variation for selection to work with was assumed.
Sociobiologists originated and promoted many concepts that are still central to evolution-
ary studies of human behavior (Laland & Brown, 2002). Kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) and
reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) were foundational to the study of the evolution of social
behavior (West-Eberhard, 1975) and cooperative behavior in humans (Bowles & Gintis, 2003).
While frequently challenged (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003), these concepts are still central to
debates over human nature (West, El Mouden, & Gardner, 2011).
Human behavioral ecology
Like sociobiology, human behavioral ecology focused on optimal behavior given environmen-
tal conditions but broke from sociobiology by relying more heavily on data to test hypotheses
(Laland & Brown, 2002). While sociobiology talked about human universals, research in-
formed by behavioral ecology paid much closer attention to within- and between-population
variability (Borgerhoff Mulder, 2001). The chief working assumption of this school is that
humans exhibit great behavioral flexibility in response to environmental conditions and that
behavior can be tuned and selectively deployed to maximize fitness (E. A. Smith, 2000; Laland
& Brown, 2002; G. R. Brown, Dickins, Sear, & Laland, 2011). A conditional response gives
the organism flexibility to adjust its strategy and choose between alternative behaviors as the
situation or strategies of other individuals change (Gross & Repka, 1998). For example, mat-
ing preferences may relate to resource availability such as when males with more resources
choose females with higher residual reproductive value (Voland & Engel, 1990) or when fe-
males who control resources shift mating preferences to emphasize physical attractiveness of
mates (Moore, Cassidy, Law Smith, & Perrett, 2006). A focus on individual flexibility leaves
little room to consider stable individual differences in behavior (that is, personality). How-
ever, human behavioral ecology has indirectly had an influence on the study of personality




The evolution of human behavior has also been studied from the subfields of memetics and
gene–culture coevolution. These approaches take culture to be either the main focus or as
an alternative but equally important inheritance mechanism for behavior (Laland & Brown,
2002). Memetics studies the evolutionary dynamics of cultural or behavioral units (‘memes’)
but does not require individual differences in dispositions to explain variation in behavior
(R. Dawkins, 1978). Instead, individuals would behave differently because each person would
contain a different set of memes that inform and direct their behavior (R. Dawkins, 1978;
Lehmann, Aoki, & Feldman, 2011). Gene–culture coevolution, in contrast, sees both genetic
and cultural inheritance as necessary to explain the evolution of complex human behavior
(Lumsden & Wilson, 1981; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Feldman & Laland, 1996; Odling-Smee &
Feldman, 2003). The foundation of this approach is that a cultural behavior functions against
a particular genetic background (the classic, and dogged, example being the coevolution of
dairy farming and lactose persistence; Feldman & Laland, 1996) and that the capacity for
culture is itself a behavioral adaptation (Laland & Brown, 2002). Coevolutionary approaches
see individual variation as a product of both inherited genetic and inherited environmental
factors (Feldman & Otto, 1997).
Evolutionary Psychology™
Evolutionary Psychology (EP) also takes as its subject evolved universal traits in humans
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b; D. M. Buss, 1995). EP differed from sociobiology and human be-
havioral ecology by making the psychological mechanism, rather than the behavioral output,
the unit of inquiry (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987). Taking a cognitive psychology approach that
the mind is highly modular (Fodor, 1983), EP posits that the mind is composed of a host of in-
dividual mechanisms that evolved for producing a domain-specific set of adaptive behaviors
(D. M. Buss & Greiling, 1999), and it is this theoretical orientation that differentiates this par-
ticular school from the broader enterprise of evolutionary psychology. Individual variation,
in this view, is produced by a universal response to the unique environment encountered
by each individual (similar to the human behavioral ecology view of adaptively flexible be-
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havior) or by non-adaptive genetic noise that produces a departure from the evolved species
optimum (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a). Selection will reduce variation around this optimum
and minimize adaptive individual differences so that, from a functional point of view, all
humans are basically the same. In this view, many of the individual differences noted by
psychologists are the result of neutral genetic variation plus random fluctuations that occur
during development. Because selection will weed out fitness-related variants, adaptive psy-
chological traits will be notable for their low heritability. The non-zero heritability of many
individual differences traits (Turkheimer, 2000) is thus evidence for their non-adaptiveness
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a). In this view, while this neutrality is not adaptive now, it can serve
as the raw variation with which selection will produce future psychological adaptations.
The other important tenet of EP, one which grounds it methodologically, is the contention
that human psychological mechanisms must be understood in the context of the past envi-
ronment in which they evolved (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b). Inquiry proceeds by discovering
the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA; Bowlby, 1969, 1973), “a statistical com-
posite of the adaptation-relevant properties of the ancestral environments encountered by
members of ancestral populations, weighted by their frequency and fitness-consequences”
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b, pp 386–387). Although Tooby and Cosmides distance themselves
from associating the EEA with a specific time and place, they believe that most psychological
adaptations of interest will have evolved during the Pleistocene (approximately 2.5 mya -
11 kya; Gibbard & Kolfschoten, 2004) when anatomically modern humans evolved (Lahr &
Foley, 1998). The concept of the EEA is particularly informative of the type of methodology
needed to investigate psychological adaptations. If the current environment differs substan-
tially from that in which the behavior evolved, it will not appear to be fitness enhancing
and may even appear maladaptive (Symons, 1987). Thus the attention is on past rather than
contemporary evolution.
Differential psychology
Evolutionary differential psychology differs from EP in basic precepts and overall method-
ological orientation. The primary theoretical departure is that personality and other psycho-
logical variation is conceived of, in part, as adaptive individual differences (D. M. Buss, 1991;
D. M. Buss & Greiling, 1999; Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007). In this view, selection actu-
1.1. VARIETY 7
ally results in personality variation. In contrast to the cognitive psychology and information
processing orientation of EP (Laland & Brown, 2002), evolutionary differential psychology as
a field within psychology is methodologically aligned with individual differences, develop-
mental, psychometric, and behavior genetic approaches. Scholars taking this approach also
draw thoroughly from life-history theory and evolutionary genetics (Hawley & Buss, 2011).
Work in this area is represented by two main branches. The first is in clarifying, evolution-
arily, what personality is ‘for’ (D. M. Buss, 1991; MacDonald, 1995; D. M. Buss & Greiling,
1999; Denissen & Penke, 2008a) and how continuous variation in a personality trait might
relate to fitness trade-offs (Nettle, 2006; D. M. Buss, 2009b; Figueredo et al., 2011). Because
of its origins in psychometrics and psychological measurement, a related research pursuit
is to develop questionnaires that take an evolutionarily-informed approach to personality
assessment (Figueredo, Vásquez, Brumbach, & Schneider, 2007; Denissen & Penke, 2008a).
The second strand concerns reconciling what is known about the genetics of personality with
evolutionary genetic principles (Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007; D. M. Buss, 2009b; Ganges-
tad, 2011; Keller et al., 2011; Miller, 2011). One of the main tenets underlying this school of
thought is that selective neutrality is an unlikely explanation of personality variation because
fitness differences between alleles of personality-related genes would have to be extraordinar-
ily small to not be able to overcome genetic drift given assumed ancestral human population
sizes (Keller et al., 2011). If Ne is the effective population size and s is the selection coefficient
of a mutation, random genetic drift will overcome selection when |2Nes| ≈ 1 (Ohta, 1992).
Keller and Miller (2006) calculated that if we assume a human effective population size of
Ne ≈ 10000 (Tenesa et al., 2007), then for drift to dominate the selection coefficient would
have to be so small that it would not result in a single difference in reproductive success over
a dozen generations or more.
This last point emphasizes the incorporation by the differential approach of specific quan-
titative principles from evolutionary quantitative and population genetics into evolutionary–
psychological theorizing. Using this framework, evolutionary differential psychology has
also studied the evolution of mental disorders (Keller & Miller, 2006; Crespi, Summers, &
Dorus, 2007; Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007; Keller, 2008; Nettle, 2008; Nichols, 2009).
Again, the main focus of the inquiry is to understand how variation in genes underlying
mental disorders persists in the face of the negative consequences for individual fitness.
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Comparative personality psychology
Another approach that grew primarily out of psychology is personality research on nonhu-
man animals (Gosling & Graybeal, 2007). This approach offers a comparative perspective on
the evolution of individual differences in behavior. The realization by scientists that nonhu-
man primates are individually recognizable and behaviorally distinct began in early labo-
ratory colonies and preceded the formal study of their personality (Crawford, 1938; Yerkes,
1939). Later contributions came from researchers such as Itani (1957) who considered in-
troversion and extraversion in Japanese macaques, and Goodall (1986a), who described the
personalities of the chimpanzees she studied at Gombe. Rather than being simple anthropo-
morphism, the assumption that primate personality should resemble our own has a strong
phylogenetic basis (Weiss & Adams, 2008). Without evidence to the contrary, we assume
that closely related species will be more similar to each other than more distantly related
species (Darwin, 1859, ch. 13). Thus, how individuals within a nonhuman primates differ
behaviorally should resemble how humans differ from each other.
One new goal of psychologically-informed animal personality research is to determine
a whole personality structure rather than study only single behavioral dimensions. Such
studies have been primarily carried out on nonhuman primates, including rhesus macaques
(Stevenson-Hinde & Zunz, 1978; Bolig, Price, O’Niell, & Suomi, 1992; Capitanio, 1999; Weiss,
Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011), langurs (Konečná et al., 2008), chimpanzees (King &
Figueredo, 1997; Weiss, King, & Hopkins, 2007; Weiss et al., 2009), orang-utans (Weiss, King,
& Perkins, 2006), and gorillas (Gold & Maple, 1994). While the personality structure of other
species such as fallow deer (Bergvall, Schäpers, Kjellander, & Weiss, 2011) have been studied
comprehensively the close phylogenetic relationship of nonhuman primates makes them par-
ticularly informative of human studies for genetics (Weiss, King, & Figueredo, 2000), health
(Capitanio, Mendoza, & Baroncelli, 1999) and longevity (Weiss, Adams, & King, 2011), and
mental well-being (King & Landau, 2003; Weiss et al., 2006; Brüne, Brüne-Cohrs, McGrew, &
Preuschoft, 2006; Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011).
Behavioral syndromes
The evolution of individual differences in behavior is also being studied in parallel under the
heading of behavioral syndromes (Sih, Bell, Johnson, & Ziemba, 2004; Sih, Bell, & Johnson,
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2004). Researchers in this field tend to be ethologists rather than psychologists and typically
study nonprimate animals. A behavioral syndrome is a correlated suite of behaviors that is
consistent across contexts (Sih, Bell, Johnson, & Ziemba, 2004) and is a more general concept
that encompasses personality (Stamps & Groothuis, 2010a; but see Uher, 2011a). While per-
sonality refers to the interindividual differences in behavior that are stable across situations,
behavioral syndromes can also exist at the population level. Because of its origins in biol-
ogy and its use of study organisms with shorter lifespans, research on behavioral syndromes
tends to take a more selectionist approach to studying the evolution of behavior. Rather than
reconstructing the ancestral environment, the selectionist approach attempts to empirically
determine the strength and shape of phenotypic selection using contemporary populations
(Lande & Arnold, 1983; Endler, 1986; Kingsolver et al., 2001; Réale & Dingemanse, 2011).
This approach is particularly relevant to the study of individual differences because it al-
lows hypotheses about the maintenance of variation in a behavioral trait to be directly tested
(Réale & Dingemanse, 2011, and Chap. 5).
In carrying out the studies in this work, I draw primarily on evolutionary differential psy-
chology and comparative personality psychology but combined with the selectionist common
in behavioral syndromes research. The primary reason is that these approaches take the adap-
tiveness of a particular individual difference as something to be tested rather than assumed a
priori. The second reason is that these subdisciplines rely more heavily on methodology from
population and evolutionary quantitative genetics to test evolutionarily informed hypotheses
against data.
1.2 Evolutionary psychology as framework
D. M. Buss (2009b, p 359) described evolutionary psychology as a “metatheoretical paradigm”
for understanding the orgins, function, and structure of psychological traits. While some
branches of evolutionary studies of human behavior (e.g., Evolutionary Psychology sensu
stricto) offer a specific theory of human nature (e.g., that adaptive evolution has fashioned
the mind out of specialized modules: Fiddick, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1995; Cosmides & Tooby,
1997), as an overarching metatheory evolutionary psychology offers a framework for ask-
ing questions, determining what evidence constitutes an answer, and organizing results. In
terms of practice, grounding psychological studies in evolutionary biology provides a set of
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tools and procedures for understanding the trait of interest. On a theoretical level, evolu-
tionary reasoning can help guide our thinking and answer questions in psychology that may
not at first strike one as directly related, such as under what conditions we should expect
personality traits to be stable.
To understand what constitutes suitable questions and acceptable answers in evolutionary
psychology, we can turn back to Darwin’s (1859) original formulation. Evolution by natural
selection is a result of
1. variation among individuals,
2. resemblance between parents and offspring,
3. differential survival and reproductive success among individuals, and
4. the variation among individuals being the cause of differences in fitness.
Selection is the result when these four assumptions hold: differences in reproductive success
(fitness) means that variation in the offspring will be a subset of that in the parents, which
over many generations leads to adaptation. Evolutionary biology has since also identified
the extent to which other processes influence the evolution of a trait (Mayr, 1983; Hartl &
Clark, 2007). Darwin did not have much to say about the cause of new variation (Darwin,
1859, p 325), but we now know that variation arises from mutations in the genome. Evolution
can also proceed from random differences in fitness, which produces genetic drift through
random sampling of alleles. The variation within a population can be effected by the immi-
gration and emigration of individuals. These processes (selection, mutation, migration, and
drift) have complex but precisely determined relationships with each other (Hartl & Clark,
2007). Mutation and migration tend to increase variation within a population while drift and
selection reduce it. Mutation and drift will increase between population differences while
migration between populations will make them more similar. Selection’s effect on between-
population variation depends on whether selection pressures are uniform. When they are,
selection will make populations more similar but differing selective environments will result
in divergence between populations. These processes also apply if the populations represent
different species, with the exception that there could be no migration. Evolutionary psychol-
ogy thus comes down to understanding how the interaction of these processes has shaped
and continues to shape our psychological character.
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The practice of evolutionary psychology, rather than being limited to specific phenotypes
that on the surface seem related (surely, surely!) to fitness and reproductive success (e.g.,
attractiveness, mating strategy), should instead be broadened to (and, at its core, be) the ap-
plication of an evolutionary analysis of selection, mutation, migration, and drift with regard
to any psychological trait. Because selection is the dominant process over long periods of
evolutionary time (Hartl & Clark, 2007), the evolution of personality first requires under-
standing what personality is an adaptation to. Other aspects of the growth and development
of an organism (Stamps, 2007; Stamps & Groothuis, 2010a) can also act as constraints (Hansen
& Houle, 2008; Merilä, 2009) on the selection of personality. Comparisons of personality in
closely related species can also be informative of how differences in social ecology might
shape personality. Looking at personality in nonhuman primates is likewise informative of
which aspects of personality are ancestral versus derived (Gosling, 2001; Gosling & Graybeal,
2007; Weiss & Adams, 2008). Such complementary avenues of exploration show how evolu-
tion can be a proper metatheory and framework for understanding the origins of individual
differences in behavior.
Personality from the comparative perspective
Early biographers such as Plutarch (46 AD-120 AD) ascribed personality characteristics to
their subjects but the study of human personality as a science has a shorter history. Research
in human personality originated from Galton’s (1892) study of human individual differences,
which also led to the development of modern psychometrics, statistics, behavior genetics,
and intelligence research. The insight that personality descriptors may be found in natural
languages and can be used to construct personality inventories came later (Allport & Odbert,
1936) and is still one of the most popular ways of studying human personality (McCrae &
Costa, 1995). These data are most commonly analyzed using factor or principal components
analysis (Gorsuch, 1983), which involve examining covariances among variables to determine
whether groups of variables cluster, i.e., are indicative of one or more latent underlying
constructs (factors or components). Current trait explanations of personality take personality
traits to be relatively stable, underlying behavioral dispositions that interact with external
influences to produce behavior (McCrae & Costa, 1995).
12 CHAPTER 1. PSYCHE
Personality structure
The study of human personality via ratings was and is still not without debate. The most
serious charge by critics was that personality traits did a poor job of predicting behavior
and were inconsistent across situations (Mischel, 1968). In fact, like early (and some contem-
porary) ethologists and behavioral ecologists (M. S. Dawkins, 2007), Mischel favored using
behavioral measures. This challenge was later answered by research showing that personal-
ity measures were related to behavior if behavior was aggregated over time (Epstein, 1979).
Personality researchers also showed that self-ratings and observer-ratings were correlated
(McCrae, 1994), that personality was mostly stable in adulthood (Costa & McCrae, 2002), and
that personality predicted a broad range of important outcomes (Ozer & Benet-Martínez,
2006; Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007; Deary, Weiss, & Batty, 2010). Other
debates, many of which are still ongoing, revolved around the number of personality di-
mensions needed to explain human personality differences (Costa & McCrae, 1992a, 1992b;
H. J. Eysenck, 1992, 1992; K. Lee, Ogunfowora, & Ashton, 2005; Block, 2010).
In much contemporary research, the Five Factor Model (FFM; Digman, 1990) has become
the dominant model of human personality and the basis for the human and nonhuman pri-
mate personality research pursued herein. Five Factor Theory contends that human person-
ality consists of five normally-distributed dimensions or domains: neuroticism, extraversion,
openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness (Costa & McCrae, 1992c). Indi-
viduals on the low end of neuroticism are emotionally stable, well-adjusted, and exhibit low
levels of negative affect; individuals on the high end tend to be emotionally unstable, have
problems with adjustment, and have high levels negative affect. Individuals high in extraver-
sion are more sociable, assertive, active, and experience more positive affect whereas those
low in extraversion do not seek out others’ company and are independent, less active, and
experience less positive affect. Individuals scoring higher in openness to experience tend to
be curious, to value new experiences and feelings, and to be unconventional whereas individ-
uals scoring on the low tend to be less curious, prefer the familiar to the novel, and are more
conventional in their outlooks and behavior. Individuals higher in agreeableness tend to be
helpful, trusting, and more inclined to cooperate rather than compete. On the other hand,
individuals lower in agreeableness tend to be less inclined to help others, suspicious and
cynical, and more competitive. Finally, individuals ranking high in conscientiousness will be
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reliable, organized, directed, and self-disciplined whereas those lower in conscientiousness
will often be less reliable, disorganized, directionless, and lacking in self-discipline.
The five personality dimensions appear to be a human universal because they replicate
across cultures (McCrae, 2002; McCrae, Terracciano, & 78 Members of the Personality Profiles
of Cultures Project, 2005; Schmitt et al., 2007) and show cross-cultural consistency in genetic
structure (Yamagata et al., 2006). However, some personality instruments do not show com-
plete measurement equivalence where items making up a personality scale have equivalent
relationships to each other across samples. One study (Nye, Roberts, Saucier, & Zhou, 2008)
found that the five personality dimensions showed configural equivalence (the items showed
similar structure across cultures) but not metric (similar loadings) or scalar equivalence (simi-
lar means and loadings). However, this study used a shorter personality instrument (Saucier,
1994) and simulation has shown that if scalar equivalence is a large problem for cross-culture
studies then consistent factor structures are unlikely to be recovered (McCrae, Terracciano, &
78 Members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005).
Debates about structure also extend to higher levels. There is some evidence that the five
human personality dimensions intercorrelate. One formulation of this creates two higher
order factors: Stability out of agreeableness, conscientiousness, and (reversed) neuroticism;
and Plasticity from extraversion and openness (Digman, 1997; DeYoung, 2006; DeYoung,
Peterson, & Higgins, 2002). It has also been proposed that a single higher-order personality
factor (the general factor of personality or GFP) underlies first- or second-order structures
of a variety of personality measures (Musek, 2007; Rushton & Irwing, 2008). Critics have
challenged the psychometric validity of the GFP and suggested that it is an artifact arising
from, for example, common method variance (Riemann & Kandler, 2010), self-presentation
bias (Bäckström, Björklund, & Larsson, 2009), or blends of orthogonal factors (Ashton, Lee,
Goldberg, & Vries, 2009). One way to potentially clarify these debates is to explore personality
structure in species that are closely related to humans.
Nonhuman primates
Personality dimensions similar to those identified in humans have been found in nonhuman
primates (Gosling, 2001; Freeman & Gosling, 2010). Most studies of nonhuman primates
focus on single dimensions or behavioral traits such as anxiety (e.g., Barros, Major, Huston,
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& Tomaz, 2008; Rogers, Shelton, Shelledy, Garcia, & Kalin, 2008), impulsivity (e.g., Fairbanks,
2001; James et al., 2007), and aggression (e.g., Anestis, 2006; Kitchen & Beehner, 2007). A
minority of studies, however, have attempted to determine a full personality structure for
nonhuman primates using methods imported from human personality research (Freeman &
Gosling, 2010). Freeman and Gosling (2010) identified 14 different personality dimensions or
traits that have appeared in these studies. In structural studies that use a large number of
personality items or behaviors to define a whole personality structure the most commonly
identified dimensions were Sociability, Fearfulness, and Playfulness.
Our closest living relatives, chimpanzees, who shared a common ancestor with us ap-
proximately six or seven million years ago (Steiper & Young, 2006; Chatterjee, Ho, Barnes,
& Groves, 2009), have five human-like personality factors in addition to dominance, a broad
factor that describes individual differences in social assertiveness (King & Figueredo, 1997).
This might be expected given that, like humans, chimpanzees live in complex social groups,
have a slow life-history strategy, and exhibit many human-like behaviors, characteristics, and
abilities. Among others, these include theory of mind, moral behaviors, empathy, cooper-
ative hunting, culture, and warfare (Goodall, 1990). Orang-utans, who shared a common
ancestor with humans and chimpanzees sometime around 15–18 million years ago (Steiper &
Young, 2006; Chatterjee et al., 2009), are less similar still in terms of personality (Weiss et al.,
2006). While they share with humans and chimpanzees separate extraversion, agreeableness,
and neuroticism dimensions they differ from both of these species in several respects. Like
chimpanzees but unlike humans, orang-utans can be characterized in terms of a dominance
dimension. However, while both humans and chimpanzees have independent openness and
conscientiousness dimensions, items describing curiosity and goal-related behaviors covary
as a single dimension in orang-utans called intellect (Weiss et al., 2006). This suggests that
there is at least some phylogenetic patterning in personality structure (Weiss & Adams, 2008;
Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011, and see Chap. 2).
Given their phylogenetic similarity to humans, we might expect nonhuman primate per-
sonality to incite similar debates about how to measure it. This turns out to be the case.
The charge of anthropomorphism, ascribing human-like traits such as personality to non-
human animals (Schilhab, 2002), has long plagued studies of nonhuman primate behavior
(Goodall, 1990; Uher, 2008a; Wynne, 2009). However, there are no empirical studies that
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show anthropomorphism being detrimental to the study of animal behavior. In fact, results
from numerous studies contradict what one would expect if anthropomorphism had a strong
influence on animal personality ratings (Gosling, 2001; Kwan, Gosling, & John, 2008; Uher
& Asendorpf, 2008; Weiss, Inoue-Murayama, King, Adams, & Matsuzawa, 2012). The most
striking evidence against nonhuman personality domains being anthropomorphic projections
is their external validity. For example, rater-assessed chimpanzee personality dimensions cor-
related with recorded behaviors (Pederson, King, & Landau, 2005; Uher & Asendorpf, 2008).
Personality in nonhuman primates also relates to immune functioning (Capitanio et al., 1999;
Maninger, Capitanio, Mendoza, & Mason, 2003) and brain structure (Blatchley & Hopkins,
2010). Rhesus macaques that were rated higher on sociability had an increased antibody re-
sponse compared to individuals low on sociability (Maninger et al., 2003). In chimpanzees,
individuals who scored higher on dominance and conscientiousness (Blatchley & Hopkins,
2010) had a greater percentage of gray matter in the cingulate cortex, a brain region that in
humans has been linked to emotional processing (Drevets et al., 1997; Coryell, Nopoulos,
Drevets, Wilson, & Andreasen, 2005).
However, even among researchers who accept the pertinence of nonhuman primate per-
sonality, there is still room for debate. Assessing primate personality differs in terms of the
what and the how of measurement (Itoh, 2002; Koski, 2011; Freeman, Gosling, & Schapiro,
2011). Behaviors can either be recorded through naturalistic observation or elicted via behav-
ioral tests. These behaviors can then be assessed either by trait ratings (by knowledgeable
raters on adjectival items) or by behavioral codings (objective measurement of specific behav-
iors). Each combination of methods has its advantages and disadvantages (Freeman et al.,
2011). While coding naturalistic behaviors is easier to implement and can be performed by
researchers who have less familiarity with individual animals, they are time consuming and
only capture behaviors in single contexts. Trait ratings can be collected on a large number
of individuals at once and smooth over temporal variability but rely on impressions of the
same individual animals that may differ between raters. Testing allows behaviors to be stud-
ied under controlled conditions but requires manipulating subjects and are more difficult to
conduct outside of laboratory and captive settings (Freeman et al., 2011).
Whether using trait adjectives or behavioral codings, personality scales can also be differ-
entiated based on the origins of the adjectives or behaviors they are composed from (Gosling,
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2001; Uher, 2008a; Freeman et al., 2011). Analogously with cross-culture studies of human
personalitiy, etic approaches are those where a personality scale developed for one species
is used to assess another. In contrast, emic approaches describe the development of a scale
based solely on observations of the species that is to be studied. While etic approaches, such
as studies of chimpanzees, orang-utans, and rhesus macaques using nearly-identical ques-
tionnaires (King & Figueredo, 1997; Weiss et al., 2006; Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald,
2011) have the advantage of yielding results that allow between-species comparisons to be
easily made, Uher (2008a, 2008b) criticized such studies as being “top-down” and possibly
imposing a personality structure of one species (namely humans) on to that of another (non-
human primate). As an alternative, Uher proposed a “bottom-up” approach of developing
behavioral repertoires based on what is known about the behavior and ecology of a species.
Among its advantages, this approach promises to be much more sensitive to the specific con-
texts in which behavior is expressed and, more importantly, to describe new, species-specific
personality dimensions that are missed when behavioral descriptors from one species are ap-
propriated wholesale to study another.3 Weiss and Adams (2008) defended their approach,
noting that while being “top-down” it has developed “bottom-up” over time, and questioned
the suitability of behavioral repertoire approaches for comparative personality research and
its disregard for phylogenetic relationships between organisms.
Guideposts of evolutionary theory
Debates about the structure and assessment of personality can be guided by evolutionary
theory. In measuring nonhuman primate personality, which side of the dispute a researcher
finds themselves on can seemingly be explained by whether or not the default assumption is
that species that are genetically closely related will also be behaviorally similar. The impor-
tance here is not what turns out to be the case (for separating homologous, phylogenetically
shared versus analogous, convergently evolved traits has to be determined empirically) but
simply what the default assumption is. And when it comes to cognitive and behavioral phe-
notypes, the most parsimonious explanation is for similarity (de Waal, 2009). Telling apart
homologous and analogous features requires comparing multiple species with known phy-
logenetic relationships.
3What these new, as-yet-unheralded personality dimensions might be is still forthcoming, as far as I can tell.
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Perhaps one problem is in thinking that evolution is omnipotent. Tooby and Cosmides
(1989, p 175) write, for example, that “[b]ecause selection acts on the consequences of be-
havior, the behavioral output of the psyche will be easily shaped by adaptive demands over
evolutionary time” (emphasis mine). While we might be vulnerable to the dazzling variety
of nature, the evidence points to strong constraints on evolutionary processes (Merilä, 2009).
Thus, in determining personality structure, it is prudent to assume phylogenetic similarity
until we find evidence to the contrary.
A phylogenetically-informed comparative approach is highly relevant to broad debates
about human personality. For example, if we assume that the human GFP is substantial rather
than artefactual, it is useful to determine whether it characterizes nonhuman primates as well.
A study of chimpanzee, orang-utan, and rhesus macaque personality found no evidence for a
single, higher-order factor (Weiss, Adams, & Johnson, 2011). While assessments of nonhuman
primate personality are probably less likely to suffer from desirability biases that have been
proposed as explanations for a human GFP (Bäckström et al., 2009), this result leaves open
the possibility that, if it exists, the covariance among personality dimensions leading to a
GFP is a uniquely human trait. This puts constraints on when a human GFP evolved, that is,
after the speciation of humans and chimpanzees. Some arguments for a GFP tie it in with life
history traits (Figueredo et al., 2011) and thus base its probable existence in evolution rather
than psychometrics. In this case, a consistent theory of the GFP would have to show why it
did not evolve in socially and behaviorally similar species.
If comparative studies of primate personality reveal personality dimensions to be adapta-
tions to specific social or ecological factors, evolutionary psychology may be able to answer
Fiske’s (1994) question “Why these five?” For example, if conscientiousness turns out to
unique to humans, chimpanzees, and another socially or ecologically but not phylogeneti-
cally similar species, then this will help explain under what circumstances conscientiousness
tends to evolve as an independent personality dimension. Comparative perspectives can also
be used to assess the utility of new personality models. As a test of validity, attempts to
reconceptualize personality structure, such as circular trait arrangements (e.g., Tiliopoulos,
Pallier, & Coxon, 2010), should offer the hypothesis that chimpanzee personality items will
show a more human-like structure than other species. Evolutionary theory can also guide de-
bates about situations versus traits (Epstein, 1979; Mischel & Shoda, 1995; D. M. Buss, 2009a)
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and trait stability over the lifespan (McCrae et al., 2000; Costa & McCrae, 2002; Roberts, Wal-
ton, & Viechtbauer, 2006; Costa & McCrae, 2006) by answering questions like Why do we find
behavioral variability at all? (Wolf, Sander van Doorn, Leimar, & Weissing, 2007) and How do
we expect personality to develop? (Stamps, 2007; Stamps & Groothuis, 2010a).
Personality as an adaptation to the social environment
Understanding the adaptiveness of a trait requires understanding to what aspect of the envi-
ronment the trait is adapted. Instead of thinking about environments of evolutionary adapt-
edness, Irons (1998) proposed the “adaptively relevant environment” (ARE) as a more prac-
tically workable concept. Irons thought that, in its formulation, the EEA concept overem-
phasized the amount of stasis in ancestral environments. The EEA concept also yields a
human nature that is adapted to past conditions and maladapted to the present (Symons,
1987). However, 10000 years of evolution would encompass hundreds of generations, which
has shown to be an ample amount of time for evolution to affect change (Irons, 1998), a point
born out by evidence of recent selection across the entire human genome (Hawks, Wang,
Cochran, Harpending, & Moyzis, 2007). Rather than seeing the environment as monolithic,
the ARE concept suggests that phenotypes will instead adapt to specific aspects of the envi-
ronment, which may in turn show different amounts of stability over evolutionary time. In
other words, not all aspects of the environment are relevant for every trait.
The independence of personality dimensions from each other thus suggests that each
might have a separate adaptively relevant environment. Human personality is primarily an
adaptation to the social environment (D. M. Buss, 1995; Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007;
D. M. Buss, 2011). In terms of fitness, personality relates primarily to reproductive success
rather than survival (B. Smith & Blumstein, 2008). Humans thus require adaptations to com-
pete for, attain, and retain mates and cooperate with allies and with kin in the acquisition of
material resources and status (D. M. Buss, 1995, 2009b). Primate social structure may have
solved problems such as foraging and predator defense (Strier, 2003) that creates individual
differences in behavior in other species (Sih, Bell, & Johnson, 2004; Réale, Reader, Sol, Mc-
Dougall, & Dingemanse, 2007). The relevant environment for a primate’s personality is the
behavior of conspecifics.
Personality dimensions have been explained as alternative, continuously distributed strat-
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egies for achieving reproductive success in variable environments (MacDonald, 1995, 1998;
Nettle, 2006). Synthesizing various conceptions of the five personality dimensions, Denissen
and Penke (2008a) found support for the Five-Factor Model of personality using question-
naire items related to motivational reactions that had been formulated to tap into evolution-
arily-relevant behaviors. They formulated extraversion as reward in social situations, agree-
ableness as a tendency to cooperate during resource conflicts, conscientiousness as the ability
to choose among multiple competing goals, neuroticism as sensitivity to punishment with
regard to social exclusion, and openness as reward sensitivity for cognitive activity. Thus,
the five factors relate to the basic social tasks that humans need to deal with: making social
affiliations, being included in the social group, cooperating with others, pursuing goals, and
transmitting culture. Because features of social organization are phylogenetically conserved
(Thierry, Iwaniuk, & Pellis, 2000; Shultz et al., 2011), it is likely that personality dimensions
in other primate species are also adaptations to similar social tasks.
Life-history
Life history refers to organisms’ patterns of growth, development, maturation, and repro-
duction (Stearns, 1992). These traits typically reflect a trade-off between reproductive and
somatic effort (Fisher, 1958; Stearns, 1992; Bulmer, 1994). Dall, Houston, and McNamara
(2004) reconceptualized personality as alternative behavioral strategies and Wolf et al. (2007)
placed personality in the context of life-history evolution. An individual’s optimal behavior
depends both on its own condition and behavioral history as well as on the behaviors of oth-
ers in the population. For example, an animal with poor body condition and, therefore, a low
potential for reproductive success, would do better to invest in foraging, even if this increases
predation risk. Likewise, the advantage of behaviors like aggression depends both on how
others are behaving and on population density. Normally, aggression leads an individual to
out-compete its neighbors for resources, but at low population densities with moderate com-
petition, high aggression might be counter-productive, leading to lower fitness (Dingemanse,
Both, Drent, & Tinbergen, 2004; Sih, Bell, Johnson, & Ziemba, 2004).
One model of the life-history trade-off between growth and reproduction is offered by
r/K theory (Pianka, 1970). Unstable environments lead to species that are r-selected, that
is, characterized by reproductive effort. These r-selected species (e.g., rabbits) have short
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generation times, a lower probability of offspring survival, and small body size. On the
other hand, stable environments lead to species that are characterized by somatic effort or
K-selected. Individuals within K-selected species (e.g., elephants) possess traits indicative of
somatic effort, namely larger body size, high parental investment, and greater longevity.
Rushton (1985) argued that r- and K-selection could also be applied at the individual
or group level, which he dubbed differential K theory. Life-histories tend to be coordi-
nated affairs and although humans are K-selected species (with slow development, long
lives, small family sizes, and high offspring investment), some humans are “more K than
others” (Rushton, 1985, p 441). Humans show a trade-off between the life-history traits of
fertility and longevity (Doblhammer & Oeppen, 2003; Korpelainen, 2003; Maklakov, 2008;
Penn & Smith, 2007; Pettay, Kruuk, Jokela, & Lummaa, 2005; Thomas, Teriokhin, Renaud, De
Meeus, & Guegan, 2007; Westendorp & Kirkwood, 1998) and this trade-off also links in with
cognitive traits such as intelligence (Rushton, 1985). To test whether human personality di-
mensions were also related to how K-selected individuals were, Figueredo et al. (2005, 2007)
conducted two analyses. In the first they showed that factor analysis of either the phenotypic
or genetic covariance among questionnaire items concerning altruism, reproductive effort,
parenting effort, and other aspects of life history revealed a single factor, which they named
K. Figueredo et al. also conducted a second factor analysis on the covariance among K and
the five human personality factors and found a single higher order factor. These findings
are certainly suggestive. However, these studies are limited in that they are cross-sectional
and do not rule out the possibility that correlations may have arisen because personality and
outcome measures were assessed using the same method, i.e., questionnaires (see Campbell
& Fiske, 1959).
While the r/K distinction has become shorthand for talking about coordinated, indi-
vidual differences in human life-history traits, the terminology is theoretically problematic.
The terms r-selected and K-selected, coined by MacArthur and Wilson (1967), come from
a simple model describing the evolution of a trade-off between fecundity and development









where N is the population size, r is the rate of population growth, and K is the population
carrying capacity. Together, these variables yield dN/dt, or the change in population size
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overtime. The equation shows that population size grows fastest when the population is
far from carrying capacity. While theoretical analysis led to the implications of r- versus K-
selected species, the model is really about how life-histories evolve under density-dependent
selection (Reznick, Bryant, & Bashey, 2002). If discussions of human life history and person-
ality are not about population growth rates and carrying capacity there is no reason to tie
the discussion to MacArthur’s (1962) and Pianka’s (1970) formulations. Giving equation 1.1 a
generous squeeze is unlikely to provide any insight about the evolution of human personality.
Thus, if differential K theory (Rushton, 1985) is about life-history trade-offs, particularly with
regards to stable and unstable environments (Brumbach, Figueredo, & Ellis, 2009; Figueredo
et al., 2011), it is more useful to talk about the specific trade-offs involved rather than to hang
onto an equation that has since been supplanted by other models (Stearns, 1992; Reznick et
al., 2002).
A more useful formulation that has a strong theoretical and empirical basis for the co-
adaption of personality with life-history traits is the trade-off between developmental growth
and mortality (Stamps, 2007; Biro & Stamps, 2008). As growth rate is known to vary consis-
tently between individuals in many different species, individuals that require an increased
food intake benefit from a personality style suitable for high foraging rates, e.g., by being
bold, aggressive, or explorative. The maintenance of variation in both productivity and be-
havioral traits require and reinforce each other. Behaviors on balance either provide energy
(e.g., foraging) or consume it (e.g., courtship) and thus consistencies individuals have in time
allocated to different behaviors have to be compatible with life-history productivity (Biro &
Stamps, 2010). For example, Careau, Bininda-Emonds, Thomas, Humphries, and Réale (2009)
found that in rats exploratory behavior was negatively related to basal metabolic rate. When
resources are scarce, it is beneficial to use energy at a low rate when resting but to explore
the environment to increase the chances of finding food resources. On the other hand, when
resources are plentiful, less time is needed exploring and having a high metabolic rate al-
lows the organism to “spend” its energy more quickly to reproduce faster. These behavioral
and physiological processes come together to form a consistent pace of life (Careau, Réale,
Humphries, & Thomas, 2010). It has also been theorized that such life-history trade-offs
are what generates personality (Wolf et al., 2007). The trade-off between current and future
reproduction can maintain variation in a population because no one strategy can dominate
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(Rueffler, Dooren, & Metz, 2004). Wolf et al. (2007) built simulations to show that when
such life-history differences exist, concomitant behavioral strategies emerge to support the
required level of risk taking necessary to support short-term or long-term fitness. Multi-
ple objectives ultimately result in fitness trade-offs, but in humans and other primates these
trade-offs may go beyond life-history traits.
Personality and fitness outcomes
While laymen would be inclined to see one end of each personality domain as a desirable
state of affairs, when considered within the framework of evolution, it is easy to imagine the
advantages and disadvantages presented by various levels of each of the five domains. Nettle
(2006, 2006) has outlined possible benefits and costs to the high end of each domain which
I briefly detail. While high neuroticism could offer benefits such as increased vigilance, it
might also carry costs including poorer interpersonal relationships which are critical in social
species. Extraversion, while possibly leading to benefits such as mating success, might also
cost in terms of harm from risk taking behaviors. High openness to experience, while being
related to benefits such as increased creativity, carries the possible costs of having unusual
or even harmful beliefs. High agreeableness may benefit individuals by making them more
valued partners in coalitions, though it may also lead to individuals being at greater risk
from social cheaters. Finally, while conscientiousness may benefit individuals by helping
them meet long-term goals, it can potentially cost them the benefits of more immediate
fitness gains.
There is evidence supporting the existence of these trade-offs (Nettle, 2011a). While neu-
roticism is linked to stress and mental illness (Fanous, Gardner, Prescott, Cancro, & Kendler,
2002; Kendler, Gatz, Gardner, & Pedersen, 2006), individuals high in neurotoicism are also
more likely to accurately detect threats in the environment (Haselton & Buss, 2000; Nesse,
2005). Individuals high in extraversion have more sexual partners but are also more prone
to accidents (Nettle, 2005). Openness is linked with increased creativity (McCrae, 1987) and
may therefore be attractive to potential mates (Miller, 2001). On the downside, people high
in openness to experience are more predisposed to a range of mental illnesses (Saulsman &
Page, 2004; Gurrera et al., 2005). Individuals who are high in agreeableness enjoy strong
inter-personal relationships (Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998) but may also overinvest in social
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relationships at their own personal expense (Nettle, 2011a).
Apart from these trade-offs, personality has also been linked to actual differences in repro-
ductive success (see Chap. 5). While the relationships differ between populations, individuals
higher in extraversion tend to have higher fitness (Alvergne, Jokela, & Lummaa, 2010; Jokela,
Alvergne, Pollet, & Lummaa, 2011). Jokela et al. (2011) also found that in the US individuals
low in openness and neuroticism had higher fitness while Alvergne et al. (2010) determined
that in a high-fertility population in Senegal women’s fitness was maximized at intermedi-
ate levels of neuroticism. Another study conducted in Australia found individuals whose
extraversion and neuroticism scores were at opposite extremes (one high, one low) had the
highest fitness (Eaves, Martin, Heath, Hewitt, & Neale, 1990). Personality, like many other
phenotypes under selection in contemporary populations (Stearns, Byars, Govindaraju, &
Ewbank, 2010), continues to adapt. Examining fitness correlates and trade-offs is important
to understanding how selection can maintain variation in personality and also shows that,
instead of having “stone age minds” in our “modern skulls” (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997), our
psychological makeup continues to adapt to our environment.
Maintenance of genetic variation
The assumption for selection to proceed that offspring resemble their parents means that the
study of heritability is highly relevant to understanding the evolution of a trait through a
population’s response to selection pressures. When a population experiences selection, how
does it respond? Say we go into the wild and find a troop of apes that differ in extraversion.
We measure their personalities and find, as it happens, that only individuals who are a value
of S below the population mean in extraversion are having children. For the moment, do
not worry about why this might be the case. How sociable should we expect these offspring
to be? Here, S is the selection differential (the amount that the parents producing offspring
deviate from the average trait value) and we want to know by how much the offspring will
also differ from the parental average (or the response to selection, R). We are asking to solve
R = x × S and the value of x should have something to do with the resemblance between
parents and their offspring.
Heritability captures this resemblance between relatives. Heritability (h2) is the proportion
of the difference in phenotypes attributable to differences in inherited genes and thus ranges
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from 0.0 to 1.0. Narrow sense heritability is the ratio between additive genetic variance (VA)
and the phenotypic variance (VP):
h2 = VA/VP. (1.2)
Because parents and offspring share genes but not whole genotypes, the genetic causes of
resemblance are from the independent (additive) effects of genes (Falconer & Mackay, 1996).
Alternatively, heritability can be defined as the resemblance between parents and offspring





In practice the second definition can be used as a way to estimate the first (and more complex
estimation techniques are available; see Lynch & Walsh, 1998) but the second definition is
more general because it does not lay claim to the cause of parent–offspring resemblance,
which may be down to genetic and (inherited) environmental factors (Rice, 2004).
In the age of molecular genetics, heritability may seem like an old fashioned or even
outdated concept (Visscher, Hill, & Wray, 2008). It may also appear quirky to put so much
focus on genes (without naming specific ones) rather than on genotypes. Would we not like to
know the specific genes that interact with each other and with the environment to determine
an individual’s personality? For answering evolutionary questions, however, heritability gets
at those differences in genes that are required for the change of phenotypes through both
random drift and natural selection and are therefore fundamental to the debate over how
phenotypic differences are maintained in populations. Heritability relates to selection (S)
and response (R) through the breeder’s equation (Falconer & Mackay, 1996)
R = h2S (1.4)
However, something else follows from the application of this equation. If some individuals
are outbreeding others, genes from individuals with higher fitness will have greater represen-
tation in the next generation. This leads to a reduction in the genetic variance by selection. A
basic question in evolutionary biology is, therefore, if selection tends to reduce genetic vari-
ance, why do so many traits have such high levels of genetic variance? This turns out to be a
question that is difficult to resolve precisely because it has so many possible solutions (Barton
& Turelli, 1989; Barton & Keightley, 2002). To evaluate the alternatives, it is first necessary to
take stock of what is known about the genetic structure of personality.
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Quantitative genetics
Across animal species, the heritability of behavioral traits tends to be lower than that of
morphological traits (Mousseau & Roff, 1987; Stirling, Réale, & Roff, 2002). A review of
the literature suggested that approximately 50% of the variance of all five human domains
was heritable with little to no variance being accounted for by the shared family environ-
ment (Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001). While there is some variation in heritability estimates
of personality, ranging from about .4 to .8 depending on the population and whether per-
sonality is assessed with self- or peer-reports (Riemann, Angleitner, & Strelau, 1997) and
whether nonadditive genetic effects are included (Eaves, Last, Young, & Martin, 1978; Keller,
Coventry, Heath, & Martin, 2005). Additive genetic effects are those that contribute to the
phenotype independent of their genetic background. Nonadditive genetic effects arise from
interactions either between the two alleles at the same locus (dominance genetic variance) or
between genes at different loci (epistatic genetic variance). There is evidence that a substan-
tial proportion of the genetic variance in personality traits is caused by nonadditive genetic
effects (Eaves, Heath, Neale, Hewitt, & Martin, 1998; Keller et al., 2005; Rettew, Rebollo-Mesa,
Hudziak, Willemsen, & Boomsma, 2008; Rushton, Bons, & Hur, 2008).
Additive and nonadditive genetic variance estimates are of similar magnitude in other
animal species (van Oers, Jong, Noordwijk, Kempenaers, & Drent, 2005). There have also
been several recent studies on the genetics of personality in nonhuman primates. Weiss et
al. (2000) estimated the heritability of the six factors of chimpanzee personality. Of these
factors, only dominance was found to be significantly heritable (h2 = .63). The estimate
for conscientiousness was .21; while not detectably greater than .00, this suggests low to
moderate heritability. The remaining traits showed little or no heritability. Importantly,
this study of zoo-housed chimpanzees also established that very little of the differences in
personality could be accounted for by differences among zoos. A later study using a different
estimation technique confirmed the high heritability of dominance (h2 = .66) and established
the high genetic correlation with subjective well being (rA = 1.00, Weiss, King, & Enns, 2002).
However, it is not yet known to what extent nonhuman primate personality can be explained
by nonadditive genetic variance.
The heritability of facets of personality and other related traits has also been investigated
in nonhuman primates. Williamson et al. (2003) estimated the heritability of fearfulness and
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anxiety in rhesus macaques. Several aspects of their responses, such as a tendency to explore
novel environments (latency to leave the protection of their mother in a Free Play Test) or to
approach novel objects (in this case, a kiwi fruit) had estimated heritabilities of 1.0. These
high estimates of heritability in these types of traits were confirmed in a later study with a
similar measure of vigilance with h2 = .98 (Rogers et al., 2008). Latency to approach strangers
(measured as a Social Impulsivity Index) is also heritable in vervets, but only moderately so
(h2 = .34 ± .11; Fairbanks et al., 2004). There was no effect from the maternal environment
which, given how it was estimated, includes nonadditive genetic variance from dominance
and epistatic effects as well as the influence of maternal care and the mother’s genotype.
The Social Impulsivity Index consisted of two subscales measuring approach–avoidance and
aggressiveness that were themselves highly genetically correlated (rA = .78± .12), suggesting
that both facets are influenced by a similar set of genes. The lack of a maternal effect in
vervet impulsivity is also consistent with the small influence of shared environment, such
as maternal care experienced by siblings, on personality in humans (Bouchard, 1994; Rowe,
1994).
Molecular genetics
Molecular genetic research in humans and nonhuman primates supports the findings of
quantitative geneticists that personality traits have a genetic basis. Various candidate genes
related to neuronal and hormone functions have been linked to behavior (Inoue-Murayama,
2009). Many of these genes are involved in signal transduction between neurons; and muta-
tions to these genes effect either the function or expression proteins involved in the release,
reception, or metabolization of neurotransmitters like dopamine and serotonin. Associations
include genes encoding the serotonin transporter with anxiety (Lesch et al., 1996), dopamine
receptors with impulsivity (Noble et al., 1998) and novelty seeking (Benjamin et al., 1996), and
the androgen receptor with psychoticism (Turakulov, Jorm, Jacomb, Tan, & Easteal, 2004). Al-
though these associations do not always replicate, meta-analyses have confirmed the associa-
tion of serotonin transporter with anxiety-related traits (Sen, Burmeister, & Ghosh, 2004) and
the dopamine receptor with novelty seeking (Munafò, Yalcin, Willis-Owen, & Flint, 2008). In
some cases, a failure to replicate may be the result of insufficient power, as the small effect
size of a single gene requires large sample sizes to detect (Sen et al., 2004). The evolutionary
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functional significance of these variants is unclear but homologous genes have also been stud-
ied in nonhuman primates (Lesch et al., 1997; Inoue-Murayama et al., 2000; Seaman, Chang,
Deinard, Quiñones, & Kidd, 2000) and these genes may have a similar physiological role.
Between and within species variants in these genes have been identified in promoter, exon,
and untranslated regions and include single nucleiotide polymorphisms, indels, and tandem
repeats (Inoue-Murayama, 2009). Like humans (Lesch et al., 1996), several macaque species
(Lesch et al., 1997; Wendland et al., 2006; Chakraborty et al., 2010; de Ruiter, Adams, & Inoue-
Murayama, submitted) have tandem repeat variants in the promoter region of the serotonin
transporter gene (5-HTT), referred to as the serotonin transporter polymorphic linked region
(5-HTTLPR), which influences the expression level of the serotonin transporter protein. In
rhesus macaques the short allele predisposes individuals to alcohol consumption (Barr et al.,
2003), has a neuroendocrine response to stress moderated by rearing condition (Barr et al.,
2004), and correlates with higher scores for behavioral measures of social anxiety and threat
response (Champoux et al., 2002; Watson, Ghodasra, & Platt, 2009). In vervet monkeys, a
repeat polymorphism in the dopamine D4 receptor (DRD4) was linked to differences in nov-
elty seeking (Bailey, Breidenthal, Jorgensen, McCracken, & Fairbanks, 2007). This locus is also
variable in several species of macaques (Wendland et al., 2006; de Ruiter et al., submitted).
In chimpanzees, trytophan hydroxylase 2 (TPH2), a gene controlling serotonin production, is
associated with neuroticism (Hong et al., 2011).
In addition to the direct effects of specific genes, studies have also uncovered gene ×
environment interactions. Experimental studies of genotyped rhesus macaques suggests that
the effects of genetic polymorphisms on behavioral indicators of personality differs as a func-
tion of early environmental stressors (Champoux et al., 2002; Newman et al., 2005; Kraemer,
Moore, Newman, Barr, & Schneider, 2008). Studies of humans have found similar interactions
between the effect of a gene on behaviors related to stress reactivity and the environment in
which an individual develops (Caspi & Moffitt, 2006; Caspi, Hariri, Holmes, Uher, & Mof-
fitt, 2010; Belsky & Beaver, 2011) though several other studies failed to support this finding
(Gillespie, Whitfield, Williams, Heath, & Martin, 2005; Surtees et al., 2006; Risch et al., 2009).
One possible explanation for this inconsistency is that multiple genes contribute to the behav-
ioral phenotype under study so effects are easily masked by the joint effects of other genes
(Belsky & Beaver, 2011).
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A recent meta-analysis for genome-wide association studies of personality turned up few
consistent associations (Moor et al., 2012). Openness to experience was related to a SNP near
the RASA1 gene, which is involved in cell signalling and differentiation, and conscientious-
ness was associated with a SNP in the intron of KATANAL2, a gene involved in neuronal
migration and pruning. This meta-analysis had 80% power to detect effects explaining as
little as .23% of the variance. Thus, genes affecting personality must have very small effect
sizee, be at very low frequency, not be captured by current SNP platforms, or have effects are
primarily epistatic. While the last possibility is supported by the large proportions of nonad-
ditive genetic variance for personality, these alternative explanations for GWAS findings are
not mutually exclusive.
Evolutionary processes maintaining variation
The maintenance of heritable variation in traits is a long standing problem in biology (Barton
& Turelli, 1989; Barton & Keightley, 2002). It is a puzzle because under directional or sta-
bilizing selection, the eventual heritable variance of in any given trait should be negligible
(Barton & Turelli, 1989; Falconer & Mackay, 1996). Processes that maintain additive genetic
variation in a trait may come through direct action on the trait or through indirect action on a
genetically correlated trait (Robertson, 1967). All genetic differences ultimately arise through
mutation, so it is possible for genetic variance to be maintained by a balance between its in-
troduction by mutation and its removal by selection (Lande, 1979) or by random drift (Barton
& Turelli, 1989). In biology, most of the debate involves theoretical considerations about the
distribution of mutation effect sizes, the number of loci influencing the trait, and the extent
of pleiotropy (T. Johnson & Barton, 2005). Pleiotropy, where a gene has an effect on multiple
traits, is effective at maintaining polygenic variation when the population is near the fitness
optimum because each trait may have different, possibly opposing, effects on fitness (Turelli,
1985; Turelli & Barton, 2004). Selection on a trait may also be balanced by mutation when the
trait is influenced by a large number of genes (Turelli, 1984; Barton & Keightley, 2002).
Evolutionary psychologists have in turn given many explanations for the persistence of
variation in human personality. These explanations have been grouped into three categories:
adaptive, non-adaptive, and maladaptive differences (D. M. Buss & Greiling, 1999). In evo-
lutionary genetic terms, the categories can be rephrased. When speaking of adaptive or
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maladaptive differences, one is interested in traits that are causally related to fitness, without
regard for ‘where’ the variation is coming from (genes or the environment). Non-adaptive
sources of difference include neutral variation that, while it may correlate with fitness, does
not cause fitness differences; and so-called “by-products of adaptive variation” (D. M. Buss
& Greiling, 1999, p 209) that come about through the correlated selection of some other trait.
When Tooby and Cosmides (1990a) placed personality squarely within a modern evolu-
tionary framework, they argued that individual variation was the result of neutral evolution.
The neutral theory states that most mutations have neither beneficial nor deleterious fitness
consequences (Kimura, 1983, 1986) leading to a balance between the input of new variation
by mutation and its removal by drift (Lynch & Hill, 1986). Most of the variation in the
traits that psychologists consider as personality would evolve by drift if behavioral tenden-
cies that are stable across situations are not adaptive; this is because such general tendencies
would not be solving any particular problem and thus be causally unconnected with fitness,
that is, evolving neutrally. While the effective population size in humans is large enough
that drift is inadequate at reducing genetic variance in neutral traits, all the evidence con-
necting personality to differences in health, longevity, and reproductive success contradicts
the required complete selective neutrality (Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007). Furthermore,
even extremely small selection differences can have an effect over a few hundred generations
(Keller & Miller, 2006; Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007; Miller, 2011). MacDonald (1995,
1998) and Nettle (2006) argued instead that variation is maintained by balancing selection for
personality differences as alternative behavioral strategies. The fitness tradeoffs (see above)
could maintain variation because no single strategy is optimal.
Penke, Denissen, and Miller (2007) argued for balancing selection as the most likely ex-
planation for the maintenance of genetic variation in personality. Balancing selection in-
cludes processes like heterogeneity in selection pressures across space and time (Hedrick,
Ginevan, & Ewing, 1976), frequency-dependent selection where the fitness of an allele (or
behavioral strategy) depends on its frequency in the population (Maynard Smith, 1982), and
agonistic plieotropy where a gene has opposing effects on two or more components of fit-
ness (Hedrick, 1999). Models show that these processes are capable of maintaining genetic
variability (Barton & Keightley, 2002). Given theory and evidence about fitness trade-offs
for personality (MacDonald, 1998; Nettle, 2006), Penke, Denissen, and Miller (2007) found
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balancing selection to be a plausible explanation and made the prediction that personality
genes would be found at intermediate frequencies and have moderate effects. This was a
reasonable prediction at the time given the number of studies with candidate genes for be-
havior that were found at intermediate frequencies (Lesch et al., 1996; Chang, Kidd, & Kidd,
1996; Spinelli et al., 2007). However, it is inconsistent with evidence from GWAS studies
indicating that personality-related genes will have to have very small effects, because alleles
with moderate or large effects would have been detected under the power of current studies
(Gangestad, 2011; Miller, 2011; Penke, 2011).
Demographic processes may also be involved with creating variability in the environment
to which personality is adapted. Del Giudice (2012) theorized that, given their relationship to
life-history variables and mating strategies, personality dimensions should show differential
fitness effects depending on the sex ratio of the population. The sex ratio determines much
about the competition for mates, because there is more competition for the rarer sex (Weir,
Grant, & Hutchings, 2011). Theory and evidence suggest that, when males are the more
frequent sex, there will be selection for high agreeableness and conscientiousness. The op-
posite selection pressure should prevail when females are more frequent. Given reasonable
estimates for the average size of human demes, or the population of potential reproductive
partners, of about 500 (Birdsell, 1973; Eller, Hawks, & Relethford, 2009), the sex ratio will
fluctuate just by chance (Del Giudice, 2012). This sets up a potentially strong and repeated
source of temporal heterogeneity in selection for personality.
Several alternative processes can be joined together that could explain genetic variance
of personality and we should therefore be wary of thinking that a single process will suffice
(Figueredo et al., 2011). Personality might be under both directional and stabilizing selection
which would create a difference between maximum and mean fitness (Gangestad, 2011).
This could presumably be combined with frequency-dependent selection, particularly if this
applies to a large number of genes at once (Penke, 2011). Most theoretical models focus on
variation in single genes, but variation can also be maintained depending on the structure
of the phenotype. For example, phenotypes that are the product of partially independent
processes (for example, different populations of neurons influencing the same behavior) can
be maintained more easily by selection (Reeve & Dugatkin, 1998). This is plausible given
that personality domains are composed of lower order facets and have each been linked to
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multiple brain regions (DeYoung et al., 2010). There is also some evidence that copy-number
variants (CNV), large segmental duplications in the genome, relate to several psychatatric
disorders (reviewed in Gangestad, 2011) and thus may influence personality as well. CNVs
have much greater mutation rates than nucleotide point mutations (Sebat et al., 2007) which
means that mutation on a trait influenced by CNVs could balance against stronger selection
pressures (Gangestad, 2011). However, while all of this is plausible, we currently lack data
to rigorously test these hypotheses (Miller, 2011). For psychological phenotypes where a
large number of putative genes have been identified, such as schizophrenia, it is possible to
conduct more detailed analyses like look for molecular signatures of selection (Crespi et al.,
2007).
Species ecology and genetic variants
Wendland et al. (2006) proposed that the presence of polymorphisms in 5-HTT and the
monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) gene, which produces an enzyme that breaks down sero-
tonin, are related to interspecific differences in aggression in macaques. Macaque species
can be classified in terms of the dominance and reconciliation styles (Thierry, 2000). Among
seven macaque species, those with intolerant and nepotistic societies had multiple alleles
at the loci linked to 5-HTT and MAOA while more tolerant species were monomorphic at
these regions. Contrary to this, (Chakraborty et al., 2010) found long/short 5-HTT variants
in samples from wild populations of bonnet and Arunachal macaques, species which have a
relaxed dominance style. Like rhesus macaques, bonnet macaques are successful in a wide
range of habitats, leading Chakraborty et al. (2010) to propose that within-species behavioral
flexibility underpinned by genetic variation may be a factor contributing to ecological suc-
cess. Spinelli et al. (2007) proposed that the relatively high frequencies for the long and short
5-HTTLPR alleles have been maintained by balancing selection. In long-tailed macaques,
another ecologically successful species with an intermediate dominance style, de Ruiter et
al. (submitted) found evidence for directional selection on a short version of the serotonin
transporter promoter. Selection occured in isolated island populations with reduced preda-
tion and smaller groups size. Variation in the expression of the serotonin transporter may
thus arise under particular ecological conditions. Even once we identify genes that influence
personality, it will still be a challange to work out their exact evolutionary origins.
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Personality development
While we are starting, very slowly, to pick apart the genetics of personality, we are still left
with about half of the phenotypic variance coming from environmental effects (Bouchard &
Loehlin, 2001). From an evolutionary perspective, it is pertinent to ask why personality devel-
ops the way it does (Draper & Belsky, 1990; Stamps & Groothuis, 2010b, 2010a). Across ani-
mal species, an individual’s experiences during growth can have strong effects on its behavior
as an adult (Stamps & Groothuis, 2010a). For example, fish exposed to predators during de-
velopment change their levels of exploration and boldness (Dingemanse et al., 2009). For
humans, much of the research focus is on the developmental effects of stress (Belsky, 1997;
Ellis, Boyce, Belsky, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Ijzendoorn, 2011). For optimizing fitness, it is
beneficial to be sensitive to environmental cues during development because of uncertainty
in the exact environment the individual will encounter (Bulmer, 1994; West-Eberhard, 2003).
This will lead to coordinated responses among life-history traits, physiology, and behavior
(Réale et al., 2010). Developmental reaction norms define the value of a phenotype that will
develop under various environmental conditions (Pigliucci, 2001). While studies showing
how behavioral phenotypes develop differently under different environments have estab-
lished the presence of these reaction norms, studies showing interactions between genes and
environment suggest that reaction norms may differ between individuals (Suomi, 2006). One
theoretical question to address however, is why individuals should differ in their reaction
norms.
While personality undergoes change through out the lifespan (McCrae et al., 2000), the
personality of adults is relatively stable compared with the amount of change experienced
during childhood and adolesence (Soto, John, Gosling, & Potter, 2011). Chimpanzees show
similar age related changes as humans, namely that over the lifespan extraversion and open-
ness decrease while agreeableness and conscientiousness increase (King, Weiss, & Sisco,
2008). This suggests that great apes and perhaps other primates share common maturational
processes for the development of personality.
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Happiness is ancestral
Happiness was once perceived as the result of virtuous action (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
Book X). However, we now know happiness, also known as subjective well-being (SWB) is
related to personality and that people who are lower in neuroticism and higher in extraver-
sion and agreeableness are generally happier (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998; Steel, Schmidt, &
Shultz, 2008). SWB is furthermore underpinned by genetic variation (Nes, Røysamb, Tambs,
Harris, & Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2006; Bartels & Boomsma, 2009; Caprara et al., 2009; Nes,
Czajkowski, & Tambs, 2010) that is shared with the Five-Factor Model domains of neuroti-
cism (in the form of Emotional Stability), extraversion, and conscientiousness (Weiss, Bates,
& Luciano, 2008) This is not surprising in light of the fact that high neuroticism is also genet-
ically co-morbid with depression (Fanous et al., 2002; Kendler et al., 2006) and neuroticism,
agreeableness, conscientiousness, and extraversion explain all of the genetic variation in bor-
derline personality disorder (Kendler et al., 2008; Distel et al., 2009). In addition to being a
key part of mental health (Keyes, 2005) and protecting against psychopathology (Diener &
Seligman, 2002; Furnham & Cheng, 1999), SWB is also related to longevity (Danner, Snow-
don, & Friesen, 2001) and positive life events such as health and relationship status (Diener,
Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999; Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005). SWB is therefore part of a
healthy physical and psychological life.
While we are starting to understand the genetic and environmental etiology of the nexus
of SWB and personality, the ultimate origins of happiness, and why it is genetically correlated
with personality and affective disorders rather than just an indicator of present fortunes, re-
main speculative. Evolutionary accounts of happiness (D. M. Buss, 2000), and psychopathol-
ogy (Keller & Miller, 2006) are beginning to address these questions of ultimate origins. The
mechanisms that produce distress, happiness, and emotions like jealousy or anger are adap-
tations that allow individuals to solve particular social problems (D. M. Buss, 2000; Nesse,
2004; Andrews & Thomson, 2009). A complementary, non-adaptive factor in the prevalence
of anxiety and depression is that the modern environment differs dramatically from that to
which our capacities for positive and negative affect are optimally adapted (D. M. Buss, 2000;
Nesse, 2004). This does not explain, however, why individuals differ in their “set points” of
well being (Diener et al., 1999). Nesse (2004) suggested that it is not the baseline level but only
the individual’s capacity to change their affective state as situations demand that is adaptive,
34 CHAPTER 1. PSYCHE
but this is inconsistent with the general robustness of baseline happiness to changes in life
circumstances (Lykken & Tellegen, 1996) and does not resolve why human happiness shares
a common genetic cause with personality (Weiss et al., 2008). An alternative explanation is
that evolution has selected for adaptive individual differences in personality and affect. Like
personality, selection may maintain variation in SWB because there is no single optimal trait
value and the relationship between happiness and fitness differs across environments and
contexts (Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007). In these scenarios, the stable aspects of positive
and negative affect and their correlation with personality would be part of the alternative
behavioral strategies that humans follow.
Nonhuman primates can also be characterized in terms of individual differences in pos-
itive and negative affect (King & Landau, 2003) and psychopathology (Lilienfeld, Gershon,
Duke, Marino, & de Waal, 1999; Brüne et al., 2006). Chimpanzees (King & Landau, 2003;
Weiss et al., 2009), orang-utans (Weiss et al., 2006), and rhesus macaques (Weiss, Adams,
Widdig, & Gerald, 2011) can all be reliably assessed in terms of SWB. In all three species,
SWB correlates with personality. Chimpanzees who are higher in dominance, extraversion,
and conscientiousness are also rated as being happier (King & Landau, 2003). High SWB in
orang-utans is related to lower neuroticism and higher extraversion and agreeableness (Weiss
et al., 2006). Orang-utans who are happier also, like humans, live longer (Weiss, Adams, &
King, 2011). For rhesus macaques, higher confidence and friendliness and lower anxiety
were both concurrently and prospectively related to SWB (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald,
2011). Chimpanzee SWB also shares a genetic cause with the dominance domain, leading the
researchers to propose an underlying ‘covitality’ factor to explain the common basis (Weiss
et al., 2002). The genetic basis of chimpanzee happiness in personality led researchers to
look for, and find, the same relationship in humans (Weiss et al., 2008). This shows the im-
portance of evolutionarily-informed, cross-species comparisons for guiding reserach about
human individual differences.
1.3 Origins and destinations
Differential psychologists have rightly identified evolutionary theory as a unifying framework
for explaining the origins and persistence of individual differences in a wide array of human
psychological characteristics. Workers are integrating evidence from behavior genetics, life-
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Figure 1.1: Schematic of temporal scales over which psychological diversity is generated:
mean level differences between generations from selection and drift; divergence among lin-
eages of related individuals, population differentiation from adaptation, drift, and migration;
and speciation.
history theory, genomics, and neuroscience to show how variation is likely adaptive (Hawley
& Buss, 2011). The basis of evolutionary psychology in evolutionary theory can do more
than prompt questions. It also provides a readymade and comprehensive set of tools for
testing our hypothesis against our data. Here I embrace a range of methods and results
from quantitative and population genetics, developmental evolution, and phylogenetically-
grounded comparative psychology to explore how personality evolves on a range of time
scales.
Psychological diversity is generated over a range of different time scales (Figure 1.1). The
evolutionary processes of mutation, selection, drift, and migration have differing effects at
each temporal level. At the broadest level, socioecological differences lead to differences in
behavioral adaptations among species. Primate cladogenesis and speciation covers millions
to tens of millions of years of evolution (Fleagle, 1999). Behavior has been found to provide
as strong a phylogenetic signal as morphological traits (Queiroz, 1993) and social structure
tends to be conserved between species (Thierry et al., 2000; Shultz et al., 2011).
For this bout of evolutionary psychology, I selected anthropoids as the group of organ-
isms to study (Fig. 1.2). The Infraorder Anthropoidea includes monkeys, apes, and humans.
I selected this clade because it has the best coverage using a comprehensive personality in-
strument and because it includes two groups (humans and macaque monkeys) that are well
understood from a behavioral perspective. I sought to better integrate comparative, adapta-
tionist, and selectionist approaches to evolutionary psychology. I studied the phylogenetic
patterns of personality in four species of macaques and the genetic basis of personality and
subjective well-being in orang-utans. In humans, I studied the plasticity of personality to life

















Figure 1.2: Phylogeny of species considered in the studies. Node labels give time to common
ancestor in millions of years. Tree and branch lengths from consensus tree inferred using
10kTrees http://10ktrees.fas.harvard.edu/ (C. Arnold et al., 2010).
history and how personality is continuing to adapt to the environment. Finally, I undertook
a theoretical analysis to explore what aspects of personality development could maintain
genetic variation.
Comparative personality structure
Species that are more closely related to each other or who are have similar socioecologies
should therefore be more similar in personality structure (Weiss & Adams, 2008). Because of
the long time scales involved, differentiation will occur primarily through the processes of
mutation and selection. Mutation provides the raw input on top of which selection shapes
adaptive characters. In chapter 2 I will explore psychological variation at the species level via
the phylogenetic patterning of personality in macaques and other primates. Macaques are a
genus of Old World monkeys that shared a common ancestor with humans approximately
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27 million years ago (Andrews, 1986). A study of rhesus macaques found that their person-
ality could be described using six personality dimensions (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald,
2011). Rhesus macaques differed from chimpanzees (King & Figueredo, 1997) and orang-
utans (Weiss et al., 2006) that had been measured using the same personality instrument.
In contrast to these two ape species that, like humans, had independent extraversion and
agreeableness dimensions, rhesus macaques had a single friendliness dimension that cap-
tured aspects of behavior related to social affiliation and cooperativeness. Rhesus macaques
also differed from humans, chimpanzees, and orang-utans by having two dimensions related
to neuroticism-like aspects of behavior. Weiss, Adams, Widdig, and Gerald (2011) proposed
that primate personality dimensions could be defined in terms of the blending or splitting
of lower level personality facets. I sought to test the feasibility of this idea by studying how
rhesus macaque personality generalized to other macaque species. Along with several col-
laborators, I collected data on rater impressions of personality for three additional macaque
species to determine which of these aspects of personality structure distinguished macaques
from apes. Macaques species share a common social structure based around female phy-
lopatry, where females stay in their natal troop and males migrate between troops, where the
social organization centers around lineages of related females. I therefore predicted that the
personality domain friendliness, related to social affiliation, might generalize to the other
species of macaques. Macaque species do however differ in the gradient of their dominance
hierarchy, ranging from species that are extremely nepotistic to those that are more egalitar-
ian (Thierry, 2000). In the nepotistic species, the outcomes of agonistic interactions between
two individuals almost always favor one individual over the other. In egalitarian societies,
reversals between winners and losers are common. I therefore predicted that the species
might differ in the composition of their dominance and confidence dimensions. Specifically,
species with rigid hierarchies might show more differentiation in these personality domains
because of the need to persue alternative ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ strategies.
Because of heterogeneity in the linguistic and cultural backgrounds of the raters, I formal-
ized an analysis technique that was flexible with regards to the ‘meaning’ of any one particu-
lar item for a particular personality dimension. Across studies of nonhuman primates, cate-
gories of personality dimensions often have similar and overlapping item loadings (Freeman
& Gosling, 2010). For example, dimensions variously called dominance and fearfulness often
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resemble each other in terms of item content depending on the species studied. It can thus
be helpful to conceptualize items as having a continuous rather than a binary membership in
a personality dimension (King & Weiss, 2011). Formalizing these relationships allowed me
to determine the core set of items that consistently described personality dimensions across
species.
Adaptive plasticity to life-history conditions
Within species, populations can also come to differ from one another. If selection pressures
are consistent across populations, then selection will tend to make populations more alike
one another. However, if selection differs across environments, this will cause populations
to diverge. Random genetic drift and mutation will also cause populations to diverge from
each other as well whereas migration between populations will help maintain homogene-
ity. On shorter time scales, environmental differences might also cause populations to differ
from one another in phenotypes that are adaptively plastic to local conditions. Mean level
personality traits differ between human populations (McCrae, Terracciano, & 78 Members of
the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005) but the causes of this variation have not
yet been determined (Allik & McCrae, 2004). Because personality relates to differences in
life-history traits, it is possible that personality will show some adaptive tuning to the life-
history conditions experienced during development. In this case, the organism is attempting
to achieve a more optimal personality given the life-history conditions that it will experience
as an adult. Humans show a trade-off between longevity and fertility (Westendorp & Kirk-
wood, 1998). It is therefore possible that personality levels will differ in response to the local
longevity–fertility conditions experienced during ontogeny. Furthermore, because national
populations differ in their average life-history conditions (Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998), some of
the cross-cultural differences in average personality differences could be explained by shifts
in population-level life-history. Average personality in a country relates to socioeconomic
factors (McCrae, Terracciano, & 79 Members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project,
2005) which are in turn strongly related to fertility and mortality trends (Chesnais, 1992).
I therefore estimated whether within-country shifts in life-history across a generation were
related to parallel changes in personality while controlling for socioeconomic factors and un-
known (cultural/ecological/genetic) sources of resemblance between neighboring countries
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(Chap. 3).
Genetic structure of orang-utan personality and subjective well-being
Within populations, diversity also exists between lineages of related individuals. Put in other
words, family members tend to resemble each other. Family resemblance is the basis of heri-
tability estimates and understanding the genetic and environmental influences on individu-
als differences. Personality has been found to be heritable in humans (Bouchard & Loehlin,
2001) and chimpanzees (Weiss et al., 2000), so I aimed to estimate whether similar amounts
of genetic variation was present in orang-utans. Second, extended-family studies of human
personality have uncovered a large proportion of nonadditive genetic variance (Keller et al.,
2005). It has been argued that this is consistent with ‘recent’ selection on human personality
(Rushton et al., 2008). After reviewing evidence that higher proportions of nonadditive than
additive genetic variance is in fact consistent with long-term selection on a trait, I sought
to test whether the presence of nonadditive genetic variance was a unique aspect of the ge-
netic structure of human personality or whether it might be present in other primates. In
chapter 4, I estimate the heritability of and genetic and environmental correlations among
personality and SWB dimensions in a sample of captive orang-utans linked by an extended
pedigree. I also devised a quantitative genetic model that would, as far as possible, remove
rater effects on personality and that handled heterogeneity in the varying number of items
in the personality questionnaires that the sample was assessed with.
Contemporary selection on personality
The smallest, most basic increment of evolutionary change in a quantitative trait is the change
in its mean between generations from selection. While there have been several studies of the
fitness correlates of human personality (Eaves et al., 1990; Alvergne et al., 2010; Jokela et
al., 2011), they have relied on an untested assumption that the genetic relationship between
personality and fitness is the same as the phenotypic relationship (M. B. Morrissey, Kruuk,
& Wilson, 2011). A genetic relationship is necessary to establish because selection works
through the differential transmission of genes to the next generation. In chapter 5, I use two
genetically-informative samples from the US and Scotland to estimate the genetic covariance
between lifetime reproductive success and personality. In this analysis, I take a selectionist
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(as oppposed to adaptationist) approach to the study of the evolution of personality. This
approach does not assume that a species is perfectly adapted to its environment and instead
seeks to test how selection pressures continue to shape the trait (Réale & Dingemanse, 2011).
Developmental evolution of individual differences
To understand personality evolution, it is necessary to understand its development (Draper
& Belsky, 1990; Stamps & Groothuis, 2010a). Theory and evidence point to individuals
differing in their developmental responses to early life stress (Boyce & Ellis, 2005; Ellis, Essex,
& Boyce, 2005). Surprisingly, a U-shaped relationship was found between early-life stress and
the sensitivity of the stress response system later in life. While individuals experiencing a
moderate amount of stress had low reactivity, individuals who experienced both the highest
and the lowest amount of stress developed the most active response systems. Boyce and Ellis
(2005) and Del Giudice, Ellis, and Shirtcliff (2011) have theorized that evolution has tuned the
stress response system to show this kind of plasticity in order to have the optimal response
later in life. While this theory is consistent with the evidence, it is unclear whether genetic
variability could be maintained or whether we should expect the population to settle on a
single, optimal reaction norm. Thus, this theoretical evolutionary analysis has the potential
to support or refute the plausibility of evidence for gene × environment interactions for
robustness (Caspi & Moffitt, 2006). In chapter 6 I formalize the evolutionary development
model proposed by Boyce and Ellis (2005) and analyze how the system evolves as a function
of genetic and environmental factors.
Chapter 2
Building blocks of macaque personality
. . . there are an infinite number of personality traits one can define and measure,
but evolutionarily analyzable order will tend to be found only in those causally
related to adaptive function.
Tooby and Cosmides (1990a, p. 25)
2.1 Evolutionary patterns of primate personality
Nonhuman primate personality has been examined from a number of stances but integrat-
ing these different views is still a major challenge (Clarke & Boinski, 1995; Itoh, 2002; Uher,
2008a; Uher & Asendorpf, 2008; Freeman & Gosling, 2010; Freeman et al., 2011). These
methods include, broadly, impressionistic ratings using adjectives describing personality; ob-
servational measures and codings of differences in the presence, frequency, and duration
of behaviors; and impressionistic ratings of behavior–situation units (Uher, 2008a). While
methodological differences can shroud comparisons among species, Gosling and John (1999)
found broad support for the basic personality dimensions related to sociality, anxiety, and co-
operativeness in a number of other animals, from octopuses to chimpanzees. While species-
specific dimensions outside of those that differentiate humans exist (Uher, 2008a, 2008b)
and while personality should encompass not only people but also behaviors and situations
(Funder, 2009; Uher, 2011b), descriptions of stable, between-human personality differences
as rendered in factor models usefully orient explorations of nonhuman primate personality
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structure. Studying multiple species with the same instrument also aids phylogenetic com-
parisons of personality structure by revealing the historical patterning of the emergence and
modification of personality dimensions (Weiss & Adams, 2008).
Models
One of many models for human personality describes personality differences in five indepen-
dent dimensions (Digman, 1990): generally speaking, differences in sociability and assertive-
ness are called extraversion; variation in trust and cooperation are grouped as agreeable-
ness; conscientious describes differences in discipline, planning, and self control; variation
in curiosity and creativity are captured by openness; and a dimension called neuroticism
differentiates individuals in terms of anxiety, emotional stability, and stress response. Rea-
sonably, it is referred to as the Five-Factor Model. A single individual is characterized by a
stable density distribution along each of these dimensions (Fleeson, 2001). The Five-Factor
Model is robust across cultures (McCrae, 2002; Allik & McCrae, 2004; McCrae, Terracciano,
& 78 Members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005; Schmitt et al., 2007, see
Chap. 3) and emerges whether people are measured on items that are adjectival descriptors
(Digman, 1990) or cognitive-affective reactions to situations (Denissen & Penke, 2008a).
This factor-model description of human personality has served as the starting point of sev-
eral investigations of nonhuman primate personality. Chimpanzees share with humans the
broad dimensions of the Five-Factor Model, with the addition of dominance, which describes
differences in competitive facility (King & Figueredo, 1997). As a personality trait in pri-
mates, dominance should be distinguished from social dominance or rank as the latter is an
outcome rather than an aspect of personality (Hinde, 1978; A. H. Buss, 1988; Gosling & John,
1999). The chimpanzee dimensions agreeableness and openness were given identical names
to their human homologues or analogues. While the labels differ, the remaining three traits
map human equivalents, surgency onto extraversion, emotionality onto neuroticism, and de-
pendability onto conscientiousness. While chimpanzee conscientiousness is more narrowly
defined than its counterpart in humans (it does not include facets related to trustworthiness
and duty) the conscientiousness personality dimension seems to be a derived character in
humans and chimpanzees, as it has not appeared as a “pure” construct in any other species
investigated (Gosling & John, 1999; Weiss et al., 2006; Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald,
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2011). Chimpanzees can also be differentiated from each other in their behavioral signa-
tures, including propensities to set upon or affiliate with conspecifics, anxiety and arousal in
stressful situations, curiosity toward novel foods and objects, impulsivity, goal pursuit, and
physical and sexual activity (Pederson et al., 2005; Uher, Asendorpf, & Call, 2008; Uher &
Asendorpf, 2008).
Gorillas likewise can be differentiated in their behavioral repertoires, similar to chim-
panzees (Uher et al., 2008). Gorillas have also been described under the rubric of the human
Five-Factor Model using the dimensions extraversion, understanding (i.e., agreeableness),
fearfulness (i.e., neuroticism), and dominance (Gold & Maple, 1994). Salient in their absence
from gorilla personality are homologues of human and chimpanzee openness and conscien-
tiousness. Do gorillas really not differ in levels of curiosity and self control or did researchers
not include items that load on these traits (Gosling & John, 1999; Weiss et al., 2006)?
The importance of being more thorough was demonstrated by Weiss et al.’s (2006) study
of orang-utan personality using a similarly broad instrument previously applied to chim-
panzees (King & Figueredo, 1997). Orang-utans can be described with the dimensions domi-
nance, extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism, and a blend of openness and conscientious-
ness that was dubbed intellect. Given that gorillas are more closely related to chimpanzees
and humans than orang-utans, it likely that a openness dimension was present in the an-
cestor of great apes and that gorillas can be characterized by openness, too. A nonhuman
personality instrument can only capture what it is designed to measure (Uher, 2008a).
A variety of models using impressionistic ratings have emerged to describe rhesus ma-
caque personality. Some early studies revealed alternatively three dimensions of fear, hostil-
ity, and affiliation (Chamove, Eysenck, & Harlow, 1972); or excitability, sociability, and con-
fidence (Stevenson-Hinde & Zunz, 1978; Stevenson-Hinde, Stillwell-Barnes, & Zunz, 1980).
Later studies derived four dimensions of either tense–fearful, aggressive, solitary, and curious–
playful (Bolig et al., 1992) or sociability, confidence, excitability, and equability (Capitanio,
1999). Rhesus macaques can even be described in as many as six dimensions: confidence,
friendliness, dominance, anxiety, openness, and activity (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald,
2011). These results demonstrate the vagaries of measuring personality with instruments
that have been incompletely adapted from studies of other species (Uher, 2008a). That said,
despite the various labels and differing numbers of components, many of these dimensions
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describe the same constructs. The primate dimensions of
• extraversion are captured by affiliation/sociability/solitary,
• agreeableness by hostility/aggressive/friendliness,
• neuroticism by fear/excitability/tense–fearful/confidence–anxiety,
• openness by curious–playful/openness,
• and dominance by confidence/dominance (Gosling & John, 1999; Weiss, Adams, Wid-
dig, & Gerald, 2011).
This lumbering development matches the slow growth and refinement in characterizing
broad dimensions of human personality chronicled by Digman (1990). We will not get there
all in one go.
Using behavioral codings, Rouff, Sussman, and Strube (2005) identified three dimensions
of overall behavioral variation and four of between-individual differences in the personal-
ities of lion-tailed macaques. The components that differentiated individuals (as opposed
to behavioral occasions irrespective of the individual exhibiting them) map roughly onto
the rhesus macaque dimensions friendliness, dominance, activity/confidence, and anxiety.
While methodological and sample-size differences between these studies makes for a knotty
comparison, they suggest that several broad features are conserved in the genus Macaca. It
also shows that basic dimensions can shine through even if the instrument or ethogram are
not specifically designed to find them. For instance, Rouff et al. (2005) chose behaviors that
defined neuroticism-like, bipolar facets, namely Anxious–Relaxed and Reactive–Unreactive.
Each pole of these facets, however, did not group together. Reactive clustered with the
confidence-like component while Relaxed and Unreactive loaded on the anxiety-like com-
ponent. This tallies with the claim that primate neuroticism can become uncoupled into
two independent dimensions describing free-floating anxiety (the anxiety dimension) versus
situationally-determined anxiety (the confidence dimension) (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Ger-
ald, 2011). Further work on lion-tailed, rhesus, and other macaque species is needed to clarify
personality structure within this genus.
Whole personality structures have been educed in other Old World monkeys. Vervet
monkey personality consists of three dimensions: social competence, playful–curious, and
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opportunistic self-serving (McGuire, Raleigh, & Pollack, 1994), which map to the great ape
domains of dominance, openness, and agreeableness, respectively (Gosling & John, 1999).
Konečná et al. (2008) have extended the search for nonhuman primate personality structure
to colobines. They investigated male Hanuman langur personality using both impression-
istic descriptors and behavioral codings. Male langur behavior exhibits a three-dimensional
structure consisting of dominance, involvement, and activity. Impressionistic ratings also
revealed three dimensions called agreeableness, confidence, and extraversion. High agree-
ableness was expressed behaviorally by low dominance, high confidence by high dominance
and involvement and by low activity, and high extraversion by elevated activity. Again, these
dimensions broadly match those found in other primate species while the absence of other
distinct dimensions (such as Openness) have reasonable ecological explanations (e.g., langurs
are opportunistic foragers).
Over the years other, more specific aspects of personality and temperament have been
examined in nonhuman primates (Clarke & Boinski, 1995; Freeman & Gosling, 2010). Factor
models and behavioral profiles by no means cover all the facets of primate personality that
have been discovered. But attempts to describe all the features of between-individual per-
sonality differences are starting to pay dividends by distinguishing the separate threads we
need to weave the historical patterns of primate personality evolution.
Building blocks
Gosling and John (1999) showed that dimensions analogous (and perhaps homologous) to the
five human factors appear in other species with the addition of two dimensions, dominance
and activity. While dominance is a salient dimension across many species, there initially
little evidence for activity as a separate dimension. Further research has shown that activity
is commonly found in behavioral-ecological investigations of personality (Réale et al., 2007)
and in nonhuman primates (Freeman & Gosling, 2010), such as wild langurs (Konečná et
al., 2008) and rhesus macaques (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011). Furthermore, in
humans, while this dimension is subsumed under extraversion in adults, it can emerge as
a separate feature in adolescent males (John, Caspi, Robins, Moffitt, & Stouthamer-Loeber,
1994).
As it is possible for traits that normally vary together to become uncoupled during devel-
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Figure 2.1: Cladogram of hypothetical patterns of personality structure evolution in catar-
rhine primates. The schematic describes personality structures as a combination of ‘basic’ or
‘blended’ dimensions. Figure by Weiss, Adams, Widdig, and Gerald (2011) and reproduced
under a Creative Commons Attribution Unported Licence.
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opment (Groothuis & Carere, 2005), we can consider the developmental evolution and pheno-
typic integration of personality dimensions. Correlated variation in the rudimentary person-
ality structures of humans, chimpanzees, orang-utans, and rhesus macaques can be described
with a set of eight “basic” and five “blended” personality traits (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, &
Gerald, 2011). The basic traits are called Sociability, Activity, Altruism, Anxiety, Confidence,
Dominance, Openness, and Conscientiousness (Fig. 2.1). The other traits are combinations
of these components. In humans, chimpanzees, and orang-utans Sociability and Activity
positively covary to form extraversion while Anxiety and Confidence negatively covary as
neuroticism. In rhesus macaques, Sociability instead fluctuates with Altruism and is denoted
as friendliness. Meanwhile, in humans, Altruism and Dominance negatively covary in the di-
mension that describes cooperative behavior, namely agreeableness, while orang-utans have
an interesting blend of openness and conscientiousness called intellect. Identifying and hy-
pothesizing about these different basic traits follows the suggestion of Réale et al. (2007) to
start defining possible categories of correlated suites of behavior beyond those already con-
sidered in work on behavioral syndromes (namely, shyness–boldness, exploration–avoidance,
activity, aggressiveness, and sociability). These basic traits may be the result of opportunities
for adaptive behavioral variation for meeting the social, ecological, and developmental chal-
lenges faced by big-brained, gregarious, and long-lived mammals. Factor models for each
species are the first step in hypothesizing the building blocks constituting primate personal-
ity structures.
Personality traits have also been posited to cluster together at higher levels. Noting in-
tercorrelations among the five human personality dimensions, Digman (1997) proposed two
higher-order factors which he labelled α (comprising agreeableness, conscientiousness, and
(reversed) neuroticism) and β (extraversion and openness). DeYoung et al. (2002) offered a
more firm interpretation of these two higher order factors. Stability describes a refractory
ability in situations that are emotionally, socially, and motivationally demanding and draws
on the shared variance of agreeableness, conscentiousness, and emotional stability (i.e., neu-
roticism). Plasticity reflects exploration, engagement, and flexibility with(in) the environment
and thus ties in with extraversion and openness. Genetically-informed designs in humans
have also recovered these two higher-order factors (Jang et al., 2006), suggesting they may
be a stable feature of personality. Building on this, several researchers proposed and found
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evidence for a single higher order factor, dubbed the general factor of personality (Musek,
2007; Rushton & Irwing, 2008), or GFP, that describes variance common to the five personality
dimensions with positive loadings from extraversion, agreeableness, openness, and conscien-
tiousness and a negative loading from neuroticism. A hierarchical structure also found the
GFP sitting atop Stability and Plasticity (Musek, 2007)
The existence of a GFP and other higher-order factor structures has been criticized on
methodological grounds. The GFP has been explained away psychometrically as a result
of biases in self-presentation (Bäckström et al., 2009), common method variance inherent
in assessing personality dimensions using only one instrument that evaporates when using
multi-trait multimethod approaches (Riemann & Kandler, 2010), or the result of the prepon-
derance of items that load in the same direction even though the personality dimensions are
orthogonal (Ashton et al., 2009). Even if two higher order factors are substantial, the shared
variance seems to be incorporating at least some biases that creep in during personality eval-
uation (McCrae et al., 2008). Weiss, Adams, and Johnson (2011) took a comparative approach
to addressing the existence of a GFP by testing whether a single, higher-order factor was a
good fit to personality data on chimpanzees, orang-utans, and rhesus macaques. The answer
was a resounding ‘no’. Like in humans, intercorrelations among the nonhuman primate per-
sonality dimensions were only weak, questioning whether, even if it exists, a higher order
factor is worthy of the title ‘general’.
Affect
Like behavioral domains, basic differences in subjective well-being (or, simply put, happi-
ness) have been found in nonhuman primates, including chimpanzees, orang-utans, and
rhesus macaques (King & Landau, 2003; Weiss et al., 2006; Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald,
2011). Subjective well-being captures the balance of positive and negative moods as well as
one’s overall satisfaction with life (Diener et al., 1999). Across species, subjective well-being
has a shared basis in personality variation. In nonhuman primates, subjective well-being
assesses affect and positive functioning in social relationships and goal achievement. In hu-
mans, happiness is positively related to extraversion, agreeablenss, and conscientiousness
and negatively related to neuroticism (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998; Steel et al., 2008). Chim-
panzees rated higher in subjective well-being are also higher in dominance, extraversion,
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and conscientiousness (King & Landau, 2003). Subjective well-being in orang-utans is re-
lated to lower neuroticism and higher extraversion and agreeableness (Weiss et al., 2006).
Rhesus macaques that were higher in subjective well-being were also higher in confidence,
friendliness, and activity; and lower in anxiety (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011). Fur-
thermore, in rhesus macaques high confidence, high friendliness, and low anxiety were also
prospectively related to subjective well-being assessed more than a year later.
Genetic variation in human personality overlaps completely with personality (Weiss et al.,
2008) and chimpanzee personality also genetically covaries with the dominance personality
dimension (Weiss et al., 2002), although there were not any detectable shared basis between
personality and subjective well-being in orang-utans (Chap. 4). However, in both humans
(Diener & Chan, 2011) and orang-utans (Weiss, Adams, & King, 2011), individuals who are
happier live longer lives. Personality and subjective well-being thus seems to form a common
nexus of ‘covitality’ in primates (Weiss et al., 2002).
Patterns
The presence of a GFP in humans, because it is linked to self-assessed life-history strategies,
could be explained as the result of directional selection on human personality (Figueredo
& Rushton, 2009, but see Sec. 4.7). Whether the GFP is substance or artifact in humans, its
absence in closely related species of primate, indicates that, if it is an actual feature of hu-
man personality, it may be unique to the human lineage. Weiss, Adams, and Johnson (2011)
note that given chimpanzees’, orang-utans’, and rhesus macaques’ phylogenetic proximity to
humans, a shared genetic basis of behavior, slow life-histories, and the similar social environ-
ments that they inhabit, an artefactual explanation of the GFP is more parsimonious. How-
ever, testing all of the possible alternative evolutionary explanations for why humans exhibit
a GFP but these other three species do not would require examining nonhuman primates
that are more human-like in some aspect of their socioecology (for example, cooperative
breeding in marmosets or monogamy in gibbons). Therefore the identification of personality
domains in nonhuman primates suggests a phylogenetic patterning (Weiss & Adams, 2008;
Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011; King & Weiss, 2011), namely that more closely re-
lated species are more similar to each other and that differences in personality structure can
be framed as shared or derived evolutionary characteristics.
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The relative invariance of personality structure in a nonhuman primate species across
habitats, rearing environments, social groups, and observers’ culture (King, Weiss, & Farmer,
2005; Weiss et al., 2007, 2009) means that the presence or absence of a particular personality
dimension can be informative of behavioral evolution (Weiss & Adams, 2008; King & Weiss,
2011). In this way, personality structure can, like any trait or set of traits, characterize evolu-
tionary lineages (Harvey & Pagel, 1991; Gosling & Graybeal, 2007). For example, the presence
of a conscientiousness domain in humans and chimpanzees but not in orang-utans or rhesus
macaques suggests that this dimension is an evolutionary derived feature in the human–
chimpanzee lineage relative to the ancestral condition (Fig. 2.1; Weiss, Adams, Widdig, &
Gerald, 2011). Likewise, if we take rhesus macaques as representative of the ancestral condi-
tion, this implies that human, chimpanzee, and orang-utan neuroticism and extraversion are
derived from multidimensional ancestral variants where neuroticism comes from an integra-
tion of confidence and anxiety and extraversion of friendliness and activity. These differences
may be the result of adaptation to differences in social organization and complexity, where
chimpanzees and orang-utans live in fission-fusion societies whereas rhesus macaques live
in stable troops organized around matrilines (Wrangham, 1987; Melnick & Pearl, 1987; Strier,
2003). The lack of a clear, distinct dominance domain is the feature that separates human per-
sonality structure the most from that of other primates. While several species differences do
exist, the overall pattern suggests that personality structure is also highly conserved among
primates. Both humans and chimpanzees exhibit a conscientiousness domain despite wide
ranging differences in social structure (Boehm, 1999) which makes parallel evolution a less
than parsimonious explanation (King & Weiss, 2011) and suggests that personality structure
may be conserved despite divergence in social and ecological traits.
As these broad brush strokes are being applied, a complete picture is beginning to emerge.
Studying personality in species that have different phylogenetic relationships to each other
can be used to determine at what point along each lineage different features of personal-
ity structure could have evolved (Fig. 2.1) However, it is necessary to examine more closely
related clades of nonhuman primates to understand which features of personality struc-
ture uniquely define each group and whether there are signs of conservation in personality
structure. Here, I compare the personality structure of four species from the same genus,
namely macaques, to determine which aspects of rhesus macaque personality structure can
2.2. STUDY SPECIES 51
be used to define these species more broadly. The friendliness domain in rhesus macaques
seems to combine features of ape extraversion and agreeableness, so my first goal was to see
whether this domain also characterized other macaques. Earlier studies of rhesus macaques
(Stevenson-Hinde & Zunz, 1978; Bolig et al., 1992; Capitanio, 1999) did not find any dimen-
sion resembling openness, which was found when rhesus macaques were assessed with a
broader instrument (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011) that had uncovered that domain
in chimpanzees and orang-utans. Thus, I wanted to see whether the same broad question-
naire would uncover openness in other species of macaques. Finally, rhesus macaques have
three separate domains (dominance, confidence, and anxiety) that in apes relate to facets of
dominance and neuroticism and I therefore wanted to see whether the separation of these
dimensions was shared with other species of the macaque genus.
2.2 Study species
Macaques are a genus of Old World monkeys that shared a common ancestor with humans
around 29 million years ago (Andrews, 1986; Chatterjee et al., 2009). The genus Macaca con-
sists of around two dozen species and as the most geographically distributed primate genus
besides humans, reside in a wide range of habitats and ecologies (Melnick & Pearl, 1987;
Fleagle, 1999). Fossil (Delson, 1980; Fooden, 1980) and recent molecular evidence (Morales &
Melnick, 1998; Tosi, Morales, & Melnick, 2000; Deinard & Smith, 2001; Tosi, Morales, & Mel-
nick, 2003) suggests that macaque species can be clustered into four or five lineages. Macaque
societies are based around female phylopatry with male dispersal (Fleagle, 1999) and troops
tend to move as cohesive units (Melnick & Pearl, 1987). Macaque species differ in how strict
or relaxed their dominance hierarchies are (Thierry, 2000) and also exhibit considerable phy-
logenetic inertia in their social structure compared with morphological (particularly dietary)
adaptations (Thierry et al., 2000).
I examined personality structure in four species of macaque: rhesus macaques (Macaca
mulatta), Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata), Barbary macaques (Macaca sylvanus), and As-
samese macaques (Macaca assamensis). I collected data on Japanese, Barbary, and Assamese
macaques and compared their personality structures to the published rhesus macaque struc-
ture (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011) derived using the same personality instrument.
The phylogeny for these species is shown in Figure 2.2. These four species shared a common









Figure 2.2: Phylogeny of macaque species studied. Node labels give time to common ancestor
in millions of years. Tree and branch lengths from consensus tree inferred using 10kTrees
http://10ktrees.fas.harvard.edu/ (C. Arnold et al., 2010).
ancestor approximately 9 million years ago (Chatterjee et al., 2009). The rhesus and Japanese
macaques were previously classified together in the fascicularis group of macaques, separate
from the sinica group that contained Assamese macaques and the silenus-sylvanus group that
included Barbary macaques (Fooden, 1980). However, while molecular evidence shows that
the Barbary macaques are an unambiguous outgroup to other macaques, it is ambiguous
about the relationship between rhesus, Japanese, and Assamese macaques (Tosi et al., 2003).
This ambiguity could be a result of introgression or incomplete lineage sorting or a combi-
nation of both processes. Recent molecular evidence indicated that Japanese and Assamese
macaques are the most closely related of the two, with the Barbary macaques forming an
incontrovertible outgroup to all other macaques (Tosi et al., 2003).
Japanese macaques have traditionally been divided into two subspecies: Macaca fuscata
fuscata and Macaca fuscata yakui (Kuroda, 1940).1 The subspecies classification is recognized
on the basis of differences in pelage, size, and distribution (Fooden & Aimi, 2005). M. f. yakui
are slightly darker and smaller than M. f. fuscata and restricted to Yakushima, an island off
the southern coast of Kyushu. However, molecular evidence does not support the separa-
tion of Japanese macaques into two subspecies (Marmi, Bertranpetit, Terradas, Takenaka, &
Domingo-Roura, 2004). The genetic difference between the Yakushima and other popula-
1In Japanese the native monkeys are generally referred to as nihonzaru while M. f. yakui are designated yaku-
nihonzaru, or more simply and affectionately, yakuzaru.
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tions is the same as between populations of M. f. fuscata. For my analysis I will therefore treat
Japanese macaques as a single taxon.
2.3 Subjects and study sites
The subjects came from a mix of captive, free-ranging, and wild troops.
Japanese macaques
The Japanese macaque sample consisted of 24 subjects from a free-ranging troop in Japan
(Koshima, see Fig. 2.3), 21 subjects from two wild troops on Yakushima, Japan (Umi and
Donguri), and 29 subjects from two zoos in Italy and the US. There were 52 females and 22
males and as noted above, the two wild troops from Yakushima were M. f. yakui while the
other individuals were all M. f. fuscata. The mean age of females was 12.3 (SD = 6.8, range =
1–29) and of males was 12.8 (SD = 6.3, range = 3–27). While the ages of the free-ranging and
captive individuals were known, the ages of the subjects from wild troops were approximated
by the field researchers.
Barbary macaques
There were 63 (25 females and 38 males) Barbary macaque subjects from three wild troops
living in the Atlas Mountains, Morocco (Flat-face, Green, and Large). Exact ages were not
known so the subjects were classified into age categories. There were 19 adult and 6 sub-adult
females and 31 adult and 7 sub-adult males.
Assamese macaques
The Assamese macaque sample comprised 60 subjects from a free-ranging troop at the Phu
Khieo Wildlife Sanctuary, Thailand. There were 22 females and 38 males. There were 19
adult, 9 juvenile, and 1 infant females; and 18 adult, 9 juvenile, and 4 infant males.
2.4 Instruments and raters
Nonhuman primate personality traits can be captured with rater impressions of individuals
on adjectives that describe primate behavior, dispositions, and affect. The rater assessments
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Figure 2.3: Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) on Koshima, Miyazaki Prefecture, Japan (Au-
gust 2009).
are reliable in that they are consistent across raters and time (Stevenson-Hinde et al., 1980;
King & Figueredo, 1997; Weiss et al., 2006; Dutton, 2008; King et al., 2008; Uher et al., 2008;
Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011). Personality dimensions in chimpanzees have been
found to generalize across samples living in different environments (King et al., 2005; Weiss et
al., 2007) and when using raters from differing cultural backgrounds (Weiss et al., 2009). The
personality structures describe differences among the animals and are not merely artifacts of
rater biases or projections (Weiss et al., 2012) although genetic modelling revealed that rater
effects may either enhance or hide correlations among personality dimensions (Chap. 4). The
personality traits defined by rater assessments are also valid. They are related to observed
behavior (Stevenson-Hinde et al., 1980; Capitanio, 1999; Pederson et al., 2005; Kuhar, Lukas,
Stoinski, & Maple, 2006; Uher & Asendorpf, 2008; Murray, 2011), affect (King & Landau,
2003; Weiss et al., 2006, 2009; Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011), neuroanatomical
structure (Blatchley & Hopkins, 2010), and genetic polymorphisms (Hong et al., 2011); and
are heritable (Weiss et al., 2000, 2002, Chap. 4).
Ratings-based methods of personalitiy assessment have several advantages and disad-
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vantages compared with other methods such as behavioral coding and behavioral tests (Itoh,
2002; Freeman & Gosling, 2010; Freeman et al., 2011). Compared to behavioral coding, ratings
can be used to assess a large sample quickly and takes variability in behavior into account.
While ratings approaches rely on subjective judgments, they are based on the cumulative
knowledge of raters who are familiar with each subject and thus can be deployed at research
sites where researchers are observing the subjects for purposes other than personality data
collection. While ratings data may make comparisons between individuals more difficult to
interpret (Freeman & Gosling, 2010), they are particularly advantageous because the use of
a single questionnaire makes it possible to standardize measurement across different study
sites and species (King & Weiss, 2011; Weiss & Adams, in press). Describing different species
personality structures with the same set of items aids cross-species comparisons.
Hominoid Personality Questionnaire
While early studies of Japanese macaque behavior were framed in psychological terms in-
cluding introversion, extraversion and individual personality (Itani, 1957; Imanishi, 1957), the
systematic study of personality structure only began with the development of specific ques-
tionnaires designed to assess it (Stevenson-Hinde & Hinde, 2011). Work on rhesus macaque
personality was conducted using a questionnaire composed of 33 adjectives describing be-
havior (Stevenson-Hinde & Zunz, 1978). Studies using this questionnaire in captive samples
yielded three or four personality domains (Stevenson-Hinde & Zunz, 1978; Stevenson-Hinde
et al., 1980; Bolig et al., 1992; Capitanio, 1999). To study chimpanzee personality King and
Figueredo (1997) developed the Chimpanzee Personality Questionnaire (CPQ) which con-
tained 43 personality descriptor adjectives borrowed from the human literature (Goldberg
1990).
Each adjective was given a definition to place it within the context of primate behavior
in general rather than chimpanzee behaviors specifically. For example fearful was defined
as “Subject reacts excessively to real or imagined threats by displaying behaviours such as
screaming, grimacing, running away or other signs of anxiety or distress.” Forty-one of the
items were taken from the Big Five subscales (Goldberg, 1990) and two items, clumsy and
autistic were added by King and Figueredo (1997). Weiss et al. (2006) expanded and modified
the CPQ for use with orang-utans. Because a previous study of chimpanzees found that neu-
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roticism and openness did not replicate in a different habitat, (Weiss et al., 2006) added three
additional items that would potentially describe neuroticism (anxious, (not) cool, and vulnera-
ble) and two that could flesh out openness (conventional and curious). Together these 48 items
composed the Orangutan Personality Questionnaire (OPQ). In another study of chimpanzees,
Weiss et al. (2009) added additional items, again derived from the human literature (McCrae
& Costa, 1985) to assess conscientiousness (distractable, quitting, and thoughtless) and openness
(individualistic and innovative). This 54-item questionnaire is known as the Hominoid Person-
ality Questionnaire. The HPQ was modified by Weiss, Adams, Widdig, and Gerald (2011) for
use in assessing free-ranging and wild monkeys, which involved replacing references in the
adjective descriptions to ‘enclosure’ with the word ‘environment’.
Subjective well-being
The subjective well-being questionnaire contained four items drawn from human subjective
well-being measures and was identical to the questionnaire used to assess orang-utans (Weiss
et al., 2006), chimpanzees (Weiss et al., 2009), and rhesus macaques (Weiss, Adams, Widdig,
& Gerald, 2011). The items assessed the individual monkey’s balance of positive and negative
moods, pleasure derived from social interactions, the ability to achieve goals, and how ‘happy’
the raters think they would be if they were the target individual.
Questionnaire translation
The HPQ and subjective well-being questionnaire were translated into Japanese by Miho
Inoue-Murayama and checked for equivalence with the original English version via back-
translation (Weiss et al., 2009). For this study I used both the English version of the question-
naires from Weiss, Adams, Widdig, and Gerald (2011) as well as a Japanese versions adapted
by Akitsugu Konno for use with Japanese macaques.
Raters and assessment
Raters were zookeepers, field station staff, and researchers who were all familiar with the
individual subjects they rated. The raters had between 4 months and 6 years (mean = 22.5
months, SD = 17.9 months) experience with the subjects they assessed.
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Japanese macaques
One rater used the Japanese-language questionnaire while the remaining 7 used the English-
language version and ratings were made between February 2009 and February 2010. Each
subject was rated by 1–3 raters (mean = 1.4) and each rater assessed between 6 and 24 subjects.
Sixteen subjects were missing a rating on at least 1 personality item (mode = 1, range=1–4).
Three subjects were missing a rating on a single subjective well-being item while four subjects
were not assessed on subjective well-being.
Barbary macaques
Two raters used the English-language questionnaire and ratings were made between June
2009 and December 2010. The raters assessed 17 and 47 subjects and all but one subject was
assessed by a single rater. There were three subjects missing a rating on a single personality
item and all subjects had complete subjective well-being assessments.
Assamese macaques
All eight raters used the English-language questionnaire. Ratings were made between May
and December 2009. Each subject was rated by between 1 and 8 raters (mean = 5.6) and each
rater assessed between 32 and 58 subjects. Nine subjects were missing a score for a single
personality item. No subjects were assessed on the subjective well-being questionnaire.
2.5 Personality structure
A personality structure can be derived from ratings data by means of data reduction tech-
niques that compress the high dimensional item data into a smaller number of dimensions. I
used principal components analysis (PCA) to determine the dimensions underlying the data.
Structures derived from PCA are similar to those derived from principal axis factors (Velicer,
1977) and previous studies of primate personality ratings have found the structures yielded
by the two techniques are almost identical (Weiss et al., 2006; Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Ger-
ald, 2011). I ran the PCA using the principal procedure in R (Revelle, 2011). To determine
the appropriate number of components to extract for each sample I examined the scree plot
and conducted a parallel analysis using the paran function in R (Dinno, 2010), which deter-
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mines the number of components by using the eigenvalue expected by chance given the data
as a cutoff (Horn, 1965). I ran the PCA on mean scores across raters for the items. For each
species I only used items that had intraclass correlation coefficients ICC(3, k) > 0. I obtained
orthogonal components using a varimax rotation and oblique components using a promax
rotation.
I calculated personality domain scores using unit-weighting, which assigns items with
salient positive or negative loadings (≥ |.40|) a component score of either +1 or −1. Items that
did not have a salient loading were assigned a component weight of 0. I used unit-weighting
in order to create more generalizable results as scores derived from differentially-weighted
loadings vary between samples (Gorsuch, 1983).
To interpret the personality dimensions I interpreted the item content and pattern of
loadings primarily in light of the rhesus macaque personality structure derived using the
same instrument (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011). I also created unit-weighted do-
main scores for the Japanese, Barbary, and Assamese macaques based on the rhesus macaque
(Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011), chimpanzee (King & Figueredo, 1997; Weiss et al.,
2009), and orang-utan (Weiss et al., 2006) personality dimensions and examined the corre-
lations with domain scores from each species’s structure. This scoring approach had the
advantage over calculations of congruence coefficients between components because it did
not require the personality structures to contain precisely the same items.
Item reliabilities
To make good inferences from personality measurements, it is necessary to only rely on
items where there is some measure of agreement among raters. Interrater reliability can
be calculated by means of intraclass correlation coefficients. I used two intraclass correla-
tion coefficients (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979): ICC(3, 1), which gives the expected correlation of
item scores between single raters assessing the same subject, and ICC(3, k), which gives the
expected correlation among the mean item scores of two groups of k raters.
The ICC for an item is calculated by an analysis of variance from the regression
score = subject + rater + e
yielding a between-subject mean square (BMS) and an error mean square (EMS). The intra-
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class correlation coefficients are then
ICC(3, 1) =
BMS − EMS




and are appropriate when the subjects are considered a random sample from a larger popu-
lation.
For the rhesus macaque sample, the personality item reliability from single raters (ICC[3,
1]) had a mean of .26 and ranged from -.05 for autistic to .63 for dominant (Weiss, Adams,
Widdig, & Gerald, 2011). The item reliability for mean ratings (ICC[3, k]) was .52 and ranged
from -.17 for autistic to .86 for dominant. For this study I calculated the item reliabilities for
the Japanese and Assamese samples but could not calculate them for the Barbary macaque
sample because only one subject had been assessed by more than one rater. The item reliabil-
ities are given in Table 2.1. For Japanese macaques the mean ICC(3, 1) was .40 and the mean
ICC(3, k) was .47. The least reliable item was intelligent (ICC[3,1] = -.15, ICC[3, k] = -.22) and
the most reliable item was active (ICC[3,1] = .79, ICC[3, k] = .85). For the sample of Assamese
macaques, the mean ICC(3, 1) was .22 and the mean ICC(3, k) was .57. The least reliable item
was autistic (ICC[3,1] = .05, ICC[3, k] = -.23) and the most reliable item was active (ICC[3,1] =
.61, ICC[3, k] = .90).
Japanese macaques
A parallel analysis suggested a five-component solution (eigenvalues 13.3, 9.1, 7.2, 3.7, and
2.6). However, the adjusted eigenvalue of the last component retained was 1.01, indicating
it was only marginally above what would be expected by chance. An examination of the
screeplot (Fig. 2.4a) showed that the fifth component had an eigenvalue that did not differ
substantially from that of the sixth component. I therefore extracted four components to
describe Japanese macaque personality. Item loadings are listed in Table 2.2.
The first component was positively defined by items such as dominant and aggressive and
negatively by items such as submissive and fearful. These items describe traits related to both
Machiavellianism and social potency (Maestripieri, 2007), which in humans are found in the
negative pole of agreeableness (Goldberg, 1990), and to reactions within the social environ-
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Japanese Assamese
ICC(3, 1) ICC(3, k) ICC(3, 1) ICC(3, k)
Fearful .62 .69 .25 .65
Dominant .66 .73 .58 .88
Persistent .41 .49 .12 .43
Cautious .45 .53 .24 .64
Stable .45 .53 .20 .58
Autistic .50 .58 .05 .23
Curious .32 .40 .31 .72
Thoughtless .42 .51 .10 .38
Stingy/greedy .52 .60 .19 .56
Jealous .39 .47 .13 .46
Individualistic .05 .06 .12 .43
Reckless .62 .69 .09 .35
Sociable .21 .27 .29 .70
Distractable .11 .14 .09 .35
Timid .61 .69 .39 .78
Sympathetic .33 .40 .05 .24
Playful .72 .78 .61 .90
Solitary .64 .71 .45 .82
Vulnerable .47 .56 .41 .79
Innovative .42 .50 .05 .24
Active .80 .85 .38 .78
Helpful .54 .62 .18 .56
Bullying .54 .62 .25 .65
Aggressive .53 .62 .27 .68
Manipulative .50 .58 .23 .63
Gentle .22 .28 .17 .54
Affectionate .43 .52 .16 .51
Excitable .10 .13 .22 .61
Impulsive .12 .16 .21 .60
Inquisitive .29 .36 .33 .74
Submissive .63 .70 .51 .85
Cool .08 .11 .14 .48
Dependent/follower .07 .09 .42 .80
Irritable .42 .50 .19 .56
Unperceptive .41 .49 .14 .47
Predictable -.08 -.12 .08 .33
Decisive .43 .51 .32 .73
Depressed .34 .42 .24 .64
Conventional .32 .39 .12 .43
Sensitive .30 .38 .09 .37
Defiant .77 .82 .15 .49
Intelligent -.15 -.22 .22 .61
Protective .65 .72 .36 .76
Quitting .38 .46 .11 .40
Inventive .22 .28 .08 .33
Clumsy .49 .57 .13 .46
Erratic .45 .54 .08 .32
Friendly .23 .29 .10 .38
Anxious .57 .65 .23 .63
Lazy .32 .39 .33 .74
Disorganized .25 .32 .16 .52
Unemotional .56 .63 .19 .57
Imitative .51 .59 .22 .61
Independent .43 .51 .27 .68
Table 2.1: Intraclass correlation coefficients for personality items.
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ment, similar to human neuroticism (Goldberg, 1990). High-scoring individuals would thus
be competent in social interactions and confident when facing challenges within their envi-
ronment. Low-scoring individuals would be more cautious when confronting such challenges
and would readily yield during conflicts. This dimension was similar to the confidence–
fearful dimension in rhesus macaques (Stevenson-Hinde & Zunz, 1978). Unit-weighted scores
on this domain (Table 2.5) were correlated with the rhesus macaque dimensions of confidence
and dominance and was almost identical to the chimpanzee dimension dominance. Scores
also correlated postively with scores on orang-utan dominance and intellect and negatively
with orang-utan neuroticism. I therefore named this component ‘dominance’.
The second component was defined by items related to exploratory behavior, such as
curious, which in humans makes up openness (McCrae & Costa, 1985). It also contained
items related to low conscientiousness and high neuroticism in humans, such as impulsive
(Goldberg, 1990; Costa & McCrae, 1992c). Individuals scoring high on this dimension would
be highly exploratory and also prone to act impulsively. Low scorers would in contrast
be less active and playful in their environment. This dimension was extremely similar to
the openness dimension in rhesus macaques (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011) and
likewise resembled chimpanzee extraversion, openness, and (negatively) conscientiousness
(Table 2.5). It also resembled orang-utan extraversion and dominance but not intellect. I
named this component ‘openness’.
The third component was related to social affiliation, including items such as social and
solitary, and to cooperative behavior, with items like gentle and helpful. It was thus similar
to facets of human extraverison and agreeableness (Goldberg, 1990). It also contained items
(irritable, excitable, and stable), related to high and low human neuroticism (Costa & McCrae,
1992c). High scorers would therefore seek out social contact and would act cooperatively
in social situations. Low scorers, meanwhile, would shun social engagement. This dimen-
sion was extremely similar to friendliness in rhesus macaques (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, &
Gerald, 2011) and was similar in resembling chimpanzee extraversion and agreeableness and
orang-utan agreeableness (Table 2.5. However, unlike rhesus friendliness, this dimension in
Japanese macaques also (negatively) resembled chimpanzee and orang-utan neuroticism. I
named this component ‘friendliness’.
The final component contained items such as erratic and disorganized that were related
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to human conscientiousness (Goldberg, 1990). It also contained items related to high neu-
roticism in humans, such as anxious and depressed (Costa & McCrae, 1992c). High scorers
would therefore be volatile in their behavior and tense while low scorers would be less emo-
tional. This dimension differed from the first component, dominance, in that it seems to
describe reactions to less context-specific stressors. In this way it was similar to the anxi-
ety/confidence division seen in rhesus macaques (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011)
although this dimension discribed features related to both rhesus macaque confidence and
anxiety (Table 2.5). In terms of correlations based on unit-weighted domain scores, it re-
sembled chimpanzee conscientiousness but not neuroticism and resembled both orang-utan
neuroticism and (reversed) intellect. I named this domain ‘anxiety’.
Because of the results of the parallel analysis, I also tried a five-component solution. I
calculated factor congruence coefficients using the psych package in R (Revelle, 2011) and
found that the four dimensions were also well described in the five-component solution
(congruence coefficients = .90–1.0). The highest loading on the fifth component was (not)
cool (-.69) and also contained the items excitable, reckless, impulsive, and (not) stable. This
component had factor congruences of .46 and -.58 with openness and friendliness from the
four-component solution and had several salient cross-loadings on the other components.
While it resembled rhesus macaque excitability (Stevenson-Hinde & Zunz, 1978) it did not
represent a clear separate dimension in Japanese macaques. I therefore stuck with the four-
component solution.
Barbary macaques
The parallel analysis yielded four components (eigenvalues 17.9, 8.0, 5.0, 4.2) which was
supported by an examination of the screeplot (Fig. 2.4b). Item loadings are listed in Table 2.3.
The first component was large and encompassing and explained 32% of the variance in
item scores. It was primarily characterized by items (dependent/follower, independent, fearful)
related to human neuroticism as well as both the positive (helpful and protective) and negative
(dominant) poles of human agreeableness (Goldberg, 1990). The loadings on several items also
resembled human conscientiousness, such as persistent and decisive. After reflecting the com-
ponent loadings, individuals who score high on this trait would therefore be commanding
in a variety of situations while low-scorers would be more cautious and timid. This compo-
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Figure 2.4: Scree plots from parallel analysis for personality items in 1) Japanese macaques,
b) Barbary macaques, and c) Assamese macaques. Adjusted eigenvalues (EV) show the num-
ber of components retained by the analysis as having eigenvalues greater than expected by
chance.
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Dom Opn Frd Anx h2
Dominant .93 .02 .02 -.21 .90
Submissive -.89 .08 -.13 -.09 .82
Timid -.87 .03 -.06 .11 .77
Aggressive .86 .17 -.20 .10 .81
Bullying .81 .27 -.24 .06 .79
Fearful -.81 .17 -.11 .34 .80
Manipulative .63 .11 .14 -.27 .51
Independent .63 .23 -.28 .29 .61
Persistent .61 .47 .00 .06 .60
Stingy/greedy .61 .26 -.10 .32 .55
Decisive .60 .33 .25 -.09 .54
Cautious -.60 -.17 .10 .21 .44
Vulnerable -.55 .06 -.23 .41 .53
Dependent/follower -.53 .46 .15 .13 .53
Quitting -.44 -.19 -.30 .43 .50
Protective .44 .09 .43 .16 .41
Innovative .06 .78 .08 -.05 .62
Inventive .06 .77 .25 -.11 .67
Curious .19 .76 .33 -.10 .74
Playful -.19 .75 .20 -.06 .64
Inquisitive .05 .72 .29 .04 .61
Active .20 .70 .13 .12 .56
Impulsive .26 .64 -.42 -.07 .66
Imitative -.03 .63 .35 .38 .67
Reckless .40 .60 -.27 -.07 .59
Jealous .55 .57 .02 .03 .63
Defiant .39 .56 -.26 .29 .62
Distractable -.37 .49 -.08 .05 .39
Individualistic .04 .47 -.30 .22 .36
Conventional -.04 -.46 .14 -.21 .27
Gentle -.25 -.01 .81 -.09 .73
Affectionate .03 .30 .80 -.15 .75
Sympathetic .03 .31 .71 -.22 .65
Friendly -.16 .49 .69 -.17 .77
Irritable .36 .11 -.69 .00 .62
Sociable .31 .37 .65 -.13 .68
Excitable .13 .44 -.60 .04 .57
Solitary -.19 -.09 -.57 .29 .45
Helpful .22 .34 .56 -.09 .49
Stable .26 -.30 .50 -.31 .50
Disorganized -.31 .07 -.05 .79 .72
Unperceptive -.01 -.01 -.11 .76 .59
Erratic .03 .31 -.14 .76 .69
Clumsy -.01 -.12 -.10 .74 .58
Autistic -.20 .20 -.09 .74 .64
Depressed -.32 -.02 -.32 .70 .70
Unemotional .10 -.21 .40 .68 .68
Anxious -.56 .09 -.20 .67 .82
Sensitive -.19 -.01 .14 -.60 .42
Thoughtless .32 .42 -.02 .45 .49
Lazy -.32 -.38 -.20 .05 .29
Cool .37 -.20 .38 -.02 .32
Table 2.2: Japanese macaque personality domain loadings from a principal components anal-
ysis using orthogonal rotation. Salient loadings (≥ |.40|) are bolded. Dom = dominance, Opn
= openness, Frd = friendliness, Anx = anxiety. h2 = communalities.
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Cnf Opp Frd Opn h2
Dependent/follower -.91 .02 .03 .02 .82
Independent .91 .17 .18 -.13 .90
Dominant .90 .19 .06 -.11 .86
Distractable -.90 .03 -.08 .12 .84
Fearful -.90 -.06 -.06 -.2 .86
Stable .89 -.08 .19 .14 .85
Vulnerable -.88 -.25 -.23 -.07 .90
Timid -.86 -.24 -.27 -.04 .87
Intelligent .85 -.21 .06 .04 .77
Anxious -.84 -.07 -.23 -.15 .79
Submissive -.83 -.24 -.01 .12 .76
Quitting -.82 .08 -.02 .04 .69
Cool .82 -.06 .22 .11 .73
Clumsy -.81 .21 -.06 -.06 .70
Decisive .79 .06 .09 -.20 .67
Manipulative .77 .13 .11 -.09 .64
Persistent .76 .40 .23 .04 .79
Disorganized -.72 .38 .20 .07 .70
Excitable -.71 .10 .13 -.43 .71
Unemotional .68 .17 -.28 .32 .67
Cautious -.57 -.52 -.25 -.17 .69
Thoughtless -.53 .31 .08 .22 .44
Erratic -.52 .43 -.23 -.16 .53
Protective .51 -.46 .23 .17 .56
Helpful .48 -.32 .48 .07 .57
Unperceptive -.45 .23 -.43 .14 .46
Jealous .31 .73 .16 .00 .65
Impulsive -.30 .72 .10 .02 .61
Stingy/greedy .43 .70 .23 -.19 .77
Reckless -.01 .68 .08 .15 .50
Gentle -.17 -.66 .30 .23 .61
Predictable .14 -.65 -.12 .04 .45
Sympathetic .15 -.64 .28 -.16 .53
Aggressive .59 .62 .03 .08 .74
Bullying .57 .61 .20 -.19 .77
Individualistic .15 .58 .18 -.06 .40
Conventional .01 -.53 .05 -.14 .31
Sensitive .19 -.47 .43 -.23 .49
Sociable .28 .14 .83 -.08 .78
Friendly -.06 -.36 .75 .18 .73
Solitary -.36 -.28 -.71 .13 .73
Affectionate -.07 -.12 .70 -.20 .54
Depressed -.35 -.21 -.66 .13 .62
Playful -.20 .22 .62 .33 .58
Active .01 .50 .62 .26 .70
Autistic -.38 -.17 -.56 .39 .64
Lazy -.23 -.27 -.52 -.37 .53
Imitative -.22 .23 -.09 .79 .73
Innovative .15 -.03 -.12 .76 .61
Inventive .31 -.04 -.17 .72 .65
Irritable -.14 .30 -.22 -.59 .50
Inquisitive -.13 .44 .08 .55 .52
Curious -.19 .27 .44 .52 .57
Defiant .36 .38 .24 .13 .35
Table 2.3: Barbary macaque personality domain loadings from a principal components anal-
ysis using orthogonal rotation. Salient loadings (≥ |.40|) are bolded. Cnf = confidence, Opp
= opportunistic , Frd = friendliness, Opn = Openness. h2 = communalities.
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Cnf Act Opn Frd Opp h2
Dependent/follower -.86 .15 -.15 .10 -.23 .84
Anxious -.85 -.31 .12 -.06 .07 .85
Vulnerable -.82 -.21 .05 -.09 -.20 .76
Fearful -.80 .09 .07 .03 -.02 .66
Timid -.80 -.23 .03 -.05 -.15 .72
Submissive -.80 -.02 -.01 .06 -.36 .76
Dominant .77 -.06 .08 -.01 .51 .86
Independent .74 -.22 .21 -.21 .05 .68
Decisive .73 -.12 .19 .08 .37 .72
Protective .71 -.25 -.06 .41 .22 .79
Quitting -.64 -.37 .08 -.19 .06 .59
Clumsy -.59 -.26 .36 .30 .04 .64
Intelligent .59 .07 .02 .44 .13 .57
Reckless -.58 -.17 .56 -.16 -.17 .73
Lazy .09 -.84 -.16 -.26 .09 .81
Stable .06 -.77 -.23 .06 -.45 .85
Unemotional .06 -.76 -.33 -.09 -.16 .72
Depressed -.41 -.72 .07 -.36 -.10 .83
Cool .35 -.66 -.11 .00 -.18 .60
Predictable -.21 -.62 -.15 .27 .08 .53
Active -.20 .62 .48 .34 -.11 .79
Playful -.27 .56 .49 .40 -.18 .81
Cautious -.30 -.53 -.29 -.27 -.03 .53
Persistent .45 -.46 .43 .18 .28 .71
Unperceptive -.33 -.35 .33 -.15 -.10 .37
Thoughtless .01 .09 .79 .03 .08 .64
Conventional -.11 -.36 -.73 -.12 -.08 .69
Innovative .13 .07 .71 .18 .02 .56
Distractable -.27 .14 .68 -.02 .09 .57
Inventive .26 .28 .65 .15 -.08 .60
Erratic -.20 .15 .60 -.22 .41 .64
Individualistic .44 -.20 .56 -.28 .08 .64
Impulsive .06 .36 .56 .16 .52 .74
Excitable -.48 .44 .53 -.07 .18 .74
Disorganized -.44 .22 .47 .19 .11 .51
Helpful .24 .06 .00 .90 .10 .87
Affectionate -.10 .20 -.03 .84 -.22 .80
Sympathetic -.03 -.25 .07 .83 -.20 .80
Sociable .24 .45 .19 .72 .05 .81
Friendly -.20 .30 -.08 .70 -.41 .79
Solitary -.20 -.53 -.20 -.63 -.05 .77
Curious .06 .44 .55 .63 .12 .91
Inquisitive -.01 .34 .45 .62 .26 .76
Sensitive -.07 .04 -.08 .60 .14 .40
Jealous .25 -.12 -.14 .05 .83 .79
Stingy/greedy .20 -.24 -.22 .04 .82 .81
Bullying .31 .23 .26 -.10 .78 .84
Aggressive .37 .15 .29 -.04 .77 .83
Irritable -.11 .29 .37 -.19 .73 .79
Manipulative -.54 .03 .18 .12 .64 .74
Gentle -.23 -.41 .08 .53 -.60 .86
Defiant .16 .44 .47 .03 .50 .69
Imitative -.39 .32 -.12 -.04 -.17 .29
Autistic -.07 .11 -.19 -.32 .24 .21
Table 2.4: Assamese macaque personality domain loadings from a principal components
analysis using orthogonal rotation. Salient loadings (≥ |.40|) are bolded. Cnf = Confidence,
Act = Activity, Opn = Openness, Frd = friendliness, Opp = Opportunistic. h2 = communali-
ties.
2.5. PERSONALITY STRUCTURE 67
Japanese macaque Barbary macaque Assamese macaque
Dom Opn Frd Anx Cnf Opp Frd Opn Cnf Act Opn Frd Opp
Rhesus
Dom .82 .58 -.27 .03 .65 .77 .35 -.10 .68 .28 .50 .06 .91
Cnf .89 -.01 .20 -.49 .98 .29 .30 .06 .94 -.04 -.22 .09 .34
Frd .45 .35 .84 -.39 .65 -.02 .77 .02 .42 .54 .15 .93 .16
Opn .33 .94 .22 .19 -.22 .43 .16 .83 .11 .74 .82 .65 .39
Anx -.32 .33 -.46 .58 -.87 .09 -.15 -.11 -.44 .42 .60 .06 .39
Act .20 .75 .25 .00 .27 .62 .70 .47 .01 .94 .60 .54 .11
Chimpanzee
Dom .99 .36 .05 -.20 .94 .48 .35 .03 .93 .20 .21 .20 .72
Ext .30 .61 .75 -.10 .24 .29 .98 .34 -.02 .85 .39 .86 .01
Agr .23 .26 .85 -.31 .38 -.57 .27 -.02 .27 -.03 -.15 .70 -.14
Neu -.07 .24 -.62 .08 -.85 -.13 -.07 -.27 -.12 .83 .72 .32 .41
Opn .24 .86 .37 .06 .07 .35 .08 .85 .20 .69 .68 .75 .31
Con -.28 -.74 .34 -.54 .39 -.70 -.09 -.05 -.16 -.57 -.84 -.25 -.72
Orang-utan
Ext .29 .82 .28 -.01 .06 .60 .75 .52 -.01 .95 .60 .64 .21
Dom .90 .57 -.13 -.04 .70 .78 .34 -.01 .72 .28 .38 .09 .94
Agr .30 .38 .86 -.26 .41 -.24 .72 .05 .29 .40 .02 .90 .03
Neu -.68 .17 -.46 .63 -.96 -.15 -.32 -.16 -.71 .26 .49 -.09 .02
Int .78 .20 .20 -.64 .96 .12 .16 -.08 .91 -.05 -.10 -.06 .37
Table 2.5: Correlations between unit-weighted scores for macaques as defined by the species
structures and rhesus macaque and chimpanzee structures. Bold indicates significance at
p < .001. Dom = dominance, Opn = openness, Frd = Friendliness, Anx = Anxiety, Cnf =
confidence, Opp = opportunistic, Act = activity.
nent resembled the rhesus macaque confidence dimensions (Stevenson-Hinde & Zunz, 1978;
Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011) but also shared some features with rhesus macaque
dominance (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011). Unit-weighted domain scores corre-
lated positively with scores on rhesus macaque dominance, confidence, and friendliness and
negatively with anxiety (Table 2.5). Scores also correlated positively and negatively with
chimpanzee dominance and neuroticism. This component also strongly resembled orang-
utan neuroticism (reversed) and confidence and had weaker correlates with both dominance
and agreeableness. However, while this component had a high loading from the item dom-
inant, it did not resemble rhesus macaque dominance in not having many items related to
aggressive behavior, which instead loaded on the second component. I therefore named this
component ‘confidence’.
The second component was composed of items related to the positive (gentle, sympathetic)
and negative (jealous, aggressive, bullying) poles of agreeableness in humans (Goldberg, 1990).
It also had high loadings from human conscientiousness-like items such as reckless. Individ-
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uals high on this dimension would be aggressive toward conspecifics. Low scorers would
be constrained and supportive in social relations. The items in this component resembled
rhesus macaque dominance and activity and chimpanzee and orang-utan dominance (Table
2.5). Unit-weighted domains scores also correlated negatively with chimpanzee agreeable-
ness and conscientiousness. Because this component related to forceful behavior but without
the controlled Machiavellianism of dominance or confidence, I named this component ‘op-
portunism’.
The third component was similar to human agreeableness (items like friendly and affection-
ate) and to human extraversion (sociable, solitary, active). High scorers would seek out social
affiliation while low scorers would be more solitary. It thus resembled the sociable–solitary
(Stevenson-Hinde & Zunz, 1978; Capitanio, 1999) and friendliness domains (Weiss, Adams,
Widdig, & Gerald, 2011) in rhesus macaques, particularly in being a blend of extraversion-
and agreeableness-like features. This component did indeed correlate with rhesus macaque
friendliness when compared using domain scores (Table 2.5). It also correlated with rhesus
macaque activity and orang-utan extraversion and agreeableness. It most resembled chim-
panzee extraversion. I named this component ‘friendliness’.
The fourth component was characterized primarily by positive loadings on items related
to human openness (McCrae & Costa, 1985), such as innovative and curious. High scorers
would therefore be high on exploratory behavior. Domain scores revealed this component
to be similar to rhesus macaque and chimpanzee openness but it also shared some features
with rhesus macaque activity and orang-utan extraversion (Table 2.5). It did not resemble
orang-utan intellect. I therefore named this component ‘openness’.
Assamese macaques
The parallel analysis suggested that five components be retained (eigenvalues = 14.0, 10.4,
5.6, 3.7, and 3.4) which agreed with an examination of the screeplot (Fig. 2.4c). Item loadings
for the Assamese macaque structure are listed in Table 2.4.
After reflection the first component was chiefly defined by items related to human neu-
roticism (Goldberg, 1990), such as negatively by anxious and vulnerable and positively by inde-
pendent. It also had positive loadings from items decisive and intelligent and negative loadings
from items quitting and reckless related to human conscientiousness (Goldberg, 1990). The
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loadings on dominant and submissive also suggested human agreeableness. Monkeys scor-
ing high on this domain could therefore be described as competent in meeting challenges
in their environment. Individuals scoring low on this component would display anxiety
across a variety of situations. Items making up this component were similar in nature to
the confidence dimensions in rhesus macaques (Stevenson-Hinde & Zunz, 1978; Capitanio,
1999; Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011). Domain scores from unit-weighted loadings
correlated positively with rhesus macaque dominance and confidence and negatively with
anxiety (Table 2.5). It was also highly similar to chimpanzee and orang-utan dominance and
correlated positively and negatively with orang-utan intellect and neuroticism. However, like
with the Barbary macaques, this component was not strongly characterized by items related
to the negative pole of human agreeableness. I therefore named this component ’confidence’.
After reflecting the second component, it had negative loadings from items related to
human neuroticism (stable, unemotional) and to human conscientiousness (lazy, persistent). It
was also defined positively by two items, active and playful, related to extraversion in humans
(Goldberg, 1990). High scorers would therefore be active but stable when engaging with their
enviroment while low scorers would be more cautious and less energetic. This component
was similar to activity in rhesus macaques (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011) and
correlated positively with domain scores on rhesus macaque activity as well as friendliness
and openness. Domain scores also correlated positively with chimpanzee neuroticism and
openness and negatively with conscientiousness; and highly resembled scores on orang-utan
extraversion. Given its similarity to the rhesus macaque domains, I named this component
‘activity’.
The third component had items, such as innovative and inventive, related to the positive
pole of human openness (Costa & McCrae, 1992c). It also had negative markers of human
conscientiousness, such as distractable and disorganized. High scorers would thus be novel
yet erratic in their behavior whereas low scorers might be more typical. This domain was
therefore similar to both rhesus macaque openness and activity. The domain scores also
revealed that it was similar to anxiety in rhesus macaques and was positively correlated with
domain scores on chimpanzee neuroticism and openness and negatively with chimpanzee
conscientiousness. This component also resembled orang-utan extraversion and neuroticism
but not intellect. Given its similarity to the rhesus and chimpanzee domains, I named this










Opn -.04 .11 -.08
Assamese macaque
Cnf Act Opn Frd
Act .01
Opn -.00 .28
Frd .07 .21 -.11
Opp .24 .17 .27 -.08
Table 2.6: Intercorrelations for components derived via promax rotation. Act = activity, Anx
= anxiety, Cnf = confidence, Frd = Friendliness, Opn = openness, Opp = opportunism.
component ‘openness’.
The fourth component showed the same blend of agreeableness- (helpful, affectionate) and
extraversion-like items (sociable, (not) solitary) as friendliness in rhesus macaques (Weiss,
Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011). Domain scores correlated positively with rhesus macaque
friendliness, openness, and activity and with chimpanzee and orang-utan extraversion and
agreeableness (Table 2.5). I therefore named this component ‘friendliness’.
The last component was defined by items, such as stingy/greedy, bullying, and irritable,
that characterize the negative pole of human agreeableness. It was similar in content to the
Barbary macaque opportunism dimension and likewise correlated positively with domain
scores on rhesus, chimpanzee, and orang-utan dominance and negatively with chimpanzee
conscientiousness (Table 2.5). I therefore labeled this component ‘opportunism’.
Oblique rotations
To examine the correlations among the macaque personality dimensions, I extracted the num-
ber of components as above but subjected them to a promax rotation. The dimensions for
each species were only weakly intercorrelated, with the maximum not greater than |.30| (Ta-
ble 2.6).
Domain reliabilities
I measured the agreement among raters on personality domain scores using the ICC(3, 1)
and ICC(3, k) reliability coefficients (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). I calculated domain scores using
unit-weighting on each rater’s assessment of the subjects using mean substitution on missing
scores. Because only the Japanese and Assamese macaque samples had a sufficient number
of raters per subject, I only calculated intraclass correlation coefficients for these two species
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ICC(3, 1) ICC(3, k) α
Japanese macaque
Dominance .67 .74 .92
Openness .61 .68 .90
Friendliness .37 .45 .87
Anxiety .73 .79 .89








Confidence .60 .89 .94
Activity .51 .85 .90
Openness .27 .68 .88
Friendliness .38 .77 .90
Opportunism .32 .72 .91
Table 2.7: Interrater reliabilities (ICC[3, 1] and ICC[3, k]), and internal consistencies (Cron-
bach’s alpha) of personality and subjective well-being domains scores.
(Table 2.7). For Japanese macaques, the interrater reliabilities ranged from poor (friendliness)
to good (dominance, anxiety). For the Assamese macaques, reliabilities ranged from poor
(openness) to excellent (confidence, activity). I also calculated internal reliabilities for per-
sonality and subjective well-being domains scores via Cronbach’s alpha. Domain scores on
the personality dimensions had excellent reliability (Table 2.7).
2.6 Subjective well-being
I conducted a principal components analysis on subjective well-being for the two species,
Japanese and Barbary macaques, that had been rated on this questionnaire (the Assamese
macaques had not been rated on subjective well-being). As all but one of the Barbary
macaque sample had been assessed by only one rater, I calculated the item reliabilities only
for the Japanese macaque sample. The item reliabilities for scores from a single rater (ICC[3,
1]) were .32 for moods, .61 for social, .76 for goals, and .71 for be. The average was .60. The
reliabilities from average scores from multiple raters (ICC[3, k]) were .40 for moods, .40 for
social, .82 for goals, and .77 for be. The average was .67. I used all of the items even though
the reliability for one item, moods, was poor.
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A parallel analysis for the average scores of each Japanese macaque on the subjective
well-being items indicated that one component should be retained (eigenvalue = 3.4). All the
items had a high, positive loading on this single component (Table 2.8), which explained 85%
of the variation in the scores. A parallel analysis on the Barbary macaques also indicated a
single dimension to describe the subjective well-being scores (eigenvalue = 3.5) and all items
loaded positively, explaining 88% of the variance. Domain scores on subjective well-being
had acceptable interrater reliability for Japanese macaques (Table 2.7). Internal consistency
of the subjective well-being scale was excellent for both Japanese and Barbary macaques.
Personality correlates
I calculated correlations among personality and subject well-being for Japanese and Bar-
bary macaques using unit-weighted domain scores (Table 2.9). Japanese macaques who were
higher on dominance and friendliness and lower on anxiety were higher on subjective well-
being. Barbary macaques higher on confidence, opportunism, and friendliness were also
rated higher on subjective well-being. This mirrors results for rhesus macaques, where in-
dividuals high on confidence and friendliness and lower on anxiety had higher subjective
well-being (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011).
Moods Social Goals Be
Japanese macaque .90 .93 .90 .95
Barbary macaque .94 .94 .91 .96




Dominance .63 .48, .76 < .001
Openness .13 -.10, .35 .27
Friendliness .33 .11, .52 .003
Anxiety -.60 -.74, -.44 < .001
Barbary macaque
Confidence .88 .81, .92 < .001
Opportunism .25 .01, .47 .05
Friendliness .59 .41, .74 .001
Openness -.04 -.29, .21 .74
Table 2.9: Correlations among domain scores on personality and subjective well-being. CI =
95% confidence interval.
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2.7 Personality domains as fuzzy sets
The examination of item content and unit-weighted domains scores show that macaques ap-
pear to be consistent in having distinct friendliness and openness domains while differing
slightly in the composition of the other domains. Facets of human agreeableness and neu-
roticism and chimpanzee dominance and neuroticism appear in the various dominance, op-
portunism, confidence, and anxiety dimensions in rhesus, Japanese, Barbary, and Assamese
macaques. King and Weiss (2011) point out that, although the items making up a domain
will vary among species, the domains will still be distinct from other domains within each
species. A domain can therefore be conceptualized as a “fuzzy set” of items. Rather than
yes/no inclusion, a fuzzy set allows sets to be defined in terms of each item’s continuous
probability of being included (Zedeh, 1965; Smithson & Verkuilen, 2006). This property of
membership is referred to as degree-vagueness. I used fuzzy set theory in an attempt to
formalize this conception proposed by King and Weiss (2011).
A membership function is used to assign an object (in this case, a personality item) to a
set (a personality domain). The membership function maps the object onto the unit interval,
from 0 to 1 (Smithson & Verkuilen, 2006)
mK(i) : H → [0, 1] (2.1)
H is space of HPQ items, H = {fearful, dominant, persistent, . . . , independent}, and mK(i) is
the mapping function of item i onto personality dimension K. Because the loading of an item
onto a personality component (vi) is between -1 and +1, one possible mapping function is the
absolute value of the loading
mK(i) = |vi| (2.2)
If we take the fuzzy value for membership as a probability, we could invent other membership
functions. For example, I have used .4 as the salience cutoff out of tradition. Thus, it might
be reasonable to take a loading of .35 to represent an item that, while not ‘in’ the personality
domain, is not entirely out of it either. A membership function
m(i) = logit−1(20 log(2)(|vi| − 0.35)) (2.3)
for example would map a loading of |.35| onto a membership value of .5, that is a 50% prob-
ability of being in the set. A loading of |.4| would map onto 67% probability of membership,
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while vi = |.5| → .89 and vi = |.8| → .998. However, for the purposes of this analysis, the
only property that will be necessary for the membership function is that the resulting mem-
bership value relates monotonically to the loading (that is, the loadings can be compared in
terms of being lesser than or greater than), not that they exactly frame our intuitions about
the probability that an item belongs to a personality domain. Therefore I will use the simpler
membership function defined in Equation 2.2, which also means that the outputs of the set
functions are understandable as loadings.
Items supporting each personality domain
The shared support that each item has for two or more personality domains from different
species can be determined by making a fuzzy intersection between the sets, where a set con-
tains information on the membership of each item in a personality domain. A membership
of an item in the fuzzy intersection between two personality domains X and Y, X ∩ Y, is
mX∩Y = min(mX , mY) (2.4)
which in effect gets the lowest loading (or, more precisely, the value closest to 0) of each item
on the two components. For example, the memberships of each item in Japanese macaque
dominance would be
Dj = {fearful/.81, dominant/.93, persistent/.61, . . . , independent/.63}
where fearful/.81 denotes that the degree of membership of the item fearful in dominance is
.81. The set for Barbary macaque confidence would be
Cb = {fearful/.90, dominant/.90, persistent/.76, . . . , independent/.91}
and their fuzzy intersection is
Dj ∩ Cb = {fearful/.81, dominant/.90, persistent/.61, . . . , independent/.63}
I named the sets for each domain as D = dominance, C = confidence, F = friendliness, O
= openness, X = anxiety, T = activity, and P = opportunism. I used the subscripts r, j,
b, and a for rhesus, Japanese, Barbary, and Assamese macaques, respectively. I used |.30|
as a lenient cutoff for considering an item saliently included in the fuzzy sets. I used
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fuzzy set theory to differentiate semantically similar domains (confidence/dominance, dom-
inance/opportunism, confidence/anxiety) and to determine what items described the do-
mains that were found in all species (friendliness, openness).
Dominance/confidence
I used fuzzy intersection to find items uniquely defining the confidence and dominance do-
mains in rhesus macaques, the dominance in Japanese macaques, and confidence in Barbary
and Assamese macques. The fuzzy intersection for confidence-like domains for macaques,
CM, was
CM = Cr ∩ Dj ∩ Cb ∩ Ca
while for dominance-like domains was
DM = Dr ∩ Dj ∩ Cb ∩ Ca
Both the dominance and confidence domains were described by the item dominant (Table
2.10). However, the dominance set had a much higher loading than the confidence set on
this item (.64 versus .50). The confidence set was defined best by the items (not) submissive,
(not) fearful, and (not) timid. It was also different from the dominance set by having higher
membership for the items anxious and depressed. The dominance set was separable from
confidence by items related to aggressiveness and Machiavellianism (manipulative, aggressive,
bullying).
Dominance/opportunism
Barbary and Assamese macaques had a domain, opportunism, related to the negative pole
of agreeableness that defined items related to dominance in other species. I therefore con-
structed the intersection
PM = Dr ∩ Dj ∩ Pb ∩ Pa
which had the greatest membership for the items aggressive, bullying, and stingy/greedy (Table
2.10). Opportunism thus differs from the more inclusive dominance domain by describing
aggression without behavioral aspects related to social potency, such as dominant, manipula-
tive, and protective.
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Confidence/anxiety
In rhesus macaques the separation between confidence and anxiety was described as repre-
senting reactions to situation-specific versus more generalized reactions to stressors. I looked
at the intersection of anxiety in rhesus and Japanese macaques with confidence in Barbary
and Assamese macaques
XM = Xr ∩ Xj ∩ Cb ∩ Ca
Both the confidence and anxiety sets were described by the items anxious, vulnerable, and fear-
ful (Table 2.10). Interestingly, both sets included an item related to human conscientiousness:
disorganized in the case of the confidence set and quitting in the case of the anxiety set.
Friendliness
The fuzzy intersection of the friendliness domains
FM = Fr ∩ Fj ∩ Fb ∩ Fa
showed that the items that had good support of friendliness across species were describing
both extraversion- (sociable, solitary) and agreeableness-like (affectionate, friendly, helpful) facets
(Table 2.10). I then intersected the macaque friendliness set (FM) with chimpanzee extraver-
sion (ECH) and agreeableness (ACH) defined using loadings from a study that used the same
HPQ items (Weiss et al., 2009):
FM ∩ ECH = {sociable/.63, solitary/−.52, depressed/−.32, . . .}
FM ∩ ACH = {affectionate/.70, sociable/.56, friendly/.56, gentle/.30, . . .}
The chimpanzee/macaque extraversion set (FM ∩ ECH) and agreeableness set (FM ∩ ACH)
were both well supported by the item sociable but were differentiated by the membership of
the other items.
Openness
A fuzzy intersection between the four openness domains
OM = Or ∩ Oj ∩ Ob ∩ Oa
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Table 2.10: Membership of items in fuzzy intersections of personality domains for the four
macaque species. Membership values have been reassigned their positive and negative va-
lence so that the direction of the loading can be interpreted. D = dominance, C = confidence,
F = friendliness, O = openness, X = anxiety, T = activity, and P = opportunism. Kr = rhesus
macaque, Kj = Japanese macaque, Kb = Barbary macaque, Ka = Assamese macaque.
was supported by the membership of a common set of items related to exploratory behavior,
such as inventive and inquisitive (Table 2.10).
2.8 From items to building blocks to dimensions and taxonomies, and beyond
Observer ratings on 54 personality items could be reduced to the following dimensions in
three species of macaque:
• Japanese macaque: dominance, openness, friendliness, and anxiety.
• Barbary macaque: confidence, opportunism, friendliness, openness.
• Assamese macaque: confidence, activity, openness, friendliness, and opportunism.
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I compared these dimensions with rhesus macaque dimensions derived from ratings on the
same personality questionnaire, which were confidence, openness, dominance, friendliness,
activity, and anxiety. There was variation in the number of components, ranging from four
to six, that described correlations among the personality items.
The personality structure differed between macaque species in several respects. Aspects
related to the great ape personality domains of dominance and neuroticism were found in
various configurations in macaques, with different aspects being captured by dominance,
confidence, anxiety and opportunism. The dominance facet described behavioral disposi-
tions to intervene decisively in social interactions and the tendency to take actions without
interference from other individuals. This facet was not as strongly characterized by items re-
lated to aggression and intimidation and was instead better described by the item protective,
suggesting that one aspects of the dominance facet in macaques is the tendency to intervene
on behalf of other individuals (Chapais, 2004). The dominance facet appeared as part of the
dominance domain in rhesus and Japanese macaques and as part of confidence domain in
Barbary and Assamese macaques.
Appearing as part of the dominance domain in rhesus and Japanese macaques and as
a separate dimension in Barbary and Assamese macaques, behaviors relating to aggression
were subsumed under the opportunism facet. In addition to aggressive behaviors, this facet
was also supported by the membership of the items defiant, irritable, stingy/greedy, jealous. This
suggests that this facet is not just about aggression but also describes a behavioral pattern
that runs counter to the established dominance hierarchy and that the antagonism may be
part of lashing out at other individuals.
In contrast to the dominance facet, which described how macaques act, the facets of con-
fidence and anxiety seemed to capture how individuals react to different kinds of situations.
The confidence facet, which appeared as its own dimension in rhesus but was combined with
the dominance facet in Japanese, Barbary, and Assamese macaques, primarily described an
individual’s reaction in specific situations involving other animals. The item showing the
greatest support, submissive, describes whether an individual is likely to yield to others and
thus the other items appear to describe the level of anxiety and distress that this provokes.
Only in rhesus macaques, however, did this facet vary independently from the dominance
facet. The anxiety facet likewise appeared as its own dimension in rhesus and Japanese
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macaques but was part of the confidence dimensions of Barbary and Assamese macaques
and differed from dominance/confidence facets by not tying in specifically with behaviors
related to the social order. It was also revealing that the scores on macaque dominance and
confidence dimensions correlated highly with scores on orang-utan intellect. Orang-utan in-
tellect has been described as a blend of openness and conscientiousness (Weiss et al., 2006)
but the macaque results suggest it may be an ancestral facet related more to decisiveness and
independence.
Friendliness was the dimension that was most uniquely characteristic of macaques when
compared with apes. Friendliness contained a facet similar to chimpanzee agreeableness
in only containing items related to the positive pole of the human trait that Weiss, Adams,
Widdig, and Gerald (2011) dubbed altruism but was also characterized by a sociability facet
describing the sociable–solitary axis of behavior. Friendliness thus does describe a blended
personality domain containing two facets that have become uncoupled in other species and its
definition using behavioral adjectives is consistent across four different species of macaques.
Openness was unsurprisingly supported by the membership of a consistent set of items
that is likely a general feature of primate personality (Freeman & Gosling, 2010). Rather than
it being a limitation of the behavioral repertoire of captive macaques, previous studies of
rhesus macaque personality (Stevenson-Hinde & Zunz, 1978; Stevenson-Hinde et al., 1980;
Bolig et al., 1992; Capitanio, 1999) did not uncover this dimension because the questionnaires
used did not contain the relevant items (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011). There
was nothing that distinguished macaque openness from the dimension as described in other
species. For example, even though the item playful is part of chimpanzee extraversion, it often
has cross-loadings on to openness (Weiss et al., 2007, 2009).
Phylogeny and social ecology
While the phylogenetic relationship among rhesus, Japanese, and Assamese macaques is
ambiguous, they are more closely related to each other than to Barbary macaques. Bar-
bary macaques may also be the best representatives of the ancestral state of social behav-
iors for macaques (Thierry et al., 2000). If personality is partly an adaptation to social
factors (D. M. Buss, 1996; D. M. Buss & Greiling, 1999) then we might expect Barbary
macaque personality structure to also be closest to the ancestral state. If this is the case
80 CHAPTER 2. BUILDING BLOCKS
then the ancestors of macaques would have differed from each other in terms of a com-
bined dominance/confidence dimension related to social assertiveness, an opportunism di-
mension defined by aggression and impulsivity, a friendliness dimension capturing indi-
vidual differences in social affiliation, and an openness dimension related to curiosity and
exploratory behavior. The appearance of separate dominance and anxiety (in rhesus and
Japanese macaques) and activity (in rhesus and Assamese macaques) would then be derived
characters.
Although Japanese macaques may be more genetically related to Assamese macaques,
they have a greater resemblance to rhesus macaques in terms of social patterns (Thierry,
2000; Thierry et al., 2000). Macaques have been divided into four grades that capture species
differences in behavioral patterns of aggression, dominance, reconciliation, and temperament
(Thierry, 2000). The grades range from tolerant societies (grade 4) to nepotistic societies
(grade 1). Rhesus and Japanese macaques are classified as grade 1 and exhibit highly asym-
metrical dominance encounters while Barbary macaques are grade 3 and Assamese macaques
are classified as grade 2 or 3 (Thierry, 2000, 2007). Both Barbary and Assamese macaques had
a dimension called opportunism that was independent of confidence. What could be going
on is that, when the dominance hierarchy is relaxed, there is the opportunity for agonistic
behaviors to vary independently from dominance and submissiveness. This makes sense in
light of the “degrees of freedom” individuals from these species enjoy in their social net-
work (Butovskaya, 2004). Individuals are less constrained in their friendly interactions and
have more frequent affiliative encounters with nonkin. Aggressive encounters likewise occur
without involving coalitions, so these behaviors are free to vary apart from each other. On
the other hand, when the hierarchy is more strict, the only adaptive strategy is for aggression
to covary with other behaviors related to social competence and manipulativeness. Japanese
and rhesus macaques have greater kin bias among females (Thierry et al., 2000) so individuals
can rely more on kin support during conflicts (Thierry et al., 2008). The dominance asymme-
tries entailed require individuals to be able to form coalitions (Thierry et al., 2008), so both
aggressiveness and social competence are required. For example, male Japanese macaques
that could not maintain dominance on their own are able to do so with support from females
(Nakamichi, Kojima, Itoigawa, Imakawa, & Machida, 1995) or in coalitions with other males
(Kutsukake & Hasegawa, 2005).
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Japanese macaques societies, furthermore, are matrilocal (Kawamura, 1958), meaning that
females tend to stay within their natal group while males migrate to new groups. Female
Japanese macaques form stable coalitions with matrilineal kin (Pereira, 1995). Foraging is
restricted by the patchiness of their primary food sources (van Shaik, 1989; Saito, 1996). The
limited availability of food and the attendant high within-group feeding competition leads
to a strict dominance hierarchy in females (Saito, 1996). When food patches are small and
isolated, the frequency of agonistic encounters increases. Females that are able to dominate
opponents retain access to more desirable foods. The losers in these agonistic encounters
are forced to switch to patches containing less nutritious items. If dominance rank requires
maintaining kin coalitions through both fighting ability and social assertiness, than oppor-
tunistic and aggressive individuals that lack social support could be at a fitness disadvantage
if they persist when they are on the losing side. While the dominance personality trait is not
the same thing as rank, they may vary together (Anestis, 2005), and thus in rigid hierarchies
it would be adaptive for vulnerable, submissive individuals to also be lower on aggression
as well. Otherwise, the overly aggressive individual is likely to suffer consequences to fit-
ness through injury (Parker, 1974). If the dominance gradient is less steep and reversals are
likely during aggressive encounters, it could be beneficial for an individual to be aggressive
independent of their confidence and social assertiveness and engage in agonistic encounters
more opportunistically. When dominance hierarchies are strict, aggression needs to be a
coordinated part of social manipulation to be adaptive (Western & Strum, 1983).
If an independent opportunism dimension represents the ancestral condition in macaques,
then this appears to have been retained in Assamese macaques, a species with a more relaxed
hierarchy (Cooper & Bernstein, 1999; Thierry et al., 2000). As Japanese macaques are more
closely related to Assamese macaques, the absence of a separate opportunism dimension in
rhesus and Japanese macaques may be parallel evolution. These species, with strict domi-
nance hierarchies, evolved similar but slightly different ‘solutions’ to blending opportunism
with other dimensions. In the case of Japanese macaques, opportunism blended with con-
fidence to form a single dominance dimension. For rhesus macaques, behaviors related to
aggression began to covary with other aspects of social assertiveness to form the dominance
dimension while neuroticism-like traits remained separate. In both species anxiety split off
as its own dimension.
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Completing the picture of how these different behavioral facets start or stop covarying
over evolutionary time will first require determining which of the macaque personality di-
mensions derived here generalize to other populations of the same species. The Barbary
macaques were assessed by only two raters, so it is possible that rater effects could have a
larger influence on the structure than is typical (Weiss et al., 2012). Ecological factors may also
play into the expression of individual behavioral tendencies as personality differences. While
Japanese macaques are classified as highly hierarhical, some of this could be the result of in-
creased aggression in provisioned populations that were used in the foundational studies of
this species (D. A. Hill, 1999). Wild (i.e., non-provisioned) troops of Japanese macaques such
as those on Yakushima, where I sampled two troops, show less linear dominance hierarchies
because of decreased food competition that results in less frequent aggression (D. A. Hill &
Okayasu, 1995). Within Yakushima, the dominance gradients do not differ as a function of
the environment (Hanya et al., 2008), so the M. f. yakui subspecies may be a good candidate
to study the adaptive conditions and evolutionary timeframes over which the opportunism
could start to vary independently of the confidence/dominance dimension. Further under-
standing will involve sampling both closely related species and more distantly related ones
that share aspects of social structure (Chapman & Rothman, 2009).
Covitality
In Japanese and Barbary macaques, ratings that assessed the balance of moods, pleasure from
social and affiliative interactions, the ability to achieve goals, and global well-being together
described a single subjective well-being domain as that found in humans (Diener et al., 1999),
chimpanzees (King & Landau, 2003), orang-utans (Weiss et al., 2006), and rhesus macaques
(Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011). In Japanese macaques the domain showed good
interrater reliability. Japanese macaque subjective well-being was related positvely to dom-
inance and negatively to anxiety while in Barbary macaques it was related to higher con-
fidence. In both Japanese and Barbary macaques, individuals higher in friendliness were
also higher in subjective well-being. Thus the relationship between positive affect and high
sociability and affiliation and low anxiety mirrored findings in humans (Steel et al., 2008),
chimpanzees (King & Landau, 2003; Weiss et al., 2009), orang-utans (Weiss et al., 2006), and
rhesus macaques (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011). This lends further support to
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a nexus of affect, neuroticism, and extraversion being present in the common ancestor of
Old World monkeys and great apes. Weiss et al. (2002) dubbed this subjective-well-being–
peronality nexus covitality. This basic relationship may underlie why different aspects of
mental health vary together, such as in the comorbidity of anxiety and depression (Kendler,
Gardner, Gatz, & Pedersen, 2007). Healthy psychological function may therefore be more
than the absence of mental illness (Keyes, 2005).
Phenotypic integration and imposition
The results here show that one of the advantages of assessing different species using the
same personality inventory can aid the comparison of similarites and differences in person-
ality structure. I have also demonstrated that the conceptualization to use fuzzy set theory
in understanding personality structure, first proposed by King and Weiss (2011), can yield
insights into the facets that describe different aspects of primate personality that appear in
different combinations depending upon the species. The prevelance of personality dimen-
sions range from those found in every species assessed, such as openness, to those that are
only found in a limited number of species, such as conscientiousness.
Finding a domain in a limited number of species is important for reasons beyond what it
tells us about the phylogenetic patterning of personality dimensions (Fig. 2.1). I did not find
any domains resembling chimpanzee or human conscientiousness as items defining these
domains instead described openness and opportunism in macaques. From the viewpoint
of making phylogenetic comparisons (Gosling & Graybeal, 2007), the absence of a macaque
conscientiousness dimension lends more support to the conclusion that conscientiousness is
a derived personality domain (Gosling & John, 1999) that is exclusive to chimpanzees and
humans (Weiss et al., 2006). Additionally, this result also speaks to the validity of using
personality questionnaires on nonhuman primates. For although the personality adjectives
used in the HPQ items are drawn from the human literature, they do not impose the five-
factor structure on nonhuman primates. If they did, we might expect nonhuman primate
personality structure to resemble that of humans even more than it does. That four species
of macaques resemble each other and differ from other primates in having an unhumanlike
friendliness domain suggests that adjective-based personality questionnaires modified from
those used on humans can give an accurate, if crude, rendering of personality structures that
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are phylogenetically informative. Given that the only workable and evolutionarily consistent
default assumption is that closely related species resemble each other, if there is anything
that instruments like the HPQ are not picking up in a particular species, attempts to measure
other dimensions of behavioral and affective variation should be grounded in the specific
behavior of the species under study (Uher, 2008a, 2011b). While one of the advantages of rater
impressions for personality assessment is that they smooth over within individual variation
(Freeman & Gosling, 2010), individuals may still be consistent (that is, differ from each other)
in the amount of variation they show across contexts (Uher et al., 2008; Uher, 2011b). Seasonal
variation and the mating season, for example, have strong effects on reconciliation behavior
in Japanese macaques (Majolo & Koyama, 2006) and this could provide different contexts for
the expression of personality and the evolution of individual differences in behavior.
Strong functional equivalences of adjective-derived personality dimensions across primate
species have yet to be firmly established (Uher, 2011b). The analysis of personality dimen-
sions as fuzzy sets can guide the development of models testing the structural equivalence of
dimensions across species because it can be used to determine facets that are being described
consistently across species even when they are obscured within a species through correlation
with other facets. The fuzzy set analysis also revealed that some items may be describing
different features of separate personality dimensions (e.g., dominant and vulnerable are both
descriptive of the confidence, dominance, and anxiety facets). Nonhuman primate person-
ality as assessed with the HPQ therefore does not appear to show simple structure, where
each item loads on one and only one dimension. Separating out the different ‘meanings’ of
these items will require adjective or coding approaches that are sensitive to the context of the
behavior (Uher & Asendorpf, 2008). This will serve as the basis for constructing personality
taxonomies that start from individual items or behaviors, determine how they fit together
as consistent facets, and how these facets covary within a population or species to compose
independent personality dimensions.
This comparative approach to personality dimensions also says something stronger about
personality domains as evolutionary characters. Why we should find these particular his-
torical patterning in primates or even whether we have the right “basic” dimensions are
big questions. When thinking about the evolution of personality dimensions, it might seem
strange at first to consider the evolution of something that describes differences between in-
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dividuals within a species rather than a species universal trait that can be used to distinguish
clades from each other. Extraversion, for instance, describes differences between individuals
in their sociality and action. Unlike a new behavior or organ, a personality dimension is not
an obvious thing that a single individual has. However, this thinking takes a rather narrow
view of what evolution is or how it affects populations. Selection does not act only on the
mean level of a trait. Evolutionary change can occur on higher moments (like variance, skew,
and kurtosis) of the population distribution of a trait as well as its covariance with other traits
(Rice, 2004). The genetic and environmental factors contributing to personality can start and
stop covarying as the population evolves. While the identification of basic and blended per-
sonality dimensions using adjective ratings method may or may not provide the right answer,
I believe it is asking the right question.

Chapter 3
Personality and life-history across nations
. . . the correlations among different presumed forms of development left some-
thing to be desired. Yet the nagging correlations persisted. It was somehow true,
on the average, that richer countries had higher life expectancy, larger shares of
the population in cities, greater literacy, smaller completed family sizes, more
durable institutions of parliamentary government, and so on, through a long list
of national characteristics not deducible by definition from national income.
Why? Although people confused the idea of “modernization” with an answer,
the word came to stand for a question: Why do these many characteristics vary
together, but only imperfectly?
Charles Tilly (1984, p. 45)
3.1 Cultures, personalities, and pace-of-life
While differing in countless ways, cultures can be classified by general styles of thinking
and acting (Hofstede, 2001). Culture-level attributes generally do not vary along the same
dimensions as individual differences (Na et al., 2010), but cultures can be differentiated by
aggregate scores on the personality traits that describe individual differences in cognition,
affect, and behaviour (McCrae, Terracciano, & 79 Members of the Personality Profiles of
Cultures Project, 2005). The challenge, however, is not only to describe these differences but
to explain why personality profiles of cultures differ and how they are distributed globally
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(Allik & McCrae, 2004). One intriguing possibility is that personality traits are related to
differences in life histories (LH), or the suite of biological traits involving timing, duration,
and investment in growth, reproduction, and survival (Biro & Stamps, 2008; Wolf et al., 2007).
Studies of human personality, however, have focused on either reproductive success and
fertility (Alvergne et al., 2010; Eaves et al., 1990; Jokela, Kivimaki, Elovainio, & Keltikangas-
Jarvinen, 2009; Jokela, Hintsa, Hintsanen, & Keltikangas-Jarvinen, 2010) or longevity (Kern
& Friedman, 2008; Friedman, Kern, & Reynolds, 2010) separately and not together as a single
LH dimension.
Although trade-offs in LH are categorized along a fast–slow continuum, in mammals they
actually occupy two dimensions: the first is between offspring size and offspring count and
the second concerns reproductive timing (Bielby et al., 2007). A predicted consequence of
position along the fast–slow continuum is the generation and maintenance of personality
(Biro & Stamps, 2008; Réale et al., 2010; Stamps, 2007; Wolf et al., 2007, see Sec. 1.2). To
optimize fitness, organisms should behave in tune with their LH strategy, so that a “slow”
strategy (e.g., low fertility, high life-expectancy) should be associated with behaviours that
consistently favour long-term fitness benefits, such as avoiding risk and being cooperative
(Wolf et al., 2007). Conversely, high levels of risk-taking, activity, and aggressiveness may
be required to fuel the high productivity of a “fast” LH strategy (Biro & Stamps, 2008).
Studies of animals have found empirical evidence in support of the connection between fast-
slow LH and personality (Biro & Stamps, 2008; Careau et al., 2009, 2010). The coordination of
personality and life-history traits may also be part of a larger pace-of-life syndrome involving
additional physiological variables (Réale et al., 2010).
One way that personality could become associated with LH traits at the population level
is through adaptive developmental plasticity (Bock, 1980) where personality and LH traits
become correlated because they are both sensitive to the same environmental cues during
ontogeny (Réale et al., 2010). Humans show some changes in personality as a response to
LH events such as an increase in emotionality and fluctuations in sociability after giving
birth (Jokela et al., 2009). Personality may be particularly sensitive during ontogeny as major
changes in metabolic and other physiological processes, such as growth, are already ongoing
(Stamps & Groothuis, 2010b, 2010a). To see whether personality had changed as a results of
shifts in LH at the population (country) level, I explored whether average personality scores
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varied consistently between subjects from different national cohorts that were born under
different LH conditions.
On the individual level, human personality dimensions have been theorized to relate to
LH strategies (Figueredo et al., 2005). There are co-variations among self-reported parental
investment, mating effort, and similar traits that indicate the presence of individual fast-slow
LH strategies. The slow LH end of this dimension correlates positively with extraversion,
openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness and negatively with neuroticism (Figueredo
et al., 2005; Gladden, Figueredo, & Jacobs, 2009). Personality also correlates with real fit-
ness outcomes. Neuroticism appears to interact with reproductive choices along the LH
continuum to determine reproductive success (Alvergne et al., 2010; Jokela et al., 2009).
Neuroticism also varies in its relationship with longevity, being protective against accidents
among the young (W. E. Lee, Wadsworth, & Hotopf, 2006) but a risk factor for mortality
later in life (Friedman et al., 2010). Conscientiousness is furthermore associated with greater
longevity in lower-fertility populations even when controlling for education and socioeco-
nomic status(Friedman et al., 2010). Because countries can be distinguished along the same
dimensions of personality and fertility/longevity trade-off that separate individuals, it may
prove insightful to explore connections between personality and LH strategy at the level of
human populations. I therefore investigated whether personality and LH strategy covary
between cultures and predicted that nations on the slower end of the LH continuum would
have higher average extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness and lower
neuroticism.
Culture-level personality profiles
The assessment of aggregate personality scores at the level of culture has been conducted
from several measurement frameworks, including the three dimensions from Eysenck’s Per-
sonality Questionnaire (EPQ; H. J. Eysenck & Eysenck S., 1975; Barrett & Eysenck, 1984;
Lynn & Martin, 1995) and five dimensions from the Revised NEO Personality Inventory
(NEO-PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992c; McCrae, 2002; McCrae, Terracciano, & 78 Members of
the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005; McCrae, Terracciano, & 79 Members of the
Personality Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005; McCrae et al., 2010) and the Big Five Inventory
(BFI; Benet-Martínez & John, 1998; Schmitt et al., 2007). These studies collected data on ado-
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lescents, college-aged students, or adults from 24–51 cultures. Across cultures women were
on average higher in all personality dimensions and for both sexes older individuals tended
to be lower in extraversion and openness and higher in conscientiousness (Costa, Terracciano,
& McCrae, 2001; McCrae, Terracciano, & 78 Members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures
Project, 2005).
The studies based on a five-factor model of personality (McCrae, Terracciano, & 78 Mem-
bers of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005; Schmitt et al., 2007) found that the
5 dimensional structure replicated across cultures. Furthermore, cultures could be differenti-
ated on the basis of their average, or aggregate, scores along roughly the same 5 dimensions
that characterize individuals (McCrae, 2002; McCrae, Terracciano, & 79 Members of the Per-
sonality Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005). There were several broad geographic patterns. Eu-
ropean and American cultures were higher on extraversion (Allik & McCrae, 2004; McCrae,
Terracciano, & 79 Members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005) and lower
in agreeableness (Allik & McCrae, 2004) than Asian and African cultures. South American
and East Asian cultures were found to be higher in openness (Schmitt et al., 2007). Person-
ality profiles also show finer-grained geographic structure (Allik & McCrae, 2004; McCrae,
Terracciano, & 79 Members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005) whereby
cultures that are geographically close together share more similar personality profiles (see
Sec. 3.3). This similarity may have its source in shared genetic (Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, &
Piazza, 1994) or cultural history or in a response to similar biological, social, and economic
factors (Allik & McCrae, 2004).
The amount of between-culture variation in personality is small compared to that within
cultures (McCrae, 2002). Yet culture-level personality profiles relate to cultural differences
in beliefs, values, and social and economic variables. Allik and McCrae (2004) found that
personality profiles of cultures could be separated along two dimensions: the first had a pole
representing high extraversion and openness and low agreeableness; the second dimension
was defined by high neuroticism and low agreeableness and conscientiousness. Cultures high
in neuroticism had also been assessed to be high in uncertainty avoidance (low tolerance
for ambiguity and more strictness in laws and norms) and masculinity (larger difference
between the values of men and women) (Hofstede, 2001). Additionally, cultures low in
neuroticism were high in interpersonal trust (most people can be trusted; Inglehart, 1997)
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and subjective well-being (Diener, Diener, & Diner, 1995). Cultures that ranked high on the
dimension principally characterized by extraversion were also high on individualism (less
group integration) and low on power distance (less accepting of inequality; Hofstede, 2001).
Cultures that were higher on extraversion, openness, and agreeableness also tended to
have higher gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, greater longevity, greater school enroll-
ment, and less income inequality (Allik & McCrae, 2004; McCrae, Terracciano, & 79 Members
of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005). Economic development also appears
to be confounded with several of the relationships between aggregate personality profiles
and belief and value variables (McCrae, Terracciano, & 79 Members of the Personality Pro-
files of Cultures Project, 2005). However, whether personality profiles of cultures vary with
longevity, fertility, or other life-history-related variables has not been investigated.
No one was ever fired for basing a study on IBM
To test whether life-history patterns experienced during ontogeny related to personality dif-
ferences between cultures and between cohorts within cultures, I needed aggregate person-
ality scores that studied at least two different age cohorts. I therefore used mean level per-
sonality scores for 51 cultures from McCrae, Terracciano, and 78 Members of the Personality
Profiles of Cultures Project (2005); McCrae, Terracciano, and 79 Members of the Personal-
ity Profiles of Cultures Project (2005) which consisted of peer assessments by 12156 college
students, most of whom were native to their countries. The use of participants that have
more homogeneous backgrounds but live in different countries may better recover cultural
differences in personality, as in Hofstede’s (2001) original series of studies which sampled
employees from IBM in different countries. The replication of the corporate structure across
countries resulted in the same sorts of people in each position in the company so that be-
tween country differences were more likely to be the result of between-culture differences.
Each participant completed the Form R of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (Costa &
McCrae, 1992c) on a person they knew well (the target) who was also a native-born citizen
of their country. Targets were younger (18–21 years) or older (> 40 years) male and female
adults. Each sample is referred to as a culture because some came from separate linguistic
(e.g., French- and German-speaking Swiss) or administrative subgroups (e.g., Mainland and
Hong Kong Chinese) within a country.
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To compare personality scores across cultures, it is necessary to establish a degree of
measurement invariance (Byrne & Campbell, 1999). The structural equivalence of the 5 per-
sonality dimensions emerges on both phenotypic (McCrae, 2002; McCrae, Terracciano, &
78 Members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005; Schmitt et al., 2007) and
genetic (McCrae, Jang, Livesley, Riemann, & Angleitner, 2001; Yamagata et al., 2006) levels
across cultures while the functional equivalence is shown by the consistent relationships with
non-personality variables (Sec. 3.1). Scalar equivalence refers to the appropriateness of com-
paring scores numerically across cultures (e.g., that a 50 on extraversion in Japan is the same
as a 50 in France). Simulations in which aggregate personality scores of each country were
perturbed by a random value, thereby introducing structural inequivalence, resulted in an
inability to recover the 5-factor structure (McCrae, Terracciano, & 79 Members of the Person-
ality Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005; McCrae & Terracciano, 2008). This provided evidence
that the data had some scalar equivalence. The personality scores from McCrae, Terracciano,
and 78 Members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project (2005); McCrae, Terracciano,
and 79 Members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project (2005) also correlated with
similar constructs measured at the country-level in other studies (McCrae, Terracciano, & 79
Members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005; Schmitt et al., 2007).
3.2 The second demographic transition
Human life histories
Studies of humans have provided empirical support for a fertility–longevity trade-off (Dobl-
hammer & Oeppen, 2003; Korpelainen, 2003; Maklakov, 2008; Penn & Smith, 2007; Pettay
et al., 2005; Thomas et al., 2007; Westendorp & Kirkwood, 1998). Since the 19th century,
many human populations have experienced the “demographic transition,” a rapid change
of decreasing reproductive effort and increasing lifespan (Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998; K. Hill
& Kaplan, 1999; Stearns & Koella, 1986) that occurred with shifts in social and economic
development factors including nutrition, public health, education, social life, and resource
consumption (Chesnais, 1992). Researchers have recently placed the demographic transition
within LH theory, showing that modern human populations exhibit contrasting strategies
that map onto the “fast–slow” LH continuum (Bielby et al., 2007). Several explanations have
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been given for the interplay between the demographic transition and the attendant social and
economic chances. For example, Mace (2008) concluded that low fertility is the the result of
changes in parental investment under modern work and lifestyle regimes while Potts (1997)
found that economic growth was preceded by fertility-regulation and changes in family size.
It has also been argued that changes in economic productivity and fertility are not rigidly
linked (Bryant, 2007). While the debate continues, it is possible to explore how differences in
LH relate to other broad, basic aspects of behaviour.
Fast–slow (LH) index
I developed a LH index using total fertility rate and life-expectancy at birth data for 194
countries compiled by the World Resource Institute (http://earthtrends.wri.org) from the UN
World Population Prospectus. Total fertility rate estimates the number of children a woman
would have over her reproductive life assuming current age-specific fertility rates. Life ex-
pectancy is the average number of years an individual is expected to live if the mortality rates
in its year of birth are maintained throughout its life. The fetal and early-development stages
of the younger and older groups would have occurred between 1980–1985 and 1950–1960,
respectively (Fig. 3.1). I therefore calculated average fertility rates and life expectancies over
these two periods for each country. I matched each culture with country-level data except for
Hong Kong and mainland China where separate estimates were available.
A principal components analysis of LH data for 194 countries yielded a single principal
component that explained 92% of the variance in fertility and life expectancy (eigenvalue
1.84) with a negative loading on fertility (-.96) and a positive loading on life expectancy (.96).
I therefore standardized both LH variables and generated a unit-weighted score for each
country covering the years 1950–1960 and 1980–1985 (Fig. 3.2). These periods correspond to
the time of birth and early-development of the 40+ and 18–21-year old cohorts, respectively.
Countries scoring low on the LH index are characterized by having ‘fast’ LH strategy while
a high index score indicates a ‘slow’ LH strategy.
To characterize the average amount of change in the LH index over time, I ran a fixed-





















Figure 3.1: Changes in fertility and life expectancy of the 49 countries covered in the study,
1950–1985.
slope, varying-intercept model.1 The LH index for country i at time t was
LHit = u0 + timet + u0i + eit
where timet was coded as year (centered at 1950) in 5-year increments, u0 is the mean and
u0i is the country-level intercept, and eit is the error term. According to the model, the
average LH value in 1950 was −.74 ± .06 SE and LH increased by .13 ± .002 SE every 5
years. Mean differences between countries accounted for 91% of the variance in LH. Among
the 49 countries (comprising 51 cultures) with personality data available, the mean change
between the older and younger cohorts in fertility was −1.3 ± 1.0 children/woman and in
life expectancy was 9.6± 5.0 years. This translated into a mean change on the LH continuum
of .73 ± .40.
1A model with a slope fit for each country did not converge, suggesting homogeneous trajectories between
countries.
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Figure 3.2: LH index for 49 countries, 1950–1985.
3.3 Spatial dependency
Countries that are close together are likely to resemble each other in ecological, cultural, and
climactic factors that could influence both personality and LH strategies. I assessed spatial
autocorrelation using Moran’s I (Moran, 1950) which captures the correlation among mea-
surements weighted by spatial proximity. Values of Moran’s I that are significantly greater
than 0 indicate neighbouring units are more similar than expected by chance. Because coun-
tries are neither equally sized nor randomly distributed, I used areal rather than continuous
spatial methods. I used the spdep package (version 0.5-31, Bivand, 2011) to join countries
with their three nearest neighbours and correlate their aggregate personality scores (Figs. 3.3,
3.4). The distance between neighboring countries was determined using the great-circle dis-
tance between the center coordinates of each country.
Except for neuroticism, all aggregate personality scores showed significant spatial auto-
correlation (Table 3.1) although, in general, neighboring countries were less similar in aggre-









Total fertility .63 < .001
Life expectancy .44 < .001
LH index .55 < .001
Table 3.1: Spatial autocorrelation of aggregate personality scores and life history variables.
Each culture (personality traits) or country (life history traits) was clustered with its three














































Figure 3.3: Sampled countries joined with their 3-nearest neighbors.
gate personality profile than in life history parameters.
I used semiparametric filtering (Tiefelsdorf & Griffith, 2007) to remove non-independence
among data points from spatial autocorrelation as implemented in spdep. This technique
generates an optimal set of eigenvectors that reduces the Moran’s I of the residuals of a
linear regression model. These spatial eigenvectors were then used in subsequent analyses. I
ran the semiparametric filtering using culture-level personality as the outcomes and country-
level LH and socioeconomic (SED) indices as the predictors.
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Figure 3.4: Sampled countries joined with their 3-nearest nieghbors, detail of Europe.
3.4 Aggregate personality along the fast–slow continuum
Because there were multiple personality measures for young and old men and women in each
culture, I used multilevel models to explore the effect of LH on the personality profiles within
and between cultures. Multilevel modelling is useful for capturing the structure of the data
to understand the effect of the variable of interest. I built four models for each personality
domain. I started with baseline models that predicted aggregate personality from cohort, sex,
and country (Model 0). I then characterized how aggregate personality scores differed under
fast and slow life-history regimes (Model 1). I repeated this procedure for a similar index of
socioeconomic development (Model 2). Significant predictors from Models 1 and 2 were then
combined (Model 3).
The full model I fit for relating LH to the aggregate personality score of age/sex group i
in culture j was
yij = u0 + cohortij + sexij + cohortij × sexij + ∑k veckj+
LHWij + LH
B
j + sexij × LHWij + sexij × LHBj + u0j + eij
where veckj is the kth spatial eigenvector for culture j, u0j is an intercept for the country of
culture j, and eij is the residual. Sex (female = 1, male = -1) and cohort (old = 1, young
= -1) variables were contrast coded so that the LH and SED parameter estimates could be
interpreted as averaging across cohorts. The change within cultures (LHW) is modeled as
LHWij = LHij − ¯LHj where LHij is the life-history index at time of birth for cohort i in culture
j and ¯LHj is the average LH index of culture j. LH
W
ij is therefore the centered LH index within
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each culture that removes the effect of between-culture variation (Pol & Wright, 2009). The
fitted estimate represents the change in aggregate personality attributable to within-culture
changes in LH. LHBj =
¯LHj fits the between-culture effect (LHB) that estimates the difference
in aggregate personality scores between cultures in different positions on the LH spectrum.
Socioeconomic development index
To control for broad economic and lifestyle differences between countries that may account
for differences in aggregate personality profiles of cultures, I produced a single socioeco-
nomic index (SED) using Gross Domestic Product (log transformed current US dollars per
capita), the percentage of the population living in urbanized areas, and calorie supply (Kilo-
calories per person per day). I did not use the Human Development Index2 because it in-
corporates life-expectancy, which I wanted to treat separately as part of LH. For the speci-
fied time periods, data on GDP were not available for Czech Republic (i.e., Czechoslovakia);
Lebanon, Estonia and Russia (Union Republics of USSR); or Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia
(SFR Yugoslavia). Data on urbanization was also missing for Serbia and on calorie supply
for Hong Kong, Puerto Rico, and Serbia. All countries but Serbia had at least one economic
indicator that could be used to construct the index. I obtained these data from the World
Resource Institute.
I repeated the model building procedure using SED index in place of LH index (Model
2). In the final stage, I combined the predictors from models 1 and 2 together to see if the
estimates of the effect of LH changed after conditioning on SED (Model 3). I fit varying-
intercept models with country as the group. I fit the models by REML estimation using lme4
(D. Bates & Maechler, 2010) and specified country as a random effect and the other predictors
as fixed effects.
Model averaging
Among all countries (not just those with personality data) where longevity, fertility, and (at
least one) economic variables were available, LH and SED were highly correlated, r = .83, 95%
confidence interval .78–.87, N = 192. One of the consequences of entering two highly corre-
lated predictors into a regression model is that the standard errors tend to increase which
2http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/
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leads to less certainty about the exact parameter estimates, an issue referred to as variance
inflation (O’Brien, 2007; Freckleton, 2011). The variance inflation factor (VIF) indicates the
amount that regression coefficients are inflated because of collinearity with other variables in




where R2i is from a regression of variable i on the other variables in the model. One standard
rule-of-thumb is that a VIF > 4 indicates some degree of collinearity while > 10 indicates
exceedingly problematic collinearity that needs to be corrected (O’Brien, 2007). I calculated
VIFs using the DAAG package in R (Maindonald & Braun, 2011). The VIF of the between
country LH and SED indices was 4.9.
Because there was some variance inflation from collinearity, I used multimodel inference
(Burnham & Anderson, 2002) to check that the contribution of LH and SED to aggregate
personality variation could be distinguished. One way to do this is to average parameter
estimates across models that include, exclude, and combine each of the predictors in turn as
models 0–3 do with regard to the LH and SED predictors. I averaged the parameter estimates
from the models using AIC weights (Burnham & Anderson, 2002; Freckleton, 2011). For each








where b̂+j,i is the fitted parameter estimate of bj from model i or 0 if model i does not include








and ∆AICi is the difference between the AIC of the best model and the AIC of model i for R
models. R code for this procedure is listed in Appendix A.1.
Contributions from individual life-history and economic variables
The multilevel models using LH index as the predictor of interest test the speficic hypoth-
esis that the trade-off between fertility and longevity, as a core part of human life-history
strategies, will influence personality at the level of cultures. The relative contributions of
each of the components of the LH and SED indices can be explored but models containing all
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these predictors would suffer from the same issue solved by averaging the multilevel models
(Sec. 3.4). That is, entering many highly correlated predictors into a regression tends to give
estimates that are unstable because a large positive estimate on one predictor could be bal-
anced out by an estimate on a correlated predictor of equal but opposite magnitude (Hastie,
Tibshirani, & Friedman, 2009).
One way to handle a number of correlated predictors is to employ shrinkage methods
such as ridge regression (Hoerl & Kennard, 1970). Ridge regression uses a tuning parameter
(λ > 0) that penalizes the total sum-of-squares of the parameters. This has the effect of
shrinking parameter estimates toward 0 and toward each other. The best value for the tuning
parameter can be chosen by cross-validation where parameter estimates are fit using a subset
of the data and then assessed against the remaining data (Hastie et al., 2009). Because the
number of countries sampled was small, I simply explored the rank ordering of the ridge
regression coefficients over a range of λ values. I used the lm.ridge function (Venables &
Ripley, 2002) in R to fit a ridge regression of average personality scores for each country
on z-transformed fertility, life expectancy, log(GDP), urbanization, daily calorie intake, and
spatial vectors constructed as in Sec. 3.3. I used multiple imputation with Amelia (Honaker,
King, & Blackwell, 2010) to replace missing values for the SED indicators as the input to the
spatial filtering function. Input to the ridge regression procedure used the raw data with
missing values.
Model inferences
Population-level life history strategies were related to several aggregate personality dimen-
sions after controlling for spatial resemblance among neighboring nations, broad social and
economic factors, and mean differences between cohorts within and between countries, as
well as other unmeasured factors (i.e., country as a random effect). Country as a random
effect explained 21-46% of the variation in country-level aggregate personality scores relative
to the total variance among average scores of cohort/sex groups in all countries (Table 3.2).
Model 3, which included both LH and SED predictors, had the best fit for all personality
domains (Table 3.3). Parameter estimates for LH and SED predictors for all models are listed
in in Table 3.4 and all parameter estimates from the best fitting models are visualized in
Figure 3.5. Figure 3.6 is a plot of inferred within- and between-country effects of LH on
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Country Residual Country/Total
Neuroticism 2.03 2.75 0.42
Extraversion 2.82 3.28 0.46
Openness 1.33 4.92 0.21
Agreeableness 2.22 3.38 0.40
Conscientiousness 1.99 5.37 0.27
Table 3.2: Variance components and proportion of variance attributable to country intercepts
for the best fitting models for each personality domain.
Model AIC (weight)
0 1 2 3
Neuroticism 894.5 (.00) 858.7 (.00) 856.6 (.01) 847.0 (.99)
Extraversion 913.6 (.00) 897.1 (.00) 879.4 (.31) 877.8 (.69)
Openness 946.0 (.00) 939.5 (.00) 927.6 (.08) 922.6 (.92)
Agreeableness 920.3 (.00) 891.4 (.00) 885.6 (.01) 877.0 (.99)
Conscientiousness 970.1 (.00) 957.2 (.00) 949.8 (.05) 943.7 (.95)
Table 3.3: Model set 0 includes only sex, cohort, and country effects. Model set 1 adds life-
history index while model set 2 uses socioeconomic index. Models in set 3 fit both indices.
AIC from the best fitting models are given in bold. Relative AIC weights for calculating
model-average parameter estimates are given in parentheses. Variance components are for
the random effects of country (varying intercept) from the best-fitting models.
personality for men and women. Rather than focus on p-values, I interpreted effects that had
robust magnitudes across models when averaged. This helps protect against Type II errors,
as an effect could be statistically significant in model 1 but not in model 3 even though the
two estimates might not be significantly different from each other. Model averaging protects
against Type I errors as the averaged estimates are pulled toward zero. Countries on the
slow end of the LH continuum had higher aggregate openness (b = 1.7; CI = .40, 3.0; model
average b̄ = 1.6) and agreeableness (b = 1.2; CI = -.19, 2.5; b̄ = 1.1). Within countries, a shift
to slower LH also led to higher aggregate agreeableness (b = 1.8; CI = .30, 3.2; b̄ = 1.7) and
lower extraversion (b = −1.6; CI = -3.0, -.16; b̄ = −1.1). SED also had effects on aggregate
personality independent of LH. Between countries, economic development was related to
higher extraversion (b = 1.5; CI = .02, 2.9; b̄ = 1.5).
Sex differences
To infer the effects of between-country LH and SED for men and women separately, I simu-
lated model-implied regression coefficients using the sim() function from the arm package
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Figure 3.5: Fitted parameter estimates for demographic and life-history variables from best
fitting models. Parameter estimates plotted as circles with 95AIC-model averaged coefficients
plotted as vertical lines. Sex was contrast coded as male (+1) versus female (-1). Cohort was
contrast coded as birth year 1960 (+1) versus 1980 (-1). LHB and LHW = life-history between
and within countries; SEDB and SEDW = socioeconomic development between and within
countries.
Figure 3.6: Scatterplot of Life History (fast-slow) index against aggregate personality scores
for the 18-21 and 40+ cohorts for each country after removing spatial, age, and main sex
effects. Positive LH scores corresponds to slow life history characteristics. Regression lines
for the between-country (black) and within-country (dark gray) effects are from the final
models. Between-country regression line shows personality profile predicted from position
of the LH spectrum. Within-country lines show change predicted in countries as they move
toward the slow end of the continuum, plotted at LH index = -1, 0, and +1. The two cohorts
for each country are plotted using ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes and connected by gray lines.
(Gelman et al., 2011). This allows coefficients to be added together but also expresses uncer-
tainty in the estimate. Slower between-country LH also predicted higher aggregate neuroti-
cism for women (simulated coefficient bsim= 1.0, CI = -.45, 2.4, Fig. 3.6) but lower aggregate
neuroticism for men (bsim= -1.1, CI = -2.5, .32). Womens conscientiousness was higher in
slower LH countries (bsim= 1.4, CI = -.32, 3.0), whereas there was no effect for men (bsim=
-.18, CI = -1.9, 1.5). Within countries, a shift to higher LH led to higher average neuroticism
for women (bsim= 2.0; CI = .31, 3.9).
Model averaging
Because of the multicollinearity between the LH and SED predictors and because in some
cases the best models had only marginally better fit, I averaged the coefficients across models.
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Female Male
LH index LH index
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Table 3.4: Coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. For each personality dimension, models
estimating the effects of aggregate life-history patterns (1) or socioeconomic development (2)
are contrasted with models that include both sets of predictors (3). Subscript W specifies
within-country effect (e.g., the predictor ) and B specifies between-country effect (e.g., ). A
dashed line indicates the predictor was not included in the model. Sex was contrast coded
as male (+1) versus female (-1). Cohort was contrast coded as older (+1) versus younger
group (-1). Model average gives the AIC-weighted averages for each estimate from models
0-3 (contributed estimate = 0 if a parameter not included in a model).
The AIC-weighted averaged estimates that combined information from all models, weighted
by model fit (Table 3.4), supported the influence of LH within and between countries on
personality. Although several estimated coefficients were not nominally significant (P > .05)
in the best-fitting models, several additional averaged coefficients were in the same direction
and of the same magnitude across the models. Thus there may be additional effects that,
while small, are not zero.
Life-history and economic variables
Parameter estimates from ridge regressions of average personality scores for each country
across a range of values for the tuning parameter (λ) are shown in Fig. 3.7. There was
evidence for a trade-off between longevity and fertility, where each variable had large but
opposing effects on aggregate personality scores, for openness and agreeableness. For neu-
roticism, extraversion, and conscientiousness, increasing the tuning parameter caused the
estimate for fertility to shrink rapidly towards zero. The effect of fertility on neuroticism
and conscientiousness was in the same direction as longevity (that is, countries that had both
long lifespan and high fertility were higher in conscientiousness and higher in neuroticism).
Ridge regression also showed that, among the components of the SED index, log(GDP) and
urbanization had a larger positive effect on agreeableness and on extraversion, respectively,
than did life expectancy.
Sensitivity analysis
A country’s values of LH and SED indices are strongly autocorrelated from year to year, i.e.,
their values in one year will correlate highly with values in subsequent years (mean ρ = .74).
Because of this I used LH and SED calculated in approximate birth year of each cohort as
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LHW 1.17 [0.11, 2.33] — 1.24 [-0.08, 2.55] 1.23
LHB 0.25 [-0.32, 0.82] — -0.01 [-1.26, 1.24] -0.01
LHW× sex -0.30 [-1.46, .086] — -0.81 [-2.12, 0.49] -0.81
LHB× sex -1.04 [-1.32, -0.75] — -1.07 [-1.70, -0.44] -1.06
SEDW — 0.56 [-1.02, 2.13] -0.18 [-1.88, 1.52] -0.17
SEDB — 0.28 [-0.28, 0.85] 0.30 [-1.93, 1.53] 0.30
SEDW× sex — 0.90 [-0.66, 2.45] 1.47 [-0.20, 3.14] 1.46
SEDB× sex — -0.90 [-1.20, -0.60] 0.03 [-0.59, 0.65] 0.02
(b) Extraversion
LHW -1.42 [-2.68, -0.15] — -1.59 [-3.03, -0.16] -1.1
LHB 1.44 [0.75, 2.14] — 0.16 [-1.30, 1.61] 0.11
LHW× sex -0.42 [-1.69, 0.85] — -0.84 [-2.27, 0.58] -0.58
LHB× sex -0.37 [-0.69, -0.05] — -0.11 [-0.80, 0.58] -0.08
SEDW — -0.33 [-2.01, 1.34] 0.60 [-1.26, 2.47] 0.31
SEDB — 1.59 [0.93, 2.25] 1.45 [0.02, 2.87] 1.49
SEDW× sex — 0.75 [-0.89, 2.40] 1.24 [-0.58, 3.06] 1.09
SEDB× sex — -0.39 [-0.70, -0.07] -0.29 [-0.97, 0.39] -0.14
(c) Openness
LHW 0.55 [-0.99, 2.09] — 0.19 [-1.56, 1.94] 0.17
LHB 1.02 [0.44, 1.59] — 1.71 [0.49, 2.93] 1.58
LHW× sex -0.68 [-2.21, 0.86] — -0.92 [-2.66, 0.83] -0.85
LHB× sex -0.46 [-0.80, -0.13] — -0.37 [-1.21, 0.48] -0.34
SEDW — 1.23 [-0.77, 3.24] 0.99 [-1.27, 3.35] 1.01
SEDB — 0.68 [0.08, 1.28] -0.81 [-2.01, 0.39] -0.69
SEDW× sex — 0.09 [-1.90, 2.07] 0.64 [-1.59, 2.87] 0.6
SEDB× sex — -0.44 [-0.81, -0.06] -0.12 [-0.95, 0.71] -0.14
(d) Agreeableness
LHW 1.56 [0.27, 2.84] — 1.75 [0.30, 3.21] 1.73
LHB 1.12 [0.52, 1.73] — 1.15 [-0.19, 2.49] 1.13
LHW× sex -1.13 [-2.42, 0.14] — -1.47 [-2.92, -0.02] -1.45
LHB× sex -0.70 [-1.02, -0.39] — -0.43 [-1.14, 0.27] -0.43
SEDW — 0.52 [-1.20, 2.25] -0.56 [-2.45, 1.32] -0.55
SEDB — 0.99 [0.37, 1.61] 0.01 [-1.32, 1.31] 0.01
SEDW× sex — 0.04 [-1.66, 1.74] 0.92 [-0.93, 2.77] 0.91
SEDB× sex — -0.69 [-1.02, -0.37] -0.32 [-1.01, 2.77] -0.32
(e) Conscientiousness
LHW 1.37 [-0.24, 2.97] — 1.65 [-0.19, 3.48] 1.57
LHB 0.52 [-0.11, 1.15] — 0.56 [-0.83, 1.96] 0.54
LHW× sex 1.43 [-0.17, 3.03] — 1.49 [-0.34, 3.31] 1.42
LHB× sex -0.73 [-1.13, -0.33] — -0.79 [-1.67, 0.10] -0.75
SEDW — 0.22 [-1.93, 2.37] -0.79 [-3.16, 1.57] -0.75
SEDB — 0.44 [-0.19, 1.07] -0.04 [-1.41, 1.32] -0.02
SEDW× sex — 0.59 [-1.54, -2.72] 0.06 [-0.81, 0.93] -0.14
SEDB× sex — -0.63 [-1.04, -0.22] 0.06 [-0.81, 0.93] 0.03
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(e) Conscientiousness
Figure 3.7: Parameter estimates from ridge regressions with varying penalization parameter
(λ) for country-level aggregate personality scores on each component of the life-history or
socioeconomic development indices. LE = life expectancy.
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a proxy for conditions experienced during ontogeny even though personality also changes
during late adolescence and adulthood (Soto, et al., 2011). Thus, it is possible that model
inferences will be sensitive to the range of years used to summarize LH and SED experienced
during development. I therefore conducted a sensitivity analysis to test whether using aver-
ages of the LH and SED variables experienced during the first 15 years of life (instead of 5
and 10 for the young and old cohort) made any difference to the model inferences. I reran
each of the models using the recalculated indicators. The sensitivity analysis showed that
averaging LH and SED inputs over approximately the first 15 years of life for the two cohorts
did not change the results (Fig. 3.8).
Personality and life-history shifts
Population-level life history strategies were related to the population averages of personality
dimensions after controlling for spatial resemblance among neighboring nations, broad social
and economic factors, and mean differences between cohorts within and between countries.
In particular, I found that (i) although LH and SED variables tended to be highly correlated,
the effects of LH on personality were more detectable, (ii) personality traits differed in their
flexibility with regard to adaptive plasticity to LH conditions, and (iii) for personality traits
that were related to shifts in LH, the effects were often sex specific, being either in opposite
directions or present in women only.
As I predicted, openness, agreeableness, and (although in women only) conscientious-
ness were higher in countries experiencing slow LH regimes. However, average neuroticism
of women in different countries was positively related to slower between-country LH. For
men in different countries, mean conscientiousness was stable across the LH spectrum while
neuroticism was lower in slower LH countries. Cohorts within countries that experienced
a slower LH regime during ontogeny had higher average agreeableness and neuroticism.
Within-country changes in agreeableness as LH slowed down were in the same direction as
the global trend whereas the between-country trend for neuroticism in men was opposite that
in women. Thus, between- and within-country differences in fast-slow LH strategy account
for some of the cross-cultural differences in personality.
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of parameter estimates from models that summarize life-history and
socioeconomic development variables using only data from year-of-birth (0) or the average
value of variables experienced during childhood and adolescence (0-15). The model infer-
ences do not change substantially between the two sets of inputs. Childhood/adolescence
was approximately 1960-1975 for the older cohort and 1980-1995 for the younger cohort. Sex
was contrast coded as male (+1) versus female (-1). Cohort was contrast coded as birth year
1960 (+1) versus 1980 (-1). LHB and LHW = life-history between and within countries; SEDB
and SEDW = socioeconomic development between and within countries.
3.5 Adaptive developmental plasticity
Because the LH regime of the population an individual is born into is a significant predictor
of the population average adult personality, both within and between countries, I propose
that early-life conditions simultaneously affect the development of LH trajectories and per-
sonality. Adaptive developmental plasticity, by which developing individuals adopt different
phenotypic characteristics in response to the prevailing environment to increase fitness, has
been documented in many species (West-Eberhard, 2003), including humans (Gluckman &
Hanson, 2006; Nettle, 2011b). If several components of a life-history course can be adjusted in
a coordinated manner, as life-history theory suggests (Stearns, 1992), then it is reasonable to
expect that changes in personality are part of the adaptive reaction norm (Réale et al., 2010;
Stamps & Groothuis, 2010b). For example, as an extension of Draper and Harpending (1982),
Belsky, Steinberg, and Draper (1991) theorized that humans evolved sensitivity and respon-
siveness to the environmental context of early-rearing (e.g., availability and predictability of
resources, trustworthiness of others), and as a consequence developed behavioral patterns
that guide (or are guided by) how they allocate their reproductive effort (see also Bjorklund
& Pellegrini, 2000; Del Giudice, 2009).
In understanding how population variation in LH leads to personality differences, it is
essential to know at what stages of development personality and individual LH strategy are
affected (Stamps & Groothuis, 2010b). Similar to the sensitive periods of imprinting (Bateson,
1979), animal personalities are also shaped by early experiential and environmental condi-
tions. For example, early exposure to predators leads threespined sticklebacks to become less
aggressive (Bell & Sih, 2007) but also prompts an increase in rates of growth (Bell, Dinge-
manse, Hankison, Langenhof, & Rollins, 2011) and thereby also influence trade-offs between
growth and reproduction. In humans, data on multiple cultures shows a consistent pattern
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where personality stabilizes around age 30 with slight increases in agreeableness and consci-
entiousness and decreases in neuroticism, extraversion, and openness as individuals continue
to age (McCrae et al., 1999). Human personality could have the greatest sensitivity to pre-
vailing LH conditions during childhood and adolescence before the core facets of personality
stabilize. Human LH traits such as age at primiparity and lifespan are likewise responsive
to stress and other aspects of early life experiences such as parental involvement (Chisholm,
Quinlivan, Petersen, & Coall, 2005; Nettle, 2011b; Nettle, Coall, & Dickens, 2011).
The aggregate personality data consisted of two cohorts within each country who would
have grown up under more or less different LH regimes depending on the occurrence and
timing of the demographic transition of their country. This structure in the data allowed a
test of the hypothesis of adaptive developmental plasticity of personality to LH conditions
by comparing departures from predicted age differences in aggregate personality profiles
depending on within-country, cohort differences in position on the fast-slow continuum.
I found the greatest support for adaptive developmental plasticity for the two personality
domains, agreeableness and neuroticism, that also showed detectable within-country effects.
The high resource stability and somatic investment of members of a population could prompt
an individual to be more prosocial (higher agreeableness) and to seek novelty and explore
the environment (higher openness). In contrast, environments where overall somatic in-
vestment is low, individuals would adopt slightly more conservative and less cooperative
strategies (lower agreeableness and openness). High agreeableness is related to the quality of
interpersonal relationships (Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998) and is preferred in long-term mat-
ing partners (Penke, Todd, Lenton, & Fasolo, 2007), so it would be advantageous to become
more agreeable in environments where slow strategies are favored. An increase in neuroti-
cism might be related to status striving (Nettle, 2006) as a resource control strategy (Hawley,
2011) necessary for the increased investment costs of individual offspring. Conscientious-
ness would also play a role in fostering the long-term strategies needed to sustain slow LH
(Figueredo et al., 2005; Nettle, 2006). However, the between-country effect of LH on neu-
roticism and conscientiousness was positive for women but negative or absent for men. The
larger difference in neuroticism between those men and women living in developed cultures
(which I identify as having slow LH) (McCrae, Terracciano, & 78 Members of the Personality
Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005; Schmitt et al., 2007; Schmitt, Realo, Voracek, & Allik, 2008)
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has been interpreted as arising from a return to more egalitarian conditions under which sex-
ually dimorphic personality traits first evolved (Schmitt et al., 2008). In contrast, I interpret
the divergence as a sex difference in an adaptive developmental response to prevailing LH
conditions.
Here I examined the effect of only one LH trade-off on personality: that between fertility
and longevity. A ridge regression on country-level personality scores showed that fertility
and longevity were only having strong opposing effects on openness and agreeableness. Be-
cause the scores were aggregated for countries rather than for age/sex groups, the differential
effects of sex could not be seen in this analysis. Sex effects from the multilevel model that
showed the effects for women’s and men’s neuroticism and conscientiousness scores being
affected in opposite directions by the LH trade-off explains why the separate effects for life
expectancy and fertility appeared to go in the same direction. However, it may also mean
that the effects of the trade-off are not as strong on these two personality dimensions or that
other LH trade-offs are involved. Because humans vary in maturation and reproductive tim-
ing (K. Hill & Kaplan, 1999) and personality is related to the onset of childbearing (Jokela
et al., 2009, 2010), personality may also be responsive to differences in these conditions that
are expressed in cross-cultural personality profiles. Unfortunately the exploration of these
effects is limited by data availability. While relevant international data, such as on teenage
pregnancy,3 are being collected that could act as proxies for reproductive onset, such data
only extend back 1 or 2 decades and therefore do not cover the period of ontogeny of the two
cohorts.
The within- and between- country estimates of the relationship between LH and aggregate
personality will reflect the effect of the demographic transition over two different time scales.
Changes within countries were detected using departures from the cross-cultural (i.e., likely
species-typical) differences in personality during maturation (McCrae et al., 1999; McCrae,
Terracciano, & 78 Members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005) of one cohort
born circa 1960 compared to another born circa 1980 and therefore captures the outcome
of recent demographic changes. Developmental response of personality to LH would be a
function of the rate of fertility and longevity changes during this period. In contrast, between-
3Teenage mothers (% of women ages 15–19 who have had children or are currently pregnant), http://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.MTR.1519.ZS; adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15–19),
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.ADO.TFRT/
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country variation in personality and LH would be the result of longer term trends, such as
historical differences among countries in the onset of the decline in fertility and mortality
(Chesnais, 1992). The confluence of LH patterns and aggregate personality also suggests
that population-level personality profiles have varied throughout the demographic transition.
Although life expectancy has been rising steadily, fertility has not decreased monotonically
(Chesnais, 1992) and the very latest data show a reversal of the fertility decline among the
most economically developed nations (Myrskylä, Kohler, & Billari, 2009). If changes in LH
influence aggregate personality profiles, this also has implications for cross-cultural studies
of longitudinal changes in personality as same-aged cohorts from different countries may
have experienced different LH conditions during ontogeny. Future longitudinal studies on
personality should therefore explore changes between adolescence and adulthood with an
eye on the LH regime experienced by the population being studied. Furthermore, cross-
sectional studies should consider LH as a key birth cohort effect that may have a strong
influence on personality differences between cohorts.
If neuroticism and agreeableness are plastic to LH conditions experienced during on-
togeny, I would expect them to show the least stability during childhood and adolescence
but the most stability in adulthood. Personality shows some of these expected developmen-
tal characteristics. Personality tends to change most during childhood and adolescence and
becomes more stable as individuals reach reproductive age (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000; Mc-
Crae, Terracciano, & 78 Members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005; Soto
et al., 2011). Personality traits that cluster as negative emotionality, which is similar to neu-
roticism and includes aspects such as stress reaction and aggression, show an increase in en-
vironmental relative to genetic influence during the transition to adulthood (McGue, Bacon,
& Lykken, 1993) and thus could be an indicator of increased plasticity. Change in neuroti-
cism during adolescence exhibits a pronounced sex difference with a sharp upward trend in
females and a shallow downward trend in males which then decrease slightly and converge
during adulthood (Soto et al., 2011). Agreeableness shows a sharp decrease in late childhood
before increasing during adolescence (Soto et al., 2011). Agreeableness, conscientiousness,
and, to a lesser extent, neuroticism all show change across adulthood, in contrast with flat
trends in extraversion and openness. Detailed longitudinal studies that include individuals
of the same age when their personalities are measured but who were born under different
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LH conditions are needed to distinguish change attributable to environmental responsiveness
from age-related developmental trends. In contrast to within-country change attributable to
plasticity, between-country variation in personality and LH would be the result of longer
term trends, such as historical differences among countries in the onset of the decline in fer-
tility and mortality (Chesnais, 1992) as well as genetic differences among populations along
the fast-slow LH continuum.
Group-level personality correlates do not automatically extend to the individual level
(Rentfrow, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Robinson, 1950). The results presented are ecological
correlates only and thus do not necessarily entail that people who live longer lives and bear
fewer children are more open and agreeable, only that, on average, people in slower nations
are higher in these traits, irrespective of their individual LH strategies. However, it is in-
teresting to note that the trade-off between life expectancy and fertility registers at both the
individual (Pettay et al., 2005; Westendorp & Kirkwood, 1998) and the country level (Thomas
et al., 2007) and that the same five dimensions that describe individual differences in per-
sonality also differentiate countries (McCrae, Terracciano, & 78 Members of the Personality
Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005). Furthermore, the results show that the relationship of
agreeableness to LH on the individual level (Figueredo et al., 2005; Gladden et al., 2009) also
extends to differences between populations and change within populations. This indicates
that the same processes maintaining variation in personality and LH within populations may
be influencing differences between populations.
Several of my findings did not match individual-level effects. On the individual level,
high neuroticism is associated with a fast LH strategy while high extraversion is associated
with slower LH (Gladden et al., 2009). In contrast I found that as a population shifted to
slower LH conditions, average neuroticism increased while average extraversion decreased.
I also did not detect any strong within-country trends for openness. These differences in
ecological correlates of personality on the population level may be outcomes of the parts
of personality that are flexible to the environment while individual level relationships are
caused by common genetic influences on personality and LH (Figueredo & Rushton, 2009)
that would not change substantially between generations. Differences in findings about the
association between personality and LH may also be a measurement issue. For example,
Alvergne et al. (2010) found that high extraversion was related to a greater number of sexual
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partners and more offspring (a ‘fast’ strategy). The personality instrument used in that study,
the International English Mini-Markers (Thompson, 2008), measures extraversion with items
related to the gregarious, activity, and excitement-seeking facets of the broad extraversion
domain (Costa & McCrae, 1992c) and thus may miss ‘slow LH’ facets of warmth and positive
emotion. Future studies of the relationship between personality and LH may therefore be
fruitfully conducted at the level of lower-order facets.
Estimating the exact effect that LH conditions have on personality is limited by collinear
predictors, particularly those related to social and economic development. While this was
partially addressed by model averaging and penalization, conditioning on SED may be overly
conservative as economic development is the cause of at least some of the variation in LH
between populations, or at least differences in longevity if not fertility rates (Bongaarts &
Watkins, 1996). Similarly, plastic changes in both LH and personality during development
may be sensitive to some of the variables incorporated into the SED index, such as calorie
supply. Finally, indices of social and economic development are predictable from personality
at the individual and cultural level, too (Roberts et al., 2007; Allik & McCrae, 2004).
Although the results suggest that the average LH regime of a population influences the
developmental calibration of personality, the complete story is likely to be bidirectional and
self-reinforcing (Réale et al., 2010). While country-level LH strategy influences average per-
sonality profiles, the personalities of the next generation will also guide their reproductive
choices and the probability of both having children and living longer. Such a scenario may
lead to correlational selection where LH and personality traits are under simultaneous selec-
tion and the direction of selection on personality varies consistently according to LH traits.
When applied over sufficient generations, correlational selection would lead to genetic cor-
relations between LH and personality traits, as expected from the pace-of-life syndrome hy-
pothesis which predicts that behavioral, life-history, and physiological traits will coevolve
(Réale et al., 2010). The interplay between an individual’s personality versus its LH strat-
egy likely explains some of the persistence of personality in humans (Biro & Stamps, 2008).
Future studies should aim at identifying whether personality and LH traits are subjected
to correlated selection, genetically correlated, and/or fine-tuned to each other via adaptive
developmental plasticity mechanisms at play during early-development.
Chapter 4
Quantitative genetics of orang-utan personal-
ity and subjective well-being
4.1 Genetic architecture and evolution
Most behavior genetic studies focus on the ‘narrow-sense’ heritability, h2 = VA/VP or the
ratio between additive genetic variance and phenotyptic variance, to the exclusion of nonad-
ditive sources of genetic variance. I believe this is a likely historical artifact of two trends:
the basis of early quantitative genetics in animal breeding and that twins are the primary
sample used in behavior genetics. If our goal is to estimate effects of genes or environments
on a phenotype, we start by partitioning an indivdual’s phenotypic value into a genotypic
value and an environmental deviation (Falconer & Mackay, 1996). The variation in these val-
ues is informative of the relative contributions of genes and environments to the phenotypic
variance.
The genotypic and environmental variances can themselves be broken into different kinds
of effects. Additive genetic variance, VA, is produced by the effects of genes that are inde-
pendent of the rest of the genotype and thus their combined effect can be thought of as the
simple ‘addition’ of each allele’s effect. Nonadditive genetic effects also exist. They come
from the interaction between alleles at the same locus or between genes at different loci.
Interactions between alleles at the same locus produce dominance deviations, the variance
of which is dominance genetic variance VD, a quantitative parallel to the classic Mendelian
115
116 CHAPTER 4. ORANG-UTAN PERSONALITY GENETICS
effects of dominant and resessive alleles. Interactions between alleles at different loci pro-
duce epistatic variance VI. These different kinds of genetic effects are additive or nonadditive
in the statistical rather than biological sense (Rice, 2004). The proportion of total genotypic
variance from additive, dominance, and epistatic effects yields the ‘broad-sense’ heritability
H2.
For historical reasons the values that VA is the variance of are called breeding values.
Heritability gives information about the effects of genes, not genotypes. Because genotypes
get broken up during meiosis, each parent in most species with separate sexes contributes
only a set of their genes to their offspring, not their whole genotype (Falconer & Mackay,
1996). Thus, if you are an animal breeder looking to improve your stock then you care only
about the ability to predict an offspring’s phenotype given the parents from the independent,
that is, additive, effects of individual genes. Assuming the average breeding value is zero,
an individual’s breeding value is defined as twice the difference in the expected mean of its
offsprings’ phenotypes from the population mean if it were to mate with random individuals
from the population (whose expected breeding values are zero). If you want to know how
much genetic material you have to play with for selecting animals to breed, you are inter-
ested in calculating the proportion of additive genetic variance, namely, the narrow-sense
heritability. Quantitative genetics, born out of agricultural concerns, was thus primarily con-
cerned with methods to estimate narrow-sense heritability (Falconer & Mackay, 1996; Lynch
& Walsh, 1998).
The foundational studies in behavior genetics are based on analyzing twins and most be-
havior genetics research continues in this vein. In addition to their aptitude for riding tandem
bicycles and chewing gum at the same time, twins have several useful properties for disen-
tangling genetic from environmental effects. First, twins are born at the same time and are
thus the same age while sharing many aspects of their environment, from the uterus to their
household to their neighborhood. Second, twins differ in the proportion of their genes that
are identical by descent, which is 2Θxy = 1 for monozygotic (MZ) twins and 2Θxy =
1
2 for
dizygotic (DZ) twins, where Θxy is the cofficient of coancestry, or the probability that if you
select one allele from each twin you will get the ‘same’ allele (Wright, 1922; Lynch & Walsh,
1998). In other words, MZ twins share all of their genome while DZ twin share on average
half. Monozygotic twins reared together differ only in the unique environments they expe-
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rience while dizygotic twins differ also from each other in their exact genetic makeup. The
difference in phenotypic correlations between MZ and DZ twins is the basis for separating es-
timates of genetic and environmental causes of similarity using either ANOVA (Kempthorne
& Osborne, 1961; Christian, Kang, & Norton, 1976; Eaves et al., 1978; Lynch & Walsh, 1998) or
structural equation model approaches (Loehlin, 2004). However, because the comparison is
being made based on a contrast between only two types of relatives (MZ or DZ twins), there
is limited power to detect certain genetic effects. In particular, classic twin designs have low
power to detect nonadditive sources of genetic variance (Martin, Eaves, Kearsey, & Davies,
1978; Posthuma & Boomsma, 2000). In practice, researchers using SEM methods are forced to
choose between estimating nonadditive genetic or common environment effects. As a result,
nonadditive genetic components of variance are usually found to be nonsigificant or never
estimated in the first place (Keller et al., 2005).
Quantitative genetic studies of human personality traits such as those described by the
Five-Factor Model (Digman, 1990) consistently show that the additive effects of genes, as
summarized by heritability, have an influence on personality variation (Bouchard & Loehlin,
2001) and that the additive genetic structure of personality (the G matrix) is a human uni-
versal (McCrae et al., 2001; Yamagata et al., 2006). Happiness, also known as subjective
well-being, is similarly underpinned by genetic variation (Bartels & Boomsma, 2009; Caprara
et al., 2009; Lykken & Tellegen, 1996; Nes et al., 2006, 2010) that is shared with the Five-
Factor Model domains of neuroticism (reversed), extraversion, and conscientiousness (Weiss
et al., 2008). In addition, extended family designs, that incorporate information from non-
twin family members, have also uncovered non-additive genetic effects on personality. These
dominance and interaction effects of genes account for more than twice the amount of per-
sonality variance attributed to additive genetic effects (Eaves et al., 1998; Keller et al., 2005;
Pilia et al., 2006; Rettew et al., 2008). While extended designs still make it difficult to dis-
tinguish between dominance and epistatic effects, Eaves et al. (1998) found that models with
epistatic effects fit better than those with dominance effects. The correlations between par-
ent and offspring phenotypes were close to those of DZ twins and siblings, and this fits
with additive and epistatic effects because the coefficients for the components of covariance
(σ2A = additive, σ
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D = dominance, σ
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A = additive × additive [epistatic] genetic variance) for




















if there is no dominance genetic variance (σ2D = 0) (Lynch & Walsh, 1998). This can be






Dominance and epistatic effects are caused by several molecular mechanisms (Wilkie,
1994; Lehner, 2011). Epistasis at the molecular level occurs through mechanisms such as
protein–protein interfaces, feedback in regulatory networks (Hartman, Garvik, & Hartwell,
2001), and basic physical constraints (Lehner, 2011). Redundancy also influences epistasis
(Kafri, Springer, & Pilpel, 2009). For example, gene duplication creates two functional copies
of a gene (Musso et al., 2008). A mutation in one copy still leaves the other functioning, so
both copies might have to be mutated before an effect is seen. Redundancy also occurs in
pathways. If two pathways are involved in a trait, a change in one can be buffered by the
other. Interactions also occur within a pathway, where a mutation that blocks a pathway will
not be further modified by other mutations influencing different points on the same pathway
(Papp, Pal, & Hurst, 2004). Molecular mechanisms for dominance include alternations of
expression level and gain/loss of function (Wilkie, 1994).
The proportion of additive to nonadditive genetic variance can also be informative of the
evolution of a trait (Merilä & Sheldon, 1999). The fitness of an additively-acting allele will
always be the same in every individual whereas alleles with nonadditive effects will differ de-
pending on the state of other genes. Additive genetic variance comes from such independent
effects of genes and is thereby eroded more efficiently by selection than nonadditive effects
which arise from combinations of genes (Crnokrak & Roff, 1995; Merilä & Sheldon, 1999).
High nonadditive genetic variance is therefore one sign of long-term directional or stabilizing
selection because the alleles with additive effects will reach fixation first. While the presence
of non-additive genetic effects on personality is consistent with balancing selection (Penke,
Denissen, & Miller, 2007) or with joint directional selection for personality and life-history
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traits (Figueredo & Rushton, 2009), the ratio of additive to non-additive genetic variance is
not a strong test of particular evolutionary mechanisms (Keller, 2007).
4.2 Personality and subjective well-being in great apes
A complementary approach to understanding the evolutionary history of a trait is to see
whether it is present in closely related species. This is because the most parsimonious expla-
nation for species similarity is that the trait is ancestral, i.e., existed in the species common
ancestor, while traits that differ between species are most parsimoniously explained as being
derived, i.e., the product of evolutionary divergence (Harvey & Pagel, 1991; Gosling & Gray-
beal, 2007). Humans and nonhuman primates share the basic biological bases of behavior
(Fleagle, 1999) and comparing species that are more or less closely related indicates when
in time a particular trait originated (Gosling & Graybeal, 2007). Studies of nonhuman pri-
mate personality reveal dimensions akin to some or all of the Five-Factor Model domains and
one or two dimensions not typically identified in humans, the most prominent being labeled
“dominance” or “confidence”, which describe individual differences in competitive prowess
(Freeman & Gosling, 2010). Like humans, chimpanzees, one of our closest living relatives and
a highly social species (Goodall, 1986b), also exhibit genetic variance in personality (Weiss et
al., 2000). The similar phenotypic and genetic correlations between personality and subjective
well-being suggests that this link existed in our common ancestors approximately 6 million
years ago (King & Figueredo, 1997; King & Landau, 2003; Weiss et al., 2002, 2009). Humans
and chimpanzees shared a more distant ancestor approximately 15 million years ago with
orang-utans, a semi-solitary species of great ape (Galdikas, 1985) with similar personality
and subjective well-being traits (Weiss et al., 2006).
Humans, chimpanzees, and orang-utans all share the personality domains of neuroti-
cism, extraversion, and agreeableness (Digman, 1990; King & Figueredo, 1997; Weiss et al.,
2006). Chimpanzees (King & Figueredo, 1997) and orang-utans (Weiss et al., 2006) differ
from humans in having a domain called dominance related to social competitiveness and as-
sertiveness, although in chimpanzees it is a broader domain capturing facets of timidity and
fearfulness that in humans and orang-utans make up neuroticism. Chimpanzees and humans
are distinguished by the presence of openness and conscientiousness domains. Orang-utans
instead have a domain called intellect that appears to be a blend of openness and conscien-
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tiousness (King & Figueredo, 1997; King & Weiss, 2011).
Subjective well-being encompasses long-term pleasant and unpleasant affect (as opposed
to momentary mood) as well as global satisfaction with one’s life and is related to positive
outcomes such as health (Diener et al., 1999). People who are lower in neuroticism and higher
in extraversion and agreeableness are generally happier (DeNeve, 1999). Chimpanzees (King
& Landau, 2003; Weiss et al., 2009) and orang-utans (Weiss et al., 2006) can also be distin-
guished in terms of subjective well-being that captures both affect and positive functioning
in social relationships. Although nonhuman primate subjective well-being is assessed by
observers and therefore not “subjective” in the sense that humans report their own happi-
ness and life satisfaction from their perspective (Diener et al., 1999), the term “subjective
well-being” is appropriate to studying other primates. The trait is subjective in so far as
attempting to capture normal variation in overall mood as opposed to physical health or
well-being that is not an individual difference, such as through enrichment in captivity.
These personality and subjective well-being dimensions were defined using items derived
from human inventories that were modified so as to be appropriate for rating nonhuman
primates (King & Figueredo, 1997; King & Landau, 2003). The ratings are made on each
individual primate by knowledgeable judges. There is convergent evidence for the reliability
and validity of these and similar ratings of nonhuman primate personality. For one, there is
moderate to high agreement among raters assessing the same individual (King & Figueredo,
1997; King & Landau, 2003; Uher & Asendorpf, 2008; Weiss et al., 2006) and ratings are
stable over time in apes (King et al., 2008; Uher & Asendorpf, 2008) and Old World monkeys
(Capitanio, 1999; Stevenson-Hinde et al., 1980; Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011). For
example, the correlations of rhesus macaque personality scores over a one-year follow-up
ranged from .63 to .78 (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011) and of chimpanzee scores
over a ≈ 7-year follow up ranged from .39 to .74. In addition, the structure derived from
ratings of chimpanzees has been replicated in three independent samples (King et al., 2005;
Weiss et al., 2007, 2009). Evidence of the validity of ratings such as these, includes the fact
that they correlate with behavior measures (Pederson et al., 2005; Uher & Asendorpf, 2008).
For example, chimpanzees rated as high in extraversion engaged in more play and frequently
approached other chimpanzees for friendly interactions (Pederson et al., 2005).
The validity of subjective well-being ratings has also been demonstrated. For one, the
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phenotypic correlations between personality and subjective well-being are consistent across
chimpanzees, humans, and orang-utans. Human subjective well-being is related to higher ex-
traversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness and lower neuroticism (DeNeve & Cooper,
1998) while chimpanzee subjective well-being is related to higher dominance, extraversion,
and conscientiousness (King & Landau, 2003). Orang-utan subjective well-being is related to
lower neuroticism and both higher extraversion and agreeableness (Weiss et al., 2006).
The subjective well-being of nonhuman primate species resembles their human coun-
terpart in other ways, too. For one, as is in humans (Diener & Chan, 2011), orang-utans
higher in subjective well-being live longer (Weiss, Adams, & King, 2011). Also, like human
subjective well-being (Weiss et al., 2008), approximately 40% of the variance in chimpanzee
subjective well-being is heritable with all of the heritable variance being shared in common
with personality variance (Weiss et al., 2002).
Here I explore the quantitative genetic structure of personality and subjective well-being
in orang-utans to test whether non-additive genetic variance is present in other primates and
whether the genetic basis of subjective well-being is a unique feature of chimpanzees and
humans. If a large proportion of the genetic variance in orang-utan personality can be at-
tributed to non-additive effects, it would support the idea that similar evolutionary processes
are maintaining variation in personality across primate species. Alternatively, if non-additive
effects are absent or small relative to additive genetic variance, then this would support the
idea that the genetic structure in humans is the result of more recent evolutionary processes
unique to the hominid lineage. Existing findings do not rule out the possibility that the
personality-subjective well-being nexus arose independently in humans and chimpanzees as,
for example, an adaptation to their particular social environments where encounters with
other individuals are frequent. Using chimpanzees and humans alone, it is therefore not
possible to distinguish which aspects of the relationship between personality and subjective
well-being are shared or derived. Orang-utans are a good species to address these questions.
Unlike chimpanzees and humans, orang-utans are semi-social and because of their phyloge-
netic relationship with humans, the presence or absence of a similar genetic structure can be
used to distinguish ancestral features. In this study I relied on rater assessments of personal-
ity because of the large sample sizes required to get accurate heritability estimates.
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Relationship Informative Full pedigree
maternities 175 1711
paternities 163 1688
full sibs 79 1881
maternal sibs 149 3389
maternal half sibs 70 1508
paternal sibs 210 5775
paternal half sibs 131 3894
maternal grandmothers 50 722
maternal grandfathers 41 710
paternal grandmothers 45 564
paternal grandfathers 39 556
Table 4.1: Number of records for parental, sibling, and grandparental relationships calculated
for only individuals informative for a quantitative genetic analysis because both members of
the relationship pair have been measured and for the full pedigree, including unmeasured
ancestors. Although it contains unmeasured individuals, the full pedigree is still used in cal-
culating the additive genetic relationship matrix (A) because it yields estimates of relatedness
between potentially measured aunts, uncles, and cousins, etc.
4.3 Orang-utans
Orang-utans are a genus of apes descended from species that evolved in Asia (Steiper, 2006)
and presently inhabit the islands of Sumatra and Borneo (Singleton et al., 2004; Husson et
al., 2008).
Subjects were 54 Bornean (Pongo pygmaeus), 100 Sumatran (Pongo abelii), and 30 hybrid
orang-utans housed across 42 zoological parks in the United States, Canada, Australia, and
Singapore. Each zoo held between 1 and 22 orang-utans (mean = 4.3, mode = 3). There were
109 females and 75 males (mean age = 21.6, SD = 12.1). One hundred fifty-two of the orang-
utans participated in a previous study of personality (Weiss et al. 2006) while ratings on the
additional 32 orang-utans, from zoos in Australia and Singapore, were new to this study.
Across zoos, subjects were connected through an extended pedigree containing 358 indi-
viduals and encompassing up to 4 generations. (see table 4.1). Both the mother and father
were known for 158 subjects. Only the mother was known for 27 subjects and only the father
for one. Among the genetically informative individuals contributing to estimates of quanti-
tative genetic parameters there were 50 full sibships and 134 half sibships. The pedigree also
contained two inbred individuals (2Θxy = 1.25 for both).
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4.4 Orang-utan personality and subjective well-being
Orang-utan personality consists of five dimensions: extraversion, dominance, neuroticism,
agreeableness, and intellect (Weiss et al., 2006) defined by the intercorrelations among items
describing orang-utan personality. Extraversion captures differences in interpersonal traits
and is defined by items such as playful, (not) solitary, and social but differs from human and
chimpanzee extraversion by also including aspects of openness, such as inquisitive. Dom-
inance, as in chimpanzees, is defined by traits related to dominance and submissive be-
haviours and traits similar to the negative pole of human agreeableness, such as manipulative
and aggressive. Neuroticism is made up of traits similar to human neuroticism such as anxious,
(not) stable, and impulsive. Agreeableness was similar to the identically named dimension in
chimpanzees and is defined by items related only to the positive pole of human agreeable-
ness, such as sympathetic and protective. Finally, intellect was made up of items similar to both
human conscientiousness (decisive, [not] disorganized) and openness (intelligent).
Personality was measured by ratings of each individual provided by 113 zoo employees
who worked regularly with the orang-utans and who did not specifically receive training
on measuring personality apart from the instructions included in the questionnaire. Each
orang-utan was rated by between 1 and 7 raters (mean = 2.6). Personality was assessed
in 137 subjects using the 48-item orang-utan Personality Questionnaire (OPQ, Weiss et al.,
2006) and in 37 subjects using the expanded 54-item Hominoid Personality Questionnaire
(HPQ, Weiss et al., 2009) and 10 subjects were also rated on an earlier, 43-item version of
the OPQ that was based on the Chimpanzee Personality Questionnaire (King & Figueredo,
1997). Each item consisted of an adjectival descriptor and one to three clarifying sentences
describing the adjective in terms of orang-utan behaviour. For example, the item active was
defined as “Subject spends little time idle and seems motivated to spend considerable time
either moving around or engaging in some overt, energetic behaviour.” Ratings were made
on a 7 point scale. Across all raters and subjects the data contained 20446 personality item
scores.
Subjective well-being (SWB) was assessed in 164 orang-utans by ratings of their balance
of positive and negative moods, their enjoyment of social interaction, and their ability to
achieve goals, as well as an evaluation by the human raters as to how happy they would
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be if they were the target orang-utan for a week (Box 6.1). This instrument was based on a
previous assessment of chimpanzee well-being (King & Landau, 2003). In total there were
1578 subjective well-being item scores included in the analysis.
Box 4.1 Items from the orang-utan subjective well-being questionnaire
• Moods Estimate the amount of time the orang-utan is happy, contented, enjoying
itself, or otherwise in a positive mood. Assume that at other times the orang-utan
is unhappy, bored, frightened, or otherwise in a negative mood.
• Social Estimate the extent to which social interactions with other orang-utans are
satisfying, enjoyable experiences as opposed to being a source of fright, distress,
frustration, or some other negative experience. It is not the number of social inter-
actions that should be estimated, but the extent to which social interactions that do
occur are a positive experience for the orang-utan. Use as many social interactions
that you can recall as a basis for your judgment.
• Goals Estimate, for this orang-utan, the extent to which it is effective or successful
in achieving its goals or wishes. Examples of goals would be achieving desired
locations, devices, or materials in the enclosure. Keep in mind that each orang-
utan will presumably have its own set of goals that may be different from other
orang-utans.
• Be orang-utan Imagine how happy you would be if you were that orang-utan for a
week. You would be exactly like that orang-utan. You would behave the same way
as that orang-utan, would perceive the world the same way as that orang-utan, and
would feel things the same way as that orang-utan.
4.5 Quantitative genetic analysis
Heritability estimates are based on correlations among the phenotypes of individuals who
differ in their amount of genetic relatedness. Behavior genetic studies of humans typically
derive heritability estimates using the difference in correlations between monozygotic and
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dizygotic twins (Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001). I used two methods to estimate heritability in the
sample of orang-utans: a parent–offspring regression and an “animal model”. The regression
of breeding values on phenotypic values is an alternative definition of heritability and can be
estimated most directly using parent and offspring phenotypes (Falconer & Mackay, 1996).
Because I had a full pedigree for the orang-utans in the sample, and thus could calculate
relatedness among all the individuals in the sample, I also used the animal model. The
animal model is a biometrical genetic model increasingly used in human studies (Pilia et al.,
2006) and is commonly used in agriculture and evolutionary genetics (Lynch & Walsh, 1998;
Kruuk, 2004; A. J. Wilson & Nussey, 2009).
Parent–offspring regression
Heritability can be estimated from data on parents and offspring (Falconer & Mackay, 1996;
Lynch & Walsh, 1998) as twice the slope coefficient (b) from a regression of offspring on
parent phenotype
h2 = 2b
There were 80 orang-utans in the sample whose mother’s personality and subjective well-
being had also been assessed but only 28 whose father’s had. Because it offered the larger
sample size and thus greater power, I calculated heritability by regressing the offsprings
phenotypes on those of their mothers, e.g.
extraversionoffspring = a + b · extraversionmother + e
Because the variances in offspring and maternal personality were not equal (Table 4.2), I




where σP and σO are the parent and offspring standard deviations (Falconer & Mackay, 1996).
Each mother in the sample was paired with between 1 and 4 offspring (mean = 1.8, mode
= 1) as input into the regression. The sampling variance of the regression coefficient as an
estimate of heritability needs to take into account the correlations among the siblings and is
approximately (Falconer & Mackay, 1996)
σ2b =
k(1 + (n − 1)t)
nN
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Offspring Mother
mean sd N mean sd N
Extraversion .46 .95 80 -.80 .89 80
Dominance -.06 .98 80 -.06 1.1 80
Neuroticism .30 .89 80 -.38 .87 80
Agreeableness .12 95 80 -.19 1.1 79
Intellect -.38 1.0 80 .22 .82 80
Subjective well-being .09 .96 80 -.31 .93 69
Table 4.2: Summary statistics for offspring and mothers used in regression analysis of heri-
tability
b SE h2 s.e.(h2) CI
Extraversion .23 .12 .43 .19 .04, .81
Dominance -.19 .10 -.40 .20 -.78, .00
Neuroticism .07 .12 .13 .22 -.34, .56
Agreeableness -.10 .10 -.22 .20 -.59, .18
Intellect .14 .14 .23 .20 -.13, .65
Subjective well-being .10 .12 .20 .22 -.23, .61
Table 4.3: Heritability estimates from mother–offspring regression; b and SE are the regres-
sion coefficient and standard error; h2 = heritability; CI = 95% confidence interval of the
heritability estimate.
where k = number of parents per family (since only mothers were used, k = 1), n = mean
number of offspring in each family, t = intraclass correlation of siblings, N = total sample
size. I calculated the intraclass correlation from an ANOVA of a regression of offspring






which gives the expected correlation of personality between two siblings. The standard error
of the heritability estimate is then
s.e.(h2) = 2σb
I calculated 95% confidence intervals for each heritability estimate from the predictive distri-
bution taken from simulating 1000 samples from a normal distribution ∼ N(2b′, 2σb).
Using parent–offspring regression, only extraversion had a signficantly positive heritabil-
ity (Table 4.3, Figures 4.1, 4.2). Contrary to expectation, the heritability estimate for domi-
nance and agreeableness were negative and, more surprisingly still, significantly so for domi-
nance. The negative relationships may be attributable to an environmental effect contributing
to the divergence in mother and offspring dominance. The sample size of mother–offspring

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.1: Resemblance between mothers and offspring calculated using a linear regression
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Figure 4.2: Heritability of personality and subjective well-being. Fitted coefficients plotted as
points with 50% and 95% uncertainty intervals.
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pairs was too small to yield precise estimates of heritability. The accuracy of the regres-
sion method also rests on assumptions of random mating, no correlation in environmental
effects between relatives, and genetic effects that are only additive. Because in many cases
the parents and offspring are housed in the same zoo, both the shared zoo environment and
assessment by the same set of raters could contribute to environmental similarity between
relatives. Such complications can be addressed by using a multilevel model that relies on
relatedness between all individuals in the sample and also allows environmental sources of
resemblance to be modeled, i.e., by an animal model.
Animal model
Just as twin models can be viewed as a particular instance of structural equation models, the
animal model is a type of multilevel or mixed-effects model. If a trait is influenced by genetic
differences, two genetically related individuals should deviate from the mean in the same
direction and by a similar amount; both corresponding to how closely related these individ-
uals are. For example, full siblings should be more similar in their deviation from the mean
than full cousins. The additive genetic relationships among animals are used as the basis for
a random effect estimating an individual’s deviation from the mean phenotype attributable
to additive genetic effects (Lynch & Walsh, 1998; Kruuk, 2004).1 The proportion of variance
attributable to these genetic deviations is an estimate of heritability. Similarly, information
about the extent to which individuals share genotypes (for example, full siblings will on
average share half their genes but will have only a quarter of their genotypes in common)
can be used to estimate nonadditive sources of genetic variance such as dominance genetic
variance. While in most twin models dominance genetic variance is confounded with shared
family effects, these can be separated using extended twin family designs (Eaves et al. 1978)
or pedigree data containing a large number of full- and half-siblings (A. J. Wilson & Nussey,
2009), as was the case with the orang-utan pedigree. I also explored whether heritability esti-
mates were consistent between Bornean and Sumatran orang-utans. Significant differences in
genetic structure between these species could be a potential signal of evolutionary divergence
in their personality or subjective well-being.
1The model is referred to as an “animal” model because each individual animal gets its own row of data inputs.
This is in contrast to methods such as parent–offspring regression where each row of data consists of information
on two or more relatives.
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Individuals who share environments may also resemble each other in terms of their per-
sonality or subjective well-being. I therefore considered whether individuals with the same
mother or who lived in the same zoo environment when rated were more similar than those
living in different zoo environments. The maternal environment captures effects that make
offspring of the same mother resemble each other (independent of transmitted genes) such
as natal effects or rearing style and may be caused by either environmental effects or indirect
genetic effects. A zoo environment effect would account for any features of the captive envi-
ronment that make individuals living together more similar to each other such as the level of
enrichment, the social environment and group size, or observer effects. Because siblings did
not always live in the same zoo when assessed, maternal and zoo effects were not perfectly
confounded. I explored the amount of variance in each personality trait and subjective well-
being these effects accounted for by fitting a series of univariate models. I then estimated
genetic and environmental covariances among traits using a multivariate model.
The model had measurement and variance decomposition components. The measurement
component was used to capture the structure and distribution of the raw data by treating each
item on a personality scale as repeated observations of animals and raters. The variance
decomposition component attributes phenotypic variances in personality item scores among
various genetic (additive and nonadditive), environmental (unique, maternal, shared zoo),
and assessment (rater, residual) effects. The models consisted of a vector of latent variable l
l = Xβ + Zu + e (4.1)
where X is a design matrix indexing fixed effects, Z is the design matrix indexing random
effects, β is a vector of fixed effect parameters, u is a vector of random effect parameters,
and e is the residuals. On the latent scale the parameters β and u and residual vectors e are


























β0 is a vector of means for each outcome (personality or subjective well-being trait), B is the
covariance matrix of fixed effects, G is the covariance matrix of random effects, and R is the
covariance matrix of residuals (Hadfield, 2010).
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Measurement component
Rather than analyzing factor scores for each personality trait, I built the models up from
each raters assessments of each orang-utan on every item and thus modeled personality and
subjective well-being as latent variables. Each rating on the 7-point scale was treated as
ordinal and connected to an underlying latent scale with a probit link parameterized using
cut-points (Hadfield & Nakagawa, 2010). The probability of the item rating y equalling k is
Pr(y = k) = FN(γk|l, 1)− FN(γk−1|l, 1)
where FN is the normal density function, γk is the kth cutpoint with γ1 = 0 (Hadfield,
2010). Each item contributed to the latent score of the personality domain it had a salient
loading on as described previously (Weiss et al., 2006). I reverse coded items with negative
loadings. This approach handled heterogeneity in the number of items for each personality
domain that was a consequence of the different versions of the questionnaires used to rate
the orang-utans. Using the raw observations allowed uncertainty about individual orang-
utans personality scores to propagate through the model and thus allowed us to control for
relationships among personality and subjective well-being introduced by raters. All models
used residual variances fixed to 1 while residual covariances in the multivariate model were
fixed to 0 because each item only gave information on one personality or subjective well-being
domain, that is the residual matrix from Eqn. 4.2 was R = I.
Variance partition component
One advantage of using the animal model for heritability estimates is that it can be ex-
tended to include fixed effects that are known to affect the phenotype as well as additional
group-level random effects to partition the variance (Kruuk 2004). A mixed effects model is
composed of both fixed and random explanatory variables that contribute to phenotypic sim-
ilarity between individuals. A fixed effect is an estimate of mean differences in phenotypes
where each factor level of the variable is known. In contrast, each level of a random effect is
taken to be sampled from a larger population of values where the goal is to estimate the pop-
ulation variance of the variable. An individual’s personality can deviate from the the grand
mean for several reasons. In all models I controlled for potential differences attributable to
age and sex by fitting them as fixed effects. Secondarily, I considered the effect of different
4.5. QUANTITATIVE GENETIC ANALYSIS 131
genetic groups (in this case species) using species ancestry (1 for Sumatran and 0 for Bornean
with an intermediate percentage calculated for hybrids depending on the mixture of their
parentage) as a fixed effect (Quaas, 1988).
I built the following models to explore the partitioning of variance among combinations
of genetic and environmental factors:
1. The first model estimated individual orang-utan (VID) and rater (VJ) variances (model
1) using orang-utan and rater IDs as predictors;
2. The second model added parameters to estimate additive genetic variance (VA) for all
species together using a design matrix derived from the additive genetic relationship
matrix calculated from the pedigree.
3. The next model added nonadditive genetic variance (VD) using the dominance genetic
relationship matrix (Lynch & Walsh, 1998, p 768; Appendix A.2).
4. The fourth model included individual, rater, and additive genetic effects and added an
estimate for maternal environment variance (VM).
5. The fifth model was the same as the previous model except it fit shared zoo environ-
ment variance (VZ) instead of maternal variance.
6. The final model included all the effects to give more conservative estimates of effects
that are difficult to separate when families share a common environment (A. J. Wilson
& Nussey, 2009).
In the models that estimate additive and nonadditive genetic or maternal and zoo envi-
ronment variances, the orang-utan identity matrix fits an effect comparable to the unique
environment variance (VE) in twin models, that is, effects that cause an orang-utan to differ
from other individuals who share genes or environments.
The full model of fixed and random effects was
yijk = µ0k + agei + age
2
i + sexi + speciesi + aik + dik + mik + zik + jjk + eijk
where yijk is orang-utan’s latent score on personality or subjective well-being trait k as as-
sessed by rater j; µ0k is the mean of trait k; agei, sexi, and speciesi are the age, sex, and
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species of orang-utan i; aik and dik are the breeding value (additive genetic effect) and domi-
nance deviation (nonadditive genetic effect) of individual i; mik and zik are the environmental
deviations for individual i’s mother and zoo; jjk is the rater deviation; and eijk is the residual.
I additionally tested models that fit unique environment effects separately for each species
group (Bornean, Sumatran, and hybrid) and additive and dominance genetic effects for
Bornean and Sumatran orang-utans (model 7). I did this by creating separate genetic re-
lationship matrices for each species.
Model fitting
I estimated fixed effects and components of variance using a Bayesian animal model (Soren-
sen & Gianola, 2002) as implemented in MCMCglmm (Hadfield, 2010). I used Bayesian
methods because they better handle confounded variables (Ovaskainen et al. 2008) such as
parents and offspring who shared genes and a zoo environment. Bayesian inferences can be
made by summarizing random draws from the joint posterior distribution of the parameter
estimates. MCMCglmm uses an inverse-Wishart distribution as the prior for variance com-
ponents. I specified priors with variances of 1 and covariances of 0 and degrees of freedom
parameter of 1 for the univariate models and 6 for the multivariate models. I ran the models
for 106 iterations, discarded the first half of the samples, and thinned the samples from the
posterior distribution to 1000. The autocorrelations among the successive samples from the
posterior distributions were less than .1. I compared model fit using the deviance informa-
tion criterion or DIC (Hadfield 2010). Because there is error in calculating DIC from Monte
Carlo simulations, I ran each model twice. Because of the variance in the DIC between the
two runs of each of the univariate models (Table 1), it was not possible to definitively choose
the best model for each personality domain. I therefore interpreted the modes and credible
intervals for each parameter estimate for all models.
Heritability and variance proportion coefficients
To exclude measurement error from the heritability estimates, I calculated narrow-sense
heritability as the ratio between the additive genetic variance and the repeatable variance
(VRPT = VA + VD + VM + VZ) on the latent variable scale as h
2 = VA/VRPT. The heritabil-
ity estimate thus only reflects variance from effects assigned to individual orang-utans and
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not measurement variance from rater effects and the probit distribution used to model item
scores. I calculated the broad-sense heritability as H2 = (VA + VD)/VRPT and the propor-
tion of nonadditive genetic variance to total genetic variance (Crnokrak & Roff, 1995) as
Dα = VD/(VA + VD). I estimated correlations among traits attributable to additive genetic
(rA), nonadditive genetic (rD), and unique environment (rE) effects as well as rater effects
(rJ) using a multivariate animal model. Covariances, like variances, can also be added to-
gether, so I also examined the total genetic correlations (rG) from adding the additive and
nonadditive genetic covariance matrices (covG = covA + covD) and the phenotypic corre-
lations among personality and subjective well-being statistically controlling for rater effects
(covP = covA + covD + covE).
Variance components, heritability, and the other variance proportion coefficients of mod-
els 1-6 are given in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. The narrow-sense heritabilities of personality traits
and subjective well-being in orang-utans were moderate and across the models and traits
ranged from about 20-30% of the repeatable variance (Table 4.5, Fig. 4.3). The nonadditive
genetic effects explained on average more of the variance (30-50%) than additive genetic ef-
fects. The total genetic effects (broad-sense heritability or H2) thus accounted for upwards of
three quarters of the repeatable variance (Table 4.6, Fig. 4.3). The proportion of nonadditive
genetic variance (Dα) was greater than half for all traits (Table 4.5). The estimates for ma-
ternal environment and zoo effects were low but the variance accounted for by nonadditive
genetic effects was generally reduced when a maternal environment effect was included in
the model. The separate heritability estimates for Bornean and Sumatran orang-utans (Table
4.6) were consistent with the estimates from the whole sample.
In these models I used the dominance genetic relationship matrix, defined as the prob-
ability that two individuals share the same genotype at a locus (Lynch & Walsh, 1998), to
estimate nonadditive genetic variance. Dominance genetic variance comes from interactions
between alleles at the same locus but additive × additive and other epistatic interactions
could also contribute to nonadditive genetic variance. However, as only small fractions of
variance from epistatic effects contributes to correlations among related individuals, the de-
sign matrix needed to estimate them will be very close to that used to estimate dominance
genetic relationships. Therefore the estimate of nonadditive genetic variance would include
some variance from any epistatic effects.
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Model DIC VE (VID) VA VD VM VZ VJ
Extraversion
1 16046; 16046 .53 (.41, .68) .14 (.10, .24)
2 16036; 16046 .38 (.25, .55) .17 (.06, .32) .17 (.10, .23)
3 16028; 16036 .18 (.09, .38) .15 (.07, .29) .22 (.10, .40) .14 (.10, .24)
4 16031; 16002 .33 (.22, .53) .16 (.07, .32) .09 (.06, .20) .14 (.10, .23)
5 16042; 16026 .36 (.24, .57) .13 (.08, .36) .11 (.06, .24) .13 (.10, .24)
6 15978; 16018 .20 (.07, .36) .14 (.06, .30) .17 (.08, .35) .09 (.06, .22) .11 (.06, .26) .15 (.09, .23)
Dominance
1 17788; 17792 1.0 (.77, 1.2) .17 (.10, .25)
2 17781; 17790 .82 (.47, 1.0) .25 (.09, .57) .16 (.10, .25)
3 17778; 17787 .21 (.08, .60) .18 (.07, .44) .58 (.24, .92) .16 (.11, .26)
4 17791; 17785 .57 (.34, .88) .19 (.08, .51) .21 (.08, .46) .18 (.11, .25)
5 17779; 17781 .84 (.5, 1.05) .24 (.09, .56) .11 (.05, .27) .16 (.11, .25)
6 17777; 17776 .27 (.10, .61) .18 (.07, .45) .22 (.12, .66) .18 (.07, .45) .13 (.06, .29) .16 (.11, .26)
Neuroticism
1 13543; 13540 .42 (.32, .55) .11 (.07, .19)
2 13524; 13536 .33 (.20, .45) .14 (.06, .25) .11 (.07, .18)
3 13532; 13535 .14 (.07, .29) .10 (.06, .23) .20 (.10, .36) .10 (.07, .18)
4 13524; 13523 .29 (.16, .41) .12 (.06, .25) .13 (.06, .23) .12 (.07, .18)
5 13531; 13529 .31 (.2, .43) .12 (.06, .25) .15 (.05, .28) .11 (.07, .17)
6 13524; 13510 .14 (.08, .26) .10 (.05, .21) .13 (.07, .27) .10 (.06, .22) .13 (.06, .30) .11 (.07, .17)
Agreeableness
1 10129; 10098 .95 (.72, 1.2) .36 (.24, .55)
2 10134; 10088 .73 (.47, 1.1) .19 (.09, .49) .40 (.25, .56)
3 10124; 10126 .23 (.08, .65) .15 (.08, .40) .56 (.23, .87) .38 (.24, .57)
4 10123; 10125 .67 (.37, .95) .16 (.08, .49) .19 (.08, .40) .38 (.24, .58)
5 10091; 10115 .70 (.46, 1.0) .20 (.08, .51) .15 (.08, .46) .34 (.23, .52)
6 10122; 10121 .26 (.13, .68) .19 (.09, .42) .36 (.09, .65) .17 (.07, .36) .18 (.06, .44) .34 (.24, .54)
Intellect
1 8149; 8149 .48 (.35, .64) .24 (.15, .37)
2 8149; 8149 .31 (.17, .49) .21 (.09, .39) .28 (.15, .37)
3 8087; 8136 .15 (.08, .35) .19 (.07, .33) .23 (.09, .38) .21 (.15, .35)
4 8144; 8148 .29 (.13, .45) .18 (.08, .42) .12 (.05, .23) .27 (.13, .37)
5 8131; 8123 .33 (.16, .48) .23 (.07, .39) .15 (.06, .34) .18 (.13, .34)
6 8144; 8143 .17 (.08, .33) .16 (.06, .32) .14 (.06, .30) .12 (.05, .23) .14 (.07, 33) .22 (.13, .35)
Subjective well-being
1 4222; 4195 .92 (.65, 1.3) .69 (.43, .96)
2 4174; 4234 .64 (.31, 1.0) .29 (.08, .76) .65 (.43, .98)
3 4212; 4234 .21 (.09, .68) .19 (.07, .53) .49 (.17, .90) .62 (.44, 1.0)
4 4230; 4247 .56 (.17, .83) .28 (.08, .63) .19 (.08, .55) .67 (.44, 1.0)
5 4249; 4228 .72 (.31, 1.1) .21 (.07, .69) .20 (.06, .58) .53 (.40, .95)
6 4242; 4217 .32 (.10, .58) .23 (.06, .50) .20 (.10, .62) .23 (.07, .50) .25 (.09, .57) .67 (.43, 1.0)
Table 4.4: Variance components and model fit criteria. DIC = deviance information criterion,
with values from 2 runs of each model. VE = unique environment variance, VID = individual
variance, VA = additive genetic variance, VD = nonadditive (dominance) genetic variance,
VM = maternal environment variance, VZ = zoo environment variance, VJ = rater variance.
Residual variance, VR, fixed at 1 in all models. The first variance component column gives
VID for model 1 and VE for all other models. Posterior modes of each estimate are given with
95% credible intervals in parentheses.
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Model h2 = VA/VRPT d
2 = VD/VRPT m
2 = VM/VRPT z
2 = VZ/VRPT e




2 .30 (.13, .53) .70 (.47, .87)
3 .23 (.13, .45) .32 (.17, .55) .38 (.18, .60) .63 (.34, .80)
4 .25 (.11, .46) .19 (.09, .29) .51 (.37, .75)
5 .22 (.11, .46) .17 (.08, .30) .54 (.34, .73)
6 .16 (.08, .33) .20 (.09, .40) .13 (.07, .24) .13 (.07, .28) .29 (.09, .41) .51 (.28, .77)
Dominance
2 .21 (.07, .49) .79 (.51, .93)
3 .22 (.08, 42) .35 (.18, .70) .27 (.11, .60) .73 (.45, .91)
4 .19 (.07, .42) .17 (.09, .38) .60 (.31, .74)
5 .18 (.08, .44) .09 (.05, .22) .71 (.43, .82)
6 .15 (.06, .32) .21 (.09, .48) .20 (.06, .33) .09 (.04, .20) .19 (.08, .45) .73 (.34, .87)
Neuroticism
2 .30 (.13, .50) .70 (.50, .87)
3 .22 (.12, .42) .36 (.19, .58) .38 (.15, .55) .69 (.43, .83)
4 .21 (.11, .42) .24 (.11, .39) .49 (.29, .66)
5 .23 (.11, .40) .25 (.12, .41) .48 (.34, .68)
6 .15 (.07, ) .17 (.10, ) .16 (.09, ) .18 (.10, ) .24 (.10, ) .57 (.34, .77)
Agreeableness
2 .18 (.08, .43) .82 (.57, .92)
3 .22 (.06, .38) .52 (.17, .69) .24 (.12, .60) .78 (.45, .89)
4 .14 (.08, .41) .14 (.07, .33) .64 (.38, .8)
5 .19 (.07, .40) .20 (.07, .31) .61 (.36, .77)
6 .14 (.06, .30) .19 (.07, .46) .13 (.05, .24) .15 (.06, .29) .27 (.09, .47) .61 (.30, .83)
Intellect
2 .35 (.21, .68) .65 (.32, .79)
3 .29 (.14, .52) .28 (.14, .53) .29 (.13, .55) .52 (.27, .78)
4 .28 (.13, .57) .20 (.09, .33) .43 (.21, .65)
5 .23 (.14, .53) .22 (.10, .40) .41 (.21, .64)
6 .16 (.08, .35) .15 (.08, .34) .14 (.06, .25) .21 (.09, .35) .18 (.09, .38) .51 (.23, .72)
Subjective well-being
2 .18 (.09, .64) .82 (.36, .91)
3 .24 (.07, .47) .38 (.15, .65) .24 (.11, .60) .78 (.37, .89)
4 .19 (.08, .51) .26 (.08, .47) .47 (.20, .72)
5 .18 (.05, .52) .16 (.07, .38) .54 (.25, .77)
6 .15 (.04, .33) .21 (.05, .39) .19 (.06, .34) .14 (.07, .34) .17 (.07, .40) .55 (.25, .84)
Table 4.5: Heritability (h2) and variance partition coefficients for nonadditive (dominance)
genetic (d2) and maternal (m2), zoo (z2) and unique (e2) environments calculated relative to
the repeatable variance, VRPT = VA + VD + VM + VZ + VE. Dα = proportion of nonadditive
genetic variance.
h2 H2
Combined Bornean Sumatran Combined Bornean Sumatran
Extraversion .23 (.13, .45) .29 (.10, .55) .22 (.09, .45) .66 (.41, .86) .67 (.43, .89) .73 (.40, .87)
Dominance .22 (.08, 42) .26 (.08, .54) .19 (.06, .46) .78 (.49, .93) .72 (.36, .91) .78 (.43, .93)
Neuroticism .22 (.12, .42) .25 (.13, .53) .29 (.14, .52) .69 (.48, .85) .68 (.40, .85) .70 (.50, .87)
Agreeableness .22 (.06, .38) .25 (.09, .55) .16 (.07, .43) .82 (.41, .91) .69 (.43, .90) .71 (.40, .92)
Intellect .29 (.14, .52) .27 (.10, .53) .28 (.15, .58) .69 (47, .86) .64 (.38, .88) .73 (.46, .89)
SWB .24 (.07, .47) .19 (.06, .60) .23 (.06, .48) .77 (.44, .92) .72 (.32, .90) .78 (.40, .92)
Table 4.6: Heritability estimates for the combined sample and each species. Posterior modes
of narrow-sense, h2 = VA/(VA + VD + VE), and broad sense, H
2 = (VA + VD)/(VA + VD +
VE), heritability with 95% credible intervals in parentheses.
136 CHAPTER 4. ORANG-UTAN PERSONALITY GENETICS
Figure 4.3: Variance proportion coefficients for repeatable variance. Points indicate posterior
modes of each estimate with 50% credible intervals in solid and 95% credible intervals in
dotted lines. h2 = (narrow-sense) heritability, d2 = dominance, H2 = broad-sense heritability,
e2 = unique environment.
I also detected maternal environment effects. In addition to behaviors of mothers such
as rearing-style, the maternal environment could include the effects of prenatal factors and
maternal genes that influence offspring phenotype apart from inherited genes that the off-
spring expresses directly (Lynch & Walsh, 1998; A. J. Wilson & Nussey, 2009). Variance from
the zoo environment could likewise arise from any effect that makes the orang-utans in the
same zoo more similar to each other in personality including differences in social dynamics,
group composition, zoo enrichment, or shared biases of raters within each zoo.
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Figure 4.4: Fixed effects from Bayesian animal model (posterior mode and 95% uncertainty
intervals).
Age, sex, and species differences
There was some evidence that, compared to Bornean orang-utans, Sumatran orang-utans
in this sample were higher in neuroticism (b = .22, CI = -.05, .61; see Figure 4.4). Male
orang-utans were lower in neuroticism and higher in intellect and subjective well-being. Age
was also associated with lower extraversion and agreeableness and higher dominance and
intellect.
Genetic structure
While there was uncertainty in the additive genetic (rA), nonadditive genetic (rD), and unique
environment (rE) correlations between personality and subjective well-being (Table 4.7, Figure
4.5), the effects all went in the same direction (negative for neuroticism and positive for
extraversion, dominance, agreeableness, and intellect). From these models I was also able to
derive estimates of the phenotypic correlations among personality and subjective well-being
that controlled for covariances among traits attributable to rater effects: extraversion rP =
.24 (95% CI = .05, .37), dominance .13 (95% CI = -.09, .28), neuroticism -.22 (95% CI = -.38,
-.05), agreeableness .20 (95% CI = .05, .40), and intellect .18 (95% CI = .02, .36). There was
also some evidence for a positive dominance genetic and unique environment correlation
between agreeableness and extraversion (Table 4.7, Figure 4.6).
Because studies of humans and chimpanzees found that all or most of the genetic variance
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Additive genetic rA
Extraversion Dominance Neuroticism Agreeableness Intellect
Dominance .14 (-.24, 37)
Neuroticism -.01 (-.24, .37) -.04 (-.30, .33)
Agreeableness .17 (-.12, .52) -.20 (-.49, .19) -.03 (-.38, .28)
Intellect .08 (-.22, .39) .17 (-.11, .50) -.10 (-.42, .16) .01 (-.38, .28)
SWB .23 (-.15, .45) .13 (-.21, 43) -.16 (-.47, .13) .12 (-.19, .47) .10 (-.18, 46)
Nonadditive (dominance) genetic rD
Extraversion Dominance Neuroticism Agreeableness Intellect
Dominance .13 (-.20, .45)
Neuroticism -.03 (-.29, .30) .03 (-.29, .31)
Agreeableness .29 (-.02, .55) -.22 (-.55, .12) -.13 (-.48, .13)
Intellect .15 (-.17, .40) .20 (-.15, .47) -.16 (-.47, .10) .06 (-.23, .39)
SWB .22 (-.09, .51) .14 (-.24, .44) -.17 (-.48, .07) .20 (-.07, .56) .25 (-.11, .47)
Unique environment rE
Extraversion Dominance Neuroticism Agreeableness Intellect
Dominance .16 (-.21, .44)
Neuroticism -.03 (-.30, .31) -.02 (-.31, 30)
Agreeableness .31 (.02, .59) -.21 (-.52, .14) -.16 (-.48, .13)
Intellect .12 (-.12, .47) .13 (-.18, .44) -.15 (-.45, .11) .16 (-.19, .46)
SWB .26 (-.07, .51) .02 (-.30, .40) -.25 (-.50, .04) .30 (-.06, .54) .20 (-.10, .50)
Rater rJ
Extraversion Dominance Neuroticism Agreeableness Intellect
Dominance .11 (-.15, .30)
Neuroticism -.10 (-.30, .19) .36 (.12, 55)
Agreeableness .41 (.16, 57) -.10 (-.40, 10) -.21 (-.38, .10)
Intellect .20 (.06, .51) -.17 (-.35, .13) -.44 (-.54, -.09) .30 (.04, .50)
SWB .24 (.00, .46) -.17 (-.39, .13) -.36 (-.55, -.09) .30 (.06, .55) .41 (.16, 61)
Table 4.7: Genetic, environmental, and rater correlations. Parameter estimates from Model 2
with 95% credible intervals in parentheses. SWB = subjective well-being.
underlying subjective well-being was shared with personality, I calculated the conditional
genetic variance of subjective well-being. The conditional genetic variance (Hansen & Houle,
2008) is genetic variance that is unique to subjective well-being, excluding variance from
genetic factors that also influence the personality domains defined as
c(y|x) = Gy − GyxG−1x Gxy,
where c(y|x) is the conditional genetic variance of trait y given traits x, Gyx and Gxy are
vectors of the genetic covariance between y and the other traits, and Gx is the genetic covari-
ance matrix of the other traits. Fifteen percent (95% credible interval [CI] = .03, .38) of the
additive genetic and 19% (95% CI = .05, .44) of the nonadditive genetic variance in subjective
well-being was shared with personality.
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Figure 4.5: Random effects for personality vs subjective well-being for breeding values (left
column), dominance deviations (center column), environment deviations (right column).
Points are posterior modes of each random effect. Regression lines plotted using draws
sampled from the posterior distribution of the variance-covariance matrices.
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Figure 4.6: Random effects for extraversion vs agreeableness.
4.6 Psychometrics and reliability analysis
Because the animal model analysis incorporated a measurement component and rater effects
that accounted for both the variances of and covariances among the personality traits, it
was possible to conduct psychometric inferences from the genetic model. I calculated the
reliability of the personality and subjective well-being assessments as intraclass correlation
coefficients (ICCs) in two ways using estimates from the genetic models. First, to estimate
the consistency of the items making up each personality domain or subjective well-being, I
calculated the ratio of the animal variance (that is, the repeatable variance from genetic or
environmental effects that are assigned to individual animals) plus the rater variance over
the residual and link function variances
ICscale =
VRPT + VJ
VRPT + VJ + VR + 1
where VRPT is the repeatable variance, VJ is the rater variance, VR is the error variance (includ-
ing animal × rater interaction), and the final 1 is from the variance of the probit distribution
used to model the ordered categorical scores. This ICC is on the scale of the raw data and
represents the expected correlation between an individual’s scores on two items made by the
same rater. Although it is not the same as Cronbach’s α, it specifies the degree to which the
rating of an individual on one item generalized to other items on that scale and is therefore
a type of model-derived estimate of internal consistency. Second, I calculated reliability on
the latent scale as ICsubject = VRPT/(VRPT + VJ) to represent the expected correlation between
two assessments of the same individual’s personality domain by different raters. This ICC
estimates interrater agreement and is similar to ICC(2,1) (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979).
4.6. PSYCHOMETRICS AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 141
Consistency Reliability
Extraversion .28 (.24, .33) .81 (.71, .87)
Dominance .38 (.34, .44) .87 (.81, .91)
Neuroticism .23 (.20, .28) .86 (.73, .90)
Agreeableness .41 (.38, .48) .77 (.64, .82)
Intellect .31 (.25, .35) .73 (.60, .83)
SWB .49 (.42, .54) .60 (.50, .74)
Table 4.8: Scale consistency and reliability of assessments by multiple raters. Parameter esti-
mates with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. SWB = subjective well-being. Domain-
scale consistency calculated as (VRPT + VJ)/(VRPT + VJ + VR + 1); latent reliability calculated
as VRPT/(VRPT + VJ) where VRPT = VA + VD + VE.
The intraclass correlation coefficient from the animal and rater variances on the scale of
the raw data ranged from .31 for intellect to .41 for agreeableness and was .49 for subjective
well-being (Table 4.8). These coefficients represents the expected correlation between two
items assessed on the same animal by the same rater and can act as a form internal consis-
tency of items making up each scale, Combining information from multiple raters produced
highly reliable assessments of latent personality values which ranged from .73 for intellect
to .87 for dominance. Reliability of subjective well-being on the latent scale was .60, and
thus acceptable. Rater effects contributed to the observed correlations among personality
and subjective well-being scores (Table 4.7). After decomposing the covariance among per-
sonality and subjective well-being into animal components (genetic and environment) and
a rater component, raters who rated an orang-utan as higher on extraversion agreeableness,
and intellect and lower on dominance and neuroticism also tended to rate that orang-utan
as higher on subjective well-being. Notably, the estimate of rater effects for the correlation
between dominance and subjective well-being correlation tended to go in the opposite di-
rection from genetic and unique environmental estimates. There were also detectable rater
effects on the extraversion–agreeableness, extraversion–intellect, neuroticism–intellect, and
agreeableness–intellect correlations.
These results show the importance of conditioning on rater effects and other sources
of measurement error when analyzing questionnaire-based assessments of animal personal-
ity. To wit, while raters were consistent in the scores they assigned to individual subjective
well-being items, the interrater reliability of subjective well-being was lower than for the per-
sonality traits, which is consistent with the subjective well-being factor scores having a lower
142 CHAPTER 4. ORANG-UTAN PERSONALITY GENETICS
interrater agreement than those of personality (Weiss et al., 2006). Also, while rater variance
was small compared to genetic and environmental variance, as shown by the high interrater
reliability estimates, raters contributed to some of the covariance among personality traits
and between personality traits and subjective well-being. Rater covariance effects that go in
the same direction as the animal effects would tend to inflate the magnitude of the observed
correlations. Thus, I found that the phenotypic correlations as estimated by the genetic and
environmental covariances between subjective well-being and extraversion, neuroticism, and
agreeableness were smaller than the observed correlations previously reported (Weiss et al.,
2006), which were inflated by covariance introduced by the raters. The opposite was true for
dominance; the animal and rater covariances went in opposite directions and cancelled out,
explaining why no correlation was found between dominance and subjective well-being at
the phenotypic level (Weiss et al., 2006).
While my analysis modeled rater effects or perceptions that introduce correlations among
the personality and subjective well-being dimensions, it does not address to what extent the
five personality dimensions and one SWB dimension themselves are products of rater beliefs
and perceptions. The generalizability of chimpanzee personality dimensions across samples
living in different environments (King et al., 2005; Weiss et al., 2007) and raters with dif-
ferent cultural backgrounds (Weiss et al., 2009), their relationship with observed behaviors
(Pederson et al., 2005), and the recoverability when rater effects on chimpanzee and orang-
utan personality structure have been removed (Weiss et al., 2012) indicate that the structure
of these nonhuman primate personality dimensions is inconsistent with them being solely an
artifact of human perception. Orang-utan SWB has also shown external validity through its
relationship with mortality (Weiss, Adams, & King, 2011). Furthermore, although similar, the
personality structure of orang-utans is not identical to that of humans and the personality
structure of humans, chimpanzees, and orang-utans differ in ways consistent with phylogeny
(e.g., humans and chimpanzees share a personality domain, conscientiousness, that is absent
in orang-utans) and social structure (e.g., the primacy of the chimpanzee dominance domain)
(Weiss & Adams, 2008). However, even factor models of human personality can be under-
stood in terms of our faculties for social perception (Srivastava, 2010) and thus rater-based
assessments of nonhuman primate personality may miss individual differences that are en-
tirely absent in humans (Uher, 2008b). Understanding the full genetic structure of orang-utan
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personality may very well require multiple methods for measuring personality variation.
4.7 Genetics of personality and subjective well-being
I found that the most genetic variation in orang-utan personality and subjective well-being
could be assigned to nonadditive genetic effects. This is consistent with the results from
human personality research (Eaves et al., 1998; Keller et al., 2005; Pilia et al., 2006; Rettew et
al., 2008). The narrow-sense heritability estimates of about 20% were likewise consistent with
human findings that used a similarly specified, pedigree-based animal model (Pilia et al.,
2006). This suggests that a high proportion of nonadditive genetic variance may be a common
feature of personality in primates under long-term directional or stabilizing selection and
not exclusively the result of evolutionary processes unique to the human lineage. The low
estimates of shared zoo environment effects on personality match results from chimpanzees
(Weiss et al. 2000) and are consistent with findings from human personality research on the
effect of the shared (family) environment (Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001).
While this study lacked sufficient power to get precise estimates of genetic correlations be-
tween personality and subjective well-being, the direction of the correlations matched results
from chimpanzees (Weiss et al., 2002) and humans (Weiss et al., 2008). Human and great ape
subjective well-being may therefore have a common genetic basis in personality traits related
to emotional stability and social assertiveness. However, unlike chimpanzees and humans,
less than half of the genetic variance in orang-utan subjective well-being could be explained
by genetic effects shared with personality. Thus, while the personality–subjective well-being
link is likely ancestral in great apes, the greater genetic overlap in humans and chimpanzees
may be a derived characteristic. Alternatively, personality and subjective well-being may
have become more genetically uncoupled as orang-utans diverged from these species.
Evolutionary context
The quantitative genetic structure of personality within one species cannot act as strong evi-
dence for past and current evolutionary scenarios (Keller, 2007; Gangestad, 2011). However,
finding similar patterns of additive versus nonadditive genetic variation in human and orang-
utan personality suggests that similar processes of mutation and selection maintain variation
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in both species. A high proportion of nonadditive genetic variance is consistent with long-
term selection on a trait (Crnokrak & Roff, 1995; Merilä & Sheldon, 1999) and while it may
be a sign of strong selection reducing the additive genetic variance (Stirling et al., 2002) it
is not indicative of recent selection (pace Rushton et al., 2008; Figueredo & Rushton, 2009;
Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007).2 The recentness of novel selective pressures operating on
human psychological characteristics since the agricultural revolution (≈ 10 kya), which we
interpret as the meaning of ‘recent’ in this context (see Figueredo et al., 2011), is a matter
of perspective, as they are long-term compared to contemporary selection (Dingemanse &
Réale, 2005; Stearns et al., 2010) but recent relative to evolution before the split between hu-
man and chimpanzee lineages. Whether the large nonadditive genetic variance in orang-utan
and human personality evolved independently or is the result of long-term selection common
in both species ancestor could be investigated by estimating dominance or epistatic genetic
sources of variation in chimpanzees. While we did not have the power to explore species
differences in genetic structure between Bornean and Sumatran orang-utans, future studies
of orang-utans or other closely related species (such as in macaques) or subspecies (such as
in chimpanzees) may be informative. Such studies may also lead to an understanding of the
genetic underpinnings of species divergence in personality dimensions, such as whether the
genetic correlation we found between extraversion and agreeableness is related to the blend,
at the phenotypic level, of these two domains in rhesus macaques (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, &
Gerald, 2011). Furthermore, the presence of nonadditive genetic variance in bird personality
(van Oers, Drent, Jong, & Noordwijk, 2004) suggests that this phenomenon may be a more
general part of how personality evolves.
Happiness
The genetic correlation between neuroticism and subjective well-being reveals that happiness
is not just an outcome of an animal’s situation but shares a common genetic cause with
personality (Weiss et al., 2002). There are several evolutionary explanations for the connection
2My best guess as to the inversion of the logic to arrive at “VA < VNA implies recent selection” may be attributed
to Penke, Denissen, and Miller (2007, p 556), who write “Traits with a recent history of selection, by contrast, should
show a significant absolute and proportional amount of VNA.” This may be a misreading of Stirling et al. (2002, p
279): “we expect the [full-sib breeding design] heritability estimates should be higher on average than the [half-sib,
maximum likelihood, and regression estimates] and interpret the difference between them as an index of the strength
of recent selection” (emphasis added). It seems that the ‘strength of’ modifier was dropped in the transmission of
this idea from evolutionary genetics into evolutionary psychology.
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between personality and subjective well-being, but the phenotypic and genetic correlations
among positive affect and boldness-like personality domains across great apes suggest that
the personality–well-being nexus (or mental quality) is an ancestral feature. Subjective well-
being and personality have evolved as a set in great apes. Any explanation of the relationship
between personality and subjective well-being must be consistent with species differences in
personality and with the maintenance of within-species genetic variation.
Weiss et al. (2002) suggested that happiness may be a fitness indicator in chimpanzees
and humans, a cue that individuals use to assess and choose mates. Happiness in this case
would be an honest signal of underlying fitness that is hard to fake. Female orang-utans
prefer males who can acquire more resources (Schürmann & Hooff, 1986; Fox, 2002), so if
male dominance relates to resource acquisition, happiness may act as a similar sexual signal
through its correlation with dominance. This requires that orang-utans are able to detect
each other’s happiness (Weiss et al., 2002). However, because socially dominant males adver-
tise their status through physical appearance (cheek flanges) and vocalisations (MacKinnon,
1974), they may not need a subtle behavioural signal such as happiness.
An alternative, though not mutually exclusive, explanation is that orangutan subjective
well-being is, with neuroticism, related to social striving, where neuroticism captures re-
activity to social stressors (Denissen & Penke, 2008b) and low subjective well-being would
prompt an individual to improve their social standing (Nettle, 2006). In the wild, Suma-
tran orang-utans associate in larger social groups (van Schaik, 1999) and thus may need to
be more sensitive to social cues of inclusion. Alternative ecological explanations concern-
ing attentiveness to non-social cues, such as vigilance towards predators (which are absent
on Borneo, though absence of predators does not necessarily remove antipredator vigilance,
e.g., Byers, 1998) or risk-avoidance during seasonal food shortages (MacKinnon, 1974; Knott,
1998), would need to be evaluated in wild populations.
Species differences
The lack of clear mean-level differences in other personality dimensions between species is
not consistent with known variation in orang-utan social organisation. Orang-utans normally
avoid each other to reduce feeding competition but they come together by necessity to mate
and to forage in rich food patches (van Schaik, 1999). Access to fruit is resolved through
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contest competition (Utami, Wich, Sterck, & Hooff, 1997) so it may be beneficial to be slightly
more stingy (higher in dominance and lower in agreeableness). Sumatran orang-utans also
have larger behavioural repertoires and show more complex cultural innovations in the wild
(Schaik et al., 2003), which might manifest as differences in intellect. Tool use and other
behaviours are facilitated by the more extensive social learning that comes from associating
with larger groups. Thus, apart from neuroticism, species differences in behavior and social
organisation are not reflected in rater assessments of personality in captive settings.
Subjective well-being in orang-utans might be an aspect of coping that helps the indi-
vidual make decisions in stressful situations and is tied in to personality as part of a suite
of behavioral adaptations. Nesse (2000) and Nettle (2008) have suggested that for humans
depression and, more generally, negative affect are adaptations to deal with unfavorable sit-
uations where the organism needs to avoid risky actions and not expend too much energy.
Being an orang-utan is, energetically speaking, exceedingly expensive (Knott, 1998). Orang-
utans also experience severe seasonality in fruit availability which requires them to adjust
their diet and rely on fat reserves stored up during times of plenty (MacKinnon, 1974; Knott,
1998). During these shortages, orang-utans face starvation and an increase in disease sus-
ceptibility. In such cases, higher neuroticism might be beneficial if the associated low mood
leads individuals to take fewer risks during fruit shortages. Additionally, personality do-
mains, such as dominance, may relate to the ability to obtain sufficient fat reserves during
times of high fruiting.
Although a fitness trade-off with neuroticism and subjective well-being between the mod-
eration of risk-taking in poor situations versus stress consequences in other situations could
maintain variation within species (Nettle, 2006), the risk-avoidance hypothesis is largely in-
consistent with higher mean neuroticism among Sumatran orang-utans. The reason is that,
while both species experience fruit shortages in the wild, shortages are less severe and less
frequent on Sumatra (Marshall et al., 2008). If being slightly more prone to a low mood
state is an adaptation to deal with resource deficits during fruit shortages, we would expect
that Bornean rather than Sumatran orang-utans would be higher in neuroticism and lower in
subjective well-being. One way to resolve this would be if Bornean orang-utans have lower
neuroticism to avoid becoming overexcited during periods of extremely poor food availabil-
ity. Theory suggests that an organism should switch to a risk-averse strategy under poor
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conditions but should be willing to take more risks when the situation is extremely grim
(Nettle, 2006). The problem with this explanation is that it would require the personality
measure to be sensitive to this sort of difference even when orang-utans live in a resource
rich and stable captive environment. This does not rule out fluctuating selection from year-
by-year heterogeneity in resource availability as a process maintaining variation within each
species (Dingemanse et al., 2004) when risk aversion would be favored only during particu-
larly severe food shortages.
Into the wilds of personality
Orang-utans offer an important case for weighing social and ecological explanations of per-
sonality and variation in subjective well-being because differences between Sumatran and
Bornean orang-utans in morphology, behaviour, and social organisation follow clear geo-
graphical and ecological gradations (van Schaik, Marshall, & Wich, 2008). Individual be-
havioural variation can be related to socioecological variables that differ in quantity rather
than kind. While proclivities toward social striving and competitiveness are apparent in
captivity, other species-level differences may be salient in the wild. If species differences in
orang-utan personality and subjective well-being also manifest in non-captive populations,
then I hypothesise that personality differences will occur among the Bornean subspecies that
vary along the same geographical gradient in group size, diet, and cultural repertoire that
explains most between-species differences (van Schaik et al., 2008). Yet despite differences
between species, within species variation in personality and subjective well-being is still ap-
parent. Such differences have also been noted in the wild where, for example, orang-utan
females with infants vary in social tolerance (van Schaik, 1999). The results here show that
some of this individual variation is genetic. Comparing orang-utans on the species and sub-
species levels will be particularly useful for exploring how individual behavioural variation
persists as great apes migrate, speciate, and adapt to local conditions and for understanding
the ecological and social parameters that shape primate personality variation.
Quantitative genetic models were originally devised for the purposes of animal breeding
(Falconer & Mackay, 1996; Lynch & Walsh, 1998) but are now increasingly adapted for use
in evolutionary studies (Kruuk, 2004). Multilevel models, such as the animal model, are par-
ticularly useful for making genetic inferences on personality in nonhuman primates, whether
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in captivity or the wild, because they can tease apart genetic, environment, and measurement
effects. Nonhuman primates tend to share an environment (enclosure or troop) with their
close relatives so appropriate modelling is also needed to avoid subtle instances of pseu-
doreplication, as observations of different individuals may not be completely independent.
For example, if a trait is heritable then two siblings will tend to deviate from the mean in the
same direction, and their residual values in a linear regression would be correlated. Genetic
modeling accounts for this nonindependence and thus help make better inferences about
phenotypic correlations among traits in the population. I have shown here how the measure-
ment process can also be incorporated into an animal model to handle some of the effects
that raters will have. Finally, the results reveal that the total genetic variance in primate per-
sonality dimensions may be considerably higher than heritabilities would suggest because of
the presence of nonadditive genetic variance. Because nonhuman primates tend to have mul-
tiple mates throughout their lives, genetically-informed samples will contain a proportion of
half siblings. As half siblings resemble their relatives through additive and interaction but
not dominance genetic variance (Lynch & Walsh, 1998), their inclusion can help tease apart
additive, dominance, and epistatic effects. Nonhuman primates thus make an excellent study
group for the evolution of the genetic structure of personality.
Chapter 5
The genotypic countergambit to contemporary
selection on personality
5.1 Adaptationist programs and selectionist approaches
Evolutionary studies of psychological traits typically focus on discerning the processes that
have led to our current set of behavioral adaptations (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b). This adap-
tationist (or optimality) approach attempts to determine the adaptive function of a particular
phenotype; that is, what features of the environment have, through natural selection over
thousands of generations, shaped the current composition and function of the phenotype
and how it leads to maximizing fitness. Both the standard Evolutionary Psychology ap-
proach (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b) and more recent incorprations of evolutionary genetics
into psychological research (Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007) have been criticized for placing
too much emphasis on ‘steady states’ of evolutionary processes (T. C. Bates, 2007; Miller,
2011). These approaches focus on neutrality, balancing selection, and mutation-selection bal-
ance as alternative explanations for the maintenance of variation in personliaty and assume
that the environment or sets of environments to which a psychological trait is adapted are
roughly fixed. Neutrality assumes that the psychological trait is independent of fitness while
mutation-selection balance carries the unstated assumption that the fitness optimum that
mutation pulls individuals away from and that selection pushes the population back toward
does not need to vary. Even balancing selection, where fitness might differ across space and
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time, only requires an established collection of states that the environment transitions be-
tween with the population, or rather the distributions of underlying genetic factors, in hot
pursuit. These explanations for the diversity of psychological traits, however, do not take into
account genomic evidence that adaptive evolution in humans has been accelerating over the
last 40,000 years (Hawks et al., 2007). In contrast to the adaptationist program, a selectionist ap-
proach to evolutionary psychology predicates that current selection is still shaping behaviour
(Krebs & Davies, 1978; Réale & Dingemanse, 2011; Stearns et al., 2010). The goal of this
approach is to characterize the direction and shape of selection pressures acting on extant
populations. Under this view, evolution is not an end state but a continuously occurring
process and it is therefore likely that our psychological makeup is still undergoing natural
selection.
Tooby and Cosmides (1990b, p 376) chastize the selectionist approach as merely studying
the “correspondence between present conditions and present fitness-maximizing behaviors”
(emphasis in original). A correspondence approach runs into trouble if it takes whatever
the current relationship between a trait and fitness happens to be and uses that to make
inferences about past selection pressures that led to the adaptive design of the trait. How
the trait maximized fitness in the past might not be reflected in the present if environmental
conditions have changed sufficiently. While studying adaption as opposed to selection can
effectively be carried out using a combination of observation and experimentation (Grafen,
1988), humans are typically not so cooperative when it comes to controlled studies of their re-
productive biology.1 The adaptationist program in Evolutionary Psychology takes it as given
that there is a lag between environmental (read ‘cultural’) change and the population’s ability
to adapt. The selectionist approach, however, is actually relying on a different assumption
entirely. The assumption is that a species is never perfectly adapted to its environment. By
studying the correspondence between a trait and fitness in current populations, it is pos-
sible to measure selection on the smallest scale as the change in mean phenotype between
generations. Rather than being informative of adaptive design, the selectionist approach can
indicate maladaptation to the current environment and be used to predict how the popu-
lation will respond to current selective pressures. This approach is necessary to understand
the maintenance of genetic variation in personality traits in current environments (Réale &
1Perhaps there is something here for the enterprising reality televison producer.
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Dingemanse, 2011).
Personality and fitness
The relationship between a trait and fitness is the core element in any evolutionary analysis. A
basic measure of fitness is simply the number of children that one has who survive to adult-
hood, or lifetime reproductive success (LRS). In both developed and developing countries,
personality differences are linked to differences in childbearing decisions and reproductive
success, though the number of studies taking a selectionist approach to human personality is
limited (Réale & Dingemanse, 2011). Australian women who were high in neuroticism and
low in extraversion (or vice-versa) had more children while women who were either high
or low in both dimensions had lower fitness (Eaves et al., 1990). This characterizes a fitness
surface with stabilizing selection along the +E, +N axis (where the intermediate phenotype
has greatest fitness) and disruptive selection along the +E, -N axis (fitness is highest at the ex-
tremes). Eaves et al. (1990) note that if you rotate extraversion and neuroticism 45° (per Gray,
1982) to yield impulsivity (+E, +N) and anxiety (-E, +N), then the fitness surface describes
stabilizing selection on impulsivity and disruptive selection on anxiety. Among Sengalese
women reproductive success was highest at an intermediate level of neuroticism while for
men higher extraversion was associated with higher fitness (Alvergne et al., 2010). In two
American samples, high extraversion and low openness to experience and neuroticism were
related to increased reproductive success in both sexes while for women high agreeableness
and low conscientiousness were additional predictors of high fitness (Jokela et al., 2011).
Thus, all populations where a selection analysis on personality was undertaken show some
signals of directional and of stabilizing selection.
Selection gradients
Directional, stabilizing, and disruptive selection on a trait zi can be expressed as the linear
combination (Lande & Arnold, 1983; Stinchcombe, Agrawal, Hohenlohe, Arnold, & Blows,
2008):




where w is relative fitness, β is the linear selection gradient (indicating directional selection),
and γ is the nonlinear selection gradient (γ < 0 indicates stabilizing selection, γ > 0 leads to
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Term Regression estimate Selection gradient
Extraversion bE = .0475 βE = .0475
Neuroticism bN = .0477 βN = .0477
Extraversion2 qEE = −.00072 γEE = −.00144
Neuroticism2 qNN = −.00058 γNN = −.00116
Extra. × Neuro. qEN = −.00403 γEN = −.00403
Table 5.1: Coefficients from a quadratic regression of extraversion and neuroticism on fitness
(Eaves et al. 1990) and the associated directional (β) and stabilizing/disruptive (γ) selection
gradients.
disruptive selection). When selection gradients are estimated using a quadratic regression of
the form
w = a + bz + qz2
it is necessary to double the coefficients estimated for the quadratic term q to express the
proper selection gradient because the gradient represents the second derivative of fitness
with respect to the phenotype (Stinchcombe et al., 2008). Thus, the quadratic regression
coefficients presented by Eaves et al. (1990) do not describe the curvature of fitness surface
in terms of selection gradients, even if they do properly capture the best-fit surface through
extraversion and neuroticism on lifetime breeding success. When there are two traits, z1 and
z2, the selection gradients are










2 + γ12z1z2 + ǫ
and the coefficients from a quadratic regression map on to the fitness surface as γii = 2qii and
γij = qij. Failing to double the appropriate regression coefficients can lead to incorrect infer-
ences about the selection surface (Stinchcombe et al., 2008). To see if this was the case with
the analysis by Eaves et al. (1990), I recalculated the correct selection gradients from the pub-
lished regression coefficients (Table 5.1) and compared the selection surface with the surface
of best-fit of extraversion and neuroticism on reproductive success (Fig. 5.1). While the selec-
tion surface does differ from that presented by Eaves et al. (1990, Fig 2 p 567), the qualitative
inference of stabilizing and disruptive selection does not change. This highlights the need to
carefully consider how statistical models map on to evolutionary inferences (Stinchcombe et
al., 2008).
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Figure 5.1: Selection surface of extraversion (Extra) and neuroticism (Neuroc) compared with
best-fit surface from a quadratic regression of personality on lifetime reproductive success
(LRS). After Eaves et al. (1990).
Selection on nonhuman animal personality
Studies of the microevolution of animal personality in the wild have primarily focused on,
and found, variation in selection pressures across space and time (Dingemanse & Réale,
2005; Réale & Dingemanse, 2011). For example, temporal variation in selection pressures on
personality have been observed for great tits (Dingemanse et al., 2004) where the optimal
level of exploration is a function of the level of intra-sexual competition for food, which
fluctuates from year-to-year. Likewise, the fitness consequences of activity and boldness in
red squirrels varies between seasons depending on food availability (Boon, Réale, & Boutin,
2007). Selection pressures have also been found to vary across habitats, such as when great
tits that are high on exploration have the highest fitness only when population density is
low (Quinn, Patrick, Bouwhuis, Wilkin, & Sheldon, 2009). Similar patterns of fluctuating or
balancing selection driven by ecological variability have been found in crickets (Cade & Cade,
1992), lizards (Cote, Dreiss, & Clobert, 2008), bluebirds (Duckworth, 2006), owls (Kontiainen
et al., 2009), and bighorn sheep (Réale & Festa-Bianchet, 2003). Reviewing the evidence, Réale
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and Dingemanse (2011) conclude that heterogeneous selection is the rule when it comes to
animal personality.
A genotypic gambit
Prior studies of personality and reproductive success in humans have estimated selection
based on the covariances between phenotypes and fitness (Eaves et al., 1990; Jokela et al.,
2011). However, the capacity of selection to change the population mean of personality traits
rests on the so-far untested assumptions that fitness itself is heritable and that the covariance
between personality and fitness is at least partly genetically based (M. B. Morrissey et al.,
2011). A non-random association between genotypes and fitness can be directly tested by
estimating the genetic covariance of a trait with fitness. This is known as the Robertson-
Price identity, ∆z = covA(z, w), where ∆z is the predicted change in mean phenotype and
covA(z, w) is the genetic covariance between trait z and relative fitness w (Robertson, 1966;
G. Price, 1970; M. B. Morrissey et al., 2011). The logic behind this relationship is that it is the
genes that are causing differences in both the trait and fitness that are more represented (that
is, selected) in the next generation.
In studies of selection in wild populations there is often an uncoupling of the observed
direction of selection from that predicted by the relationship between phenotype and fitness
(Merilä, Sheldon, & Kruuk, 2001). Among other reasons, these include instances where
selection is fluctuating or where selection is pulling in opposite directions on two correlated
traits. Another possibility is that the relationship between a trait and fitness only occurs
through a non-heritable environmental factor (T. Price, Kirkpatrick, & Arnold, 1988) or when
the fitness effects of the environmental factor mask or apparently enhance the effects of genes
(M. B. Morrissey et al., 2011). For example, if there is a positive correlation between a trait
and fitness and individuals who have a higher environmental deviation are more fit but the
genes that increase the trait value decrease fitness, the mean value of the trait in the next
generation will decrease rather than increase. Likewise, even if both the environmental and
genetic covariances between a trait and fitness are both positive, examining the phenotypic
relationships only would lead to an overestimate of the trait mean in the next generation.
While a change in the mean of a trait depends on the additive genetic variance, traits
closely linked to fitness are also predicted to have a high proportion of nonadditive genetic
5.2. POPULATION SAMPLES AND MEASURES 155
variance (Crnokrak & Roff, 1995; Merilä & Sheldon, 1999). This is because the additive
effect of a gene is indepenent of the genetic background and thus is ‘exposed’ more easily
to the selection. Nonadditive genetic effects, such as dominance and epistatis, depend on
the state of the allele at the same locus or on genes at different loci and are thus found in
different combinations of each individual. Because personality in both humans (Eaves et
al., 1998; Keller et al., 2005; Pilia et al., 2006; Rettew et al., 2008) and orang-utans (Chap. 4)
is characterized by nonadditive genetic variance, some of this variance may be shared with
fitness.
To test whether natural selection on personality has a genetic basis, I estimated the genetic
covariance between personality and fitness in genetically-informative samples from the US
and Scotland. Differences between the samples, particularly with regard to the type of kin
relationships between participants and in information on measures of fitness, necessitated
different approaches to analysis. The US sample included explicit information on lifetime
breeding success, so I used this sample to directly predict the expected change in personal-
ity over the next (overlapping) generation. In the second sample, reproductive success had
to be inferred from the data set in such a way that individuals with no offspring could not
be included in the analysis. Because this might effect the predicted change from the ge-
netic covariance, I took an alternative approach of testing for the genetic covariance between
personality and fitness and then estimating whether mean genetic values were undergoing
change in the population.
5.2 Population samples and measures
I drew samples from two large studies that included data on family members whose person-
alities had been assessed.
Participants
For the first sample, I used data drawn from the MacArthur Foundation Survey of Midlife
Development in the United States (midus; Brim, Ryff, & Kessler, 2004) on 3474 non-twin
singletons and 449 twin pairs (Kessler, Gilman, Thornton, & Kendler, 2004). The midus is
a nationally-representative sample of adults at midlife with a twin and sibling subsample.
This was the same data set used by Jokela et al. (2011) although that study was restricted
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of sampled family sizes from the Generation Scotland Scottish Family
Health Study.
to the main representative sample and did not undertake a genetic analysis with the twin
subsample. I restricted the sample to individuals aged 34–65. There were 118 female and 127
male monozyotic twin pairs and 132 female and 72 male same-sex dizygotic twin pairs. The
mean age of female twins was 47 (SD=8.4) and of male twins was 46 (SD=8.4). I used 1759
female and 1715 male singletons from the midus as part of the fitness analysis.
The second sample was drawn from the Generation Scotland Scottish Family Health
Study (GS:SFHS or GS; B. Smith et al., 2006), a family-based genetic epidemiological study
in Scotland that includes siblings and parents of the proband. The sample included data on
4357 families comprising 7511 women and 5200 men. The mean sampled family size was 2.9
(median = 2) and ranged from 1–35 (Fig 5.2). The number of kinship types included in the
whole pedigree is summarized in Table 5.2. The mean age of women was 48.3 years (SD =
15.5, range = 18–100) and of men was 48.1 years (SD = 15.6, range = 18–94).
Personality measures
The US twins were assessed on the big five personality dimensions (neuroticism, extraver-
sion, openness to experience, conscientiousness, and agreeableness) personality scales from
the Midlife Development Inventory (MIDI: Lachman & Weaver, 1997). The questionnaire
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Informative
Kin type Total LRS Personality
Maternities 24253 1488 6947
Paternities 24253 1352 6455
Full siblings 16948 839 4117
Maternal siblings 17197 840 4167
Paternal siblings 17045 839 4128
Maternal grandmothers 5846 29 1321
Maternal grandfathers 5846 29 1273
Paternal grandmothers 3166 20 636
Paternal grandfathers 3166 20 623
Table 5.2: Count of kinship types in the full pedigree from Generation Scotland. Types of
relationships that are informative with regard to the genetic structure of LRS and personality
are also listed.
consisted of 4-8 adjectives for each personality domain. Participants rated themselves on a
scale from 1 (a lot) to 4 (not at all). The domains showed specific genetic and environmental
factors suggesting they were not unified traits, with the exception of extraversion and neu-
roticism (W. Johnson & Krueger, 2004). I adjusted the personality domain scores for age and
sex using a linear regression model (McGue & Bouchard, 1984).
The Scottish family sample was assessed on neuroticism and extraversion using the Ey-
senck Personality Questionnaire Revised Short Form (EPQ-R: S. Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett,
1985; B. Smith et al., 2006). Each scale consisted of 12 questions with yes/no responses that
were tallied to yield scores between 0 and 12. 11030 of the participants had been assessed
on neuroticism and 11034 had been assessed on extraversion. Because of the skewness in the
personality scores (Fig. 5.3), I treated them as count data and reverse coded extraversion as
introversion because this looked likely to be a better fit to the Poisson distribution (Fig. 5.3b),
and the skewness indicating nonnormality could therefore be incorporated into the Bayesian
animal model (Sec. 5.6).
Fitness measures
There is no single best working definition of fitness (Charlesworth, 1994) though the most
general definition of fitness is relative contribution to long-term population growth (Coulson
et al., 2006). Fitness is a function of both survival and fecundity and in practice components
such as reproductive lifespan, fecundity, and offspring recruitment can be used as proxies for
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(b) Extraversion scores reverse coded
Figure 5.3: Distribution of neuroticism and introversion scores from Generation Scotland
fitness (D. Brown, 1988). Two fitness measures that are commonly used are: annual (ABS)
or lifetime breeding success (LBS), which capture the number of offspring an individual has;
and lifetime reproductive success (LRS), the number of offspring that survive to breeding age.
Because survival to adulthood is so high in developed countries, LBS and LRS are generally
equivalent and LRS is a good measure of fitness (Byars, Ewbank, Govindaraju, & Stearns,
2010; Stearns et al., 2010).
In the midus participants were directly asked how many biological children they had
although the coded responses were censored at 5. Participants were also asked to list the
birthdate and sex for up to 10 children. Only 20 out of the 898 monozygotic and dizygotic
twins used in the analysis listed more than 5 children, and for all twins who stated they had
5 or fewer children, the two ways of inferring reproductive success gave the same answer. I
thus used the number of listed children (censored at 10) as a proxy for fitness. Mean LRS in
the whole sample was 2.0 (median = 2, SD = 1.6, range = 0–10). In the twin subsample, mean
LRS was 2.1 (median = 2, SD = 1.5, range = 0–10).
The Generation Scotland sample did not include direct information on biological child
count. However, this information could be inferred in two ways. The first was by count-
ing each individual’s number of children included in the pedigree. Second, participants
were asked how many brothers and sisters they had as part of the process to recruit family
members as participants. If a participant had at least one child in the sample, I used this
information to assign a number of children to each parent. The measure is imperfect for















































Figure 5.4: Total count of Generation Scotland participants who had at least one offspring in
the cohort (LRS >= 1) versus no offspring sampled (LRS = 0).
two reasons: (1) the wording of the question is ambiguous as to whether the sibling count
included full-, half-, or stepsiblings and (2) to obtain information on the number of children
it was necessary for the participant to have at least one 18-year-old-or-older child in the sam-
ple. If an individual’s offspring gave conflicting answers as to their number of siblings, I
used the lowest reported number to exclude half-siblings that were not the biological child
of the target individual. This second point raises the issue of missing data, because zeros in
the offspring count are a mix of true zeros (no biological offspring) and missing zeros (par-
ticipant has offspring but none were included in the sample). There were 2948 women and
1823 men who had at least one child included in the sample (Fig. 5.4). Among participants
with at least one reported child and assigning offspring count using the children’s reported
numbers of brothers and sisters, the mean LRS for women was 2.5 (median = 2, SD = 1.2,
range = 1–9) and for men was 2.4 (median = 2, SD = 1.0, range = 1–8). The GS data set did
not include information on year of birth but only age at time of assessment. Data collection
for the Scottish Family Health Study occured between 2006 and 2011 (Generation Scotland:
timeline, 2011) so I calculated approximate year of birth using age relative to 2009.
5.3 Phenotypic selection on personality
Before studying the genetic basis of selection on personality, I tested whether there was any
detectable phenotypic association. A previous study that incorporated data from the midus
found that LRS was positively correlated with extraversion and agreeableness and negatively
correlated with neuroticism and openness (Jokela et al., 2011). I used the twin subsample
from the US and the Scottish families sample to obtain bivariate correlations between per-
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sonality and reproductive success. I did not make age and sex adjustments because these
would be incorporated into the genetic models, which would also handle the potential non-
independence in the data from observations of individuals from the same family. I used both
twins from each pair from the midus, restricted to individuals age 35+, and all individuals
with at least one observed offspring from Generation Scotland. Among the US twin sample
and among the Scottish family sample, there were no sigificant raw phenotypic correlations
between personality and reproductive success (Table 5.3). Although not significant, the nega-
tive correlation between neuroticism and LRS trended in the same direction in both samples.
5.4 Heritability of fitness
For there to be a genetic correlation between a trait and fitness, it is first necessary to establish
whether fitness itself is heritable. This is because if there is no genetic variation in fitness then
there could be no genes under selection that could also be having pleiotropic effects on the
trait of interest. I used different types of quantitative genetic models to analyze the midus
and GS data because of the different types of relatives included in each sample. In the twin
sample I calculated a version of relative fitness that could be used to compare individuals
across the age cohorts in the sample. In the family sample I used the observed offspring
counts so that the model could account for missing data.
r CI p
midus
Extraversion .07 -.00, .13 .06
Neuroticism -.06 -13, .01 .10
Openness .02 -.05, .08 .66
Agreeableness .02 -.05, .09 .53
Conscientiousness -.02 -.08, .05 .56
Generation Scotland
Neuroticism -.02 -.05, .01 .14
Introversion .02 -.01, .05 .25
Table 5.3: Phenotypic correlations between personality and lifetime reproductive success. CI
= 95% confidence interval. midus: N = 820, GS: N = 4209.
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Relative fitness (MIDUS)
Because the twin sample reported lifetime reproductive success (as number of biological
children), I used this as the measure of fitness (Fig. 5.5a). To account for changes in fertility
rates over the lifespan of the participants, I calculated a cohort-adjusted measure of relative
fitness. First, I used a generalized additive model (Hastie, 2011) with 4 degrees of freedom to
regress LRS on year of birth for the non-twin participants. This model captured fluctuations
in fertility trends between the years of birth (1930–1960) and created a “moving” or locally-
weighted average LRS for each year. I then used this fitted model to predict LRS for each




where LRS is the mean LRS for the whole sample. I did this rather than use residuals from
the model so that the mean cohort-relative fitness is constant across cohorts and so that a
value of 0 is the minimum. From the cohort-relative fitness scores I calculated total relative





The transformed fitness values are plotted against cohort in Figure 5.5b.
Classical twin model
The basis of the twin model is in comparing the covariances in phenotypes among two types
of twins: monozygotic (MZ) twins who share all of their genome and dizygotic (DZ) twins
who share on average half of their genome. The assumption is that the phenotypic covariance
between twins can be decomposed into contributions from additive genetic (σ2A), common
environment (that is, aspects of the environment shared by siblings growing up in the same
household, or σ2C), and unique environment (aspects of the environment that affect each
individual uniquely including measurement error, or σ2E) effects. The phenotypic covariance
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(b) Relative fitness
Figure 5.5: (a) Lifetime reproductive success (LRS) by year of birth for the non-twin midus
sample. A fitted line from a generalized additive model is plotted over the data. (b) Relative
fitness versus cohort for the non-twin midus sample. The fitted line shows that average
relative fitness is constant across cohorts.
Because the common environment variance contributes equally to both types of twins and the
unique environment variance not at all, the difference between the MZ and DZ covariances
is











and if the phenotypic variance is the same for both types of twins the heritability is approxi-
mately
h2 = 2(rMZ − rDZ)
where rMZ and rDZ are the correlations among MZ and DZ twin pairs. For the midus sample,
the heritability for cohort relative fitness was h2 = .12 for females and h2 = .18 for males
(Table 5.4).
Because the twin–twin covariances indicated that fitness was heritable, I estimated the ad-
ditive genetic, common environment, and unique environment variances using an ACE twin
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rMZ rDZ h
2
Female 0.32 [.15, .47] 0.26 [.09, .41] .12
Male 0.31 [.14, .47] 0.22 [-.02, .43] .18
Table 5.4: Monozygotic (MZ) and dizygotic (DZ) correlations for cohort-relative fitness, wi,
with 95% CIs in brackets. h2 = heritability.
model (Loehlin, 2004). The ACE model is a type of structural equation model that decom-
poses the phenotypic covariance into its genetic and environmental components (Fig. 5.6).
Each effect is modelled as a latent variable and the model is identified because the correlation
of additive genetic effects is fixed at 1 for MZ twins and at 0.5 for DZ twins, the correlation
for common environment effects is 1 for both types of twins, and the unique environment
effects are uncorrelated.
Because the twin-pair correlations for men and women were within each other’s confi-
dence intervals (Table 5.4) and the variance in relative fitness did not differ between the sexes
(women: s2 = .013; men: s2 = .014; Levene’s Test F1,447 = .024, p = .88), I analyzed both
sexes together in a single model using OpenMx (Boker et al., 2011). I first fit a full ACE
model and then compared it to models that excluded either the common environment (AE)
or additive genetic (CE) components (Table 5.5). The fit of the full model was not significantly
better than either of the two restricted models. The AIC also did not differ substantially be-
tween the models, indicating there was not sufficient power to differentiate between additive
genetic and common environment variance. I therefore used the full ACE model to give a
conservative estimate of both effects. To generate confidence intervals I ran the model on
1000 bootstrapped data sets that randomly sampled each twin pair with replacement. The
mean variance proportion coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for relative fitness were:
h2 = .18 (CI = .06–.32), c2 = .15 (.04–.27), e2 = .67 (.57–.76). Heritability of relative fitness in
the US sample was low and more than half of the variance could be attributed to unique
environment effects. Because fitness is heritable, any trait that is genetically correlated with
fitness in this population would be selected.
Distribution of reproductive success (GS)
The distribution of lifetime reproductive success in the Generation Scotland sample showed
considerable zero inflation (Fig. 5.7). This is because, given that the sample only included



















Figure 5.6: Schematic of the ACE twin model. Boxes represent observed variables (w1 and
w2 are fitness of twins 1 and 2). Circles represent latent variables (A = additive genetic, C =
common environment, E = unique environment). Path between latent A1 and A2 variables
fixed at 1 for MZ twins and 0.5 for DZ twins. Paths for the loadings (a, c, and e) of the latent
variables on the observed variables are estimated from the data.
Model h2 c2 e2 AIC ∆χ2 ∆ df p
ACE .14 .17 .69 -3171 — — —
AE .33 0 .67 -3172 1.38 1 .24
CE 0 .28 .72 -3173 0.70 1 .40
Table 5.5: Variance proportion coefficients and model fit statistics for ACE models on twin
relative fitness. AE and CE models that drop the common environment or additive genetic
paths are compared to the full model. h2 = heritabiliy, c2 and e2 = proportion of common
and unique environment variances. AIC = Akaike Information Criterion. ∆χ2, ∆ df gives the
difference in log-likelihoods and degrees of freedom between each model and the full model.
adult children, many of the zeros in the data set are not true zeros (individual did not have
any children) but are instead missing zeros where the individual had children that were not
included in the dataset. Thus, there are more zeros than we would expect assuming that
lifetime reproductive success follows a Poisson distribution (Kruuk, Clutton-Brock, Rose, &
Guinness, 1999). The Poisson distribution is defined with one parameter, λ, which equals the
mean. To get an idea of the amount of zero-inflation, we can compare the observed LRS = 0
frequency against the expectation Prob(x = 0|λ) = λ0e−00! . I used the fitdistr function from
the MASS package in R (Venables & Ripley, 2002) to get maximum likelihood estimates for
the λ parameters describing for men and women the distribution of LRS ∼ Pois(λ). I then
used these scale parameters to calculate the expected frequency of an LRS equal to zero. Table
5.6 lists the observed and expected frequencies of LRS = 0 for men and women. The observed
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Figure 5.7: Distribution of lifetime reproductive success for the Generation Scotland sample.
Sex λ (SE) Freq(LRS = 0) Prob(LRS = 0|λ)
(observed) (expected)
Female .96 (.01) .61 .38
Male .84 (.01) .65 .43
Table 5.6: Observed versus expected frequency of lifetime reproductive success = 0 for men
and women in the Generation Scotland sample assuming that LRS ∼ Pois(λ).
Number





Table 5.7: Counts of number of mates appearing in the Generation Scotland pedigree for
women and men.
frequencies are considerably greater, indicating that the distribution is zero-inflated.
To determine whether the missing observations would influence inferences about the
genetic covariance between personality and fitness, I estimated the effect of neuroticism and
extraversion on nulliparity (that is, having zero observed offspring). I analyzed females and
males separately because the data set included information on both mates, in contrast to the
midus twin data where mates were not included. The vast majority of subjects had children
in the pedigree with only one other individual (Mean = 1.0, SD = .09; see Table 5.7).
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I used multilevel logistic regression to explore the effect of neuroticism and extraversion
on having at least one offspring appear in the sample. Individuals were binned into 10-year
cohorts based on age. I used the subsample of cohorts that showed a mix of nulliparity and
parity, which included individuals between 36 and 85 years old. I fit the models with lme4
(D. Bates & Maechler, 2010) with neuroticism, introversion, and cohort as predictors and
varying intercepts for each family (capturing heterogeneity from the environment common
to extended families) and used simulation to estimate uncertainty in predictive inferences
from the model (Gelman & Hill, 2007; Gelman et al., 2011).
There was heterogeneity in the effect that neuroticism had on the probability of having at
least one child in the Generation Scotland sample (LRS >= 1). The predicted probabilities for
each cohort are plotted in Figure 5.8. For women aged 36–45, one point increase in neuroti-
cism score increased the probability of having a child in the sample by 2.3% (CI = 0.1–3.7%).
For men aged 56–75, a one point increase in neuroticism score reduced the probability of
having a child in the sample by 2.6% (CI = -5.1–0.0%). The fitted coefficients for all effects are
plotted in Figure 5.9. The extended family environment explained very little of the variance
in observed nulliparity (.09 for women and .02 for men).
The logistic regression model also revealed information about the sample with regard to
LRS. Almost no participants in the 36–45 age category had a child in the sample while almost
all of the 76–85 year-old participants do (Fig. 5.8). This makes sense given the sample criteria.
To be included in the study, participants had to be at least 18 years old. Thus, at least one
adult child of a participant needs to have been sampled for the participant to have an LRS
> 0. Participants in the 26–45 cohort would have been between the ages of 18 and 27 when
having their first offspring, so LRS as measured would also be conflated with the age when
the individual started having children. Personality may be partly informative of age at prim-
iparity rather than reproductive success per se. Conversely, the oldest participants included
in the sample are likely the parents of the proband and are thus being included precisely
because they have at least one child. Estimating the heritability of LRS in this sample as
well as any possible phenotypic or genetic covariance with personality thus requires models
that account as much as possible for the data collection procedure or that take a different
approach entirely to inferring a genetic basis to selection.
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Figure 5.8: Effect of neuroticism and introversion on nulliparity in Generation Scotland.
Model-fitted lines are shown for each age cohort indicating the probability of having at least
one child included in the sample.
Animal model
Despite the caveats about how offspring count was derived in the Generation Scotland sam-
ple, I wanted to see whether there was any evidence for family resemblance in LRS in the
Scottish population. To estimate the heritability of LRS I used the subset of participants with
at least one offspring and modeled the LRS as following a truncated Poisson distribution (i.e.,
count data with no observed zeros; Fig. 5.10). Because the Scottish sample included multiple
types of family relationships, I analyzed them using an animal model (see also Sec. 4.5). An
animal model is a multilevel, mixed effects model that uses pairwise relatedness of all indi-
viduals in the sample to estimate the additive genetic variance of each trait (Lynch & Walsh,
1998; Kruuk, 2004; A. J. Wilson et al., 2010). The animal model is flexible in also allowing
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Figure 5.9: Plot of coefficents from a logistic regression on nulliparity in Generation Scotland.
Bars around point estimates show 50% and 95% uncertainty intervals.
known sources of mean-level differences, such as age cohort, to be incorporated into the
model as fixed effects. In addition to additive genetic variance (VA), I also fit nonadditive ge-
netic variance (VD) and common/extended family environment variance (VK). The residual
variance from the model captured a unique environment effect (VE) for each individual. To
model nonadditive genetic variance I used the dominance genetic relationship matrix (Lynch
& Walsh, 1998, p 768; Appendix A.2). While the additive genetic relationship matrix cap-
tures the probability of having each allele in common, the dominance matrix is based on the
probability of each individual having the same genotype at a locus. The sample included 100
maternal but no paternal half-siblings that were informative with regards to LRS; inclusion of
half-siblings in the pedigree is particularly helpful in getting good estimates of nonadditive
genetic variances (A. J. Wilson et al., 2010).
I fit the models using Bayesian estimators in MCMCglmm (Hadfield, 2010) run for 2× 105
iterations and summarized the model inferences using 1000 draws from the posterior distri-
bution. I used a Bayesian animal model because it could incorporate outcomes variables with
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nonnormal distributions (Sorensen & Gianola, 2002; Hadfield & Nakagawa, 2010) without the
muss and fuss involved with REML estimators (A. J. Wilson et al., 2011). I calculated the vari-
ance proportion coefficients as ratios with the estimated phenotypic variance (VP = VA + VD
+ VK + VE), conditioned over the fixed effects for each model, including narrow-sense heri-
tability (h2 = VA/VP) and the coefficients for nonadditive (dominance) genetic (d
2 = VD/VP)
and extended family (k2 = VK/VP) and unique environment (e
2 = VE/VP) variances. To un-
derstand the amount of variation explained by the genetic and environmental effects relative
to the demographic factors of age and sex, I estimated the standard deviations of each of the
model coefficients (Gelman, 2005). This method can be used on hierarchical models to yield
information similar to a classic anova. For the variance components I simply took the square
root of each parameter estimate drawn from the posterior distribution (i.e., sd =
√
var). For
each fixed effect, I created a vector that repeated the fitted coefficient for each level in the
estimator the number of times that that level appeared in the data set, then took the standard
deviation of the resulting vector. I did this for each of the 1000 draws from the joint posterior
distribution to estimate uncertainty in the standard deviation estimates.
The models suggested that LRS was moderately heritable (h2 ≈ .26–.39, Table 5.8) and
underlain by an equal amount of nonadditive genetic variance (d2 ≈ .15–.26). Most of the
environmental variance on LRS was from effects shared between members of the same family
(k2 = .43) as opposed to environmental effects unique to each individual (e2 ≈ .16–.26). Most
of the variance in LRS was explained by differences among the cohorts (Fig. 5.11). However,
to what extent these estimates describe the actual reproductive success in the population is
difficult to infer because of the extent of missing LRS data in the sample. Doing so requires
making the assumption that having no children (i.e., LRS = 0) is part of the same continuous
process of reproductive output as having one or more children. Getting around this issue
required finding a way to estimate the effects of selection on a genetic level without recourse
to direct estimates of fitness.
5.5 Mean population change in the US
As stated above, the predicted change in a phenotype from the process of directional selection
is equal to the genetic covariance between the phenotype and fitness. I estimated the genetic
covariance between personality and relative fitness in the US twin sample using the Cholesky
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Figure 5.10: Distribution of zero-truncated lifetime reproductive success for the Generation
Scotland sample.
Model h2 d2 k2 e2
AE .39 (.17, .64) .61 (.36, .82)
ADE .35 (.12, .63) .26 (.09, .56) .39 (.16, .64)
AKE .32 (.10, .60) .43 (.10, .75) .26 (.08, .54)
ADKE .26 (.02, .54) .15 (.06, .44) .43 (.12, .81) .16 (.04, .32)
Table 5.8: Variance proportion coefficients for LRS from Generation Scotland treating ob-
served reproductive success as a truncated Poisson variable. Models: A = additive genetic
effect, D = nonadditive (dominance) genetic effect, K = extended-family environment effect,
E = unique environment effect.
decomposition of the multivariate ACE model where fitness was entered as the last variable
in the decomposition. The model parameters were estimated using maximum likelihood with
OpenMx (Boker et al., 2011) and I used bootstrapping to sample twin pairs with replacement
(1000 replicates) to calculate confidence intervals for each parameter.
There was a detectable genetic correlation of relative fitness with extraversion and agree-
ableness indicating that mean levels of both personality domains would increase in the next
generation (Table 5.9). At the level of the unique environment, agreeableness was negatively
environmentally correlated with fitness. The other personality domains were not associated
with fitness.
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Figure 5.11: Estimated standard deviation of fixed and random effects from the full animal
model on lifetime reproductive success in the Generation Scotland sample. The plot illus-
trates the relative amount of variance explained by each effect. Point estimates surrounded
by 50% and 95% uncertainty intervals. G = genetic, E = environmental, SD = standard devi-
ation.
Domain ∆z = covA(z, w) rA rC rE
Neuroticism .005 (-.003, .012) .29 (-.19, .72) -.33 (-.90, .43) -.06 (-.16, .05)
Extraversion .007 (.002, .013) .45 (.12, .77) -.19 (-.87, .62) -.07 (-.18, .05)
Openness .001 (-.004, .006) .09 (-.30, .46) -.06 (-.56, .47) -.01 (-.11, .09)
Agreeableness .006 (.002, .010) .55 (.19, .85) .09 (-.46, .76) -.15 (-.26, -.04)
Conscientiousness -.001 (-.005, .003) -.09 (-.46, .24) -.01 (-.68, .66) .03 (-.09, .15)
Table 5.9: Genetic covariance (covA) between personality and relative fitness in the US sample
that equals the predicted change in the mean phenotype between generations, ∆z. rA, rC,
and rE give additive genetic, common environment, and unique environment correlations
between the trait and fitness. 95% confidence intervals are given in brackets.
5.6 Evolution of breeding values in Scotland
Because of the missing data issue in information about reproductive success in Generation
Scotland, I took an alternative approach to estimating evolutionary change by examining
changes in breeding values over the years of birth. A breeding value is the additive genetic
effect assigned to each individual. An individual’s breeding value is an estimatable quantity
of its genetic merit and equal to twice the expected difference between its offsprings’ pheno-
type and the population mean when the individual is mated randomly (Falconer & Mackay,
1996; Lynch & Walsh, 1998). The variance in breeding values is the additive genetic variance.
Similarly, the dominance genetic variances is the variance of dominance deviations and the
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unique environment variance is the variance of environment deviations.
A breeding value is, as its name suggests, a quantity that an animal breeder can estimate
and then use to decide which animals to select and breed for the purpose of, for example,
increasing milk yield (Mrode, 1996). Breeding values can therefore be used to detect selec-
tion if the pedigree includes individuals whose years of birth cover a sufficient amount of
time (Postma, 2006). Rather than regressing breeding values on fitness (Kruuk, Merilä, &
Sheldon, 2003; Postma, 2006), mean breeding values for each cohort can be estimated directly
and the change in breeding values over time can be compared to the expectation under drift
(Hadfield, Wilson, Garant, Sheldon, & Kruuk, 2010). This therefore gets around the problem
of incomplete data on reproductive success because the breeding values of the traits of in-
terest, such as personality, are examined without reference to individual fitness. Examining
breeding values directly also gets around the problem of misestimating lifetime reproductive
success based on assumed paternity.
I used a bivariate animal model on neuroticism and introversion using all individuals in
the sample with personality assessments. The model included additive (VA) and nonadditive
genetic effects (VD), both with unstructured covariance matrices. This meant that the model
estimated genetic and environmental covariances between neuroticism and introversion or,
put another way, that the breeding values for both personality traits were allowed to corre-
late. I excluded common/extended family environment effects because they contribute only
very little, if at all, to variance in personality (Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001). However, I did
include nonadditive genetic variance so as not to overestimate the additive genetic variance.
There were 50 maternal and 110 paternal half siblings that were informative with regards
to personality for getting better estimates of the nonadditive or dominance genetic variance.
Both personality variables were modelled as following a Poisson distribution. While there
was evidence of some assortative mating for extraverison (correlation between female and
male partners ρz = .14; 95% CI = .08, .20) though not for neuroticism (ρz = .04; CI = -.02, .11),
the animal model estimates are not biased by such effects (Sorensen & Kennedy, 1984). I used
Bayesian estimation methods because they could straightforwardly incorporate the nonnor-
mal distribution of the outcome variables and propagate uncertainty about the estimates for
each predicted breeding value when analyzing the models (Sorensen & Gianola, 2002; Had-
field, 2010; Hadfield et al., 2010). For the purpose of evolutionary analysis, Bayesian tech-
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niques also give more conservative estimates of evolutionary change compared with REML
methods (Hadfield et al., 2010). I fit the models using MCMCglmm (Hadfield, 2010) and
saved the posterior distributions of predicted breeding values (PBV) for the additive genetic
effects. I ran the model for 6 × 105 iterations. From the model I calculated narrow-sense
heritability, h2 = VA / (VA + VD + VE), and the variance proportion for nonadditive genetic
variance, d2 = VD / (VA + VD + VE). I also calculated the
• additive genetic correlation: rA = covA(N, I)/
√
VA(N)VA(I);
• nonadditive genetic correlation, rD = covD(N, I)/
√
VD(N)VD(I); and
• unique environment correlation (rE = covE(N, I)/
√
VE(N)VE(I);
where covA(N, I) is the additive genetic covariance between neuroticism and introversion,
VA(N) is the additive genetic variance of neuroticism, and so on.
Both neuroticism (h2 = .26, CI = .12, .38; d2 = .32, CI = .16, .57) and introversion (i.e.,
reversed extraversion) (h2 = .19, CI = .10, .32; d2 = .28, CI = .16, .46) showed moderate additive
and nonadditive genetic variance. Neuroticism and introversion had positive but nonsignif-
icant genetic correlations (rA = .19, CI = -.19, .54; rD = .39, CI = -.05, .67) and a positive
environmental correlation (rE = .58, CI = .28, .75) with each other. A positive genetic corre-
lation between the two personality domains would allow for correlational selection, where
selection on one trait would also change the mean of the other trait (Lande & Arnold, 1983;
Falconer & Mackay, 1996).
For each draw from the posterior distribution of the PBVs, I matched each individual to
their approxmiate year of birth and calculated a mean breeding value for each year, spanning
1914-1991. The posterior distribution of breeding values are plotted in Figure 5.12a, b. There
was little certainty in the mean breeding values for the earlier years covered by the study
because there were few individuals sampled from these years. I therefore restricted the
analysis to the years 1939–1991 where each year had at least 100 participants with that year
of birth. I then regressed mean breeding value on year of birth for each sample from the
posterior distribution.
I also compared the change in breeding values to what would be expected under random
drift. To do this, I took each posterior draw of the additive genetic covariance matrix and
simulated change in breeding values from random sampling (that is, genetic drift) using the
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pedantics package (M. M. Morrissey, 2010). For each member of the founder generation (that
is, individuals who do not have any ancestors included in the pedigree) a replicated breeding
value for neuroticism and introversion is drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with
mean zero and variance equal to the additive genetic matrix. The actual pedigree is then
used to simulate the transmission of breeding values from one generation to the next. This
models the amount of change in breeding values that could occur just by chance (Hadfield
et al., 2010). Because the model does not include selection, the expected change in breeding
values is 0. As with the predicted breeding values, I regressed mean replicated breeding
value on year.
There was no evidence that mean breeding values changed between 1939 and 1991. The
estimated change in neuroticism scores from changes in breeding value was .01 (CI = -.10, .08)
and in introversion scores was -.02 (CI = -.13, .10). These changes are ≈ 1-3% of a standard
deviation in personality scores. Uncertainty in regression slopes of mean predicted breeding
value versus year are plotted in Figure 5.13.
If the change in breeding values were significant, the simulated replicates of breeding
values modelling drift could be used to determine whether the change in breeding values was
deterministic (i.e., from selection) or consistent with what would be expected from chance.
However, because I did not detect any change in mean breeding values, I used the simulations
to determine whether the mean breeding values changed less than would be expected by
chance. Less change than expected by chance would be consistent with stabilizing selection
acting counter to genetic drift. To test this, I calculated the proportion of samples where the
absolute values of the slope from the predicted breeding values was less than the absolute
value of the slope from the replicated breeding values. This gives the probability that the
change is less than expected by chance. For neuroticism and introversion 47% and 48% of the
slopes on predicted breeding values were less than the slope from the simulated replicates.
Thus, the change in breeding values from directional selection or constraint from stabilizing
selection was not signifantly different from expectation under random drift. The amount
of variability in change in mean breeding value under genetic drift, as determined from
simulated replicates, is compared to estimates of the actual change in breeding values in
Figure 5.13. I used a generalized additive model (Hastie et al., 2009) to explore nonlinear
trends in breeding values. I fit a smoothed spline using the gam package (Hastie, 2011) of
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(d) PBV, smoothed splines
Figure 5.12: Predicted breeding values (PBV) in personality from Generation Scotland. (a,
b) In black, posterior mode of mean cohort breeding values. In gray, 100 draws from the
full posterior distribution. (c, d) Smoothed splines fit to predicted breeding values from a
generalized additive model with 4 degrees of freedom, using 15 draws from the posterior
distribution.
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predicted breeding value on year using values on all individuals (rather than mean breeding
values) for each draw from the posterior distribution of random effects. Plots of the smoothed
splines did not reveal any fluctuations in breeding values (Figure 5.12c, d).
5.7 Contemporary selection on personality
Estimating selection gradients in contemporary populations starts from the idea that species
are never perfectly adapted to their environment so that some phenotypic difference or an-
other will always lead to differences in fitness outcomes. Although the study of current selec-
tion pressures cannot for certain indicate anything about adaptation in the past, particularly
if one starts from the assumption that the environment has and is changing, estimating selec-
tion gradients is necessary to understanding personality evolution because of its potential to
reveal how genetic variation in personality traits is being maintained (Réale & Dingemanse,
2011). While long term selection will govern the emergence of new phenotypes, a selectionist
approach can be used to determine how selection will shape the standing genetic variation
in a trait.
I explored the genetic basis of personality in the US and Scotland. Both samples were
genetically informative but differed in the kind of family relationships included. The US
sample included twins and the Scottish sample included extended families. Neither sample
showed detectable phenotypic correlations between personality and LRS. However, a twin
model revealed that fitness had a positive genetic covariance with extraversion and agree-
ableness in a US sample. A pedigree-based model did not show any evidence for changes in
mean genetic values over a 53-year period in the Scotland sample.
Extraversion has been found to relate to the timing of childbearing whereby more ex-
traverted individuals have their first child at a younger age (Jokela et al., 2009, 2011). The
effect is particularly strong in individuals who are not married when they have their first
child (Schmitt & Shackelford, 2008; Jokela et al., 2011). Individuals who start breeding earlier
have the opportunity for a longer reproductive lifespan in which to maximize fitness. Like
extraversion, agreeableness is also related to birth of the first child but, unlike extraversion,
was not as strongly tied to reproductive timing (Jokela et al., 2011). Although the effects
of agreeableness on childbearing was only found in women previously (Jokela et al., 2011),
a positive genetic correlation with fitness will increase the trait mean regardless of which
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Figure 5.13: Estimated change in predicted breeding values in personality from Generation
Scotland compared with expectation from drift. In black, posterior mode of mean cohort
breeding values and 10 samples from the regression of mean breeding values on year-of-
birth. In gray, 25 draws from simulated replicate under random drift.
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sex the association is found in. In other words, more agreeable women also pass on their
alleles that increase agreeableness additively to their sons. There was also a negative envi-
ronmental correlation between agreeableness and fitness in the US sample (Table 5.9). This
means that individuals who become more agreeable as an effect of the unique environment
they experience, that makes them differ from their twin, tend to have fewer children. High
agreeableness is preferred in long-term mates (Penke, Todd, et al., 2007) and thus environ-
mental effects may lead to increased parental investment (MacDonald, 1995, 1998) that could
come at the cost of overall fecundity (Bielby et al., 2007; Pettay et al., 2005). The negative
environmental correlation could equally be the effect that having children has on personality.
Having children influences emotionality and sociality (Jokela et al., 2009) and may also effect
personality facets related to agreeableness.
If the inferences from the genetic models are accurate, then directional selection is pre-
dicted to change the mean phenotypic values in the US, namely by increasing mean extraver-
sion and agreeableness, but not to change mean personality levels in Scotland over several
generations. There was also no evidence of stabilizing selection on personality in Scotland.
This implies that the fitness surface for extraversion and neuroticism in the Scottish popu-
lation is flat while the US population is still moving toward a fitness optimum. The fitness
consequences of personality differ between the US and Scottish environments. This may be
either because the distribution of underlying genetic factors differ between the two popula-
tions (Rice, 2004) or because the fitness landscape differs because of differences in distribution
of the recurrent problems that personality is an adaptation to (D. M. Buss & Greiling, 1999;
D. M. Buss, 2009b).
There are many gene frequency differences between human populations (Cavalli-Sforza
et al., 1994; Romero, Manica, Goudet, Handley, & Balloux, n.d.; Coop et al., 2009), including
between the UK and the US. While some of this differentiation is from selection pressures
unique to each population (Sabeti et al., 2007; Barreiro, Laval, Quach, Patin, & Quintana-
Murci, 2008; Pickrell et al., 2009), because the overall strength of selection is weak, other
evolutionary processes such as migration and genetic drift also contribute to population
variation in gene frequencies (Coop et al., 2009). Even if selection is present but not detectable
given the power of both samples, it can at least be said that the selection gradient in both
populations is very shallow. The effects of migration, drift, and mutation are inversely related
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to the strength of selection (Kimura, 1957; Crow & Kimura, 1970; Rice, 2004; Hartl & Clark,
2007) and thus are more likely to have an effect over the timespan of several generations.
An alternative but not mutually exclusive explanation is that the environment or distri-
bution of environments to which personality is an adaptation (D. M. Buss, 1996; D. M. Buss
& Greiling, 1999; Nettle, 2006; Denissen & Penke, 2008b) also differ between the US and Scot-
land. Countries as a whole may thus capture a level at which fitness optima vary in space.
Variation in the direction and magnitude of selection on personality may also fluctuate over
time because of cyclical or secular changes in environmental characteristics (Penke, Denissen,
& Miller, 2007; Réale & Dingemanse, 2011). If human personality is primarily an adaptation
to the social environment (Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007; D. M. Buss, 2009b), then that
social environment will be composed of the distribution other people’s personalities. The
US and UK differ in mean personality at the population level (McCrae, Terracciano, & 79
Members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005; Schmitt et al., 2007). While the
Scottish were not sampled, McCrae, Terracciano, and 79 Members of the Personality Profiles
of Cultures Project (2005) found that the English and Northern Irish were on average higher
on neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness and lower on conscientiousness than Americans.
Schmitt et al. (2007), who sampled the whole UK, found that people in the UK were higher
on neuroticism but lower on agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness than the US. If
personality is under frequency dependent selection (Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007), then
this distribution of personality within a population will determine some of the features of the
fitness landscape. While balancing selection on individual personality genes can probably be
ruled out because otherwise the resulting frequencies and effect sizes would have turned up
in genome-wide association studies (Miller, 2011), balancing selection may still be occuring
on the level of the phenotype as the changing environment, including the frequency of other
phenotypes, slowly changes the fitness landscape. Heterogeniety in fitness effects of person-
ality also entail that the direction of selection, as well as its magnitude or even presence, will
differ between populations that are studied. If selection is maintaining variation in personal-
ity then every population will present its own case. This also means that, with data on only
a few populations, it is impossible to come to general conclusions about which demographic,
cultural, ecological, or behavioral characteristics are determining the relationship between
personality and fitness (Nettle, 2009).
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If selection is weak there is also more chance for mutation to increase and maintain the
genetic variance in personality. Selection may also be weak because mutations that affect both
personality and fitness are sufficiently buffered (Hartman et al., 2001; Hermisson & Wagner,
2004) by the action of other genes. This is consistent with the large proportion of nonadditive
genetic variance in personality (Eaves et al., 1998; Keller et al., 2005; Pilia et al., 2006; Rettew
et al., 2008) because gene-by-gene interaction or epistasis contributes to nonadditive genetic
variance (Falconer & Mackay, 1996; Lynch & Walsh, 1998).
Besides these substantial explanations, methodological differences might also influence
the observed relationships between fitness and personality. First, the two samples used dif-
ferent personality instruments. The assumption is often made in evolutionary studies of
human personality that personality traits measured with different scales are interchangable.
For example, Jokela et al. (2011) combined two different samples together in their study of
personality and reproductive outcomes. While both samples were measured on scales in the
mold of the Five-Factor Model, one sample was assessed using the Big Five Inventory (BFI,
John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) while the other used the MIDI (Lachman & Weaver, 1997).
I drew the twins from this same sample that was assessed using the MIDI, so the measure-
ment was also different from the Generation Scotland participants who were assessed using
the EPQ-R (S. Eysenck et al., 1985). The MIDI neuroticism scale is composed of the items
moody, worrying, nervous and (not) calm while the EPQ scale also contains, in addition to
items pertaining to fluctuating moods and worry, questions such as Do you often feel lonely?
and Are you often troubled by feelings of guilt?. Thus, while related, each instrument might be
tapping slightly different aspects (or facets) of personality.
On top of item content, several pieces of evidence are important to keep in mind when
studying personality phenotypes using a selectionist approach. Although Jokela et al. (2011)
reported strong negative associations between openness and reproductive success, my pre-
liminary analysis of the phenotypic correlation between openness and LRS was not only not
statistically significant but the effect went in the opposite direction. W. Johnson and Krueger
(2004) found that the items making up the agreeableness, openness, and conscientious do-
mains in the MIDI did not show genetic and environmental coherence. Models that specified
either independent pathways where the items shared genetic and environmental effects or
models that specified a single, common latent structure showed poor fit to the data for these
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three domains, which implies that the genetic effects leading to the score on each item dif-
fered between the items (W. Johnson & Krueger, 2004). This lack of coherence would impede
the estimation of genetic effects common between a personality domain and fitness because
each item could vary in its relationship to fitness. I also found a significant negative envi-
ronmental correlation between the neuroticism and extraversion domains in the Generation
Scotland sample. While not significant, the additive and nonadditive genetic correlations
were also negative, suggesting a shared genetic basis for the two domains as well. In this
sample, at least, they do not describe separate phenotypes. Selectionist studies of personality
must therefore be wary of falling prey to the “jingle–jangle” fallacy (Block, 1995) of assuming
that because two personality constructs have the same name they are the same phenotype
and, conversely, that differently named constructs describe independent phenotypes.
The samples also differed in the types of relatives used to make the genetic inferences.
The analysis of the midus sample was based on monozygotic and dizygotic twins while the
Generation Scotland sample used extended families. Twin designs rest on more stringent
assumptions (Eaves et al., 1978; Keller, Medland, & Duncan, 2010) than designs that incor-
porate multiple types of relatives. Twin models are underidentfied when estimating additive
genetic (VA), nonadditive genetic (VNA or VD), and common environment (VC) variances so
one of the variance components has to be set to zero. The animal model on the other hand,
like other extended family designs, can address these and other limitations of twin models
(Lynch & Walsh, 1998; Keller et al., 2010). Because the estimate for h2 from a twin model
includes effects from both VA and VD , it is better seen as an estimate of the broad-sense
rather than the narrow-sense heritability (Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001; Keller et al., 2010). This
can be seen in genetic studies of personality using pedigree models (Pilia et al., 2006) or that
otherwise incorporate non-twin relatives along with twins (Eaves et al., 1998; Keller et al.,
2005; Rettew et al., 2008) that model nonadditive genetic effects. These family studies report
h2 ≈ .2 rather than the ≈ .4–.5 typically yielded by twin studies (Bouchard, 1994; Bouchard
& Loehlin, 2001). If only the total amount of genetic influence is of interest, this is a minor
point. However, the mean change in a phenotype from directional selection is only a function
of the addtive genetic variance. When making evolutionary inferences using a genetically-
informed selectionist approach, separating out additive and nonadditive genetic variance is
critical. Thus, the estimates of the additive genetic covariance between personality and rel-
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ative fitness may not accurately predict evolutionary change from selection if some of the
covariance is coming from nonadditive genetic effects on both personality and fitness.
Multivariate selection analysis should also not be confused with causal inference. Pre-
dicting the relevance of a trait for fitness by examining only one trait at a time assumes that
differences in the trait are the sole cause of the related differences in fitness (Pigliucci, 2006;
Hadfield, 2008; M. B. Morrissey et al., 2011). While a genetic covariance between a trait and
fitness means that the mean phenotype will deterministically change in the direction and
amount predicted (the actual change will also be determined by joint effects of other ap-
sects of the fitness surface combined with nondeterminstic processes of mutation and genetic
drift; Rice, 2004), this does not speak to how variation in the phenotype caused differences
in fitness. The analysis also does not speak to what exactly it is that is being passed on
from one generation to the next and being selected, only that whatever it is it is heritable
and works additively on both fitness and the phenotype. Animal breeders, who gave birth
to these techniques, had traditionally made the assumption that the environment each indi-
vidual experiences is unique and that it is only genes that are being passed from parent to
offspring. Studies of the relationship between fitness and personality usually condition on
non-personality traits that also relate to reproductive success, such as educational attainment
and socioeconomic status (Jokela et al., 2011). Rather than seeing these as variables to control
for, a multivariate analysis could be used that treats these sociological factors as potentially
genetically correlated outcomes. Here I have only looked at personality variables, but future
analysis should incorporate additional psychological and sociological variables.
If selection on personality is weak, it may require data on a greater number of generations
to detect than was available in the Scottish pedigree sample. The maximum pedigree depth
for the personality data was only three generations. In contrast, studies of nonhuman animals
may incorporate up to 10 generations or more (Réale & Dingemanse, 2011) which is more
feasible with organisms with shorter lifespans. The power of breeding-value based estimates
of selection in reasonable human samples should be explored.
Barring all of these assumptions, however, we can conclude that directional selection for
personality will be either absent or, at most, weak in at least some contemporary populations.
While the span of time over which this microevolutionary change occurs can be experienced
within a single human lifetime, the amount of change, even where detectable, amounts to
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only a few percents of a standard deviation, and is therefore most likely imperceptible to any
observer without a genetic model in their toolkit. Cohort effects such as the adjustment of
personality through adaptive developmental plasticity to life-history conditions (Chap. 3) or
migration would have a larger and more noticeable effect to the casual observer. However,
only a genetically-based selectionist approach can help us infer how we humans continue to
psychologically adapt to our environment.

Chapter 6
Orchid hypotheses: developmental evolution
of reactivity and resilience to environmental
stress
6.1 Sensitivity to context
When an organism encounters a stressor in its environment, a cascade of interconnected sys-
tems activate to generate the appropriate biological and behavioral response to effectively
handle the stress (McEwen, 1998; Karatsoreos & McEwen, 2011). An organism’s reactivity
describes the extent to which various physiological systems, such as mediation of central
nervous sytem activity by systemic hormones, respond to stress of a given level (Matthew,
1986). The stress response system describes the suite of functions that allow the organism to
maintain this stability in the face of environmental challenges and opportunities. The stress
response system functions in a coordinated manner on different timescales and includes com-
ponents of the neuroendocrine system such as the hypothalamic-pituitary-andrenal (HPA)
axis and the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems (Porges, 1995; Habib, Gold,
& Chrousos, 2001; Schlotz et al., 2008; Boyce & Ellis, 2005; Del Giudice et al., 2011). The
stress response system coordinates behavioral and physiological responses to both harmful
and beneficial situations and in doing so acts as both a filter and an amplifier of information
about the environment (Del Giudice et al., 2011). These responses come as reactions to im-
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mediate situational changes as well as to long-term sources of stress in the environment and
the stress response system exhibits variation both in specific reactivity and baseline activity
(Bauer, Quas, & Boyce, 2002; El-Sheikh, Erath, Buckhalt, Granger, & Mize, 2008).
While the goal of the system as a whole is to keep the organism in equilibrium, dysreg-
ulation can result in psychological, psychiatric, and somatic disorders. Both humans and
animals show individual differences in basic stress reactivity and sensory processing sensi-
tivity (Cacioppo et al., 1998; Koolhaas et al., 1999; Boyce & Ellis, 2005; Ellis et al., 2005; Aron,
Aron, & Jagiellowicz, 2012) and this variation is the result of genetic and environmental ef-
fects (Caspi & Moffitt, 2006; Belsky & Beaver, 2011). The environment experienced early in
life has a complex relationship during development with the sensitivity of the stress response
system. One early study found that in children who had relatively unreactive immune sys-
tems, the incidence of respiratory illness was independent of the degree of adversity in their
environment (Boyce et al., 1995). However, for children who had high psychobiological re-
activity, high adversity led to the worst health outcomes but low stress environments led to
the best health outcomes (Boyce & Ellis, 2005). Reactivity of the sympathetic nervous system
was also found to follow the same curvilinear shape in two samples of children experiencing
different levels of stressful life events, family discord, and social support (Ellis et al., 2005).
Similar findings have been found in mice where both very low and very high doses of cor-
ticosterone during infant development produced high reactivity in adulthood (Macrì et al.,
2009).
Boyce and Ellis (2005) synthesized this theory and evidence as the Biological Sensitivity
to Context (BSC) model (Ellis et al., 2005; Ellis & Boyce, 2008). They suggested a U-shaped
relationship between stress experienced during ontogeny and biological reactivity to the en-
vironment later in life (Fig. 6.1). Individuals growing under moderate stress and psychosocial
support develop a low biological sensitivity. Those born under conditions of either low or
high stress should develop reactivity as either sensitivity or vigilance (Del Giudice et al.,
2011). However, while individuals with low sensitivity are buffered against moderate and
even high stress, they are less receptive to the beneficial effects of good environments. The
stress response system is thus seen as conditionally adaptive: during development the sys-
tem is ‘tuned’ by the environment experienced during ontogeny to be optimally receptive
or resistant later in life (this is similar in principal to the adaptive phenotypic plasticity of
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Figure 6.1: U-shaped relationship between early stress and biological reactivity. Adapted
from Boyce and Ellis (2005) and Del Giudice et al. (2011).
personality to life history conditions, see Chap. 3). The U-shaped curve is a norm of reac-
tion (Pigliucci, 2001; Dingemanse, Kazem, Réale, & Wright, 2010) which specifies how the
phenotype (in this case, stress reactivity) will develop under different environmental values.
Individuals also show differential susceptibility to environmental stressors (Belsky, 1997;
Belsky & Pluess, 2009) and there is some evidence that variation in reaction norms to early
stress is partly genetic. Genetic studies in humans originally focused on variants that acted as
risk factors for negative behavioral and health outcomes, following the diathesis-stress model
that the risk of psychopathology or other negative outcomes of stress exists on a continuum
of vulnerability (Monroe & Simons, 1991; Belsky & Pluess, 2009). For example, genetic vari-
ants underlying the serotonergic system increase the risk of anxiety-related disorders (Lesch
et al., 1996). While some genotypes buffer against environmental stressors, there is some
cross-species evidence that variants conferring risk in moderately and highly stressful envi-
ronments may also be beneficial in environments of low stress (Caspi & Moffitt, 2006; Suomi,
2006; Caspi et al., 2010; Belsky & Beaver, 2011).
There is thus a reconceptualization underway that sees certain alleles as conferring plas-
ticity rather than risk since whether their effects are harmful or beneficial depend on the
environment (Belsky, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & IJzendoorn, 2007; Belsky, 1997; Ellis et al.,
2011). However, the evidence for single genes influencing the reaction norm is inconsistent
(Caspi & Moffitt, 2006; Risch et al., 2009; Caspi et al., 2010; Belsky & Beaver, 2011). One
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possible reason for the inconsistency is that multiple genes contribute to plasticity so that
the effects of any one gene can be masked by the effects of other genes (Belsky & Beaver,
2011). An alternative explanation is that because the reaction norm is curviliner the relation-
ship between gene, environment, and phenotype will depend on which part of the reaction
norm is being sampled (Boyce & Ellis, 2005). For example, a cross-over interaction might not
be detected if the sample consisted primarily of individuals from moderate and high-stress
environments. If such relationships are difficult to determine empirically (Eaves, 2006), it
is pertinent to ask whether a U-shaped reaction norm is likely to exist in theory, based on
an evolutionary analysis. Boyce and Ellis (2005) argue that variation in stress reactivity is
maintained because the optimal reactivity varies across environments. Yet the phenotypic
variation observed could be an outcome of variability in stress experienced early in life, even
if there is no genetic variability underlying the reaction norm. However, if we model genetic
influences on different aspects of the reaction norm specified by the BSC theory, then it is
possible to see how the gene × environment interaction for the development of reactivity
will be shaped by evolutionary processes and under what conditions genetic variation could
be maintained. This has the potential to support the idea that individuals differ in terms of
plasticity (Belsky et al., 2009).
The BSC (Boyce & Ellis, 2005) model and its extension, the adaptive calibration model
(ACM) (Del Giudice et al., 2011), were conceived in terms of evolutionary development but
have yet to be explored formally. Mathematical analysis can help clarify how the distribu-
tion of underlying genetic factors affects the evolutionary dynamics of phenotypes like the
stress response system. By formalizing the descriptions of the system, we can come to un-
derstand the ways that the evolutionary development of risk and resilience will change in
ways that are not necessarily intuitively obvious. The models, then, help guide our theo-
ries and our thinking. This work extends the BSC/ACM models by calling more directly on
rigorous evolutionary theory via mathematical prototyping. The application of this theory
relies on building a mathematical model that connects genetic architecture influencing the
trait to fitness outcomes and deriving expressions showing how natural selection will shape
the distribution of the underlying factors in the population. While the model makes many
simplifying assumptions, the key idea is to express the essential developmental aspects of
the stress response system proposed by the theory. The results of the models can then guide
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further theoretical and empirical work.
Here I describe a simple model encoding the essential features of the U-shaped reaction
norm for the stress response system proposed by Boyce and Ellis (2005). The model will
assume that the shape of the reaction norm (its position and width) is controlled by a set
of genetic factors. The analysis will show how the distribution of these variants will change
under selection. In particularly, I am interested in what aspects of the distribution of the
underlying factors will combine with the fitness landscape to maintain genetic variation in
the BSC/ACM system.
6.2 Phenotypic landscape models
The evolution of development can be explored using a general mathematical framework
that ties together the joint distribution of underlying genetic and environmental factors, the
contribution of each factor to the phenotype, and the relationship between the phenotype and
fitness (Rice, 2002, 2004). The focus of such mathematical models is twofold: (1) to explore
how selection changes the distribution of underlying factors and (2) how the structure of the
phenotype influences the evolution of its development.
Phenotypic development can be formalized and modeled by means of tensor analysis
(Rice, 2002). A tensor is a multidimensional extension of a matrix, where the rank of the
tensor indicates its dimensionality. A vector is a tensor of rank 1 while a matrix is a tensor of
rank 2.
The models are composed of several parts
• an equation specifying how the phenotype (φ) is related to the genetic and environmen-
tal factors. This is the phenotypic landscape. The equation can be based on knowledge
of the system being studied or on a theory of the phenotype’s ontogeny. The phenotype
is represented as a function of genetic (g) and environmental (e) factors
φ = f (g1, g2, . . . gk, e1, e2, . . . en)
that can take any form. Modeling involves identifying the essential relationships be-
tween the underlying factors and the development of the phenotype that one would
like to explore.
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• The distribution of the underlying factors. The different moments of the distribution
are stored in tensors: P1 = means, P2= (co)variances, P3 = multivariate skewnesses, P4 =












is a rank 1 tensor (vector) that holds the means of each underlying factor. Subscripts
can be used to index the elements: P11 = E[g1], P
1
k+1 = E[e1]. The parameters of
the distribution are more technically defined as central moments although they do
appear as terms in the empirical calculations of skewness and kurtosis. Skewness is
represented by the 3rd central moment and is contained in a three dimensional tensor








Like the relationship between variance and covariance, higher order moments also have
elements that are mixed moments of two or more variables. For example, the ‘co-skew’







(xi − x̄)(yi − ȳ)(zi − z̄)
• D tensors specifying how the phenotype changes with changes in the underlying fac-
tors. This captures different aspects of the shape of the phenotypic landscape; for
example, how steep or curved it is for various combinations of the genetic and envi-
ronmental factors. They are constructed as derivatives of the phenotypic function. For
example, the first derivatives of the phenotype with respect to each underlying factor
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where ∂φ/∂g1 is the first derivitative of the phenotype φ with respect to the genetic
factor g1.
• an equation specifying the relationship between phenotype and fitness (w).
w = g(φ, em, . . . , ez)
The inclusion of additional environmental factors into the fitness function allows the
specification of situations where the optimal phenotype varies across environments.
• Q vectors indicating how selection changes the distribution of the genetic factors. Q1
gives the change in means and is encoded as a vector. Q2, a matrix, specifies the change







where B = ∑i bi enumerates the number of order i derivatives; A = ∑i ai are the
degrees of differentiation; ⊗ is the outer product operator and ⊗iDai = Da1 ⊗ Da2 ⊗ · · ·
and represents the joint effect of different aspects of the phenotypic landscape; γ is
a scaling factor; and w̄ is the mean fitness. 〈P, D〉 is an inner product that maps the
distribution of variation in the underlying factors D onto the phenotypic landscape P.
Tensor algebra
Analyzing phenotypic landscape models proceeds by multiplying tensors to determine how
the distribution of underlying factors maps on to the phenotypic landscape. An inner product
projects one tensor onto another tensor of smaller dimension, resulting in a tensor of rank
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equal to the difference in ranks of the two original tensors. For example, the 4th moments
(kurtoses) of the underlying factors, P4, maps onto the 2nd derivatives of fitness, D2 as







resulting in a new tensor of rank 2 that is part of a Q vector influencing the 2nd moments
(variances). This formula would therefore indicate how selection would increase or decrease
the variance of a trait as a function of the curvature of the fitness landscape and the thickness
of the tails of the distribution of underlying factors.
6.3 Model specification
Boyce and Ellis (2005) conceptualized a U-shaped function to represent the relationship be-
tween early-life stress or psychosocial support and biological reactivity (φr, see Fig. 6.1). The
BSC model posits that sensitivity is the product of gene × environment interaction, so the
model needs to specify that the phenotype is a product of both genetic and environmental
factors. I paramaterized the U-shaped reaction norm as a quadratic function with 3 genetic
and 1 environmental factor:
φr(g1, g2, g3, e1) = g1 + g3(e1 − g2)2 (6.2)
where
• g1: genetic factor controlling the minimum possible reactivity.
• g2: genetic factor controlling under what value of the environmental factor (e1) mini-
mum reactivity occurs.
• g3: genetic factor influencing the rate of increase in reactivity under progressively more
and less stress.
• e1: environmental factor representing stress early in life (higher value equals more
stress).
The model is very general as to what the genetic factors are: they could represent functional
variants of a protein or different transcription levels of one or more genes. As a first step,
the model is meant to capture the phenomenology of the BSC theory. The reaction norm
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(a) Environment of minimum reactivity.

































(b) Minimum reactivity and curvature.
Figure 6.2: Reaction norm for for a biological sensitivity to context phenotype as a function
of three genetic and one environmental factors, φr(g1, g2, g3, e1) = g1 + g3(e1 − g2)2. (a)
Variation in genetic factor g2 controls the environment (e1) under which minimum reactivity
develops. (b) Genetic factor g1 controls the height and g3 the curvature of the reaction norm.
φr under different parameters for the genetic factors is plotted in Figure 6.2. The genetic
factors control the position, height, and curvature of the reaction norm. The system thus
displays phenotypic plasticity because the same genotype will produce a different phenotype
depending on the environmental factor encoding early childhood stress. The ability of the
genetic factors to change the position and shape of the curve also means that children with
different genotypes who develop in the same environment will have different phenotypes.
The equation’s specification of a single phenotype also encodes the property of “equifinality”
(Waddington, 1957; Bertalanffy, 1968; Cicchetti & Tucker, 1994) that Boyce and Ellis (2005)
note is consistent with the final BSC phenotype has the same health and fitness consequences
regardless of the exact combination of environmental and genetic values that result in a
particular phenotypic value.
Fitness function
The key aspect of the fitness function is that buffered phenotypes should have fairly constant
fitness across environments but achieve a lower maximum fitness under good environments.
Reactive phenotypes, whether sensitive or vigilant, should have higher fitness in good envi-
ronments and much lower fitness in poor environments. A logistic function, logit(x) = 1
1+e−x ,
can be used to capture some of these characteristics. Fitness is therefore a function of the re-
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Figure 6.3: Fitness function for the biological sensitivity to context model. Fitness wr is a
function of the reactivity phenotype φr and the level of stress in the environment experi-
enced as an adult e2. wr(φr, e2) = logit(−φr(e2 + 1)). Under low stress the more reactive
phenotype has the highest fitness while under high stress the resilient phenotype is buffered
and achieves highest fitness. The model assumes a crossover point of intermediate stress
where all phenotypes achieve equal fitness.
activity (φr) and stress during the reproductive lifespan (e2)
wr(φr, e2) = logit(−φr(e2 + 1)) (6.3)
The fitness curve for different levels of reactivity is plotted in Figure 6.3. As theorized,
this fitness function shows a crossover in maximum fitness between reactive and resilient
individuals depending on the level of stress experienced. The resilient phenotype shows less
of a difference in fitness between high and low stress environments so it is more robust. The
reactive phenotype shows more of a fitness differential between environments. The fitness
functions also flatten out at the extremes so that there is less of a difference in fitness between
reactive and resilient types in very good and very poor environments. While the fitness
function captures the main features of the BSC theory, it does not model the requirement that
highly reactive phenotypes have the best fitness in extremely poor environments (Boyce &
Ellis, 2005).
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6.4 Evolutionary dynamics
The model can be used to study the developmental evolution of reactivity as defined by BSC
theory. The goal of the analysis is to derive expressions for the Q tensors, which describe the
changes in the distribution of the underlying genetic factors, from the phenotypic function
and the P and D tensors and the application of Eq. 6.1. I will explore the effect that selection
has on the means and variances of the underlying traits. Therefore, the focus will be on Q
vectors that change the P1 and P2 tensors.
Change in means
The change in the means of the genetic factors is determined by the first derivative of fitness,







The model specification of the fitness function (Eqn. 6.3) includes a ‘good’, low-stress envi-
ronment (arbitrarily e2 = −1) where fitness is constant across phenotypes. The direction of
change is influenced primarily by the derivative of fitness
∂wr
∂φr




plotted in Figure 6.4a. The first derivative is positive when the average environment (e2) is
unstressful and negative when more stressful environments are common. The means of the
genetic factors, g1–g3, change in proportion to their variances (P
2) but the direction of change
is a function of the average quality of the environments early (e1) or late (e2) in life.
The magnitude and direction of change for each genetic factor is also determined by
the shape of the phenotypic landscape with respect to each factor. Here the relevant shape
parameter when we want to know the mean change in each factor given the genetic variances,
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(a) First derivative of fitness.




















(b) Second derivative of fitness.
Figure 6.4: Derivative of fitness with respect to phenotype for different values for mean stress
later in life (e2). (a) ∂w/∂φr = first derivative of fitness. The function is always positive when
average stress experienced during adulthood is low and negative when it is high. (b) ∂w/∂φr
= second derivative of fitness.
showing that the change in sensitivity as the first genetic factor (g1) changes is constant, or
∂φr/∂g1 = 1, while the change from factors g2 and g3 depend on the average values of the
genetic and environmental factors.
The change in the genetic factors from selection are visualized in Figure 6.5. When the av-
erage environment experienced during adulthood is one of low stress, selection will increase
the genetic factor controlling minimum reactivity (g1), that is, the reaction norm moves up
(Fig. 6.2b). This is because it is beneficial to be more receptive to the good environment. If
the average adult environment is stressful, however, ∆g1 is negative, so the population will
move to positions on the reaction norm surface that minimize reactivity (Fig. 6.5a).
The genetic factor g2 determines under what value of e1 (early stress) minimum reactivity
is achieved. When the average environment in adulthood is good, selection will move the
reaction norm right or left depending on its position relative to the average environment
experienced during development (e1). For example, if e1 = 0 and g2 = 1 (black line, Fig. 6.2a),
the reaction norm will move to the right, increasing mean reactivity. If the reaction norm is
on the other side (g2 = −1, for example), reactivity is increased by moving the curve to the
left. If the curve is poised so that minimum reactivity is achieved under the mean value of e1
then ∆g2 = 0. This is an unstable equilibrium so if mutation or drift pushes mean g2 either
above or below this point, the reaction norm will move away from it. If the later environment
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(b) Offset of reaction norm.

















(c) Reaction norm curvature.
Figure 6.5: Mean in genetic factors from selection under stressful and unstressful environ-
ments. Lines show combinations of low and high early/late stress environments. Black: e1
= low = -1, e2 = low = -2. Gray: e1 = high = 1, e2 = low = -2. Dotted: e1 = low = -1, e2 =
high = 1. Dashed: e1 = high = 1, e2 = high = 1. (a) Change in minimum reactivity (∆g1). g1
increases when later stress (e2) is low (top two lines) and decreases when high (bottom two
lines). The magnitude of change depends on the average stress during development, e1. (b)
Change in the offset of the reaction norm from average early stress (∆g2). When later stress
is low (e2 < −1, solid lines), the reactivity curve will move away from its current value in the
direction that maximizes reactivity at the average value of the early stress factor, e1. When
later stress is moderate or high (e2 > −1, dotted and dashed lines) g2 will move to match
e1 such that reactivity is minimized under the average amount of early stress. (c) Change
in reaction norm curvature (∆g3). High average late-life stress causes the reaction norm to
flatten out, making low reactivity more robust across a wider range of stress levels early in
life.
198 CHAPTER 6. ORCHID HYPOTHESES










low stress high stress
generation = 0
generation = 8
Figure 6.6: Evolution of the reactivity phenotype under directional selection when the average
environments are moderately stressful. Selection has the effect of lowering and flattening the
reaction norm. At generation 0: g1 = 2, g2 = -1, g3 = 0.5. By generation 8: g1 = 1.4, g2 = -0.6,
g3 = 0.06. Environment factors e1 = e2 = 0.
is more stressful on average, however, selection will move the reaction norm toward the point
where g2 = e1. The biological reactivity curve in this case will thus track the value of stress
in the early environment to minimize reactivity later in life.
Change in reaction norm curvature (g3) follows a similar dynamic to g1 (Fig. 6.5c). When
the good environments are more common later in life, the curvature of the reaction norm
will increase to maximize the biological reactivity that develops independent of the early
environment. If most environments in which fitness is expressed are poor and stressful,
the reaction norm will flatten out to create a phenotype that is more robust across early
environments in order to minimize sensitivity to the environment later in life.
The BSC model specifies that moderately stressful environments (here e1 = e2 = 0) are
most common. Thus the evolutionary dynamics will be described by the curves in Figures
6.5a–c that are labelled as high/high. Selection will therefore generally tend to move the
reactivity curve downward and toward the mean of e1 while making the curve flatter. The
evolution of the reaction norm over eight generations is visualized in Figure 6.6.
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6.5 Change in variance
If we are interested in how genetic variance in reactivity is maintained, then we need to
calculate the effect of selection on the variance of and covariances between the underlying


















〈P4, D1 ⊗ D1〉 (6.9)
where the amount that the phenotype curves as a function of the underlying genetic factors





























0 2g3 −2(e1 − g2)
0 −2(e1 − g2) 0

 , (6.11)
and the outer product of the first derivatives












































1 −2(e1 − g2)g3 (e1 − g2)2
−2(e1 − g2)g3 4(e1 − g2)2g23 −2(e1 − g2)3g3
(e1 − g2)2 −2(e1 − g2)3g3 (e1 − g2)4

 , (6.13)
P3 is the tensor of skews, and P4 is the tensor of kurtoses. The total change in the vari-








The Q21 tensor is determined by how the skew of the genetic factors (P
3) maps onto the
slope of the phenotype (D1, Eqn 6.6). This mapping is given by the inner product 〈P3, D1〉
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which takes a 3-dimensional tensor of skews and a 1-dimensional vector of derivatives, pro-
ducing a 2-dimensional matrix of terms related to the change of the covariance matrix. The
diagonals of this matrix indicate the relevant change in variances while the off diagonals give
changes to covariances among the genetic factors. The mapping relevant to the variance of
factor g1 is
〈P3, D1〉11 = P111D1 + P211D2 + P311D3
= P111 − 2(e1 − g2)g3P211 + (e1 − g2)2P311,
to g2 is
〈P3, D1〉22 = P122D1 + P222D2 + P322D3
= P122 − 2(e1 − g2)g3P222 + (e1 − g2)2P322,
to g3 is
〈P3, D1〉33 = P133D1 + P233D2 + P333D3
= P133 − 2(e1 − g2)g3P233 + (e1 − g2)2P333,
Most of the components of this tensor contain the term e1 − g2 so much of the skew between
underlying factors will only influence the variance and covariance when early-environmental
stress fluctuates away from the fitness optimum where g2 = e1. When g2 = e1 then the
diagonals of the tensor reduce to
〈P3, D1〉11 = P111
〈P3, D1〉22 = P122
〈P3, D1〉33 = P133
Thus only the skew between the minimum reactivity factor, g1, and the other genetic factors,
namely P111, P122, and P133, will have an influence on the change in variances.
Kurtosis of the factors (P4) describes whether the tails of the distribution of each factor are
thinner (positive kurtosis) or thicker (negative kurtosis) and the peakedness of the distribu-
tion. When g2 = e1 the only nonzero element of the second derivatives of the phenotype (D
2,
Eq. 6.11) is D22 = 2g3, involving the factor controlling how robust reactivity is over different
amounts of stress in the early environment. The elements of 〈P4, D2〉 that contain D22 and
relate to change in variances are
〈P4, D2〉11 = 2g3P2211
〈P4, D2〉22 = 2g3P2222
〈P4, D2〉33 = 2g3P2233
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which is plotted in Figure 6.4b, and the outer product of the first derivatives of phenotype
D1 ⊗ D1 (Eq. 6.13). At the equilibrium point the only nonzero term of this matrix is [D1 ⊗
D1]11 = 1. The elements of the mapping of P
4 onto D1 ⊗ D1 related to changes in variances
are
〈P4, D1 ⊗ D1〉11 = P1111
〈P4, D1 ⊗ D1〉22 = P1122
〈P4, D1 ⊗ D1〉33 = P1133
If the population is at the equilibrium point g2 = e1 then the changes in the variance of





































When environments experienced during reproduction are adverse, the first derivative of fit-












(−P133 − 2g3P2233 + 12 P1133)
Variance in the genetic factors will increase when these terms are positive and decrease when
they are negative. The 4th central moments of a single factor are raised to the 4th power, so
the terms P1111 and P2222 will always be positive. The other terms can be either positive
or negative and the mixed terms (P122, P133, P1122, P1122, P2233) will be zero if there is no
association between the underlying factors. If the genetic factors are uncorrelated then the










Thus variance in the minimum reactivity of genotypes could be maintained either when there
is negative skew in the distribution of g1 (i.e., P111 < 0) or when −P111 < 12 P1111. Selection
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will always work to decrease the variance of the offset parameter g2 but would not shape the
curvature parameter g3.
If environmental fluctuation in e1 or mutation or migration shift the mean value of g2
then terms in the Q2 vectors involving (e1 − g2) will come into play. If the genetic factors are
uncorrelated, this will have the biggest effect on the variance of g3 from the term in the Q
2
1,1
tensor [D1 ⊗ D1]33 = (e1 − g2)4 (Eqn. 6.13). This term maps the kurtosis of g3 so its change






(e1 − g2)4P3333. (6.16)
As this term will always be positive, fluctuations causing g2 and e1 to depart from each other
will increase the variance in the genetic parameter underlying the curvature of the reaction
norm for biological sensitivity.
6.6 Evolution of orchids and dandelions
With equal parts seriousness and whimsy Boyce and Ellis (2005) talk about robust and sen-
sitive children as dandelions and orchids, respectively.1 Dandelion children thrive and do well
in pretty much any environment. Their more delicate peers, the orchids, collapse in poor en-
vironments but flourish in exceptionally good ones. Although the reaction norms defined in
the models are simple and do not capture all of the developmental complexities of dandelion
and orchid children, the models allow us to formalize our intuitions about how biological
sensitivity to context will evolve.
First, specifying the phenotypic and fitness functions separately shows that robustness
enters the system in two places. The buffered/sensitive distinction in the BSC theory refers
to the shape of the fitness function (Eq. 6.3), where buffered individuals have relatively con-
stant fitness across the environment gradient of stress in adulthood whereas the fitness of
sensitive individuals shows more considerable differences (Fig. 6.4). Robustness also de-
scribes the norm of reaction for the sensitivity phenotype (Eq. 6.3, Fig. 6.2b). The genetic
factor (g3) determining how the sensitivity phenotype changes with the square of early stress
determines how plastic or robust the phenotype is to early life stress. When the development
of sensitivity is very robust to early stress (g3 → 0+), the individual will have the same level
1After the Swedish idioms maskrosbarn (dandelion child) and orkidebarn (orchid child).
6.6. EVOLUTION OF ORCHIDS AND DANDELIONS 203
of sensitivity to stress as an adult independent of stress experienced early in life. Whether
this leads to high or low reactivity will depend on the height of the reaction norm (specified
by the g1 genetic factor).
Lowest achievable reactivity is important because the evolutionary analysis showed that
when the average stress in adulthood is moderate selection will tend to flatten out sensitivity
reaction norm. Selection will also act to make the reaction norm ‘track’ the mean value of
the childhood environment so that minimum reactivity is achieved under the most prevalant
amount of stress. When the reaction norm is very curved it will more quickly shift to match
the average level of stress while a shallower reaction norm would not be as sensitive to envi-
ronmental fluctuations. The evolutionary–development theory of BSC specifies that variation
in (phenotypic) reactivity is maintained by variability in stress early in life. A curved reaction
norm can produce differential susceptibility to stress even if there is no underlying genetic
variation. However, according to the mathematical model, this alone is not sufficient to main-
tain variation in reactivity because selection will prefer a robust phenotype that results in the
same reactivity level in all individuals. The driver of this flattening of the sensitivity reaction
norm is that environments of moderate stress, where high reactivity achieves higher fitness,
are most prevalent. Thus, it was necessary to see if any features of the developmental system
could promote the maintenance of genetic variation in the reaction norm.
Analysis of the effects of selection on quantitative traits (Lande & Arnold, 1983; Falconer
& Mackay, 1996, see Chap. 5) typically only relies on the mean of the trait (to determine
where on the fitness surface the population is) and the amount of genetic variance in and
covariance among the traits (which determines the evolvability of the trait, i.e., the extent
to which a given strength of selection will translate into a change in the mean phenotype).
Selection, however, both works on and is determined by all the aspects of the distribution
of the underlying genetic and environmental factors (Rice, 2002, 2004). Not only mean and
variance but higher order moments of the distribution such as skew and kurtosis can also
play a role in developmental evolution. The analysis showed that variation can be main-
tained if certain kinds of asymmetries exist in the distribution of the genetic factors. Such
asymmetries could arise if the genetic factors follow nonnormal joint distributions which
would lead to skew within and among the genetic factors. If there is no association between
the genetic factors, then variation in the reaction norm curvature can still be maintained if
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fluctuations in the quality of the average childhood environment depart from the point at
which minimum reactivity is achieved (e1 6= g2, Eq. 6.16). This could occur, for example,
through year-to-year variation in resource availability that contributes to childhood adver-
sity or other unpredictable events such as natural disasters and wars. The evolvability of
variance in the reaction norm’s width is limited by the 4th moment of the genetic factor’s
distribution. Mutations have more of an influence on higher-order moments than they do
on the variance (Rice, 2004), so it would take less mutational input when the environment
fluctuates to maintain a given amount of genetic variance. Thus, under this simple model,
temporal fluctuations in the average quality of the environment experienced during child-
hood are necessary to maintain variation in adult sensitivity. Variation between individuals
in their childhood environment is not sufficient.
The results from the theoretical model thus raise several important empirical questions
that should be addressed to understand the developmental evolution of behavioral sensitivity
to context and stress responsivity. The amount of variation in sensitivity is a function of the
curvature of the reaction norm. A flatter curve will produce less phenotypic variation. Study-
ing individuals whose genotypes are at the extremes of the reaction norm (either very flat or
very curved) would be useful for understanding the range of biologically plausible shapes
that could be achieved in the population through selection on variance for curvature. Once
the systems underlying the curvature are better understood, the extent to which mutations
influence the extremes of the distribution could also be studied to estimate the evolvability of
the reaction norm. Finally, the model predicts that the minimum reactivity achievable should
occur at or near the mean value of stress expressed. Testing this in the real world will require
clarifying exactly what is meant by the average level of early stress and designing ways to
measure and assess it.
More complex models can be developed if the results of the theoretical analysis do not
match what we actually find to be the case. While the model is as generic as possible with
regard to the biological details, the flexibility of the modeling language is such that more
specific systems can be described. For example, a model could be specified that includes
multiple phenotypes for the separate aspects of the stress response system, such as the di-
vision between inhibitory and activating subsystems. Following empirical results (Belsky &
Beaver, 2011) the model could also be expanded to include multiple genetic factors contribut-
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ing to the plasticity of the reaction norm.
An additional feature of the BSC theory is that in extremely poor environments, the more
reactive phenotypes achieve higher fitness compared to the robust phenotypes. This might be
incorporated into the model using a generalized logistic function so that the asymptote differs
depending on the reactivity. The phenotypic function also allows biologically implausible
values. For example, if g3 < 0 the phenotypic curve flips over so that reactivity is minimized
in the least and the most stressful environments. Also, any combination of factors that make
the phenotype φr < 0 would cause the fitness function to invert such that highest fitness is
achieved in the most stressful environment. Such minor annoyances could be overcome by
amending the phenotypic landscape function so that neither the contribution of g3 not the
whole function can take on negative values.
A further extension of the BSC theory that I did not explore is the idea of adaptive calibra-
tion (Del Giudice et al., 2011). The encoding of the information about adversity by the stress
response system allows the organism to tune its reactivity to achieve maximum fitness. This
assumes that the environment experienced during development is predictive of the environ-
ment experienced during reproduction. However, the mathematical model did not make any
assumptions about or explore the effects of the amount of covariance between the two envi-
ronmental parameters (e1 and e2). Expanding the model to study adaptive plasticity would
require treating the two environmental factors as phenotypes of the individual2 and study
the joint developmental evolution of the reactivity phenotype and the environments (Rice,
2004). This analysis would reveal how the distribution of the environments (including their
higher moments) would shape the slope and curvature of the reaction norm.
Here I have shown how mathematical modeling can clarify evolutionary–development
theories of stress responsivity. Formalizing a theory and carrying out a rigorous analysis can
provide strong confirmation or refutation of the plausibility of evolutionary scenarios for the
origins and maintenance of genetic variation in complex phenotypic traits. The modelling
framework (Rice, 2004) allows for a very general understanding of the evolution of develop-
ment and is thus highly suited to advancing theories about biological sensitivity to context,
differential susceptibility, and plasticity of psychological traits. The orchid hypothesis is a
viable one, evolutionarily speaking, but the maintenance of genetic variation in the reaction
2Although the environmental-factor-as-phenotype has zero heritability.
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norm for sensitivity requires temporal fluctuations in average levels of early-life stress and
positive kurtosis in genetic factors determining the amount of curvature.
Chapter 7
Individuality and diversity in evolutionary time
I assumed, like many evolutionary psychologists, that vague memories of out-
dated undergraduate biology classes, plus some acquintence with genetic correla-
tions, life-history trade-offs, and frequency dependent selection, would suffice to
understand individual differences. Now I think we need to do better.
Geoffrey Miller (2011, p. 376)
7.1 Summary of findings
Personality is part of our evolutionary heritage shared with other primates. In a series of
studies I explored approximately 30 million years of personality evolution (a phylogenetic
tree for the species I studied is presented again in Fig. 7.1). Basic evolutionary theory indi-
cates that closely related species should be similar in terms of personality structure (Weiss &
Adams, 2008). Comparing closely related species indicates over what orders of evolutionary
time, from millions to tens of millions of years, personality structure is conserved or can
diverge. Comparisons with nonhuman primates can also reveal if phenomenological aspects
of personality quantitative genetics, such as the relative proportions of additive to nonad-
ditive genetic variance, are unique to humans or also found in other species. Comparing
human populations that differ in average personality or estimating changes of personality
between generations can also show how personality evolves and diversifies on much shorter
timescales, ranging from decades to tens of thousands of years. Apart from data, the strong
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Figure 7.1: Phylogeny of species considered in the studies. I determined the personality
structure of the Assamese, Japanese, and Barbary macaques and compared the phylogenetic
patterning with rhesus macaques and chimpanzees. I used the two species of orang-utans to
determine the heritability of their personality. I used human data for a life-history and selec-
tion analysis. Node labels give time to common ancestor in millions of years. Tree and branch
lengths from consensus tree inferred using 10kTrees http://10ktrees.fas.harvard.edu/
(C. Arnold et al., 2010).
mathematical basis of much evolutionary theory can also be used to test the plausibility of
theories about personality development.
Macaque species have similar personality structures
I analyzed personality ratings on three species of macaques (Japanese, Barbary, and As-
samese) and compared their personality structures to that of rhesus macaques (Weiss, Adams,
Widdig, & Gerald, 2011) assessed using the same instrument. A principal components anal-
ysis revealed that the species could be characterized by the personality dimensions
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• Japanese macaque: dominance, openness, friendliness, and anxiety;
• Barbary macaque: confidence, opportunism, friendliness, openness;
• Assamese macaque: confidence, activity, openness, friendliness, and opportunism;
that were comparable to the rhesus macaque dimensions of confidence, openness, dominance,
friendliness, anxiety, and activity.
To quantify the equivalence of personality dimensions from different species that had
similar names and similar but not identical item content, I analyzed the personality domains
as fuzzy sets where the inclusion of an item in a particular domain was continuous rather
than discrete (King & Weiss, 2011). After encoding each personality domain as a fuzzy set
by treating the absolute value of each item loading as a membership value, I used fuzzy set
theory (Zedeh, 1965; Smithson & Verkuilen, 2006) to define core sets of items that consistently
described different personality facets across species. Using this method, I found that all
macaque species were consistently defined by a friendliness domain that captured sociability
and affiliativeness. I compared this with chimpanzee personality domains and found that
friendliness did indeed describe a blend of extraversion and agreeableness. The four species
of macaques also had very similar openness dimensions.
The aspect of personality structure that differentiated the species the most was whether
aggression-related items formed a separate personality domain or were part of the dominance
dimension. Rhesus and Japanese macaques, species that both have strict hierarchies (Thierry,
2000), had a single dimension called dominance that captured both social competence and
aggression. In contrast, Barbary and Assamese macaques, that are both characterized by more
egalitarian societies, had an independent dimension made of up items related to aggression,
stinginess, and irritability that I labelled opportunism. The presence or absence of covariation
between the basic dominance and opportunism dimensions may be an adaptation to social
structure.
If dominance and opportunism are a single domain this allows two types of individu-
als to exist at the extremes of the personality dimension. Individuals high in dominance
would be independent while individuals at the other extreme would be pliant. Those high
on opportunism would be aggressive while individuals low on this facet would be peace-
ful. Rhesus and Japanese macaque societies would therefore have aggressive–independent
210 CHAPTER 7. DIVERSITY
individuals and peaceful–pliant individuals. When the basic dominance and opportunism
dimensions are independent, as in Barbary and Assamese macaques, four different personal-
ity styles would emerge: aggressive–independent, aggressive–pliant, peaceful–independent,
and peaceful–pliant. This suggests that macaque societies differ in allowing more or fewer
social niches to evolve.
Two of the macaque species (Japanese and Barbary) had also been assessed on four subjec-
tive well-being items that measured an individual’s balance of positive and negative moods,
pleasure from social interaction, ability to achieve goals, and a global assessment of how
happy the rater would be to be the target individual. In both species the subjective well-being
items composed a single dimension. Individuals in both species who were rated as higher on
subjective well-being were also rated higher on friendliness. In Japanese macaques, subjective
well-being also correlated positively with dominance and negatively with anxiety. In Barbary
macaques, individuals higher on subjective well-being were also higher on confidence. This
was consistent with results of the relationship between subjective well-being and high ex-
traversion and low neuroticism in humans (Steel et al., 2008); high dominance, extraversion,
and agreeableness and low neuroticism in chimpanzees (King & Landau, 2003; Weiss et al.,
2009); and high extraversion and agreeableness and low neuroticism in orang-utans (Weiss et
al., 2006).
Population-level personality is sensitive to LH conditions
Theory and data suggest that an individual’s personality should be consistent with their
life history (LH) strategy for the timing of growth, reproduction, and survival (Wolf et al.,
2007; Biro & Stamps, 2008; Careau et al., 2010). Countries differ both in terms of average
personality levels (McCrae, Terracciano, & 78 Members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures
Project, 2005) and their position on the fast–slow continuum of LH (Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998;
Westendorp & Kirkwood, 1998). Average personality of a country correlates with a variety
of economic variables (McCrae, Terracciano, & 78 Members of the Personality Profiles of
Cultures Project, 2005) though what drives these patterns has yet to be explained (Allik
& McCrae, 2004). I theorized that because human personality and LH go together at the
individual level (Figueredo et al., 2005, 2007), LH differences between countries might explain
some of the differences in personality.
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I compared personality and LH data on 49 countries using average personality ratings
for men and women from two cohorts, one born circa 1960 and one born circa 1980. Coun-
tries on the slow end of the LH continuum (low fertility, long life expectancy) were higher in
openness and agreeableness. In these slow LH countries women also tended to be higher in
conscientiousness while men were on average lower in neuroticism. These patterns held even
while controlling for socioeconomic factors and resemblance between neighboring countries.
While this is suggestive, I also took the additional step of seeing whether shifts in LH led
to shifts in personality within countries. I found that as a country moved to a slower av-
erage LH strategy, both agreeableness and neuroticism increased. This indicates that there
is some adaptive developmental plasticity in personality that is sensitive to LH conditions
experienced during ontogeny.
Majority of genetic variation in orang-utan personality and subjective well-being is non-
additive
Traditional behavior genetic studies of personality using twins found an even split between
genetic and unique environment effects but little room for the shared environment (Bouchard
& Loehlin, 2001). Studies that used other types of relatives, such as parents and non-twin
siblings, in addition to twins found that the genetic variance in personality was made up of
both additive and nonadditive effects (Keller et al., 2005; Pilia et al., 2006). While additive
effects come from the main effects of genes, nonadditive genetic variance comes from inter-
actions between genes at the same locus (dominance variance) or between genes at different
loci (epistatic variance). The general factor of personality is also characterized by nonadditive
genetic variance and Rushton et al. (2008) and Figueredo and Rushton (2009) have argued
that this is consistent with ‘recent’ selection on human personality. I tested whether person-
ality of a great ape was also explained by nonadditive genetic variance by estimating the
genetic structure of of orang-utan personality and subjective well-being. This sample was
particularly well suited for estimating nonadditive genetic because it contained a mix of full
and half siblings (Lynch & Walsh, 1998; A. J. Wilson & Nussey, 2009).
I found that orang-utan personality and subjective well-being dimensions had heritabil-
ities (that is, from additive genetic variance) of about 20%. Around 40% of the phenotypic
variance, however, was explained by nonadditive genetic variance. Only around 15% of the
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variance of personality was explained by maternal or shared environmental effects, though
slightly more of the variance in subjective well-being (≈ 20%) could be explained by com-
mon environment effects, similar to findings in chimpanzees (Weiss et al., 2002). There were
no statistically significant genetic correlations between personality and subjective well-being,
though in total 15% of the additive genetic and 19% of the nonadditive genetic variance in
subjective well-being was shared with personality. Thus, a high proportion of nonadditive
genetic variance underlying personality is not unique to humans.
The biometrical model also controlled for the effects of raters on personality scores and
revealed rater effects on the intercorrelations among personality and well-being dimensions.
Specifically, while rater effects enhanced the correlations between subjective well-being and
extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, and intellect, they masked a positive phenotypic
correlation between subjective well-being and dominance.
Natural selection on personality has a genetic basis
Several studies (Eaves et al., 1990; Alvergne et al., 2010; Jokela et al., 2011) found that dif-
ferences in personality are related to differences in reproductive success suggesting that per-
sonality is under selection in contemporary populations. Because these studies looked only
at phenotypic correlations between personality and fitness, they rely on an untested assump-
tion, known as the phenotypic gambit, that the phenotypic and genetic relationships are the
same. Because selection can only have an effect on the population by differential transmission
of genes, testing this assumption is an important step in evolutionary analysis (M. B. Morris-
sey et al., 2011).
I estimated the genetic relationship between personality and fitness using a twin sample
from the US and a pedigree sample from Scotland. In the US sample, I found that reproduc-
tive success positively genetically covaried with extraversion and agreeableness. However,
the covariances, while significant, were very small compared to the phenotypic variance. Be-
cause of missing and incomplete data on reproductive success in the Scottish sample, I tested
whether there were any changes to mean breeding values over time. I found that the breed-
ing values did not change more than by chance, indicating that personality in Scotland is
either neutral with respect to fitness or under very weak selection.
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Environmental fluctuations maintain plasticity to context
The Biological Sensitivity to Context (BSC) model (Ellis et al., 2005; Ellis & Boyce, 2008) pro-
poses that differential vulnerability to detrimental effects and responsiveness to beneficial
effects of the environment is based in a U-shaped relationship between early-life stress and
reactivity of the stress response system. Individuals in very low and high stress environ-
ments develop high reactivity while individuals in moderately stressful but common envi-
ronments develop low reactivity. The fitness benefits of high and low reactivity also depend
on the environment, where individuals with low reactivity, compared with high reactivity
individuals, achieve higher fitness under moderate stress but have lower fitness in very good
environments. This model has been described in terms of developmental evolution (Ellis &
Boyce, 2008; Del Giudice et al., 2011) and I sought to formalize the model mathematically for
the purpose of understanding its evolutionary dynamics.
Using the tensor analysis framework of developmental evolution advanced by Rice (2002,
2004), I constructed a mathematical model of the BSC system where the U-shaped curve
was influenced by genetic factors controlling its position and curvature. I found that when
moderately stressful environments (under which low reactive or buffered individuals have
highest fitness) are most prevalent, selection will produce a flattening to the U-shaped re-
activity curve. The evolutionary dynamics also have the property that the curve minimum
where the lowest reactivity is achieved will track the average stress level in the early environ-
ment. Temporal fluctuations in this average level of stress will maintain genetic variability in
the shape of the curve.
7.2 Primate personality evolves, but slowly
Synthesizing the results from the empirical studies on contemporary selection, quantitative
genetics, and LH, it appears that personality in primates evolves slowly. By slow I mean
relative to physiological and dietary adaptations (Fleagle, 1999). I was able to detect a ge-
netic link between personality and fitness in one large population (the US) but not another
(Scotland). However, while the results from the US indicate that the coming generations will
be more extraverted and agreeable because of natural selection on genes underlying these
domains, the change from selection only amounts to about .01 SD per generation. Assuming
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the selection gradient remains constant, it would take several dozen generations and several
hundred years for selection to have a noticeable effect. I did not detect selection on personal-
ity in the Scottish population, but even if the change in breeding values had been statistically
significant, it too would only add up to a ≈ .02 SD change in personality over a 50-year
period.
Does this mean personality evolution is ‘over’ (Jones, 2009)? No. The results from the
US sample show that, while gradual from the point of view of a longitudinal study in psy-
chology, the psychological makeup of at least some populations is continuing to adapt to the
environment. Given the heritability of personality (Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001) and fecundity
(Pettay et al., 2005) in humans, it is likely that natural selection in other populations where it
has been detected (Eaves et al., 1990; Alvergne et al., 2010) also has a genetic basis. This slow
rate of evolution is consistent with personality structure being a human universal (McCrae,
Terracciano, & 78 Members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005) and explains
why the genetic structure of personality is also largely consistent between populations in
North America, Europe, and Asia (Yamagata et al., 2006). The dimensional structure of per-
sonality is part of “the common heritage of the human species” (McCrae, 2004, p 7) because
selection may not have resulted in much divergence between populations. When populations
are on the order of 104 or larger, as humans are, processes of random genetic drift can usu-
ally be ignored because they can be overcome by even weak selection (Hartl & Clark, 2007).
Differences in personality in human populations could therefore have small contributions
from drift and selection, and may be more attributable to gene flow via selective migration
(Camperio Ciani & Capiluppi, 2010) and adaptive plasticity to local LH conditions, as was
seen in the between generation changes in agreeableness and neuroticism across cultures.
The genetic correlation between personality and fitness in the US refutes personality being
selectively neutral (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a). The difference in results between the US and
Scottish populations may mean that the two populations are at different positions on the
fitness landscape, with the US farther from the optimum. While recent evolution has changed
a lot about us (Hawks et al., 2007) and may have resulted in lots of behavioral changes (Hrdy,
2009; Figueredo et al., 2011), evolution has left the overall structure of our personality largely
untouched. That is, while personality is adaptive, the social environment to which it is
adapted has not changed enough to radically alter personality structure. This also explains
7.2. PRIMATE PERSONALITY EVOLVES, BUT SLOWLY 215
why personality structure is largely consistent between closely related species of primates.
These species share with us the same basic problems of social living that personality functions
as an adaptation to. Both chimpanzee–human and Japanese–Assamese macaque lineages are
separated by about the same amount of evolutionary time (i.e., ≈ 6 millions years to the most
recent common ancestor, Fig. 7.1). Each species resembles its evolutionary cousin in terms of
personality traits related to social affiliation and altruism (extraversion and agreeableness for
chimpanzees and humans, friendliness for the macaques) but differ in terms of the presence
and composition of a dominance dimension. This common heritage, both in term of genetic
variation and the environment we primates are adapting to, also explains other similarities
between human and nonhuman primate personality, such as correlates with happiness and
subjective well-being (Steel et al., 2008; King & Landau, 2003; Weiss et al., 2006; Weiss, Adams,
Widdig, & Gerald, 2011) and age-related differences (McCrae et al., 2000; King et al., 2008).
Personality structure and social epigenesis
The socioecological hypothesis (Jarman, 1974; Clutton-Brock & Harvey, 1977; Sterck, Watts, &
van Schaik, 1997; Kappeler & van Schaik, 2002) proposes that patterns of social organization
should adapt readily to changes in ecological conditions. However, ecology does not explain
all aspects of macaque social organization (Ménard, 2004) and primate societies seem to show
phylogenetic signals (Thierry et al., 2000; Shultz et al., 2011) that defy unrestricted transitions
between types of social organizations.
If personality is an adaptation to the social environment, then because Barbary macaques
are thought to be closest to the ancestral social organization of macaques (Thierry et al., 2000)
their personality structure may also be the true “living fossil” (per Weiss, Adams, Widdig,
& Gerald, 2011). That the two most socially similar but not most phylogenetically related
species, rhesus and Japanese macaques, differed from the ancestral condition by not hav-
ing a separate opportunism dimension may well be a case of convergent evolution. Under
strict hierarchies, the opportunistic use of aggressive and defiant behavior is not an adaptive
niche to occupy, so these behaviors were instead selected to covary with social competence.
This story is also consistent with rhesus and Japanese macaque personality being similar
but not identical. The result may be similar functionally (the lack of an independent oppor-
tunism domain) but the ‘solution’ (a single dominance/confidence dimension in Japanese
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macaques and separate dominance and confidence dimensions in rhesus macaques) differs
because they are evolutionarily independent. The opportunism dimension may also explain
a unique feature of human personality: the lack of a clear dominance dimension (King &
Figueredo, 1997; Gosling, 2001). Opportunism resembles the negative pole of agreeableness
and in chimpanzees is a facet of dominance. Chimpanzee agreeableness is made up of items
related to the positive pole of human agreeableness. Our more egalitarian social structure
(Hrdy, 2009) may have resulted in a reversion to the ancestral personality structure, where
opportunism separates from dominance, resulting in a uniquely human agreeableness di-
mension. Personality therefore ties into the social space that individuals within a species
are able to occupy (Butovskaya, 2004; Thierry, 2004) and social structure emerges out of the
behavioral dispositions and interactions among individuals.
While these results are certainly suggestive, the independence of opportunism and dom-
inance domains should be investigated behaviorally. Given species differences in aggres-
siveness and arousal (Clarke & Boinski, 1995; Thierry, 2000), methods that can compare
personality between and within species on the same dimension would be particularly fruit-
ful (Uher, 2011b, 2011a). These results also show how, by ‘imposing’ a personality structure
on a species using a common inventory, useful hypotheses can be generated that are then
amenable to confirmation or rejection by more focused behavioral observation. Before pro-
ceeding, it would also be worthwhile to see whether the macaque personality structures I
describe replicate in new samples, as has been done with chimpanzees (King et al., 2005;
Weiss et al., 2007, 2009).
Facet level structure of personality
That personality domains may be described as evolutionary blends or divisions of more basic
dimensions (Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011, see Fig. 1.1) also suggests that evolu-
tionary studies of human personality should also start exploring lower-level facets. If facets
relate to the different fitness trade-offs for each personality domain, then we also might ex-
pect the facets to covary more strongly with reproductive success and perhaps even have
fitness effects cancel each other out when examined only on the domain level. Because the
facets of human personality dimensions hang together genetically (Yamagata et al., 2006),
correlational selection on the lower order facets could pull in different directions, causing
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overall directional selection to appear very small. In proposing fitness trade-offs for person-
ality, Nettle (2011a) also asked why these facets should vary together. Nettle suggested that
sociable, sexually motivated individuals would also need a level of activity needed to seek
out such activities. However, the risk of accident from higher activity levels would keep these
facets from covarying perfectly. A higher predation risk for diseased individuals is offered
as reason for vigilance and disease avoidance to covary as facets of neuroticism. However,
group living largely solves the problem of predation risk for primates (van Schaik & van
Hooff, 1983; Strier, 2003; Silk, 2007), making it less likely that individuals within a species
would need to vary on this trait. A more likely scenario is the interplay between predation
pressure and group size. When predation risk is high, larger groups form (R. A. Hill & Lee,
1998). More anxious individuals might then prefer to join larger groups when possible. Yet
larger groups would also entail more stress from social challenges. In macaques this trade-off
can be handled by making confidence (social fearfulness) and anxiety (“free-floating” fear-
fulness, that seems more suited to antipredator vigilance) separate dimensions. In macaques
another potential fitness tradeoff involved could be time spent allogrooming and vigilance
over infants (Maestripieri, 1993). In humans the confidence and anxiety facets have been mar-
shalled handle threats of social rejection (Denissen & Penke, 2008a). Nettle also proposed that
two facets of human agreeableness, altruism and compliance, covary together because both
are needed to enter into cooperative agreements while monitoring the intentions of the other
party. In macaques, social norms, such as they are, are established through dominance hi-
erarchies so the altruism facet works through the affiliative network that would vary as a
function of friendliness.
7.3 Behavior genetics and natural selection
One approach to understanding the evolutionary history of a trait is to see whether it is
present in closely related species. Finding that two traits, such as neuroticism and SWB, are
genetically correlated can be informative of their origins because a shared genetic basis is
the first test of whether two traits have evolved together as a set (van Oers et al., 2005) and
can thus act as further evidence that the personality-SWB nexus is ancestral in great apes.
The common genetic basis among a set of traits can be approximated as a matrix (G) whose
elements are the genetic variances of and genetic covariances between traits (S. J. Arnold,
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Bürger, Hohenlohe, Ajie, & Jones, 2008). Although in general the G matrix can not be used
to detect specific processes of evolution, as divergence in structure can be a result of both
selection and genetic drift (Pigliucci, 2006), consistency in the pattern of genetic correlations
between traits among two or more species is an indication of long-term evolutionary stability,
where the traits originated together in the common ancestor and continue to evolve as a set in
each species, even as the species diverge in other ways (S. J. Arnold et al., 2008). The general
stability of the genetic covariances among personality facets is therefore, again, an indication
that they have been coevolving together. The same applies to the common genetic basis of
subjective well-being in personality in humans (Weiss et al., 2008), chimpanzees (Weiss et
al., 2002), and orang-utans. Humans and chimpanzees were more similar in that more of the
genetic variance in subjective well-being could be accounted for by genetic factors shared with
personality, consistent with the closer phylogenetic relationship between the two species.
Similarly, the genetic covariance of extraversion and agreeableness in orang-utans could be a
remnant of incomplete separation of an ancestral friendliness dimension. An examination of
the G matrix alone, however, does not reveal the causal relationship between two variables.
For example, the genetic correlation between personality and SWB might be a consequnces of
personality differences leading to differences in SWB. Data on the development of personality
and SWB could be used to test alternative causal explanations.
The lack of divergence in personality structure across cultures is not to say that there will
not be between-population variation in the frequencies of genes underlying personality. For
example, frequency of variants in the dopamine D4 receptor differs between human popu-
lations (Chang et al., 1996). Even when selection pressures are the same (or at least varying
within the same general parameter space), new mutations only arise in one place. Thus,
even if the genetic structure of personality is the same across populations, the actual alleles
contributing to genetic variances may differ. Such variation makes it difficult to replicate
genome-wide association results because these different variants will be tagged by different
sets of SNPs (Miller, 2011).
Nonadditive genetic variance indicates long-term, not recent, selection
Rushton et al. (2008) and Figueredo and Rushton (2009) state repeatedly, though without
spelling out the logic, that the large proportion of nonadditive genetic variance for the gen-
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eral factor of personality is consistent with “recent” selection. It is not. Because the additive
effects of a gene will influence a trait and fitness independent of genetic background, an
allele that acts additively is more directly exposed to selection because it does not have any
interactions to hide behind. For example, in a dominance interaction, a recessive allele at
frequency p will only be exposed to selection in the p2 fraction of individuals who are ho-
mozygous recessive. Selection will thus erode nonadditive genetic more slowly than additive
genetic variance (Crnokrak & Roff, 1995; Merilä & Sheldon, 1999; Stirling et al., 2002). Most
genetic variance is additive (W. G. Hill, Goddard, & Visscher, 2008). If a selection pressure
is recent, then, the expectation is that additive genetic variance will still be higher than non-
additive variance because there would not have been sufficient time to reduce the genetic
variance at all. If the selection pressure persists for a long time, the proportion of additive
genetic variance will drop below that of the nonadditive genetic variance. A high propor-
tion of nonadditive genetic variance in both human and orang-utan personality is therefore
consistent with long-term selection in both species. A study of exploration and boldness in
great tits also found an effect of nonadditive genetic variance (van Oers et al., 2004) and some
behaviors in fruit flies are also characterized by large proportions of epistasis (Sambandan,
Yamamoto, Fanara, Mackay, & Anholt, November 2006). One possible scenario is that fluctu-
ating selection pressure erodes additive genetic variance but changes before there is sufficient
time to reduce the nonadditive genetic variance. Evolution thus appears to shape personality
traits be affected by epistatic and dominance interactions.
The high proportion of nonadditive genetic variance in personality may also be informa-
tive of the fitness effects of the underlying genes. W. G. Hill et al. (2008) found that both
data and theory point to additive genetic effects explaining most of the genetic variance in
complex traits. The main reason is that, as most alleles are extremely rare, their combinations
with other alleles to create dominance or epistatic interactions will be rarer still. Summa-
rizing data on MZ/DZ correlations for 86 phenotypes, W. G. Hill et al. (2008) found that
the MZ correlations were on average less than twice the DZ correlations indicating mostly
additive genetic variance underlying these traits. However, the summarized data included
morphological traits as well, so the VA > VNA rule might not apply to every category of trait.
A theoretical model indicated that high VNA should be expected under selection when the al-
lele with highest fitness is dominant or when only one genotype combination has low fitness
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and the rest have equal fitness (W. G. Hill et al., 2008). Estimating the frequencies of alle-
les influencing personality can be used to determine their likely fitness effects (Eyre-Walker,
2010; Keightley & Eyre-Walker, 2010). The strength of selection against an allele determines
its frequency with more deleterious alleles found at lower frequencies. The amount of vari-
ance contributed by an allele also scales with its effect on both the phenotype and fitness, as
alleles with stronger effects entail higher selection coefficients. Only alleles under very weak
selection can get to frequencies over the minor allele threshold used in association studies
but the entire frequency spectrum of the alleles influencing the trait and fitness can be used
to infer the mean strength of selection (Eyre-Walker, 2010). Evolutionary-minded behavior
geneticists should therefore pay attention to minor alleles rather than discarding them.
Plausible genetic mechanism underlying phylogenetic patterning
The phylogenetic patterns of blending basic personality dimensions into higher-level dimen-
sions suggests that the basic dimensions can be shaped by evolution to start and stop co-
varying. How might this work? Developmental genetics has recently uncovered genetic loci
that function to affect the covariation among different traits (Cheverud, 2001; Pavlicev et al.,
2008). These relationship quantitative trait loci (rQTL) modify the correlations between traits
by regulating the expression of epistatic interactions between genes affecting each trait. When
the rQTL is ‘off’, the expression levels of the two traits would be able to vary independently.
When the rQTL is ‘on’, the gene expression levels are linked. A hypothetical example of
such covariance regulation are limb lengths in quadrapedal versus bipedal animals (Pavlicev,
Cheverud, & Wagner, 2011). In quadrapeds, the lengths of the forelimbs and hindlimbs cor-
relate more highly whereas in many primates or other species with specialized forelimbs,
such as bats, the correlation is lower. Personality facets, dimensions, and higher order fac-
tors could presumably operate the same way if individuals in a species share the rQTL but
vary on the underlying genes that are being co-regulated. A population genetic model ex-
ploring the evolution of rQTL revealed that when directional selection acted to make traits
correlate together via rQTL, new genetic variance in the trait was generated (Pavlicev et al.,
2011). Thus, the coordination of multiple behavioral dispositions as behavioral syndromes or
personality dimensions could help maintain genetic variation in the whole trait.
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7.4 Retooling evolutionary and comparative approaches to personality
I agree with Miller’s (2011, p. 377) call to begin “re-tooling” evolutionary psychology by
making greater use of specific analytic techniques from evolutionary biology to understand
the ultimate origins of personality. I have attempted to show how the integration of com-
parative psychology and evolutionary behavior genetics can answer some of these ques-
tions. While evolutionary genetics and theoretical biology offer methods such as making
genetically-informed assessments of selection gradients (M. B. Morrissey et al., 2011) or rig-
orous frameworks for building models of developmental evolution (Rice, 2004), comparing
our personality to that of nonhuman animals gives us an idea of what sorts of evolutionary
time frames are needed to understand where and when psychological diversity arose and
how quickly it changes (Gosling & Graybeal, 2007). Timing is everything. The number of
generations of evolutionary change under consideration determines the relative magnitude
of effects that selection, mutation, random drift, and migration can have on a trait (Hartl &
Clark, 2007, and see Chap. 1).
One way to reconcile contemporary selection on personality with species-level stability
(for even the small changes detected would add up to a lot over thousands of generations)
is that personality may be an adaptation to an environment that is unstable on a generation-
by-generation basis but that is relatively consistent over the longer term. That is, the overall
adaptive problems remain the same even if the fitness optimum is constantly changing. Per-
sonality is both the adaptation and the environment to which it is adapted. The ways that
behaviors vary due to selection appears to be largely conserved even as species-typical be-
havior changes signifcanty.
My research has relied primarily on trait psychology. McCrae (2009) described this ap-
proach as analogous to physics. The goal is to seek the high-level regularities in personality
dimensions. Cross species comparisons are therefore very valuable to this enterprise because
they show how principles of human personality structure might generalize and where, ulti-
mately, they came from. A chemistry based approach, which places behavior in its context,
is complementary and will be useful for understanding how personality dispositions lead to
fitness differences and how the adaptive environment for personality is constructed out of
interactions between individuals. This context-sensitive approach is already represented in
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animal personality research by behavioral repertoire (Uher, 2008a) and behavioral syndrome
(Sih, Bell, Johnson, & Ziemba, 2004) methods. A combined approach is the best way forward
(Weiss & Adams, in press). Everything I have written here and the analytical approaches I
have used can be applied equally to study the evolution of other individual differences such
as intelligence and psychopathology. Nonhuman primates also show individual differences
in general intelligence (Banerjee et al., 2009; Herrmann, Hernández-Lloreda, Call, Hare, &
Tomasello, 2010) and psychopathology (Lilienfeld et al., 1999; Brüne et al., 2006).
A recent collected volume on the evolution of individual differences (D. M. Buss & Haw-
ley, 2011) devoted considerable attention to evolutionary quantitative genetics and to demon-
strating the untenability of neutral models when applied to the evolution of psychological
traits, concluding that evolutionary processes will have shaped our psychological makeup
considerably since the Holocene (Gangestad, 2011; Keller et al., 2011; Miller, 2011; Penke,
2011). These essays, however, make little mention of our shared evolutionary heritage with
nonhuman primates.1 We must keep in mind that psychological evolution happened before
the Holocene as well (Gosling & Graybeal, 2007). The similarity in human and nonhuman
primate personality and our phylogenetically shared genetic bases of behavior and social
organization means that other primate species will serve as good models for the evolution
of human personality. Convergent evolution in distantly related taxa with complex social
life such as cetaceans and corvids will be equally informative. We may therefore be able to
discover general principles about the evolution of personality structure in big-brained, long-
lived, gregarious species by taking a comparative approach and asking How else could our
personalities have ended up?
1The words primate, monkey, chimpanzee, and rhesus macaque do not appear in the index. Within the text, these
terms appear sporadically in reference to the serotonin transporter, comparative genomics, and dominance hierar-







The following are a list of custom R functions developed during the course of this research.
A.1 AIC-weighted average
The following function takes as its input a list of lmer models and returns AIC-weighted
averages of each fixed-effect parameter estimate. This function is used in model averaging in
Chapter 3.
weight.by.aic <- function(...) {
# Given lmer models as the argument
# return a table of fixed coefficient
# estimates that are the AIC weighted
# average of each model
args <- list(...)
# gather AICs and parameter names
parameters <- c()
AICs <- c()
for(model in args) {
parameters <- c(parameters, names(model@fixef))
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AICs <- c(AICs, summary(model)@AICtab$AIC)
}
parameters <- unique(parameters)
# calculate Akaike weights
# delta AIC = diff between best model
min.AIC <- min(AICs)
delta.AICs <- AICs - min.AIC
# relative likelihood = e^(-0.5 * dAIC)
relative.lik <- exp(-0.5 * delta.AICs)
AICweights <- relative.lik / sum(relative.lik)
the.coefficients <- c()
# gather the coefficients together
for(model in args) {
# coefs are 0 if they are not included in this model
unweighted.coefs <- matrix(0, nrow=length(parameters))
# name a row for each parameter
rownames(unweighted.coefs) <- parameters
# stuff the parameters the model did include
# into the right rows
unweighted.coefs[names(model@fixef),] <- model@fixef
the.coefficients <- cbind(the.coefficients, unweighted.coefs)
}
# matrix * vector performs column-wise
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weighted.coefs <- rowSums(t(t(the.coefficients) * AICweights))
return(weighted.coefs)
}
A.2 Dominance relationship matrix
These functions calculate the dominance relationship matrix D and its inverse D−1 given
a standard pedigree data frame. The D matrix contains pairwise coefficients of fraternity
between all individuals. An individual’s coefficient of fraternity with themselves is 1, so
the diagonal elements are Dii = 1. Given the additive genetic relationship matrix A, the





where g and h are i’s parents and k and l are j’s parents.
The function dominanceRelationship calculates the D. The convenience function inverseD
will return the inverse matrix as this is what is fed into MCMCglmm as the design matrix.
library(pedantics)
library(MCMCglmm)
dominanceRelationship <- function(ped) {
ped <- fixPedigree(ped)
# coefficients of relatedness
# check that pedigree has dams and sires
if (all(is.na(ped[, 2])) & all(is.na(ped[, 3]))) {
# if not, A matrix is an identity matrix
A <- diag(dim(ped)[1])
dimnames(A) <- list(ped$id, ped$id)
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} else {
# otherwise make it quickly from the A^-1 matrix
Ainv <- inverseA(ped)$Ainv








# make pedigree easy to index




if(n > 1) { # only need off diagonal elements
# if there are >= 2 individuals
for(i_ in 2:n) {
for(j_ in 1:(i_ - 1)) {
i = ids[i_]
j = ids[j_]
# parents of i
g = ped[i,’dam’]
h = ped[i,’sire’]
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# parents of j
k = ped[j,’dam’]
l = ped[j,’sire’]
if(is.na(g) || is.na(k)) { Agk = 0} else { Agk = A[g,k] }
if(is.na(h) || is.na(l)) { Ahl = 0} else { Ahl = A[h,l] }
if(is.na(g) || is.na(l)) { Agl = 0} else { Agl = A[g,l] }
if(is.na(h) || is.na(k)) { Ahk = 0} else { Ahk = A[h,k] }






inverseD <- function(ped) {
Dij <- dominanceRelationship(ped)
Dinv <- Matrix(solve(Dij), sparse=TRUE)
return(Dinv)
}
A.3 Intraclass correlation coefficients
Calculates ICC(3, 1) and ICC(3, k) (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). See Chapter 2. The function item
reliabilities takes a data.frame of scores indexed by named subject and judge columns. ICCs
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are calculated for each column named in item.names.
# calculated per Shrout & Fleiss Psychol. Bul. 1979
icc31 <- function(BMS, EMS, k) {
(BMS - EMS)/(BMS + (k - 1) * EMS)
}
icc3k <- function(BMS, EMS) {
(BMS - EMS)/BMS
}
# Input a data.frame of individually judged, personality scores
# with a list of quoted item column names for each monkey, including
# monkey and rater name as columns
icc3.reliability <- function(.data, item.names, subject, judge) {
icc.31s <- c();
icc.3ks <- c();






k <- mean(tapply(rep(1, length(monkeys)), monkeys, sum));
BMS <- anova.Factor[1,3]
EMS <- anova.Factor[3,3]
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icc.31s <- c(icc.31s, icc31(BMS, EMS, k=k));





Targeted Procrustes rotation takes a matrix of loadings from a factor analysis and rotates it to
a target with the same number of loadings (McCrae, Zonderman, Costa, Bond, & Paunonen,
1996). The returned output shows the rotated loadings. The last row and last column of the
output give the component and item congruence coefficients.
This code was modified from SAS code by McCrae et al. (1996) and developed for the
analysis conducted by Weiss et al. (2012). It was used during an exploratory analysis of data
presented in Chapter 2.
unit.weight <- function(Loadings) {
rows <- length(Loadings[,1])
# unweigted loadings of +1, 0, -1
for (i in 1:rows) {
# replace the max of each row with 1
len <- length(Loadings[1,])
row <- Loadings[i,][1:len]
where.maximum <- abs(row) >= max(abs(row));
salient.loading <- row[where.maximum][1];
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if(salient.loading > 0) {
fill <- 1;










ssq <- function(V) {
sum(V^2);
}
# Based on SAS code from
# MCCRAE et al. Evaluating replicability of factors in the revised NEO
# Personality Inventory: Confirmatory factor analysis versus Procrustes
# rotation. J Pers Soc Psychol. (1996). vol. 70. pp 552-566.
# loadings: factor loadings for a varimax matrix
# norm: loadings for the target matrix
# weight "unit" or "none". Unit weight the loadings before applying
# the rotation
#
# Last column and last row of the result gives variable and
# factor congruences.
procrustes <- function(loadings, norm, weight="none") {
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S <- t(loadings) %*% norm;
W <- eigen(S %*% t(S))$vectors;
V <- eigen(t(S) %*% S)$vectors;
O <- t(W) %*% S %*% V;
K <- diag(diag(sign(O)));
WW <- W %*% K;
T <- WW %*% t(V);
procrust <- loadings %*% T;
#congruence coeffcients
# A
norm.diag.root <- sqrt(diag(t(norm) %*% norm));
A <- matrix(norm.diag.root, ncol=1);
#B
procrust.diag.root <- sqrt(diag(t(procrust) %*% procrust));
B <- matrix(procrust.diag.root, ncol=1)
# C
norm.procrust.diag <- diag((t(norm) %*% procrust) / (A %*% t(B)));
C <- matrix(norm.procrust.diag, ncol=1)
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# D
D <- matrix(sqrt(diag(norm %*% t(norm))), ncol=1)
E <- matrix(sqrt(diag(procrust %*% t(procrust))), ncol=1)
congruence = diag((norm %*% t(procrust))/(D %*% t(E)));
factor.congruence = sum(norm * procrust)/sqrt((ssq(norm)) *
(ssq(procrust)));






Instructions and items for the Hominoid Personality Questionnaire and the Subjective Well-
being Questionnaire.
B.1 Monkey personality trait assessment
Instructions
Monkey personality assessments can be made with this questionnaire by assigning a numer-
ical score for all of the personality traits listed on the following pages. Make your judgments
on the basis of your own understanding of the trait guided by the short clarifying defini-
tion following each trait. The monkey’s own behaviors and interactions with other monkeys
should be the basis for your numerical ratings. Use your own subjective judgment of typical
monkey behavior to decide if the monkey you are scoring is above, below, or average for a
trait. The following seven point scale should be used to make your ratings.
1. Displays either total absence or negligible amounts of the trait.
2. Displays small amounts of the trait on infrequent occasions.
3. Displays somewhat less than average amounts of the trait.
4. Displays about average amounts of the trait.
5. Displays somewhat greater than average amounts of the trait.
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6. Displays considerable amounts of the trait on frequent occasions.
7. Displays extremely large amounts of the trait.
Please give a rating for each trait even if your judgment seems to be based on a purely
subjective impression of the monkey and you are somewhat unsure about it. Indicate your
rating by placing a cross in the box underneath the chosen number.
Finally, do not discuss your rating of any particular monkey with anyone else. As ex-
plained in the handout accompanying this questionnaire, this restriction is necessary in order
to obtain valid reliability coefficients for the traits.
Items
1. FEARFUL Subject reacts excessively to real or imagined threats by displaying behaviors
such as screaming, grimacing, running away or other signs of anxiety or distress.
2. DOMINANT Subject is able to displace, threaten, or take food from other monkeys.
Or subject may express high status by decisively intervening in social interactions.
3. PERSISTENT Subject tends to continue in a course of action, task, or strategy for a
long time or continues despite opposition from other monkeys.
4. CAUTIOUS Subject often seems attentive to possible harm or danger from its actions.
5. STABLE Subject reacts to its environment including the behavior of other monkeys in
a calm, equable, way. Subject is not easily upset by the behaviors of other monkeys.
6. AUTISTIC Subject often displays repeated, continuous, and stereotyped behaviors such
as rocking or self clasping.
7. CURIOUS Subject has a desire to see or know about objects, devices, or other monkeys.
This includes a desire to know about the affairs of other monkeys that do not directly
concern the subject.
8. THOUGHTLESS Subject often behaves in a way that seems imprudent or forgetful.
9. STINGY/GREEDY Subject is excessively desirous or covetous of food, favored loca-
tions, or other resources. Subject is unwilling to share these resources with others.
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10. JEALOUS Subject is often troubled by others who are in a desirable or advantageous
situation such as having food, a choice location, or access to social groups. Subject may
attempt to disrupt activities of advantaged monkeys.
11. INDIVIDUALISTIC Subject’s behavior stands out compared to that of the other indi-
viduals in the group. This does not mean that it does not fit or is incompatible with the
group.
12. RECKLESS Subject is rash or unconcerned about the consequences of its behaviors.
13. SOCIABLE Subject seeks and enjoys the company of other monkeys and engages in
amicable, affable, interactions with them.
14. DISTRACTIBLE Subject is easily distracted and has a short attention span.
15. TIMID Subject lacks self confidence, is easily alarmed and is hesitant to venture into
new social or non-social situations.
16. SYMPATHETIC Subject seems to be considerate and kind towards others as if sharing
their feelings or trying to provide reassurance.
17. PLAYFUL Subject is eager to engage in lively, vigorous, sportive, or acrobatic behaviors
with or without other monkeys.
18. SOLITARY Subject prefers to spend considerable time alone not seeking or avoiding
contact with other monkeys.
19. VULNERABLE Subject is prone to be physically or emotionally hurt as a result of
dominance displays, highly assertive behavior, aggression, or attack by another monkey.
20. INNOVATIVE Subject engages in new or different behaviors that may involve the use
of objects or materials or ways of interacting with others.
21. ACTIVE Subject spends little time idle and seems motivated to spend considerable
time either moving around or engaging in some overt, energetic behavior.
22. HELPFUL Subject is willing to assist, accommodate, or cooperate with other monkeys.
23. BULLYING Subject is overbearing and intimidating towards younger or lower ranking
monkeys.
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24. AGGRESSIVE Subject often initiates fights or other menacing and agonistic encounters
with other monkeys.
25. MANIPULATIVE Subject is adept at forming social relationships for its own advantage,
especially using alliances and friendships to increase its social standing. Monkey seems
able and willing to use others.
26. GENTLE Subject responds to others in an easy-going, kind, and considerate manner.
27. AFFECTIONATE Subject seems to have a warm attachment or closeness with other
monkeys. This may entail frequently grooming, touching, embracing, or lying next to
others.
28. EXCITABLE Subject is easily aroused to an emotional state. Subject becomes highly
aroused by situations that would cause less arousal in most monkeys.
29. IMPULSIVE Subject often displays some spontaneous or sudden behavior that could
not have been anticipated. There often seems to be some emotional reason behind the
sudden behavior.
30. INQUISITIVE Subject seems drawn to new situations, objects, or animals. Subject
behaves as if it wishes to learn more about other monkeys, objects, or persons within
its view.
31. SUBMISSIVE Subject often gives in or yields to another monkey. Subject acts as if it is
subordinate or of lower rank than other monkeys.
32. COOL Subject seems unaffected by emotions and is usually undisturbed, assured, and
calm.
33. DEPENDENT/FOLLOWER Subject often relies on other monkeys for leadership, reas-
surance, touching, embracing and other forms of social support.
34. IRRITABLE Subject often seems in a bad mood or is impatient and easily provoked to
anger exasperation and consequent agonistic behavior.
35. UNPERCEPTIVE Subject is slow to respond or understand moods, dispositions, or
behaviors of others.
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36. PREDICTABLE Subject’s behavior is consistent and steady over extended periods of
time. Subject does little that is unexpected or deviates from its usual behavioral routine.
37. DECISIVE Subject is deliberate, determined, and purposeful in its activities.
38. DEPRESSED Subject does not seek out social interactions with others and often fails
to respond to social interactions of other monkeys. Subject often appears isolated,
withdrawn, sullen, brooding, and has reduced activity.
39. CONVENTIONAL Subject seems to lack spontaneity or originality. Subject behaves in
a consistent manner from day to day and stays well within the social rules of the group.
40. SENSITIVE Subject is able to understand or read the mood, disposition, feelings, or
intentions of other monkeys often on the basis of subtle, minimal cues.
41. DEFIANT Subject is assertive or contentious in a way inconsistent with the usual
dominance order. Subject maintains these actions despite unfavorable consequences
or threats from others.
42. INTELLIGENT Subject is quick and accurate in judging and comprehending both so-
cial and non-social situations. Subject is perceptive and discerning about social rela-
tionships.
43. PROTECTIVE Subject shows concern for other monkeys and often intervenes to pre-
vent harm or annoyance from coming to them.
44. QUITTING Subject readily stops or gives up activities that have recently been started.
45. INVENTIVE Subject is more likely than others to do new things including novel social
or non-social behaviors. Novel behavior may also include new ways of using devices
or materials.
46. CLUMSY Subject is relatively awkward or uncoordinated during movements including
but not limited to walking, acrobatics, and play.
47. ERRATIC Subject is inconsistent, indefinite, and widely varying in its behavior and
moods.
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48. FRIENDLY Subject often seeks out contact with other monkeys for amiable, genial
activities. Subject infrequently initiates hostile behaviors towards other monkeys.
49. ANXIOUS Subject often seems distressed, troubled, or is in a state of uncertainty.
50. LAZY Subject is relatively inactive, indolent, or slow moving and avoids energetic ac-
tivities.
51. DISORGANIZED Subject is scatterbrained, sloppy, or haphazard in its behavior as if
not following a consistent goal.
52. UNEMOTIONAL Subject is relatively placid and unlikely to become aroused, upset,
happy, or sad.
53. IMITATIVE Subject often mimics, or copies behaviors that it has observed in other
monkeys.
54. INDEPENDENT Subject is individualistic and determines its own course of action
without control or interference from other monkeys.
B.2 Assessment of subjective well-being in monkeys
Instructions
This questionnaire has four questions, all relating to the subjective well-being of the monkeys
at your site. Each question asks about a different personality dimension or trait relating to
subjective well-being. The following scale should be used to make your ratings.
1. Displays either total absence or negligible amounts of the trait or state.
2. Displays small amounts of the trait on infrequent occasions.
3. Displays somewhat less than average amounts of the trait.
4. Displays about average amounts of the trait.
5. Displays somewhat greater than average amounts of the trait.
6. Displays considerable amounts of the trait on frequent occasions.
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7. Displays extremely large amounts of the trait.
Please give a rating for each item even if your judgment seems to be based on a purely
subjective impression of the monkey and you are somewhat unsure about it. Indicate your
rating by placing a cross in the box underneath the chosen number. Finally, do not discuss
your rating of any particular monkey with anyone else. As explained in the handout ac-
companying this questionnaire, this restriction is necessary in order to obtain valid reliability
coefficients for the traits.
Items
1. MOODS Estimate the amount of time the monkey is happy, contented, enjoying itself,
or otherwise in a positive mood. Assume that at other times the monkey is unhappy,
bored, frightened, or otherwise in a negative mood.
2. SOCIAL Estimate the extent to which social interactions with other monkeys is not the
number of social interactions that should be estimated, but the extent to which social
interactions that do occur are a positive experience for the monkey. Use as many social
interactions that you can recall as a basis for your judgment.
3. GOALS Estimate, for this monkey, the extent to which it is effective or successful in
achieving its goals or wishes. Examples of goals would be achieving desired locations,
devices, or materials in the environment. Keep in mind that each monkey will presum-
ably have its own set of goals that may be different from other monkeys.
4. BE Imagine how happy you would be if you were that monkey for a week. You would
be exactly like that monkey. You would behave the same way as that monkey, would
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Abstract The heritability of human personality is well-
established. Recent research indicates that nonadditive
genetic effects, such as dominance and epistasis, play a
large role in personality variation. One possible explana-
tion for the latter finding is that there has been recent
selection on human personality. To test this possibility, we
estimated additive and nonadditive genetic variance in
personality and subjective well-being of zoo-housed
orangutans. More than half of the genetic variance in these
traits could be attributed to nonadditive genetic effects,
modeled as dominance. Subjective well-being had genetic
overlap with personality, though less so than has been
found in humans or chimpanzees. Since a large portion of
nonadditive genetic variance in personality is not unique to
humans, the nonadditivity of human personality is not
sufficient evidence for recent selection of personality in
humans. Nonadditive genetic variance may be a general
feature of the genetic structure of personality in primates
and other animals.
Keywords Heritability ! Dominance genetic variance !
Animal model ! Nonhuman primate ! Evolutionary
psychology ! Happiness
Introduction
Quantitative genetic studies of human personality traits such
as those described by the Five-Factor Model (Digman 1990)
show that the additive effects of genes influence personality
variation and structure (Bouchard and Loehlin 2001). In
addition, extended family designs found that nonadditive
genetic effects account for over twice as much personality
variance as additive genetic effects (Eaves et al. 1998; Keller
et al. 2005; Pilia et al. 2006). Additive genetic variance
comes from the independent effects of genes and is thereby
erodedmore efficiently by selection than nonadditive effects
which arise from combinations of genes (Crnokrak and Roff
1995; Merilä and Sheldon 1999). High nonadditive genetic
variance is therefore one sign of long-term directional or
stabilizing selection. While the presence of nonadditive
genetic effects on personality is consistent with balancing
selection on personality (Penke et al. 2007) or with joint
directional selection for personality and life-history traits
(Figueredo and Rushton 2009), the ratio of additive to non-
additive genetic variance alone is not a strong test of par-
ticular evolutionary mechanisms (Keller 2007).
A complementary approach to understanding a trait’s
evolutionary history is to see whether it exists in closely
related species. This is because the most parsimonious
explanation for species similarity is that the trait is ancestral,
i.e., existed in a common ancestor, while the most parsi-
monious explanation for species differences is that they are
the product of evolutionary divergence (Gosling and
Graybeal 2007). Studies of nonhuman primate personality
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reveal dimensions akin to some or all of the Five-Factor
Model domains and one or two dimensions not typically
identified in humans, the most prominent being labeled
‘‘Dominance’’ or ‘‘Confidence’’, which describe individual
differences in competitive prowess (Freeman and Gosling
2010).
Chimpanzees are one of humans’ closest living relatives,
sharing a common ancestor as recently as 4million years ago
(Hobolth et al. 2007) and, like humans, are highly gregarious
(Goodall 1986). Given these facts, it should not be surprising
that, alongside a Dominance dimension, chimpanzees pos-
sess five personality dimensions resembling the human Five-
Factor Model (King and Figueredo 1997). One study found
that chimpanzee Dominance is substantially heritable in the
narrow-sense (Weiss et al. 2000), suggesting that genetic
influences may underlie the personalities of chimpanzees
and possibly other great apes.
Humans and chimpanzees shared a more distant ances-
tor approximately 15 million years ago (Purvis 1995) with
orangutans, a semi-solitary great ape species (Galdikas
1985). Orangutans’ greater evolutionary distance from
humans and chimpanzees and their lower levels of sociality
would lead one to expect behavioral differences that are
manifested in their personalities. This is, in fact, what is
found. Orangutans possess five personality dimensions:
three (Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Agreeableness)
resemble like-named dimensions in humans and chimpan-
zees; one (Dominance) is a narrower version of its chim-
panzee namesake; and one (Intellect) which resembles a
combination of high Openness and high Conscientiousness,
is a species-specific dimension (Weiss et al. 2006).
Another trait whose evolutionary history can be exam-
ined via cross-species comparisons is happiness or sub-
jective well-being. In humans, subjective well-being refers
to long-term pleasant and unpleasant affect as well as
global satisfaction with one’s life (Diener et al. 1999). Far
from being the consequences of one’s fortunes, subjective
well-being is prospectively related to positive outcomes
(Diener and Chan 2011; Lyubomirsky et al. 2005) and, like
personality, is influenced by additive and nonadditive
genetic variation (Bartels and Boomsma 2009; Caprara
et al. 2009; Lykken and Tellegen 1996; Nes et al. 2006,
2010). One possible explanation for this is that subjective
well-being is closely tied to personality; people lower in
Neuroticism, higher in Extraversion, and higher in Agree-
ableness are generally happier (DeNeve and Cooper 1998).
Moreover, these relationships appear to reflect genetic
overlap as subjective well-being has a negative genetic
correlation with Neuroticism and a positive genetic corre-
lation with Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and Agree-
ableness (Weiss et al. 2008).
Chimpanzees (King and Landau 2003; Weiss et al.
2009) and orangutans (Weiss et al. 2006) also display
individual differences in subjective well-being. As chim-
panzee and orangutan subjective well-being is assessed by
observers, it is not ‘‘subjective’’ in the human sense, i.e.,
individuals’ reports of their own happiness and life satis-
faction (Diener et al. 1999). However, the term is appro-
priate since the ratings capture normal variation in overall
mood or affect as opposed to physical health or well-being
that is not an individual difference, such as through envi-
ronmental enrichment applied to an entire captive enclo-
sure (King and Landau 2003; Weiss et al. 2006).
Beyond the face validity of the subjective well-being
scale used in these studies, there is evidence that observer
ratings of chimpanzee and orangutan subjective well-being
tap the same underlying construct as human self-reports.
For example, lower Neuroticism, higher Extraversion, and
higher Agreeableness translate into higher chimpanzee and
orangutan subjective well-being (King and Landau 2003;
Weiss et al. 2006, 2009), a result similar to that in humans
(DeNeve and Cooper 1998; Steel et al. 2008). In addition,
orangutan subjective well-being is prospectively related to
longevity (Weiss et al. 2011a). Finally, approximately 40
% of chimpanzee subjective well-being variance is heri-
table in the narrow-sense and these additive genetic effects
overlap with those that contribute to individual differences
in Dominance (Weiss et al. 2002).
Studying chimpanzees and humans alone does not allow
one to determine how much of the common genetic com-
ponents of the relationship between personality and sub-
jective well-being are shared with a common ancestor. This
is because the existing findings do not rule out the possi-
bility that the genetic nexus underlying the personality-
subjective well-being correlations arose independently in
these species as, for example, an adaptation to social
environments where encounters with other individuals are
frequent. As a semi-solitary species closely related to
humans and chimpanzees, the presence or absence of a
similar genetic structure between personality and sub-
jective well-being in orangutans can be used as evidence to
differentiate between those features that are ancestral and
those that are derived. Therefore, for the present study, we
will explore the quantitative genetic structure of person-
ality and subjective well-being in orangutans that have
been rated on reliable and well-validated personality and
subjective well-being questionnaires (Weiss et al. 2006).
We relied on these questionnaires because they allowed us
to obtain the large sample size required for accurate heri-
tability estimates. The present study will enable us to
determine whether nonadditive genetic variance underlies
personality and subjective well-being variance in another
primate species and whether the genetic basis of subjective
well-being is a unique feature of chimpanzees and humans.
If a large proportion of the genetic variance in orangutan
personality can be attributed to nonadditive effects, it
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would support the idea that similar evolutionary processes
maintain variation in personality across primate species.
Alternatively, if nonadditive effects are absent or small in
orangutans relative to additive genetic variance, then this
would make selection or other evolutionary processes
unique to the hominid lineage a more likely explanation for
the genetic structure of human personality.
Method
Participants and pedigree
Subjects were 54 Bornean (Pongo pygmaeus), 100 Suma-
tran (Pongo abelii), and 30 hybrid orangutans housed
across 42 zoological parks in the United States, Canada,
Australia, and Singapore. Each zoo held between 1 and 22
orangutans (mean = 4.3, mode = 3). There were 109
females and 75 males (mean age = 21.6, SD = 12.1). Of
these orangutans, 152 participated in a previous study of
personality (Weiss et al. 2006) while ratings on the addi-
tional 32 orangutans, from zoos in Australia and Singapore,
were new to this study.
The orangutans were connected across zoos through an
extended pedigree containing 358 individuals and encom-
passing up to four generations. Both the mother and father
were known for 158 of the subjects. Only the mother was
known for 27 subjects and only the father for one subject.
Among the genetically informative individuals contribut-
ing to estimates of quantitative genetic parameters there
were 50 full sibships and 134 half sibships. The pedigree
also contained two inbred individuals.
Personality and subjective well-being
Orangutan personality consists of five dimensions: Extra-
version, Dominance, Neuroticism, Agreeableness, and
Intellect (Weiss et al. 2006) defined by the intercorrelations
among items describing orangutan personality. Extraver-
sion captures differences in interpersonal traits and is
defined by items such as playful, not solitary, and social
but differs from human and chimpanzee Extraversion by
also including aspects of Openness, such as inquisitive.
Dominance, as in chimpanzees, is defined by traits related
to dominance and submissive behaviours and traits similar
to the negative pole of human Agreeableness, such as
manipulative and aggressive. Neuroticism is made up of
traits similar to human Neuroticism such as anxious, not
stable, and impulsive. Agreeableness was similar to the
identically named dimension in chimpanzees and is defined
by items related only to the positive pole of human
Agreeableness, such as sympathetic and protective. Finally,
Intellect was made up of items similar to both human
Conscientiousness (decisive, not disorganized) and Open-
ness (intelligent).
Personality was measured by ratings of each individual
provided by 113 zoo employees who worked regularly with
the orangutans and who did not receive training on mea-
suring personality. Each orangutan was rated by between 1
and 7 raters (mean = 2.6). Personality ratings were made
on one of three versions of the same questionnaire: 137
subjects were rated on the 48-item Orangutan Personality
Questionnaire (OPQ, Weiss et al. 2006), 37 subjects were
rated on the expanded 54-item Hominoid Personality
Questionnaire (HPQ, Weiss et al. 2009), and 10 subjects
were rated on an earlier, 43-item version of the OPQ that
was based on the Chimpanzee Personality Questionnaire
(King and Figueredo 1997). Each item on these question-
naires consisted of an adjectival descriptor and one to three
sentences clarifying the adjective in term of orangutan
behavior. For example, active was defined as ‘‘Subject
spends little time idle and seems motivated to spend con-
siderable time either moving around or engaging in some
overt, energetic behavior.’’ Ratings were made on a 7 point
scale. Across all raters and subjects the data contained
20,446 personality item scores.
Subjective well-being was assessed in 164 orangutans
by ratings on four items: their balance of positive and
negative moods, the degree to which they enjoyed social
interactions, their ability to achieve goals, and by asking
raters to indicate how happy they would be if they were the
target orangutan for a week. The items were identical to
those used to assess chimpanzee subjective well-being in
prior studies (King and Landau 2003; Weiss et al. 2009). In
total there were 1,578 subjective well-being item scores
included in the analysis.1
Assessing personality in nonhuman primates using rat-
ings such as these sometimes arouses skepticism (Uher
2008a, b). However, multiple studies in great apes and Old
World monkeys support the reliability and validity of such
ratings (see review by Freeman and Gosling 2010). For
instance, there is moderate to high agreement among raters
(King and Figueredo 1997; King and Landau 2003; Uher
and Asendorpf 2008; Weiss et al. 2006) and ratings are
stable over time (Capitanio 1999; King et al. 2008;
Stevenson-Hinde et al. 1980; Uher and Asendorpf 2008;
Weiss et al. 2011b). In addition, the personality structure
derived from chimpanzee personality ratings replicated in
three independent samples (King et al. 2005; Weiss et al.
2007, 2009). Finally, the pattern of correlations between
ratings and specific behaviors supports the convergent and
discriminant validity of ratings (Konečná et al. 2008;





Pederson et al. 2005; Uher and Asendorpf 2008). Ratings
of subjective well-being in nonhuman primates also show
high reliability (King and Landau 2003; Weiss et al. 2006,
Weiss et al. 2011b) and shows external validity by, for
example, its associated with outcomes such as mortality in
orangutans (Weiss et al. 2011a).
Quantitative genetic analysis
Heritability estimates are based on correlations among the
phenotypes of individuals who differ in their amount of
genetic relatedness. Behavior genetic studies of humans
typically use the difference in correlations between
monozygotic and dizygotic twins as the basis for herita-
bility estimates (Bouchard and Loehlin 2001). Because we
had a pedigree and thus could calculate relatedness among
all the individuals in the sample, we used an ‘‘animal
model’’ to estimate heritability. The animal model is a
biometrical genetic model increasingly used in human
studies (Pilia et al. 2006) and is commonly used in agri-
culture and evolutionary genetics (Kruuk 2004; Lynch and
Walsh 1998; Wilson et al. 2009).
Just as twin models can be viewed as a particular
instance of a structural equation model, the animal model
is a type of multilevel or mixed-effects model. If a trait is
influenced by genetic differences, two genetically related
individuals should deviate from the mean in the same
direction and by a similar amount; both corresponding to
how closely related these individuals are. For example,
full siblings should be more similar in their deviation from
the mean than full cousins. The additive genetic relation-
ships among animals are used as the basis for a random
effect estimating an individual’s deviation from the mean
phenotype attributable to additive genetic effects (Kruuk
2004; Lynch and Walsh 1998). The proportion of variance
attributable to these genetic deviations is an estimate of
the trait’s heritability. Similarly, information about the
extent to which individuals share genotypes (for example,
full siblings will on average share half their genes but will
have only a quarter of their genotypes in common) can be
used to estimated nonadditive sources of genetic variance
such as dominance genetic variance. While in most twin
models dominance genetic variance is confounded with
shared family effects, these can be separated using
extended twin family designs (Eaves et al. 1978) or ped-
igree data containing a large number of full- and half-
siblings (Wilson et al. 2009), as was the case with the
orangutan pedigree. We also explored whether heritability
estimates were consistent between the Bornean and
Sumatran orangutans. Significant differences in genetic
structure between these species could be a potential signal
of evolutionary divergence in their personality or sub-
jective well-being.
Individuals who share environments may also resemble
each other in terms of their personality or subjective well-
being. We therefore considered whether individuals with
the same mother or who lived in the same zoo environment
when rated were more similar than those living in different
zoo environments. The maternal environment captures
effects that make offspring of the same mother resemble
each other (independent of transmitted genes) such as natal
effects or rearing style and may be caused by either envi-
ronmental effects or indirect genetic effects. A zoo envi-
ronment effect would account for any features of the
captive environment that make individuals living together
more similar to each other. We explored the amount of
variance in each personality trait and subjective well-being
that these effects accounted for by fitting a series of uni-
variate models. We then estimated genetic and environ-
mental covariances among traits using a multivariate
model.
Measurement component
Rather than analyzing factor scores for each personality
trait, we built the models up from each rater’s assessments
of each orangutan on every item and thus modeled per-
sonality and subjective well-being as latent variables. Each
rating on the 7-point scale was treated as ordinal and
connected to an underlying latent scale with a probit link
parameterized using cut-points (Hadfield and Nakagawa
2010). Each item contributed to the latent score of the
personality domain it had a salient loading on as described
previously (Weiss et al. 2006). We reverse coded items
with negative loadings. This approach handled heteroge-
neity in the number of items for each personality domain
that was a consequence of the different versions of the
questionnaires used to rate the orangutans. Using the raw
observations allowed uncertainty about individual orangu-
tans’ personality scores to propagate through the model and
thus allowed us to control for relationships among per-
sonality and subjective well-being domains introduced by
raters. All models used residual variances fixed to 1 while
residual covariances in the multivariate model were fixed
to 0 because each item only gave information on one
personality or subjective well-being domain.
Variance partition component
One advantage of using the animal model for heritability
estimates is that it can be extended to include fixed effects
that are known to affect the phenotype as well as additional
group-level random effects to partition the variance (Kruuk
2004). In all models we controlled for potential differences
attributable to age and sex by fitting them as fixed effects.
We started with models that estimated individual orangutan
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(VID) and rater (VJ) variances (model 1) using orangutan
and rater IDs as predictors. We then added parameters to
estimate additive genetic variance (VA) for all species
together (model 2) using a design matrix derived from the
additive genetic relationship matrix calculated from the
pedigree. We created models that estimated nonadditive
genetic variance (VD, model 3) using the dominance
genetic relationship matrix (Lynch and Walsh 1998,
p. 768).
We then created models that fit random effects using the
mother and zoo IDs to estimate maternal environment
variance (VM, model 4) and shared zoo environment vari-
ance (VZ, model 5). We also fit a model that included all
the effects (model 6) to give more conservative estimates
of effects that are difficult to separate when families share a
common environment (Wilson et al. 2009). In the models
that estimate additive and nonadditive genetic or maternal
and zoo environment variances, the orangutan identity
matrix fits an effect comparable to the unique environment
variance (VE) in twin models, that is, effects that cause an
orangutan to differ from other individuals who share genes
or environments. We additionally tested models that fit
unique environment effects separately for each species
group (Bornean, Sumatran, and hybrid) and additive and
dominance genetic effects for Bornean and Sumatran
orangutans (model 7). We did this by creating separate
genetic relationship matrices for each species.
Model fitting
We estimated fixed effects and components of variance
using a Bayesian animal model (Sorensen and Gianola
2002) as implemented in MCMCglmm (Hadfield 2010).
We used Bayesian methods because they better handle
confounded variables (Ovaskainen et al. 2008) such as
parents and offspring who shared genes and a zoo
environment. Bayesian inferences can be made by sum-
marizing random draws from the joint posterior distri-
bution of the parameter estimates. MCMCglmm uses an
inverse-Wishart distribution as the prior for variance
components. We specified priors with variances of 1 and
covariances of 0 and degrees of freedom parameter of 1
for the univariate models and 6 for the multivariate
models. We ran the models for 106 iterations, discarded
the first half of the samples, and thinned the samples
from the posterior distribution to 1,000. The autocorre-
lations among the successive samples from the posterior
distributions were less than .1. We compared model fit
using the deviance information criterion or DIC (Had-
field 2010). Because there is error in calculating DIC
from the Monte Carlo simulations, we ran each model
twice.
Model inference
To exclude measurement error from our heritability esti-
mates, we calculated heritability as the ratio between the
additive genetic variance and the repeatable variance
(VRPT = VA ? VD ? VM ? VZ) on the latent variable
scale as h2 = VA/VRPT. The heritability estimate thus only
reflects variance from effects assigned to individual
orangutans and not measurement variance from rater
effects and the probit distribution used to model item
scores. We calculated the broad-sense heritability as
H2 = (VA ? VD)/VRPT and the proportion of nonadditive
genetic variance (Crnokrak and Roff 1995) as D
a
= VD/
(VA ? VD). We estimated correlations among traits attrib-
utable to additive genetic (rA), nonadditive genetic (rD),
and unique environment (rE) effects as well as rater effects
(rJ) using a multivariate animal model. Covariances, like
variances, can also be added together, so we also examined
the total genetic correlations (rG) from adding the additive
and nonadditive genetic covariance matrices (covG =
covA ? covD) and the phenotypic correlations among
personality and subjective well-being statistically control-
ling for rater effects (covP = covA ? covD ? covE).
Because studies of humans and chimpanzees found that
all or most of the genetic variance underlying subjective
well-being was shared with personality, we calculated the
conditional genetic variance of subjective well-being. The
conditional genetic variance is genetic variance that is
unique to subjective well-being, excluding variance from
genetic factors that also influence the personality domains
(Hansen and Houle 2008), defined as
cðyjxÞ ¼ Gy %GyxG
%1
x Gxy
where Gyx and Gxy are vectors of the genetic covariance
between y and the other traits and Gx is the genetic
covariance matrix of the other traits.
Reliability analysis
We calculated the reliabilities of the personality and sub-
jective well-being assessments as intraclass correlation
coefficients (ICCs) in two ways using estimates from the
genetic models. First, to estimate the consistency of the
items making up each personality domain or subjective
well-being, we calculated the ratio of the animal variance
(that is, the repeatable variance from genetic or environ-
mental effects that are assigned to individual animals) plus
the rater variance over the residual and link function
variances (VRPT ? VJ)/(VRPT ? VJ ? VR ? 1) where the
final 1 is from the variance of the probit distribution used to
model the ordered categorical scores. This ICC is on the
scale of the raw data and represents the expected correla-
tion between an individual’s scores on two items made by
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the same rater. Although it is not the same as Cronbach’s a,
it specifies the degree to which the rating of an individual
on one item generalized to other items on that scale and is
therefore a type of model-derived estimate of internal
consistency. Second, we calculated reliability on the latent
scale as VRPT/(VRPT ? VJ) to represent the expected cor-
relation between two assessments of the same individual by
different raters. This ICC estimates interrater agreement
and is similar to ICC(3,1) (Shrout and Fleiss 1979).
Results
Genetics
We built a series of models to estimate the variance in
personality and subjective well-being attributable to the
additive and nonadditive (dominance) effects of genes, the
maternal environment, and the zoo environment that con-
ditioned on effects from raters. Because of the variance in
the DIC between the two runs of each of the univariate
models (Table 1), it was not possible to definitively choose
the best model for each personality domain. We therefore
interpreted the modes and credible intervals for each
parameter estimate for all models.
Variance components, heritability, and the other vari-
ance proportion coefficients of models 1–6 are given in
Tables 1 and 2. The narrow-sense heritabilities of person-
ality traits and subjective well-being in orangutans were
moderate and across the models and traits ranged from
about 20–30 % of the repeatable variance (Table 2; Fig. 1).
The nonadditive genetic effects explained on average more
of the variance (30–50 %) than additive genetic effects.
The total genetic effects (broad-sense heritability or H2)
thus accounted for upwards of three quarters of the
repeatable variance (Table 3; Fig. 1). The proportion of
nonadditive genetic variance (D
a
) was greater than half for
all traits (Table 2). The estimates for maternal environment
and zoo effects were low but the variance accounted for by
nonadditive genetic effects was generally reduced when a
maternal environment effect was included in the model.
The separate heritability estimates for Bornean and Su-
matran orangutans (Table 3) were consistent with the
estimates from the whole sample.
While there was uncertainty in the additive genetic (rA),
nonadditive genetic (rD), and unique environment (rE)
correlations between personality and subjective well-being
(Table 4), the effects all went in the same direction (neg-
ative for Neuroticism and positive for Extraversion,
Dominance, Agreeableness, and Intellect). Using the con-
ditional genetic variances, we determined that 15 % (95%
credible interval [CI] = .03, .38) of the additive genetic
and 19 % (95% CI = .05, .44) of the nonadditive genetic
variance in subjective well-being was shared with person-
ality. From these models we were also able to derive
estimates of the phenotypic correlations among personality
and subjective well-being that controlled for covariances
among traits attributable to rater effects which were
Extraversion rP = .24 (95% CI = .05, .37), Dominance .13
(95% CI = -.09, .28), Neuroticism -.22 (95% CI =
-.38, -.05), Agreeableness .20 (95% CI = .05, .40), and
Intellect .18 (95% CI = .02, .36). There was also some
evidence for a positive dominance genetic and unique
environment correlation between Agreeableness and
Extraversion (Table 4).
Psychometrics
Using the fitted genetic models we estimated the reliability
of the orangutan personality ratings. The intraclass corre-
lation coefficient from the animal and rater variances on
the scale of the raw data, which represents the expected
correlation between two items assessed on the same animal
by the same rater and can act as a form internal consistency
of items making up each scale, ranged from .21 for Intellect
to .41 for Agreeableness and was .49 for subjective well-
being (Table 5). Combining information from multiple
raters produced highly reliable assessments of latent per-
sonality values which ranged from .73 for Intellect to .87
for Dominance. Reliability of subjective well-being on the
latent scale was .60, and thus acceptable.
Rater effects contributed to the observed correlations
among personality and subjective well-being scores
(Table 4). After decomposing the covariance among per-
sonality and subjective well-being into animal components
(genetic and environment) and a rater component, raters
who rated an orangutan as higher on Extraversion, Domi-
nance, Agreeableness, and Intellect and lower on Neurot-
icism also tended to rate that orangutan as higher on
subjective well-being. Notably, the estimate of rater effects
for the correlation between Dominance and subjective
well-being correlation tended to go in the opposite direc-
tion from genetic and unique environmental estimates.
There were also detectable rater effects on the Extraver-
sion–Agreeableness, Extraversion–Intellect, Neuroticism–
Intellect, and Agreeableness–Intellect correlations.
Discussion
We found that the most genetic variation in orangutan
personality and subjective well-being could be assigned to
nonadditive genetic effects. This is consistent with the
results from human personality research (Eaves et al. 1998;
Keller et al. 2005; Pilia et al. 2006). The narrow-sense
heritability estimates of about 20 % were likewise
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Table 1 Variance components and model fit criteria
Model DIC VE (VID) VA VD VM VZ VJ
Extraversion
1 16,046; 16,046 .53 (.41, .68) .14 (.10, .24)
2 16,036; 16,046 .38 (.25, .55) .17 (.06, .32) .17 (.10, .23)
3 16,028; 16,036 .18 (.09, .38) .15 (.07, .29) .22 (.10, .40) .14 (.10, .24)
4 16,031; 16,002 .33 (.22, .53) .16 (.07, .32) .09 (.06, .20) .14 (.10, .23)
5 16,042; 16,026 .36 (.24, .57) .13 (.08, .36) .11 (.06, .24) .13 (.10, .24)
6 15,978; 16,018 .20 (.07, .36) .14 (.06, .30) .17 (.08, .35) .09 (.06, .22) .11 (.06, .26) .15 (.09, .23)
Dominance
1 17,788; 17,792 1.0 (.77, 1.2) .17 (.10, .25)
2 17,781; 17,790 .82 (.47, 1.0) .25 (.09, .57) .16 (.10, .25)
3 17,778; 17,787 .21 (.08, .60) .18 (.07, .44) .58 (.24, .92) .16 (.11, .26)
4 17,791; 17,785 .57 (.34, .88) .19 (.08, .51) .21 (.08, .46) .18 (.11, .25)
5 17,779; 17,781 .84 (.5, 1.05) .24 (.09, .56) .11 (.05, .27) .16 (.11, .25)
6 17,777; 17,776 .27 (.10, .61) .18 (.07, .45) .22 (.12, .66) .18 (.07, .45) .13 (.06, .29) .16 (.11, .26)
Neuroticism
1 13,543; 13,540 .42 (.32, .55) .11 (.07, .19)
2 13,524; 13,536 .33 (.20, .45) .14 (.06, .25) .11 (.07, .18)
3 13,532; 13,535 .14 (.07, .29) .10 (.06, .23) .20 (.10, .36) .10 (.07, .18)
4 13,524; 13,523 .29 (.16, .41) .12 (.06, .25) .13 (.06, .23) .12 (.07, .18)
5 13,531; 13,529 .31 (.2, .43) .12 (.06, .25) .15 (.05, .28) .11 (.07, .17)
6 13,524; 13,510 .14 (.08, .26) .10 (.05, .21) .13 (.07, .27) .10 (.06, .22) .13 (.06, .30) .11 (.07, .17)
Agreeableness
1 10,129; 10,098 .95 (.72, 1.2) .36 (.24, .55)
2 10,134; 10,088 .73 (.47, 1.1) .19 (.09, .49) .40 (.25, .56)
3 10,124; 10,126 .23 (.08, .65) .15 (.08, .40) .56 (.23, .87) .38 (.24, .57)
4 10,123; 10,125 .67 (.37, .95) .16 (.08, .49) .19 (.08, .40) .38 (.24, .58)
5 10,091; 10,115 .70 (.46, 1.0) .20 (.08, .51) .15 (.08, .46) .34 (.23, .52)
6 10,122; 10,121 .26 (.13, .68) .19 (.09, .42) .36 (.09, .65) .17 (.07, .36) .18 (.06, .44) .34 (.24, .54)
Intellect
1 8,149; 8,149 .48 (.35, .64) .24 (.15, .37)
2 8,149; 8,149 .31 (.17, .49) .21 (.09, .39) .28 (.15, .37)
3 8,087; 8,136 .15 (.08, .35) .19 (.07, .33) .23 (.09, .38) .21 (.15, .35)
4 8,144; 8,148 .29 (.13, .45) .18 (.08, .42) .12 (.05, .23) .27 (.13, .37)
5 8,131; 8,123 .33 (.16, .48) .23 (.07, .39) .15 (.06, .34) .18 (.13, .34)
6 8,144; 8,143 .17 (.08, .33) .16 (.06, .32) .14 (.06, .30) .12 (.05, .23) .14 (.07, 33) .22 (.13, .35)
Subjective well-being
1 4,222; 4,195 .92 (.65, 1.3) .69 (.43, .96)
2 4,174; 4,234 .64 (.31, 1.0) .29 (.08, .76) .65 (.43, .98)
3 4,212; 4,234 .21 (.09, .68) .19 (.07, .53) .49 (.17, .90) .62 (.44, 1.0)
4 4,230; 4,247 .56 (.17, .83) .28 (.08, .63) .19 (.08, .55) .67 (.44, 1.0)
5 4,249; 4,228 .72 (.31, 1.1) .21 (.07, .69) .20 (.06, .58) .53 (.40, .95)
6 4,242; 4,217 .32 (.10, .58) .23 (.06, .50) .20 (.10, .62) .23 (.07, .50) .25 (.09, .57) .67 (.43, 1.0)
DIC Deviance information criterion, with values from two runs of each model. Model for each personality dimension with the lowest average
DIC is highlighted in bold although the variance in DIC meant it was not possible to choose overall best models based on parsimony criteria. VE
unique environment variance, VI individual variance, VA additive genetic variance, VD nonadditive (dominance) genetic variance, VM maternal
environment variance, VZ zoo environment variance, VJ rater variance. VR Residual variance, fixed at 1 in all models. The first variance




consistent with human findings that used a similarly
specified, pedigree-based animal model (Pilia et al. 2006).
This suggests that a high proportion of nonadditive genetic
variance may be a common feature of personality in pri-
mates under long-term directional or stabilizing selection
and not exclusively the result of evolutionary processes
unique to the human lineage. Our low estimates of shared
zoo environment effects on personality match results from
chimpanzees (Weiss et al. 2000) and are consistent with
findings from human personality research on the effect of
the shared (family) environment (Bouchard and Loehlin
2001).
While we lacked enough power to get precise estimates
of genetic correlations between personality and subjective
well-being, the direction of the correlations matched results
from chimpanzees (Weiss et al. 2002) and humans (Weiss
et al. 2008). Human and great ape subjective well-being
may therefore have a common genetic basis in personality
Table 2 Variance partition coefficients








= VE/VRPT Da = VD/(VA ? VD)
Extraversion
2 .30 (.13, .53) .70 (.47, .87)
3 .23 (.13, .45) .32 (.17, .55) .38 (.18, .60) .63 (.34, .80)
4 .25 (.11, .46) .19 (.09, .29) .51 (.37, .75)
5 .22 (.11, .46) .17 (.08, .30) .54 (.34, .73)
6 .16 (.08, .33) .20 (.09, .40) .13 (.07, .24) .13 (.07, .28) .29 (.09, .41) .51 (.28, .77)
Dominance
2 .21 (.07, .49) .79 (.51, .93)
3 .22 (.08, 42) .35 (.18, .70) .27 (.11, .60) .73 (.45, .91)
4 .19 (.07, .42) .17 (.09, .38) .60 (.31, .74)
5 .18 (.08, .44) .09 (.05, .22) .71 (.43, .82)
6 .15 (.06, .32) .21 (.09, .48) .20 (.06, .33) .09 (.04, .20) .19 (.08, .45) .73 (.34, .87)
Neuroticism
2 .30 (.13, .50) .70 (.50, .87)
3 .22 (.12, .42) .36 (.19, .58) .38 (.15, .55) .69 (.43, .83)
4 .21 (.11, .42) .24 (.11, .39) .49 (.29, .66)
5 .23 (.11, .40) .25 (.12, .41) .48 (.34, .68)
6 .15 (.07,) .17 (.10,) .16 (.09,) .18 (.10,) .24 (.10,) .57 (.34, .77)
Agreeableness
2 .18 (.08, .43) .82 (.57, .92)
3 .22 (.06, .38) .52 (.17, .69) .24 (.12, .60) .78 (.45, .89)
4 .14 (.08, .41) .14 (.07, .33) .64 (.38, .8)
5 .19 (.07, .40) .20 (.07, .31) .61 (.36, .77)
6 .14 (.06, .30) .19 (.07, .46) .13 (.05, .24) .15 (.06, .29) .27 (.09, .47) .61 (.30, .83)
Intellect
2 .35 (.21, .68) .65 (.32, .79)
3 .29 (.14, .52) .28 (.14, .53) .29 (.13, .55) .52 (.27, .78)
4 .28 (.13, .57) .20 (.09, .33) .43 (.21, .65)
5 .23 (.14, .53) .22 (.10, .40) .41 (.21, .64)
6 .16 (.08, .35) .15 (.08, .34) .14 (.06, .25) .21 (.09, .35) .18 (.09, .38) .51 (.23, .72)
Subjective well-being
2 .18 (.09, .64) .82 (.36, .91)
3 .24 (.07, .47) .38 (.15, .65) .24 (.11, .60) .78 (.37, .89)
4 .19 (.08, .51) .26 (.08, .47) .47 (.20, .72)
5 .18 (.05, .52) .16 (.07, .38) .54 (.25, .77)
6 .15 (.04, .33) .21 (.05, .39) .19 (.06, .34) .14 (.07, .34) .17 (.07, .40) .55 (.25, .84)
Heritability (h2) and variance partition coefficients for nonadditive (dominance) genetic (d2) and maternal (m2), zoo (z2) and unique (e2)




traits related to emotional stability and social assertiveness.
However, unlike chimpanzees and humans, less than half
of the genetic variance in orangutan subjective well-being
could be explained by genetic effects shared with person-
ality. Thus, while the personality–subjective well-being
link is likely ancestral in great apes, the greater genetic
overlap in humans and chimpanzees may be a derived
characteristic. Alternatively, personality and subjective
well-being may have become more genetically uncoupled
as orangutans diverged from these species.
In our models we used the dominance genetic relation-
ship matrix, defined as the probability that two individuals
share the same genotype at a locus (Lynch and Walsh
1998), to estimate nonadditive genetic variance. Domi-
nance genetic variance comes from interactions between
alleles at the same locus but additive 9 additive and other
epistatic interactions could also contribute to nonadditive
genetic variance. However, as only small fractions of
variance from epistatic effects contributes to correlations
among related individuals, the design matrix needed to
estimate them will be very close to that used to estimate
dominance genetic relationships. Therefore our estimate of
nonadditive genetic variance would include some variance
from any epistatic effects.
Our results also show the importance of conditioning on
rater effects and other sources of measurement error when
analyzing questionnaire-based assessments of animal per-
sonality. To wit, while raters were consistent in the scores
they assigned to individual subjective well-being items, the
interrater reliability of subjective well-being was lower
than for the personality traits, which is consistent with the
subjective well-being factor scores having a lower inter-
rater agreement than those of personality (Weiss et al.
2006). Also, while rater variance was small compared to
genetic and environmental variance, as shown by the high
interrater reliability estimates, raters contributed to some of
the covariance among personality traits and between per-
sonality traits and subjective well-being. Rater covariance
effects that go in the same direction as the animal effects
would tend to inflate the magnitude of the observed cor-
relations. Thus, we found that the phenotypic correlations
as estimated by the genetic and environmental covariances
between subjective well-being and Extraversion, Neuroti-
cism, and Agreeableness were smaller than the observed
correlations previously reported (Weiss et al. 2006), which
were inflated by covariance introduced by the raters. The
opposite was true for Dominance; the animal and rater
covariances went in opposite directions and cancelled out,
explaining why no correlation was found between Domi-
nance and subjective well-being at the phenotypic level
(Weiss et al. 2006).
Fig. 1 Variance proportion coefficients for repeatable variance.
Points indicate posterior modes of each estimate with 50 % credible
intervals in solid and 95% credible intervals in dotted lines.
h2 = (narrow-sense) heritability, d2 = dominance, H2 = broad-sense
heritability, e2 = unique environment. Figure by the authors, licensed
under a Creative Commons Attribution Unported License and
published under the terms of this license
Table 3 Heritability estimates for the combined sample and each species
h2 H2
Combined Bornean Sumatran Combined Bornean Sumatran
Extraversion .23 (.13, .45) .29 (.10, .55) .22 (.09, .45) .66 (.41, .86) .67 (.43, .89) .73 (.40, .87)
Dominance .22 (.08, 42) .26 (.08, .54) .19 (.06, .46) .78 (.49, .93) .72 (.36, .91) .78 (.43, .93)
Neuroticism .22 (.12, .42) .25 (.13, .53) .29 (.14, .52) .69 (.48, .85) .68 (.40, .85) .70 (.50, .87)
Agreeableness .22 (.06, .38) .25 (.09, .55) .16 (.07, .43) .82 (.41, .91) .69 (.43, .90) .71 (.40, .92)
Intellect .29 (.14, .52) .27 (.10, .53) .28 (.15, .58) .69 (47, .86) .64 (.38, .88) .73 (.46, .89)
SWB .24 (.07, .47) .19 (.06, .60) .23 (.06, .48) .77 (.44, .92) .72 (.32, .90) .78 (.40, .92)
Posterior modes of narrow-sense, h2 = VA/(VA ? VD ? VE), and broad sense, H
2




While our analysis models rater effects or perceptions
that introduce correlations among the personality and
subjective well-being dimensions, it does not address to
what extent the five personality dimensions themselves
are products of rater beliefs and perceptions. The gener-
alizability of chimpanzee personality dimensions across
samples living in different environments (King et al.
2005; Weiss et al. 2007) and raters with different cultural
backgrounds (Weiss et al. 2009), their relationship with
observed behaviors (Pederson et al. 2005), and the
recoverability when rater effects on chimpanzee and
orangutan personality structure have been removed
(Weiss et al. 2012) indicate that the structure of these
nonhuman primate personality dimensions is inconsistent
with them being solely an artifact of human perception.
Furthermore, although similar, the personality structure of
orangutans is not identical to that of humans and the
personality structure of humans, chimpanzees, and
orangutans differ in ways consistent with phylogeny
(e.g., humans and chimpanzees share a personality domain,
Conscientiousness, that is absent in orangutans) and social
structure (e.g., the primacy of the chimpanzee Dominance
domain) (Weiss and Adams 2008). However, even factor
models of human personality can be understood in terms
of our faculties for social perception (Srivastava 2010)
and thus rater-based assessments of nonhuman primate
personality may miss individual differences that are
entirely absent in humans (Uher 2008a, b). Understanding
the full genetic structure of orangutan personality may
Table 4 Genetic, environmental, and rater correlations
Extraversion Dominance Neuroticism Agreeableness Intellect
Additive genetic rA
Dominance .14 (-.24, 37)
Neuroticism -.01 (-.24, .37) -.04 (-.30, .33)
Agreeableness .17 (-.12, .52) -.20 (-.49, .19) -.03 (-.38, .28)
Intellect .08 (-.22, .39) .17 (-.11, .50) -.10 (-.42, .16) .01 (-.38, .28)
SWB .23 (-.15, .45) .13 (-.21, 43) -.16 (-.47, .13) .12 (-.19, .47) .10 (-.18, 46)
Nonadditive (dominance) genetic rD
Dominance .13 (-.20, .45)
Neuroticism -.03 (-.29, .30) .034 (-.29, .31)
Agreeableness .29 (-.02, .55) -.22 (-.55, .12) -.13 (-.48, .13)
Intellect .15 (-.17, .40) .20 (-.15, .47) -.16 (-.47, .10) .06 (-.23, .39)
SWB .22 (-.09, .51) .14 (-.24, .44) -.17 (-.48, .07) .20 (-.07, .56) .25 (-.11, .47)
Unique environment rE
Dominance .16 (-.21, .44)
Neuroticism -.03 (-.30, .31) -.02 (-.31, 30)
Agreeableness .31 (.02, .59) -.21 (-.52, .14) -.16 (-.48, .13)
Intellect .12 (-.12, .47) .13 (-.18, .44) -.15 (-.45, .11) .16 (-.19, .46)
SWB .26 (-.07, .51) .02 (-.30, .40) -.25 (-.50, .04) .30 (-.06, .54) .20 (-.10, .50)
Rater rJ
Dominance .11 (-.15, .30)
Neuroticism -.10 (-.30, .19) .36 (.12, 55)
Agreeableness .41 (.16, 57) -.10 (-.40, 10) -.21 (-.38, .10)
Intellect .20 (.06, .51) -.17 (-.35, .13) -.44 (-.54, -.09) .30 (.04, .50)
SWB .24 (.00, .46) -.17 (-.39, .13) -.36 (-.55, -.09) .30 (.06, .55) .41 (.16, 61)
Parameter estimates shows in 95% credible intervals in parentheses
SWB subjective well-being
Table 5 Scale consistency and reliability of assessments by multiple
raters
Consistency Reliability
Extraversion .28 (.24, .33) .81 (.71, .87)
Dominance .38 (.34, .44) .87 (.81, .91)
Neuroticism .23 (.20, .28) .86 (.73, .90)
Agreeableness .41 (.38, .48) .77 (.64, .82)
Intellect .31 (.25, .35) .73 (.60, .83)
SWB .49 (.42, .54) .60 (.50, .74)
Parameter estimates with 95% credible intervals in parentheses. SWB
subjective well-being. Domain-scale consistency calculated as
(VRPT ? VJ)/(VRPT ? VJ ? VR ? 1); latent reliability calculated as
VRPT/(VRPT ? VJ) where VRPT = VA ? VD ? VE
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very well require multiple methods for measuring
behavioral variation.
The quantitative genetic structure of personality within
one species cannot act as strong evidence for past and
current evolutionary scenarios (Gangestad 2011; Keller
2007). However, finding similar patterns of additive versus
nonadditive genetic variation in human and orangutan
personality suggests that similar processes of mutation and
selection maintain variation in both species. A high pro-
portion of nonadditive genetic variance is consistent with
long-term selection on a trait (Crnokrak and Roff 1995;
Merilä and Sheldon 1999) and while it may be a sign of
strong selection reducing the additive genetic variance
(Stirling et al. 2002) it is not indicative of recent selection
(pace Figueredo and Rushton 2009; Penke et al. 2007). The
recentness of novel selective pressures operating on human
psychological characteristics since the agricultural revolu-
tion (*10 kya), which we interpret as the meaning of
‘recent’ in this context (see Figueredo et al. 2011), is a
matter of perspective, as they are long-term compared to
contemporary selection (Stearns et al. 2010) but recent
relative to evolution before the split between human and
chimpanzee lineages. Whether the large nonadditive
genetic variance in orangutan and human personality
evolved independently or is the result of long-term selec-
tion common in both species’ ancestor could be investi-
gated by estimating dominance or epistatic genetic sources
of variation in chimpanzees. While we did not have the
power to explore species differences in genetic structure
between Bornean and Sumatran orangutans, future studies
of orangutans or other closely related species (such as in
macaques) or subspecies (such as in chimpanzees) may be
informative. Such studies may also lead to an under-
standing of the genetic underpinnings of species diver-
gence in personality dimensions, such as whether the
genetic correlation we found between Extraversion and
Agreeableness is related to the blend, at the phenotypic
level, of these two domains in rhesus macaques (Weiss
et al. 2011b). Furthermore, the presence of nonadditive
genetic variance in bird personality (van Oers et al. 2004)
suggests that this phenomenon may be a more general part
of how personality evolves.
This study highlights how studying personality and
subjective well-being heritability in other primates is a
useful approach to understanding the evolution of these
traits in humans. In doing so these findings suggest that
evolutionary psychologists interested in these problems
need to reach back further than the Pleistocene and grapple
with an evolutionary story that is at least 15 million years
old, and probably older.
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6.1  Introduction
Our whole conception and acknowledgement of personality – both scientific and 
quotidian – is based on the notion of difference. A personality is precisely that which 
distinguishes one individual from another. These differences have consequences for 
behavior, health, and well-being, but we are mostly ignorant of their evolutionary 
roots. For humans and other primates, evidence is coalescing around a common struc-
ture that describes personality differences usefully categorizable in terms of shared 
versus derived traits and consistent with known species differences (Gosling and John 
1999; Weiss et al. 2006). Although functional and genomic studies begin to hint at 
the proximate genetic and environmental factors that mix to produce differences in 
personality, we are still left with this wondrous puzzle: Why do these basic differ-
ences persist over evolutionary time scales as primates have speciated and evolved?
This problem runs up against one of the unendingly contentious issues in quan-
titative genetics: How is trait variation maintained? This question comes out of a 
basic mathematical result in genetics with its origin in animal breeding. The result 
says that natural and artificial selection reduces the heritability of a trait in a popu-
lation. Much ink has been spilled on theoretical treatments of variation in primate 
(mostly human) personality and other psychological traits (e.g., Tooby and 
Cosmides 1990a; Nettle 2006; Penke et al. 2007). What we need are good data.
But which way forward? Which data? In evolutionary psychology, the usual tact is 
to identify past conditions within a lineage that explain present-day adaptation and 
variation (Tooby and Cosmides 1990b). This is mistaken in that it ignores a key insight 
of evolutionary biology: it is only through a phylogenetically informed approach that 
we can determine when traits arose and changed within a lineage (Gosling and 
Graybeal 2007). For determining when different features of  personality originated in 
each primate lineage, this comparative approach is sound. To explain why differences 
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within populations persist, however, something else is needed. Evolutionary quantitative 
genetics fills this gap. This branch of biology deals with the effects of evolutionary 
processes on continuous traits and the genetic and environmental factors underlying 
them. Most promising and relevant for the explorations of primate personality is the 
development of techniques for studying evolution in wild populations using pedigree 
data (Kruuk and Hill 2008). Given the length of time many primate populations have 
been investigated (Goodall 1986; Rawlins and Kessler 1986; Fedigan and Asquith 
1991; Nishida et al. 2002), the identification of individuals (de Waal 2003), and the 
resolution of pedigree structure (particularly through matrilineal kin e.g., Fairbanks 
et al. 2004; Blomquist 2009b), it is a wonder that these techniques have not been more 
widely applied to nonhuman primate behavior.
Revealing the evolution of nonhuman primate personality requires first under-
standing how personality variation is defined and how differences among species 
are informed by phylogenetic relations. The evolvability of personality within a 
species is proportional to the heritability of each personality trait, which has already 
been estimated in several primate species. Making usable inferences about the evolution 
of personality first requires choosing a method for estimating heritability appropri-
ate to the data (Kruuk and Hadfield 2007). Knowing what heritability really is will 
lead to a consideration of the exact role that the resemblance between parents and 
offspring, as captured by heritability, plays in random drift and selection in wild 
populations. Pinning down the fitness implications of personality differences 
requires more than just the genetic structure of personality but offers the opportunity 
to integrate many threads from psychological and behavioral–ecological approaches 
to personality.
6.2  Nonhuman Primate Personalities
Nonhuman primate personality has been examined from a number of stances, but 
integrating these different attitudes is still a major challenge (Clarke and Boinski 
1995; Itoh 2002; Uher 2008) (see Chap. 5 for a full discussion). These methods 
include, broadly, impressionistic ratings using adjectives describing personality; 
observational measures and codings of differences in the presence, frequency, and 
duration of behaviors; and impressionistic ratings of behavior–situation units 
(Uher and Asendorpf 2008). Although methodological differences can shroud 
comparisons among species, Gosling and John (1999) found broad support for the 
basic personality dimensions related to sociality, anxiety, and cooperativeness in a 
number of other animals, from octopuses to chimpanzees. Although species-specific 
dimensions outside of those that differentiate humans exist (Uher 2008; Uher and 
Asendorpf 2008) and personality should encompass not only people but also 
behaviors and situations (Funder 2009), descriptions of stable, between-human 
 personality differences as rendered in factor models usefully orient explorations of 
nonhuman primate personality structure. Differentiating individuals along basic 
personality dimensions provides a platform of traits for initial quantitative genetic 
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analyses of personality in primates. They are also good candidates for fitness 
 correlates in evolutionary studies because these broad personality dimensions 
consistently relate to differences in health, longevity, and other social outcomes in 
humans (Roberts et al. 2007).
Studying multiple species with the same instrument also aids phylogenetic compari-
sons of personality structure by revealing the historical patterning of the emergence and 
modification of personality dimensions (Weiss and Adams 2008). This chapter next 
reviews factor model perspectives before considering how personality traits can 
evolve. However, behavioral and functional approaches make their appearance later 
when we need to causally connect broad personality variation to fitness (see 
Sect. 6.5.3). Assessments of behavioral profiles (Shoda and Mischel 2000; Uher 
et al. 2008), in particular, show promise for reaction-norm studies of personality 
evolution (see Sect. 6.6).
6.2.1  Models
One of many models for human personality describes personality differences in five 
independent dimensions (Digman 1990): generally speaking, differences in socia-
bility and assertiveness are called Extraversion; variation in trust and cooperation 
are grouped as Agreeableness; Conscientious describes differences in discipline, 
planning, and self-control; variation in curiosity and creativity is captured by 
Openness; and a dimension called Neuroticism differentiates individuals in terms 
of anxiety, emotional stability, and stress response. Reasonably, it is referred to as 
the Five-Factor Model (FFM). A single individual is characterized by a stable density 
distribution along each of these dimensions (Fleeson 2001). The FFM is robust 
across cultures (McCrae et al. 2005) and emerges whether people are measured on 
items that are adjectival descriptors (Digman 1990) or cognitive-affective reactions 
to situations (Denissen and Penke 2008). This factor-model description of human 
personality has served as the starting point of several investigations of nonhuman 
primate personality.
Chimpanzees share with humans the broad dimensions of the FFM, with the 
addition of Dominance, which describes differences in competitive facility (King 
and Figueredo 1997). As a personality trait in primates, Dominance should be 
distinguished from social dominance or rank as the latter is an outcome rather than 
an aspect of personality (Hinde 1978; Buss 1988; Gosling and John 1999). The 
chimpanzee dimensions Agreeableness and Openness were given names identical 
to their human homologues. Although the labels differ, the remaining three traits 
map human equivalents: Surgency onto Extraversion, Emotionality onto Neuroticism, 
and Dependability onto Conscientiousness. Although chimpanzee Conscientiousness 
is more narrowly defined than its counterpart in humans (it does not include facets 
related to trustworthiness and duty) the Conscientiousness personality dimension 
seems to be a derived character in humans and chimpanzees, as it has not appeared 
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as a “pure” construct in any other species investigated (Gosling and John 1999; 
Weiss et al. 2006; Weiss et al. in press). Chimpanzees can also be differentiated 
from each other by their behavioral signatures, including propensities to set upon 
or affiliate with conspecifics, anxiety and arousal in stressful situations, curiosity 
toward novel foods and objects, impulsivity, goal pursuit, and physical and sexual 
activity (Pederson et al. 2005; Uher et al. 2008; Uher and Asendorpf 2008).
Gorillas likewise can be differentiated by their behavioral repertoires, similar to 
chimpanzees (Uher et al. 2008). Gorillas have also been described under the rubric 
of the human FFM using the dimensions Extroversion, Understanding (i.e., 
Agreeableness), Fearfulness (i.e., Neuroticism), and Dominance (Gold and Maple 
1994). Salient in their absence from gorilla personality are homologues of human 
and chimpanzee Openness and Conscientiousness. Do gorillas really not differ in 
levels of curiosity and self-control, or were researchers just not looking for varia-
tion in these traits (Gosling and John 1999; Weiss et al. 2006)?
The importance of being more thorough can be seen in Weiss et al.’s (2006) 
portrayal of orangutan personality using a similarly broad instrument previously 
applied to chimpanzees (King and Figueredo 1997). Orangutans can be described 
with the dimensions Dominance, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism, and 
Intellect. Intellect appears to be a blend of Openness and Conscientiousness.
A variety of models using impressionistic ratings have emerged to describe rhesus 
macaque personality. Some early studies revealed, alternatively, three dimensions: 
Fear, Hostility, Affiliation (Chamove et al. 1972) or Excitability, Sociability, 
Confidence (Stevenson-Hinde and Zunz 1978; Stevenson-Hinde et al. 1980). Later 
studies derived four dimensions: Tense–Fearful, Aggressive, Solitary, Curious–
Playful (Bolig et al. 1992) or Sociability, Confidence, Excitability, Equability 
(Capitanio 1999). Rhesus macaques can even be described in as many as six dimen-
sions: Confidence, Friendliness, Dominance, Anxiety, Openness, Activity (Weiss 
et al. in press). These results demonstrate the vagaries of measuring personality 
with instruments that have been incompletely adapted from studies of other species 
(Uher and Asendorpf 2008). That said, despite the various labels and differing 
numbers of components, many of these dimensions describe the same constructs. 
The primate dimensions of Extraversion are captured by Affiliation/Sociability/Solitary, 
Agreeableness by Hostility/Aggressive/Friendliness; Neuroticism by Fear/
Excitability/Tense–Fearful/Confidence–Anxiety; Openness by Curious–Playful/
Openness; and Dominance by Confidence/Dominance (Gosling and John 1999; 
Weiss et al. in press). This lumbering development matches the slow growth and 
refinement in characterizing broad dimensions of human personality chronicled by 
Digman (1990). We will not get there all in one go.
Using behavioral codings, Rouff et al. (2005) identified three dimensions of 
overall behavioral variation and four of between-individual differences in the 
 personalities of lion-tailed macaques. The components that differentiated  individuals 
(in contrast to behavioral occasions irrespective of the individual exhibiting them) 
map roughly onto the rhesus macaque dimensions Friendliness, Dominance, Activity/
Confidence, and Anxiety. Although methodological and sample-size  differences 
between these studies make for a knotty comparison, they suggest that several broad 
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features are conserved in the genus Macaca. It also shows that basic dimensions 
can shine through even if the instrument or ethogram is not specifically designed to 
find them. For instance, Rouff et al. (2005) chose behaviors that defined Neuroticism-
like bipolar facets, namely, Anxious–Relaxed and Reactive–Unreactive. Each pole 
of these facets, however, did not group together. Reactive clustered with the 
Confidence-like component, and Relaxed and Unreactive loaded on the Anxiety-
like component. This tallies with the claim that primate Neuroticism can become 
uncoupled into two independent dimensions describing free-floating versus situa-
tionally determined anxiety (Weiss et al. in press). Further work on lion-tailed, 
rhesus, and other macaque species is needed to clarify personality structure within 
this genus.
Whole personality structures have been educed in other Old World monkeys. 
Vervet monkey personality consists of three dimensions – Social Competence, 
Playful, Curious, Opportunistic Self-Serving (McGuire et al. 1994) – which map to 
the great ape domains of Dominance, Openness, and Agreeableness, respectively 
(Gosling and John 1999).
Kone ná et al. (2008) extended the search for nonhuman primate personality 
structure to colobines. They investigated male Hanuman langur personality using 
both impressionistic descriptors and behavioral codings. Male langur behavior 
exhibits a three-dimensional structure consisting of Dominance, Involvement, and 
Activity. Impressionistic ratings also revealed three dimensions, called Agreeable-
ness, Confidence, and Extraversion. High Agreeableness was expressed behavior-
ally by low Dominance; high Confidence by high Dominance and Involvement and 
by low Activity; and high Extraversion by elevated Activity. Again, these dimen-
sions broadly match those found in other primate species, and the absence of other 
distinct dimensions (such as Openness) have reasonable ecological explanations 
(e.g., langurs are opportunistic foragers).
Over the years other, more specific aspects of personality and temperament have 
been examined in nonhuman primates (Clarke and Boinski 1995). Factor models 
and behavioral profiles by no means cover all the facets of primate personality that 
have been discovered. Attempts to describe all the features of between-individual 
personality differences, however, are starting to pay dividends by distinguishing the 
separate threads that we need to weave the historical patterns of primate personality 
evolution.
6.2.2  Building Blocks
Gosling and John (1999) showed that dimensions analogous (and perhaps homologous) 
to the five human factors appear in other species, with the addition of two dimen-
sions, Dominance and Activity. Although Dominance is a salient dimension across 
many species, they found little evidence for Activity as a separate dimension. 
Nonetheless, activity is a common trait explored in behavioral–ecological  investigations 
of personality (Réale et al. 2007) and was found to define a separate dimension in 
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wild langurs (Kone ná et al. 2008) and rhesus macaques (Weiss et al. in press). 
Furthermore, in humans, although this dimension is subsumed under Extraversion in 
adults, it can emerge as a separate feature in adolescent males (John et al. 1994).
As it is possible for traits that normally vary together to become uncoupled during 
development (Groothuis and Carere 2005), we can consider the developmental 
evolution and phenotypic integration of personality dimensions. Correlated varia-
tion in the rudimentary personality structures of humans, chimpanzees, orangutans, 
and rhesus macaques can be described with a set of eight “basic” and five “blended” 
personality traits (Weiss et al. in press). The basic traits are called Sociability, 
Activity, Altruism, Anxiety, Confidence, Dominance, Openness, and Conscientious-
ness. The other traits are combinations of these components. In humans, chimpan-
zees, and orangutans, Sociability and Activity positively covary to form Extraversion; 
and Anxiety and Confidence negatively covary as Neuroticism. In rhesus macaques, in 
contrast, Sociability fluctuates with Altruism and is denoted as Friendliness. 
Meanwhile, in humans, Altruism and Dominance negatively covary in the dimen-
sion that describes cooperative behavior (i.e., Agreeableness), whereas orangutans 
have an interesting blend of Openness and Conscientiousness called Intellect. 
Positing these different basic traits follows the suggestion of Réale et al. (2007) to 
start defining possible categories of correlated suites of behavior beyond those 
already considered in work on behavioral syndromes (i.e., shyness–boldness, 
exploration–avoidance, activity, aggressiveness, sociability). These basic traits may 
be the result of opportunities for adaptive behavioral variation for meeting the 
social, ecological, and developmental challenges faced by big-brained, gregarious, 
long-lived mammals. Factor models for each species are the first step in hypothesizing 
the building blocks constituting primate personality structures.
Why we should find this historical patterning in primates or even whether we 
have the right “basic” dimensions are big questions. When thinking about the evo-
lution of personality dimensions, it might seem strange at first to consider the 
evolution of something that is only a construct describing differences between indi-
viduals. Extraversion, for instance, describes differences between individuals in 
their sociality and action. Unlike a new behavior or organ, a personality dimension 
is not an obvious thing that a single individual has. However, this thinking takes a 
rather narrow view of what evolution is or how it effects populations. Selection 
does not act only on the mean level of a trait. Evolutionary change can occur on 
higher moments (e.g., variance, skew, kurtosis) of the population distribution of a 
trait as well as its covariance with other traits (Rice 2004). The genetic and envi-
ronmental factors contributing to personality can start and stop covarying as the 
population evolves.
Before worrying too much over these complications, let us start more simply. 
When a population experiences selection, how does it respond? Let us go into the 
wild and find a troop of apes that differ in Extraversion. We measure their person-
alities and find, as it happens, that only individuals who are a value of S below the 
population mean in Extraversion are having children. For the moment, do not worry 
about why this might be the case. How sociable should we expect these offspring 
to be? Here, S is the selection differential (the amount that the parents producing 
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offspring deviate from the average trait value), and we want to know by how much 
the offspring will also differ from the parental average (or the response to selection, 
R). We are asking R = ? × S and the answer should have something to do about the 
resemblance between parents and their offspring.
6.3  Heritability 
Heritability captures the resemblance between relatives. Heritability (h2) is the 
proportion of the difference in phenotypes attributable to differences in inherited 
genes and thus ranges from 0 to 1.0. When considering two traits, we can also ask 
to what extent they are influenced by the same set of genes and what the direction 
of this relationship is. This is the genetic correlation  (r
A
) and can extend from −1.0 
to +1.0. Behavioral traits are generally less heritable than morphological traits 
(Stirling et al. 2002). The heritability of personality and related traits has been 
established in several species of nonhuman primates. However, it is important to 
keep in mind that genes are not the only factor of interest in explaining variation: 
for certain problems, other types of environmental variance may be equally 
 compelling to the researcher. As we shall see, although all sources of variation 
should be examined, differences caused by the additive effects of genes (called 
heritability) hold special status in the origin of both adaptive and neutral variation 
among individuals. The first step is to consider the extent of heritability in nonhuman 
primate personality.
Weiss et al. (2000) estimated the heritability of the six factors of chimpanzee 
personality. Of these factors, only Dominance was found to be significantly heri-
table (h2 = 0.63). The estimate for Dependability was 0.21; although not detectably 
greater than 0, this suggests low to moderate heritability. The remaining traits 
showed little or no heritability. Importantly, this study of zoo-housed chimpanzees 
also established that very little of the differences in personality could be accounted 
for by differences among zoos. A later study using a different estimation technique 
(see Sect. 6.3.1) confirmed the high heritability of Dominance (h2 = 0.66) and estab-
lished the high genetic correlation with subjective well-being (r
A
 = 1.00) (Weiss 
et al. 2002).
The heritability of facets of personality and other related traits has also been 
investigated in nonhuman primates. Williamson et al. (2003) estimated the heritability 
of fearfulness and anxiety in rhesus macaques. Several aspects of their responses, 
such as a tendency to explore novel environments (latency to leave the protection 
of their mother during a Free Play Test) or to approach novel objects (in this case, 
a kiwi fruit) had estimated heritabilities of 1.0. These high estimates of heritability 
in these types of trait were confirmed in a later study with a similar measure of vigi-
lance (h2 = 0.98) (Rogers et al. 2008). Latency to approach strangers (measured as 
a Social Impulsivity Index) is also heritable in vervets, but only moderately so 
(h2 = 0.34 ± 0.11) (Fairbanks et al. 2004). There was no effect from the maternal 
environment, which given how it was estimated includes nonadditive genetic variance 
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from dominance and epistatic effects as well as the influence of maternal care and 
the mother’s genotype. The Social Impulsivity Index consisted of two subscales 
measuring approach–avoidance and aggressiveness that were themselves highly 
genetically correlated (r
A
 = 0.78 ± 0.12), suggesting that the two facets are influ-
enced by a similar set of genes.
These results are not surprising given that the heritability of personality dimen-
sions in humans has been estimated to be in the range of 0.4–0.8 (Riemann et al. 
1997; Bouchard and Loehlin 2001), depending on the population and whether person-
ality is assessed with self-reports, peer-reports, or both and are of similar magnitude 
in other animal species (van Oers et al. 2005a). The lack of a maternal effect in 
vervet impulsivity is also consistent with the small influence of shared environment 
(e.g., maternal care experienced by siblings) on personality in humans (Bouchard 
1994; Rowe 1994).
6.3.1  Estimating Heritability
It is worth taking a step back and considering what heritability is and how it can be 
estimated. The basic question is how do parents and offspring resemble each other; 
that is, what is the covariance between mean offspring and mean parental pheno-
types? Second, what proportion of variation among the offspring is caused by varia-
tion inherited from their parents? This value is found in the coefficient from a linear 

















) is the covariance between the phenotypes of offspring and their 
parents, and var(z
P
) is the phenotypic variation of the parents. This quantity 
describes how traits are selected (see Sect. 6.3.2) (Rice 2004).
Like the derivation of many basic statistical terms (e.g., “split-plot”) from agri-
cultural experimentation, the meaning of many of the concepts surrounding the 
estimation of heritability are clearer once their origins in animal and plant breeding 
are understood. If you are raising livestock and are picking individuals to mate with 
one another to produce a new generation, what information do you want about these 
parents? What interests you is not the phenotype of each parent but, rather, the average 
phenotype of a parent’s offspring. An individual’s “breeding value” is a score rep-
resenting their offspring’s expected phenotype when mating is random (Falconer 
and Mackay 1996). Breeding values act additively – which is to say that an  offspring’s 
expected breeding value is the average of its parents’ – and are thus thought of as 
caused by genes (not genotypes) that are passed from parents to their offspring. The 
effects of these genes act additively because they influence the phenotype independent 
of the constitution of the rest of the genotype, which is not the case for dominance 
or epistatic interactions.
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The part of differences in phenotypes that can be attributed to breeding values is 
called the additive genetic variance of a trait. The ratio between additive genetic 
(V
A
) and phenotypic variance (V
P






because, assuming certain conditions apply, these genes are what determine the 
parent–offspring resemblance (Rice 2002). These assumptions are the following: 
(1) an individual’s phenotype is a combination of the additive genetic effects from 
both its parents plus an effect from the environment (there is no influence from domi-
nance or epistasis); (2) mating is random; (3) genotypes are independent of the 
environment in which they are expressed; and (4) parents do not transmit their 





be used to estimate z ,zO Pb , and in practice this is what is done.
Heritability can be estimated in a number of other ways, depending on the rela-
tionship between the individuals measured, such as twins (Martin and Eaves 1977) 
or half-siblings (Falconer and Mackay 1996). Entire pedigrees – describing not just 
the relatedness between parents and offspring or among siblings but between all 
relatives – can even be combined into a single analysis using the squared differ-
ences of phenotypes between all individuals (Grimes and Harvey 1980), which was 
shown to be an improvement over analysis of variance-based estimation techniques 
(Bruckner and Slanger 1986a, b). Like other, more advanced methods, this requires 
determining the relatedness of all individuals in the study population from a 
pedigree.
More recently, animal breeders and evolutionary quantitative geneticists have 
begun to favor variance component analysis, also known as random effects or 
mixed effects models, for estimating genetic and environmental sources of indi-
vidual differences (Henderson 1950, 1975; Shaw 1987; Lynch and Walsh 1998; 
Kruuk 2004). These models still use all relationships in the pedigree; but, rather 
than pairing or nesting individuals together as in the techniques described above, 
breeding values are determined for each individual. Because the analysis occurs at 
the level of individual animals, this model was dubbed the “animal model” (Lynch 
and Walsh 1998). This set of equations can also be described as a mixed-effects 
model because it differentiates fixed effects (which account for mean differences 
among groups of individuals) from random effects (which partition the remaining 
variance between individuals). Breeding values are the typical random effect of 
interest. Although the meaning of “fixed” versus “random” effects are quite varied 
(and confused) in the literature (Gelman 2005), it is by these terms that evolutionary 
geneticists are trying to distinguish known causes of differences between classes 
of individuals (e.g., sex and age) from those that govern a trait’s variance and for 
which each individual has its own value. An advantage of the animal model is 
that it can incorporate, and therefore estimate, other sources of variance. (See 
Chap. 7 for effects of interest in animal personality research.) Animal models have 
been used successfully on data from wild populations to estimate components of 
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variance in addition to heritability (Kruuk 2004; Kruuk and Hadfield 2007) and are 
particularly suitable when trying to distinguish genetic from environment effects 
(Kruuk and Hadfield 2007). Variance components and breeding values for the animal 
model can be estimated with restricted maximum likelihood (REML) methods 
(Shaw 1987; Lynch and Walsh 1998) or using Bayesian analysis (Sorensen and 
Gianola 2007; O’Hara et al. 2008; Hadfield et al. 2010).
In quantitative genetics of natural populations, these effects can only be identi-
fied if they differ between individuals so variance component decomposition does 
not provide a complete causal account of how a trait comes to be (component 




 are also referred to as causal components of variance) 
(Falconer and Mackay 1996). Take a look at maternal effects such as those from 
early rearing experience: work by Harlow (1969) showed the importance of a 
mother’s love for the behavior and adjustment of an individual later in life. The 
mother clearly has an “effect.” Although such differences can be induced in experi-
mental conditions, there still might not be any maternal effects in the wild. Just 
because close maternal contact is developmentally necessary for proper fear and 
anxiety reactivity does necessarily mean that differences in rearing style influence 
offspring phenotypes. This lack of difference is what is meant if no maternal effect 
is found on a trait.
Estimates of heritability in nonhuman primates have drawn on all of these tech-
niques, but it pays to use the method most suited to the available pedigree data. For 
estimating heritability in primate populations, the animal model is to be preferred. 
This is primarily because it can handle the arbitrary but interconnected pedigree 
structure of primates in different zoos (Weiss et al. 2000) as well as tolerate 
unknown relatedness such as missing paternity information common in studies of 
wild primates (de Ruiter and Geffen 1998). Furthermore, using all relationships 
from a pedigree improves estimates of genetic correlations (Åkesson et al. 2008). 
The ability of Bayesian methods to handle small sample sizes (O’Hara et al. 2008) 
and confounding variables (Ovaskainen et al. 2008) makes it suitable for analyses 
involving the hundreds of subjects available for primate research rather than the 
thousands typical in agricultural settings, for which REML procedures have been 
developed and refined. Bayesian methods are also good for evolutionary questions 
because the uncertainty in the prediction of breeding values can more easily be carried 
on to estimates of evolutionary change (Hadfield et al. 2010).
Whichever technique is used, it is important to realize that these are simply 
models of the transmission of traits from parents to offspring (Rice 2004). 
Estimating heritability is a process of fitting statistical parameters to data, and these 
estimates are influenced by more than just the variation in additive genes (Stirling 
et al. 2002). Many of the modeling assumptions (random mating, no gene–environment 
correlations) required to estimate heritability from a parent–offspring regression are 
unlikely to hold in primates. Furthermore, variance from the environment in these 
models is actually just the residual variance, or the error. This error includes all the 
causes of differences between individuals for which we do not know how to 
account. Even when we are assigning a name to a key component of variance, such 
as V
A
, the most general descriptions of the parent–offspring resemblance do not 
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make any assumptions about what is being inherited. It is usually assumed that the 
transmission of DNA sequence variants accounts for this resemblance, but epige-
netic sequences can be transmitted across generations and contribute to additive 
genetic variance in the same way (Johannes et al. 2008, 2009). Primate parents and 
offspring can resemble each other for nongenetic reasons as well, such as abusive 
rearing styles in rhesus macaques (Maestripieri 2005). That environments can be 
transmitted is a distinct possibility that is not without utility for evolutionary model 
building (Odling-Smee et al. 2003). As in the remake of a 1970s horror film, these 
snags in understanding heritability (Feldman and Lewontin 1975; Visscher et al. 
2008) are the “undead” of quantitative genetics, particularly in the psychological 
sciences (Taylor 2010).
It is thus important in any discussion of heritability to have a handle on how it 
is being estimated and whether the model or design being used is appropriate to the 
data (Kruuk and Hadfield 2007; Hadfield et al. 2010). Similarly, animal models can 
be sensitive to the inclusion of fixed effects (Wilson 2008). Additive genetic vari-
ance estimates can change when adding a fixed effect that is genetically correlated 
with the trait.
When interpreting heritability as a statistic, there is little practical use in P values 
associated with testing the hypothesis that h2 > 0. First, almost all psychological 
traits are heritable (Turkheimer and Gottesman 1991), so finding significant additive 
genetic variance should not come as a shock. Second, the sample sizes available for 
most primate populations often do not give enough power to distinguish heritability 
from zero, even if heritability is actually moderate. Finally, evolutionary geneticists 
are not interested in the predictive utility of heritability as it is practiced in animal 
and plant breeding, where a particular point estimate for h2 is sought. What we are, 
instead, interested in is the range of likely values for h2 that are supported by the 
data and by the model (typically the 95% coverage or confidence interval) to indicate 
whether heritability is low, moderate, or high.
6.3.2  Why Care About h2?
In the age of molecular genetics, heritability may seem like an old fashioned or 
even outdated concept (Visscher et al. 2008). It may also appear quirky to put so 
much focus on genes (without naming specific ones) rather than on genotypes. 
Would we not like to know the specific genes that interact with each other and with 
the environment to determine an individual’s personality? On a practical level, 
even if an investigation revolves around nongenetic variables, carrying out an 
analysis within an animal model framework allows estimates of the effects of these 
variables to be conditioned on familial resemblance. For answering evolutionary 
questions, heritability gets at those differences in genes that are required for the 
change of phenotypes through both random drift and natural selection and are 
therefore fundamental to the debate over how phenotypic differences are main-
tained in populations.
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Going back to our hypothetical troop of more-or-less extraverted primates, 
 heritability captures how much offspring are expected to resemble their parents. 
A linear regression, such as that of offspring on mid-parent phenotype, is also a 
model for predicting an offspring’s phenotype from those of its parents. It can be 
used to predict the average personality level of the next generation from the mean 
level of the selected parents. Heritability thus answers our question of how the 
offspring of the less Extraverted parents will differ from their parents’ generation. 
The potential for the mean phenotypic value of a trait to respond to selection is 
proportional to the magnitude of selection on the trait times its heritability. The 
equation expressing this relationship is called the breeder’s equation,
,
2
R = h S
stating that a population’s response (R) to selection (S) is limited by the heritability 
of the trait being selected. This equation can be expanded to more than one trait, in 
which case the response to selection of one trait is a function of its genetic variance 
and its covariance with other traits being selected (Lande 1979; Turelli 1988; 
Falconer and Mackay 1996), given by
,z bG
the multivariate breeder’s equation, where G is a matrix of additive genetic vari-
ances and covariances of the traits, b is a vector of selection gradients on each trait, 
and z is a vector of responses to selection for each trait (see Blows 2007 for a 
review). When studying the evolution of personality, then, it is important to esti-
mate not just the heritability of each dimension but also the genetic correlations 
among the dimensions and between personality and other traits (see Chap. 7). Thus, 
genetic correlations between behaviors is one way in which personality traits can 
be defined (Dingemanse and Réale 2005).
The centrality of heritability to the problem of quantitative variation comes from 
a basic mathematical result: both random drift and selection reduce additive genetic 
variance (Falconer and Mackay 1996). Much work on the evolution of personality 
has gone into developing theories about how individual differences in personality 
are maintained.
6.4  Persistence of Variation in Psychological Traits 
The maintenance of heritable variation in traits is a long-standing problem in biology 
(Barton and Turelli 1989; Barton and Keightley 2002). Processes that maintain 
additive genetic variation in a trait may come through direct action on the trait or 
through indirect action on a genetically correlated trait (Robertson 1967).
In discussions of the “amount” of additive genetic variation, it is often pointed 
out that, as a ratio, the magnitude of heritability is as much a function of all other 
sources of variance (nonadditive genetic and environmental) as it is of V
A
. To make 
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heritability comparable between traits and species, Houle (1992) defined the 








 by the phenotypic mean, X
_
 . However, calculating CV
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requires that the phenotype is measured on a ratio scale, meaning that it has a true 
zero value. Personality constructs in primates are typically formed on ordinal or 
interval scales, however. This coefficient, therefore, has little utility for compari-
sons among the heritability of many psychological traits. Furthermore, it loses the 
key interpretation of heritability as the covariation of parent and offspring pheno-
type, which is so key to the evolvability of a trait.
6.4.1  Processes Maintaining Variation
All genetic differences ultimately arise through mutation, so it is possible for 
genetic variance to be maintained by a balance between its introduction by muta-
tion and its removal by selection (Lande 1979) or random drift (Barton and Turelli 
1989). In biology, most of the debate involves theoretical considerations about the 
distribution of mutation effect sizes, the number of loci influencing the trait, and 
the extent of pleiotropy (Johnson and Barton 2005; see Penke et al. 2007 for a 
review of alternative models from the perspective of human personality evolution-
ary genetics). The problem with applying these models to the maintenance of 
genetic variation in nonhuman primate personality traits is that the data required to 
evaluate them are not available so the arguments are restricted to theoretical consid-
erations. Until such a time as data are available, evolutionary studies of personality 
will focus on phenotypic and quantitative genetic data.
Even without comprehensive molecular genetic data, fitness trade-offs are essential 
to consider in the evolution of any trait (Lande 1982; Charnov 1989; Roff and 
Fairbairn 2007). Such incompatibilities arise when a change in one trait that 
increases fitness is accompanied by a change in a second trait that decreases fitness. 
Trade-offs are a particular focus of life-history theory where, for example, there 
might be alternative choices between fecundity and survival (Williams 1966b; 
Partridge and Sibly 1991). Because selection will have eroded variation that influ-
ences both traits positively, components of fitness tend to have negative genetic 
correlations even if the phenotypes are positively correlated (Lande 1982). The evo-
lutionary effect that such trade-offs have is typically explored through genetic cova-
riations (Roff and Fairbairn 2007). This brings us back to the multivariate breeder’s 
equation (see Sect. 6.3.2): the potential response of a trait to selection is constrained 
by selection on other, correlated characters, expressed in the G matrix.
The interpretation of G as an expression of trade-offs between traits is not with-
out controversy (Pigliucci 2006) because functional trade-offs between two traits 
(e.g., in resource allocation) can sometimes have a positive genetic correlation 
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(Houle 1991). In personality research, some of these broader problems can be avoided 
because we are not interested in predicting long-term responses to  selection, which 
is the crux of much of Pigliucci’s (2006) critique of evolutionary quantitative genet-
ics. Trade-offs that can be posited by considering genetic covariances can also be 
seen when selection of correlated characters produces scenarios where different 
combinations of traits have equal fitness, potentially maintaining genetic variation 
in each trait (Roff and Fairbairn 2007). Beyond this, traits can be entangled devel-
opmentally through higher orders of epistasis in addition to genetic  correlation 
(Rice 2004).
6.4.2  Evolving and Resolving Explanations
Evolutionary psychologists have given many explanations for the persistence of 
variation in human personality. These explanations have been grouped into three 
categories: adaptive, nonadaptive, and maladaptive differences (Buss and Greiling 
1999). In evolutionary genetic terms, the categories can be rephrased. When speaking 
of adaptive or maladaptive differences, one is interested in traits that are causally 
related to fitness, without regard for “where” the variation is coming from (genes 
or the environment). Nonadaptive sources of difference include neutral variation 
that, although it may correlate with fitness, does not cause fitness differences; and 
“by-products of adaptive variation” (Buss and Greiling 1999) that come about 
through the correlated selection of some other trait. Given the recent shared ancestry 
and common personality structures between humans and nonhuman primates, 
explanations offered by evolutionary psychologists are a reasonable starting point 
for addressing variation in nonhuman primate personality.
Tooby and Cosmides (1990a) were the first to place personality squarely within 
a modern evolutionary framework, arguing that individual variation was the result 
of neutral evolution. Most of the variation in the traits that psychologists consider 
as personality would evolve by drift if behavioral tendencies that are stable across 
situations are not adaptive; this is because such general tendencies would not be 
solving any particular problem and thus be causally unconnected with fitness, that 
is, evolving neutrally. Although the effective population size in humans is large 
enough that drift is inadequate at reducing genetic variance in neutral traits, all the 
evidence connecting personality to differences in health, longevity, and reproduc-
tive success contradicts the required complete selective neutrality (Penke et al. 
2007). MacDonald (1995, 1998) and Nettle (2006) argued instead that variation is 
maintained by balancing selection for personality differences as alternative behavioral 
strategies. Human personality dimensions can be cast as trade-offs (Nettle 2006) 
between mating success and exploration versus risk (Extraversion); vigilance versus 
the health consequences of stress (Neuroticism), mate attraction versus psychosis 
(Openness); short-term versus long-term fitness benefits (Conscientiousness); and 
altruism versus selfishness (Agreeableness). If this is the case, similar trade-offs are 
likely to manifest in nonhuman primates. As several of these mechanisms are being 
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investigated in primates (e.g., stress and cooperative behavior), an appreciation of 
individual differences would reveal whether these fitness trade-offs exist. For example, 
most primate interaction networks support the emergence of  cooperation (Voelkl 
and Kasper 2009), so primate societies might contain a mix of cooperators and 
defectors who differ in Agreeableness. Other trade-offs that have not been put for-
ward for humans have been observed in primates, such as decreased vigilance over 
infants displayed by rhesus macaque mothers while engaged in allogrooming 
(Maestripieri 1993).
A basic life-history trade-off has also been theorized to underlie human personality 
and intelligence differences (Rushton 1985; Figueredo et al. 2005; Rushton et al. 
2008). This within-species difference in a developmental strategy of investing in 
fecundity or survival was theorized to extend in humans to family size, interbirth 
interval, and parental care (Rushton 1985). An individual would either pursue a 
risky life of multiple mates, large families, and little parental investment or a slow-
paced existence with one mate, few children, and long life. Humans disposed 
toward the latter strategy were found to be less neurotic, more extraverted, more 
agreeable, and more conscientious (Figueredo et al. 2005). Rushton et al. (2008) 
combined this with the postulation of a general factor of personality (GFP) underlying 
the five human dimensions (Musek 2007) to suggest this single factor (capturing 
differences in cooperativeness and prosociality) is under directional selection along 
with the associated life-history traits (contra Figueredo et al. 2005, who proposed 
balancing selection). Although selection has not been estimated for the GFP, 
genetic analysis of twins showed that all of the genetic variance was attributable to 
dominance effects (Rushton et al. 2008), which matches a theoretical prediction of 
long-term directional selection (Falconer and Mackay 1996) and the finding that 
life-history traits have higher dominance variance (Crnokrak and Roff 1995).
The existence of a general personality factor in humans is a bit tender in its 
psychometric joints (Ashton et al. 2009), but this does not invalidate the study of 
life-history traits and personality in nonhuman primates. Personality traits may be 
separately linked to different life-history variables. In comparison with most other 
mammals of the same size, primates take longer to gestate and mature, have fewer 
offspring, and live longer lives (Strier 2003). There is also a significant amount of 
variation in life-history variables among primate species concerning the speed of gesta-
tion, development, and maturation adjusting to fit differences in body size, which 
is an adaptation to local ecology (Harvey and Clutton-Brock 1985). Trade-offs, 
then, exist at the within-species level. This can be seen in rhesus macaques, which 
exhibit a positive genetic correlation between age at primiparity and longevity, so 
females who start reproducing earlier have a shorter lifespan (Blomquist 2009b), 
suggesting that a fitness trade-off in life-history strategies potentially exists in non-
human primates.
The life-history perspective on personality is also favored in theoretical work by 
behavioral ecologists (Dall et al. 2004; Stamps 2007; Wolf et al. 2007; Biro and 
Stamps 2008). Personality differences are again conceived of as distinct behavioral 
strategies (Dall et al. 2004). This body of theory allows us to imagine under what 
conditions we would not have personalities at all. Two basic “personalities” can 
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coexist as stable types of competing strategies under frequency-dependent selection 
(Maynard Smith 1982). However, the same stable situation can emerge if each 
individual plays a mixture of both strategies. In this case, no personalities exist 
because each individual is expressing exactly the same behavioral tendency. 
Individual differences in behavior that can be dubbed personality can emerge, how-
ever, if these differences are tied to life-history trade-offs (Wolf et al. 2007; Biro 
and Stamps 2008). More generally, the fitness of a particular trait may depend on 
the frequency of other traits being expressed in the population rather than on the 
frequency of alleles affecting the target trait (Reeve and Dugatkin 1998). For 
example, the fitness implications of exploratory behavior might depend on conspe-
cifics’ aggression rather than on one’s own level of exploration–avoidance. The output 
of such theory has so far been applied exclusively to studies of nonprimate animal 
personality from the framework of behavioral syndromes (Sih et al. 2004).
For rhetorical reasons, explanations of the persistence of variation in personality 
are often set up as mutually exclusive possibilities. This need not be the case and is 
probably an artifact of how selection is usually presented and contrasted (Rice 
2004). Directional and stabilizing selection can co-occur on the same trait, changing 
different moments of the phenotypic distribution. Such possibilities should be 
exploited when considering how personality evolves (see Sect. 6.6).
Which approach is applicable for nonhuman primates? Both their close affinity 
with humans and the rich literature on their behavioral ecology (Strier 2003) suggest 
that combining methodologies from evolutionary psychology and behavioral ecology 
perspectives are feasible. From an evolutionary genetic perspective, the apparent 
commonality of several aspects of primate personality structure, such as dimensions 
related to sociality and anxiety, suggest that certain evolutionary equilibria are main-
tained over long periods of time in primates. If true, evolutionary genetic processes 
can be fruitfully investigated using phenotypic data (see Chap. 7). Resolving alterna-
tive explanations for the persistence of variation in nonhuman primate personality is 
particularly exciting because we can compare species that are closely allied because 
of phylogenetic affinity (e.g., macaques) or socioecological similarity (e.g., chim-
panzees and spider monkeys). Nonhuman primates also offer a window through 
which to chase the evolutionary genetics of personality into the wild.
6.5  Evolution in the Wild
Studying the evolution of personality in primates means eventually studying 
 personality in wild primates. Investigating the selection of personality can proceed 
along two courses: by relating personality to fitness differences or by indirect infer-
ence in comparing how correlations among personality traits differ between popu-
lations in varying environments (Dingemanse and Réale 2005). Evolutionary genetic 
studies in the wild have progressed tremendously through the use of extensive pedi-
gree information, long-term data collection, and the identification of individuals 
(Kruuk and Hill 2008). Recognizing individual animals in the wild has been central 
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to traditions in primatology for at least 60 years (Matsuzawa and McGrew 2008). 
This acknowledgment of individuality and family life eventually led some 
 primatologists to start tracking familial lineages (Kawai 1958; Kawamura 1958; 
DeVore 1962; Yamada 1963; Carpenter 1964; Goodall 1986). Given the many 
decades these pedigrees have been curated at some wild primate sites (e.g., 
Arashiyama, Cayo Santiago, Gombe, and Koshima), it is a wonder that this infor-
mation has been used only sparingly for evolutionary and quantitative genetic 
research (the exceptions are, notably, captive populations, those at the Vervet Research 
Colony and the Southwest National Primate Research Center). More typically, 
pedigree information is used for the purpose of determining reproductive success, 
mate choice, and social relationships among kin (see Chap. 3). Quantitative genetic 
studies of wild primates offer rich, low-hanging fruit of which primatologists are 
now beginning to partake (Blomquist 2009a, b).
6.5.1  Pedigree Construction 
In primates, maternity can be reliably inferred from behavioral data, as infants 
initially associate exclusively with their mothers (Strier 2003). Paternity is more 
tricky and typically requires exclusion or likelihood assignment using genetic 
markers. Currently, the most prevalent molecular markers for pedigree construction 
are microsatellites (Jones and Ardren 2003). The advantages of microsatellites are 
that they are relatively easy to discover in new species, are codominant (both alleles 
can always be recognized, if they differ), are highly variable (making it easier to 
distinguish individuals), and can be obtained from wild samples (Pemberton 2008). 
With these markers, a number of algorithms and  statistical techniques can be used to 
assign paternity (Jones and Ardren 2003; Pemberton 2008). For evolutionary genet-
ics, pedigree accuracy is a constant concern because errors lead to imprecision in 
heritability estimates (Kruuk 2004).
Building pedigrees also allows detection of inbreeding. In primates, inbreeding 
is primarily a concern in isolated, endangered, or captive populations (e.g., Alvarez 
et al. 2009). Although the role of inbreeding depression in personality has not been 
investigated directly (Penke et al. 2007), there is evidence suggesting that it is a 
possibility (Rebello and Boomsma 2007).
6.5.2  Fitness Is Not What You Think It Is; Rather,  
It Is Exactly What You Think It Is
“Fitness” is an inconsistently used term in evolutionary studies, with evolutionary 
psychology being no exception. Many workers have taken definitions of fitness that 
attempt to distinguish the effect of random drift from that of natural selection. Writing 
on the subject, authors often adopt, knowingly or unknowingly, Williams’s (1966a) 
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definition of fitness as the average reproductive success of a given “design.” For 
example, Grafen (1988) acknowledged Williams in distinguishing individual life-
time reproductive success from fitness, and Penke et al. (2007, p. 553) described 
fitness as a property of a genotype, with “its statistical propensity for successful 
reproduction.” Yet these distinctions are not necessary. The cleanest definition 
marks fitness as an individual’s contribution to the next generation, and it is thus a 
property of individuals and not of genotypes or of alleles (Rice 2004). This inter-
pretation includes both selection and drift in an individual’s reproductive success, 
the difference being whether the covariance between genotype and fitness is random 
(drift) or nonrandom (selection). It is thus a question of causality.
Lifetime reproductive success is therefore the canonical measure of fitness, but 
individual differences leading to reproductive success can enter at any stage in an 
organism’s life – the where and when having considerable practical import. Four 
general components of fitness include survival to breeding age, reproductive lifespan, 
fecundity, and offspring survival (Brown 1988). Assuming parentage can be assigned, 
these data can be (and are being) tracked in wild primates. Whichever component of 
fitness is used, selection is measured with it in the same way. The first step is to test 
whether the trait of focus is significantly related to fitness (Mitchell-Olds and Shaw 
1987) by regressing the trait on fitness. Because annual and lifetime breeding success 
are not normally distributed but, rather, follow a zero-inflated Poisson or negative 
binomial distribution, where each year in an animal’s life is a chance to “fail” at having 
an offspring, a generalized linear model should be used instead of an ordinary least-
squares regression (Kruuk et al. 2002). The next step is to estimate the strength and 
mode of selection by regressing the standardized trait on relative fitness as the linear 
coefficient (for directional selection) or twice the quadratic coefficient (for stabilizing 
or disruptive selection) using an ordinary least-squares method (Arnold and Wade 
1984; Stinchcombe et al. 2008). Because there are competing hypotheses about the role 
of selection in maintaining variation in personality, it is essential to avoid the publica-
tion bias that plagues estimates of the strength of selection (Kingsolver et al. 2001). 
Given the present state of knowledge on personality in the wild, the absence of selec-
tion is as interesting as its presence (Dingemanse and Réale 2005) because we would 
like to know under what ecological conditions personality differences are adaptive in 
primates and when they are only neutral.
Selection coefficients of personality traits are already being estimated in wild 
populations of nonprimate animals (Dingemanse and Réale 2005), so primatologists 
should follow the lead of behavioral ecologists in applying the tools of evolutionary 
biology to personality (in contrast to doing psychology with their evolutionary- 
paradigm beanie on). A difficulty in following this path is that in current studies of 
nonhuman primate personality, lifetime reproductive success is usually not available 
simply because the study subjects are still alive. Research on living individuals must 
then use other components of fitness, such as age at primiparity, interbirth interval, 
annual reproductive success, or infant survival. Investigations of personality in popu-
lations of wild primates are barely embryonic, but a future goal of this research 
should be longitudinal studies that ultimately measure the implications of personality 
differences for lifetime reproductive success.
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6.5.3  G Matrices Gone Wild
The use of the additive genetic variance–covariance matrix runs into a spot of 
trouble when taken out of the farm and into the jungle. In agricultural and labora-
tory conditions, the predictive value of the breeder’s equation works because we 
decide which traits to select. In the wild, however, we can never be certain that we 
are including all the characteristics that are being selected (Lande and Arnold 1983; 
Endler 1986). This is one explanation for why, in wild populations, the phenotypic 
response to selection can be either zero or even opposite of what is predicted from 
the G matrix and the vector of selection gradients (Merilä et al. 2001).
Another general difficulty that must be resolved in the particular is the leap from 
the estimation of selection gradients to inferences about adaptation (Grafen 1988). 
Here, we are seeking functional and causative accounts for how personality and life-
history variables lead to differences in reproductive success (Pigliucci 2006). In the 
troop of primates where we find only the introverts having children, is the negative 
correlation between Extraversion and breeding success chance sampling variation 
(i.e., genetic drift), or is this connection causal, meaning that there is selection for 
low Extraversion? In building causal models to distinguish direct selection from 
indirect selection or random drift, it is essential to have a more complete functional and 
behavioral understanding of personality differences. In nonhuman primates, person-
ality dimensions based on adjectival descriptors do not enjoy a one-to-one mapping 
with independent aspects of behavior (Kone ná et al. 2008). In langurs, both 
Confidence and Extraversion correlate with the behavioral dimension Activity, but 
Confidence is also related to the Dominance and Involvement behavioral compo-
nents. It is likely that impressionistic dimensions capture personality traits that can 
be expressed through different aspects of the same behavior, such as the frequency 
and bout length of grooming sessions. This is precisely the point where behavioral 
repertoire and syndrome approaches will be of most use in the evolutionary genetics 
of nonhuman primate behavior, where a syndrome or profile can identify the situa-
tional and behavioral units that correlate. Such procedures promise to untangle the 
ecological variables defining the situations in which personality is differentially 
expressed and provide testable paths through which trait personality differences 
might be affecting life-history outcomes and reproductive success.
6.5.4  Into the Wilds of Personality
Although personality researchers can borrow techniques for estimating heritability 
and selection from evolutionary quantitative geneticists, they are still faced with 
the problem of collecting personality data on wild animals. Studies that specifi-
cally take ecological or evolutionary paths to discovering and defining personality 
traits are sorely lacking on nonhuman primates (Uher 2008). In addition to high-
lighting the need to investigate species-specific differences in personality con-
structs (Uher 2008; Uher et al. 2008), we also need to be open to the possibility of 
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the same species exhibiting alternative personality structures in different ecological 
environments (Bell 2005; Uher 2008). Another barrier to educing a whole person-
ality structure of a species in the wild is the number of different populations that 
can be studied. The incorporation of Openness-like facets into the Extraversion 
dimension of Hanuman langurs (Kone ná et al. 2008) could be peculiar to the 
population rather than to the species. The small sample of langurs (n = 27) is not 
necessarily fatal, as a fully informative factor structure can be recovered from 
small samples if the number of factors is small and the number of items large (de 
Winter et al. 2009). Furthermore, as the chimpanzee factor model replicated in 
different populations (King et al. 2005; Weiss et al. 2007, 2009), there are unlikely 
to be broad structural differences between  primate populations of the same species, 
as defined by factor models of personality. Understanding the ecologically relevant 
differences in primate personality expression, then, requires the finer lens of 
behavioral repertoire and allied approaches.
A standard adjective rating instrument, such as the Hominoid Personality 
Questionnaire,1 can be used to obtain an initial impression of species whose person-
ality has not been previously measured. First, this allows initial integration into 
other findings about personality structure and will help resolve unknown questions 
about the historical patterns of personality evolution. Second, as a practical matter, 
impressionistic ratings can be gathered from raters who, although familiar with the 
individual animals in the study population, may not have been studying their behavior. 
Finally, behavioral repertoires might differ between populations (because of slight 
differences in ecological situations) more than the personality structure is likely to 
differ.
6.6  Personality As a Norm of Reaction 
An interaction between a genotype and a set of environments is called a reaction 
norm (Dobzhansky 1955; Platt and Sanislow 1998 and references therein). Plots 
showing hypothetical reaction norms of different genotypes in different environ-
ments litter psychology textbooks (Platt and Sanislow 1998) and come up repeatedly 
in contentious debates about nature and nurture (e.g., Sternberg and Grigorenko 
1997). Accounting for these effects will take real work, not just chatter about 
Arabadopsis, Drosophila, and Mus. Models that estimate variance from G × E inter-
actions have started making their way into psychological research (Johnson 2007). 
The concept of a behavioral syndrome explicitly incorporates the idea of personali-
ties as norms of reaction (i.e., a correlated suite of responses across environments) 
(Sih et al. 2004) and captures the idea that personality depends on context (van Oers 
et al. 2005b). Envisioning personality in this way may allow behavioral ecologists 
1Available from Alexander Weiss.
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to bypass much of debate between person–situation and ordinary trait perspectives 
on personality (Penke et al. 2007). However, a norm-of-reaction approach offers a 
much greater potential for integrating between- and within-individual variation in 
personality to the intrepid primate psychologist willing to grapple with a few more 
complexities in their models.
Looking at personality as a reaction norm may fuse various perspectives on 
 personality when we incorporate tools from quantitative genetics (van Oers et al. 2005a). 
Mischel and Shoda’s (1995) person × situation perspective on personality, which 
looks for stable behavioral profiles, can be recast in terms of reaction norms (Penke 
et al. 2007). Penke et al. (2007) also noted that Mischel and Shoda (1995) focused 
their theory on describing individual reaction norms but that as aspects of these 
behavioral profiles are heritable (Borkenau et al. 2006) it is more appropriate to 
examine the G × E level of reaction norm differences. However, the individual reac-
tion norm should not be discarded, even if what we are interested in is genetics.
The G × E reaction norms are typically investigated using experimental designs 
that subject a set of genotypes to different environments to assess the phenotypic 
plasticity of each genotype (Via et al. 1993). What do we do with primates, how-
ever, who are generally not keen on being cloned or grown in experimental plots? 
To the extent that a personality trait varies within an individual, it is a labile trait, 
changing throughout the course of life (Gomulkiewicz and Kirkpatrick 1992; 
Lynch and Walsh 1998).
Because personality can be measured multiple times, either in different situa-
tions or as the individual ages, it can also be examined using individual reaction 
norms (Nussey et al. 2007). Individual reaction norms encompass all of the situa-
tions and environments in which an individual expresses a trait throughout life. 
Reaction norms can be scrutinized at both the individual phenotypic and genotypic 
levels. An individual reaction norm covers person × situation (or environment) 
variance at the phenotypic level, whereas the genetic reaction norm describes 
G × E interactions. Differences in reaction norms may exist at either level (or none 
or both). These reaction norms have a physiological basis, as seen in rhesus 
macaques, who have stable serotonin concentrations in early life as they experience 
a number of stressful events during emigration (Mehlman et al. 1995). The nonge-
netic variance in individual reaction norms is attributed to permanent environment 
effects, which for personality could include the influence of early development or 
of learning. Individual reaction norms can be studied with quantitative genetics 
using a random regression animal model (Gomulkiewicz and Kirkpatrick 1992; 
Nussey et al. 2007), which, using repeated measures of personality in different 
situations and pedigree data, can distinguish the permanent from the genetic 
sources of interaction variance.
The chief practical difficulties of this approach for the evolutionary genetics of 
primate personality are twofold. The first is the partition of environments. What 
situations are considered the same environment in which a personality trait is being 
expressed? Plus what is a situation? Second, the sample sizes needed to obtain good 
estimates of these parameters will be arduous to muster for nonhuman primates. 
Hopefully, primatologists are up to this challenge (van Oers et al. 2005a).
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6.7  Conclusion
Reaction-norm representations of the expression, development, and evolution of 
behavior may be able to separate out the genes, situations, and vagaries of existence 
that go into determining an individual primate’s personality. However, these approaches 
by themselves have little hope of putting an end to the nature–nurture debate 
because we cannot fathom that nature + nurture is a model.
The focus here has been on variance component models that break down the 
causes of personality and of measuring selection on the phenotypic level because 
this is what the data from most current studies of wild nonhuman primates can 
 support. Researchers familiar with their primate subjects, even if they do not study 
behavior, are a resource for getting initial impressionistic ratings from which a 
personality structure can be defined. Once this structure is known and compared 
within its phylogenetic context, researchers can ask the salient behavioral and eco-
logical questions of why we find a particular personality structure in each species. 
Many primates live together in groups where kin can be identified and tracked as 
individuals throughout their lives, supplying information about genetic relatedness 
and life history needed for evolutionary genetic studies of personality. Ethological 
investigations of more specific aspects of personality can be used to connect per-
sonality differences to fitness-relevant outcomes. To the extent that personality 
hinders or helps individual or group adaptation to habitat disruption, a thorough 
understanding of nonhuman primate personality may aid conservation efforts.
Taking evolutionary quantitative genetics more broadly, we should aim to investi-
gate primate personality through population genetics, genomics, and molecular ecology. 
These techniques are already being used to study the evolution of primate phenotypes, 
such as coloration, for which specific gene variants have been identified (see Chap. 14). 
Comparing homologous and convergent personality traits among primate taxa would 
highlight ecological conditions that pattern structural divergence between species as 
well as guide the evolutionary study of psychological traits out of the morass of “envi-
ronments of evolutionary adaptedness” (Symons 1979; Tooby and Cosmides 2005). 
This would further involve finding gene variants and quantitative loci underlying per-
sonality differences, detecting differences in gene frequencies among populations of 
the same species, and looking for molecular signatures of past selection and demo-
graphic changes that explain extant variation in primate personality.
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Rhesus Macaques (Macaca mulatta) as Living Fossils of Hominoid
Personality and Subjective Well-Being
Alexander Weiss and Mark James Adams
University of Edinburgh
Anja Widdig
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology,
and University of Leipzig
Melissa S. Gerald
University of Puerto Rico—Medical Sciences Campus
Personality dimensions capturing individual differences in behavior, cognition, and affect have been described
in several species, including humans, chimpanzees, and orangutans. However, comparisons between species
are limited by the use of different questionnaires. We asked raters to assess free-ranging rhesus macaques at
two time points on personality and subjective well-being questionnaires used earlier to rate chimpanzees and
orangutans. Principal-components analysis yielded domains we labeled Confidence, Friendliness, Dominance,
Anxiety, Openness, and Activity. The presence of Openness in rhesus macaques suggests it is an ancestral
characteristic. The absence of Conscientiousness suggests it is a derived characteristic in African apes. Higher
Confidence and Friendliness, and lower Anxiety were prospectively related to subjective well-being, indicat-
ing that the connection between personality and subjective well-being in humans, chimpanzees, and orang-
utans is ancestral in catarrhine primates. As demonstrated here, each additional species studied adds another
fold to the rich, historical story of primate personality evolution.
Keywords: rhesus macaque, primate, personality, stability, well-being
Nonhuman primate personality traits capture impressions that
are reliable in that they are consistent across raters and time (King
& Figueredo, 1997; King, Weiss, & Sisco, 2008; Stevenson-Hinde,
Stillwell-Barnes, & Zunz, 1980; Uher, Asendorpf, & Call, 2008;
Weiss, King, & Perkins, 2006). Nonhuman primate personality
traits are also valid in that they are related to other measures,
including observed behavior (Capitanio, 1999; Konečná et al.,
2008; Pederson, King, & Landau, 2005; Stevenson-Hinde et al.,
1980; Uher & Asendorpf, 2008).
Like the study of physical characteristics in different species, the
comparative method can address questions concerning the evolu-
tion of stable personality traits (Gosling & Graybeal, 2007; Harvey
& Pagel, 1991). King and Figueredo (1997) examined personality
phylogeny by obtaining ratings of zoo chimpanzees on a question-
naire based on measures of the five major dimensions along which
humans differ — Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agree-
ableness, and Conscientiousness (Digman, 1990). They found a
broad chimpanzee-specific Dominance domain, and five additional
domains that, while differing slightly on the trait level, were
analogous to human personality domains (King & Figueredo,
1997). Thus, precursors of human personality were likely present
in the common chimpanzee-human ancestor and early hominids,
though dominance was no longer a key domain upon which
members of the latter could be distinguished. A study of orangutan
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personality using an expanded version of the same questionnaire as
that used to rate chimpanzees found variants of human and chim-
panzee Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Agreeableness domains as
well as a Dominance domain, suggesting that these domains may
have existed in the common ancestors of great apes and humans
(Weiss et al., 2006). In addition, this same study found that, instead
of making up separate domains, traits defining Openness and
Conscientiousness defined a single domain in orangutans named
Intellect, suggesting that selection may have favored separate
Openness and Conscientiousness domains in species such as hu-
mans and chimpanzees, which have more complex social struc-
tures.
Although personality differences have been described in great
apes and humans, the historical patterns of personality evolution
cannot be deduced from examining this taxon alone. Studying
personality in Old World monkeys, which split off from hominoids
between 25 and 30 mya (Andrews, 1986), could offer insights into
the evolutionary origins of personality and selective factors which
contribute to phylogenetic divergences in personality. Their distant
relatedness to humans relative to hominoids makes Old World
monkeys an important study species for understanding human
evolution.
Rhesus macaques have been the most widely used nonhuman
primate in behavioral research. Unlike hominoids, and what is
often assumed to be the ancestral social structure for early hom-
inids (Foley & Lee, 1989; Wrangham, 1987), rhesus macaque
social structure is largely based on male dispersal (Colvin, 1986;
Manson, 1995; Melnick & Pearl, 1987) with female philopatry
(Gouzoules & Gouzoules, 1987). Like other macaque species,
rhesus macaques live in multimale, multifemale groups, which are
characterized as matrilineal societies, with a matriline defined as
all descendants of a founder female (Melnick & Pearl, 1987).
Early personality research on captive rhesus macaques using a
questionnaire containing 33 behaviorally defined adjectives iden-
tified three reliable and stable domains: Confident, which de-
scribes differences in boldness and submissiveness; Excitable,
representing differences in curiosity, activity, and reactions to
change; and Sociable, which captures differences in how much
time individuals spends with others (Stevenson-Hinde et al., 1980;
Stevenson-Hinde & Zunz, 1978). Later studies using this same
questionnaire identified an additional rhesus macaque personality
domain labeled Equable (Bolig, Price, O’Neill, & Suomi, 1992;
Capitanio, 1999), comprised of individual differences in reactions
to conspecifics, the appropriateness of behaviors displayed toward
conspecifics, and being slow, deliberate, and not hurried (Capi-
tanio, 1999).
These four rhesus macaque personality domains roughly ap-
proximate personality domains of other species. Confident is de-
scribed by items similar to those which describe chimpanzee
Dominance (Dutton, 2008; King & Figueredo, 1997) and orang-
utan Neuroticism (Weiss et al., 2006). Traits similar to those
making up the Excitable, Sociable, and Equable domains are found
in the Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Agreeableness domains,
respectively, of humans (Costa & McCrae, 1992), chimpanzees
(Dutton, 2008; King & Figueredo, 1997), and orangutans (Weiss et
al., 2006). In addition to predicting behavior (Capitanio, 1999),
these domains predicted immunocompetence (Capitanio, Men-
doza, & Baroncelli, 1999; Maninger, Capitanio, Mendoza, & Ma-
son, 2003) and corticosteroid response (Capitanio, Mendoza, &
Bentson, 2004).
Subjective well-being or “happiness” is a construct closely
related to personality and describes individual differences in pos-
itive affect (Diener, 2000). The study of subjective well-being was,
in part, a reaction to the near exclusive focus of much psycholog-
ical research on the study of psychopathology (Seligman & Csik-
szentmihalyi, 2000). Like human personality domains (McCrae &
Costa, 2003), subjective well-being is mostly stable throughout life
(Diener, 2000). Moreover, humans who are higher in subjective
well-being tend to be lower in Neuroticism and higher in Extra-
version (Steel, Schmidt, & Shultz, 2008). This personality-well-
being nexus is partially genetic, as the genetic variance in subjec-
tive well-being can be accounted for by genes also influencing
personality (Weiss, Bates, & Luciano, 2008).
Research on rater assessed chimpanzee subjective well-being
also found high interrater reliability, stability over time, and cor-
relations with personality like those described in human research
(King & Landau, 2003; Weiss et al., 2009). A study of subjective
well-being in orangutans using the same questionnaire also found
correlations like those described in humans and chimpanzees
(Weiss et al., 2006). Finally, as in humans, chimpanzee subjective
well-being is genetically correlated with personality (Weiss, King,
& Enns, 2002).
The above findings regarding human, chimpanzee, orangutan,
and rhesus macaque personality suggest conservation of some
basic personality dimensions over evolutionary time. We therefore
expect to find rhesus macaque variants of traits similar to the
Sociable, Excitable, Equable, and Confident domains identified in
prior studies (Bolig et al., 1992; Capitanio, 1999; Stevenson-Hinde
et al., 1980; Stevenson-Hinde & Zunz, 1978). However, these
previous studies of rhesus macaque personality did not identify
distinct Conscientiousness or Openness domains. There are three
possible explanations for the failure to find such domains in rhesus
macaques. The first possibility is that the earlier assessment in-
strument was developed prior to the adoption of what has come to
be known as the human Five-Factor Model (Digman, 1990) and
may therefore not have been comprehensive enough to capture all
rhesus macaque personality domains (Uher, 2008). The second
possibility is that prior studies were based on captive samples
which may not have been able to fully express their behavioral
repertoires (Uher, 2008). The third possibility is that rhesus ma-
caques cannot be differentiated on these domains and that the
distinct clustering of individual differences in exploratory behavior
and predictability is a more recent adaptation.
As such, our primary goal was to investigate which personality
domains are present in rhesus macaques, and, in particular,
whether distinct Conscientiousness or Openness domains are pres-
ent. To rule out the possibility that limitations of previous rhesus
macaque personality studies led to the absence of separable Con-
scientiousness or Openness domains, we used a broad instrument
which identified these domains in chimpanzees. To exclude the
possibility that the limited behavioral repertoires of small samples
of captive rhesus macaques did not permit the detection of Con-
scientiousness and Openness, we conducted this study with a large
sample of free-ranging individuals. These results could therefore
address the third possibility, that these personality differences are
the result of adaptation, and thus yield valuable insights into the
evolutionary origins of personality. For example, if we find dis-
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tinct Conscientiousness or Openness domains, this would suggest
that they were present in the common ancestor of Old World
monkeys and hominoids and that the orangutan Intellect domain is
derived. On the other hand, if we fail to find distinct Conscien-
tiousness or Openness domains this would suggest that these
domains arose in the common ancestor of chimpanzees and hu-
mans before they speciated some 5–6 mya (Chimpanzee Sequenc-
ing & Analysis Consortium, 2005).
The subjective well-being findings in humans and great apes
strongly suggest that the relationship between personality traits
such as Extraversion and Neuroticism and higher and lower sub-
jective well-being, respectively, is ancestral. This possibility is
strongly supported by the fact that these relationships are geneti-
cally mediated in humans (Weiss et al., 2008) and chimpanzees
(Weiss et al., 2002). Thus, we asked several raters to assess the
same set of rhesus macaques on the subjective well-being measure
used in previous studies of chimpanzees (King & Landau, 2003;
Weiss et al., 2009) and orangutans (Weiss et al., 2006). If person-
ality and subjective well-being are related in the same way as they
are in humans, chimpanzees, and orangutans, this would suggest
that these relationships existed in the common ancestor of cerco-
pithecoids and hominoids and were conserved.
One defining characteristic of human personality traits (Roberts
& DelVecchio, 2000) and subjective well-being is that they are
mostly stable over time (Eid & Diener, 2004). Thus, for the present
study, personality and subjective well-being ratings were collected
in two waves separated in time by over 1 year. These data will
therefore enable us to determine how stable these constructs are in
rhesus macaques and whether the relationship between these con-
structs is also stable. Thus, they will offer further insight into how
rhesus macaque personality and subjective well-being compare to
like constructs in chimpanzees, orangutans, and humans.
Methods
Subjects and Raters
Subjects were 125 rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) from the
free-ranging population on Cayo Santiago (for more details see
Rawlins & Kessler, 1986) who were rated in two waves. The Wave
1 sample consisted of 124 subjects (51 males and 73 females) rated
between February 2006 and July 2007. The mean age of Wave 1
subjects was 7.71 years (SD ! 6.21). Wave 1 males had a mean
age of 7.17 years (SD ! 6.48) and Wave 1 females had a mean age
of 8.08 years (SD ! 6.03). The Wave 2 sample consisted of 71
subjects (26 males and 45 females) rated 13.9 to 18.0 months later
between August, 2007 and May, 2008. Of the Wave 2 subjects, all
but one male had been rated in Wave 1. The mean age of Wave 2
subjects was 6.26 years (SD ! 5.53). Wave 2 males had a mean
age of 3.09 years (SD ! 0.09) and Wave 2 females had a mean age
of 8.09 years (SD ! 6.27).
Subjects were rated by multiple raters who, for 3 to 24 months
prior to this study, had been conducting unrelated research, and
could reliably identify individual subjects. There were 11 raters in
Wave 1. Ratings in Wave 2 were made by three raters from Wave
1 and three new raters.
Instruments
We modified questionnaires used to rate the personality and
subjective well-being of captive chimpanzees (King & Figueredo,
1997; King & Landau, 2003; Weiss et al., 2009) and orangutans
(Weiss et al., 2006) for use in rating free-ranging monkeys. Mod-
ification involved changing the words “enclosure” and “chimpan-
zee” to “environment” and “monkey,” respectively. Raters were
instructed to base ratings on overall impressions of the subjects
and to not discuss their ratings. Ratings were made on a 7-point
Likert scale.
Personality measure. The Hominoid Personality Question-
naire consists of 54 adjectives, each followed by one to three
sentences defining the adjective within the context of nonhuman
primate behavior. For example, the item fearful is “FEARFUL:
Subject reacts excessively to real or imagined threats by displaying
behaviors such as screaming, grimacing, running away or other
signs of anxiety or distress.” The original version included 43
items and was used to rate chimpanzees (King & Figueredo, 1997).
Of these items, 41 were sampled from the factors of Goldberg’s
(1990) taxonomy of the Big Five and two (autistic and clumsy)
were created by the King and Figueredo. This questionnaire was
later increased by five items for a study of orangutan personality
(Weiss et al., 2006). Of these new items, anxious and vulnerable
were based on facets of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory
Neuroticism domain (Costa & McCrae, 1992), curious and con-
ventional were based on markers of Openness from an adjectival
questionnaire (McCrae & Costa, 1985), and cool was created by
the researchers to capture low Neuroticism. In a later revision
(Weiss et al., 2009) the 48 item version of the questionnaire was
expanded by adding three Conscientiousness and three Openness
items. Two Conscientiousness items (thoughtless and quitting)
were from an adjectival questionnaire (McCrae and Costa, 1985)
and one (distractible) was devised by the researchers. All three
Openness markers (individualistic, innovative, and unperceptive)
were created by these researchers.
Subjective well-being measure. This questionnaire includes
four items derived from measures of human subjective well-being,
which assessed the balance of positive and negative moods, plea-
sure derived from social interactions, the ability to achieve per-
sonal goals, and how “happy” raters think they would be if they
were the target individual. Because of a clerical error, the third
item of this questionnaire referred to “enclosure”; it was thus left
out of all analyses.
Missing Data
At Wave 1 one subject was missing one item (curious) while 13
subjects were missing 18 to 39 items. Data were not missing at
random but came from raters who did not provide ratings for any
subject on a subset of items. Twenty-three subjects were not
assessed by one of their raters on a single subjective well-being
item, although every subject had a rating from at least one rater on
each item.
Statistical Analyses
Interrater reliabilities of items. Interrater reliabilities of
personality and subjective well-being ratings were calculated from
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scores at Wave 1 for the 91 macaques judged by two or more
raters. We measured interrater reliabilities of personality and sub-
jective well-being ratings using two intraclass correlations (Shrout
& Fleiss, 1979): ICC(3, 1) and ICC(3, k).
Principal-components analysis. To determine the factors
underlying ratings, we conducted principal-components analyses1
using the principal procedure (Revelle, 2009) from the R statistics
package (R Development Core Team, 2008) and determined the
number of components by examining the scree plot and by using
R’s paran function (Dinno, 2008) to conduct a parallel analysis
(Horn, 1965). We then used a varimax rotation to obtain orthog-
onal components and a promax procedure to obtain oblique com-
ponents. The latter rotation was conducted because it enabled us to
estimate correlations among components and to determine whether
allowing components to correlate altered the structure.
The principal-components analysis of personality ratings was
based on the mean scores across raters for the 52 personality items
at Wave 1 which displayed some consistency across raters. For this
analysis we dropped 13 subjects that were missing scores on nine
or more items. The principal-components analysis of subjective
well-being items was based on the mean scores across raters for
the three subjective well-being items.
We created personality domain scores using unit-weighting. This
involved assigning items with salient loadings (defined as ! .40) on
a component weights of " 1 or #1 depending on whether the loading
was positive or negative, respectively, and assigning a weight of 0 to
items which did not have salient loadings. If an item had salient
loadings on more than one component, it was assigned to the com-
ponent on which it had the highest loading. The sum of the weighted
item scores defined the domain score. The same procedure was used
to create domain scores for any subjective well-being components.
It is important to note that creating scores via unit-weighting
does not preserve the independence of varimax-rotated compo-
nents. However, we chose to use unit-weighting because results
derived from these scores are more generalizable than those de-
rived from differentially weighted scores (Gorsuch, 1983; p. 267).
This advantage stems from the fact that, unless sample sizes are
very large, the exact component loadings used to create differen-
tially weighted scores will reflect some degree of capitalization on
chance (Gorsuch, 1983; p. 266).
To interpret rhesus macaque personality factors, we examined the
items that had salient loadings on those factors in light of the content
of those items, the relationship between those items and the five
human dimensions, and the rhesus macaque personality literature
(Bolig et al., 1992; Capitanio, 1999; Stevenson-Hinde et al., 1980;
Stevenson-Hinde & Zunz, 1978). To help interpret factors we also
created unit-weighted domain scores for the rhesus macaques rated in
Wave 1 using the definitions of the six chimpanzee (King &
Figueredo, 1997) and five orangutan (Weiss et al., 2006) personality
factors and examined the correlations between domain scores based
on rhesus macaque personality structure and those based on the
chimpanzee and orangutan personality structures.
Reliabilities of personality domains and subjective well-
being. We measured interrater reliabilities of personality do-
main and subjective well-being scores using two intraclass corre-
lation coefficients described by Shrout and Fleiss (1979):
ICC(3, 1) and ICC(3, k). Personality domain scores in these anal-
yses were based on unit-weighted scores with mean substitution
from individual judgments on the 81 subjects at Wave 1 and 49
subjects at Wave 2 that were assessed by multiple raters who did
not miss more than eight items. Subjective well-being scores for
these analyses were generated by summing the three subjective
well-being items from individual judgments of each animal. Inter-
nal consistency reliabilities for personality domains and subjective
well-being were calculated via Cronbach’s alpha on mean ratings
of 111 macaques at Wave 1 and 71 at Wave 2. Retest reliabilities
were measured using Pearson correlations between the Wave 1 and
Wave 2 mean unit-weighted personality domain and subjective
well-being scores for the 70 subjects assessed in both waves.
Personality and subjective well-being correlations. To ex-
amine the cross-sectional relationship between personality domains
and subjective well-being we computed correlations between person-
ality and subjective well-being scores for the 111 subjects assessed in
Wave 1 and the 71 subjects assessed in Wave 2 with fewer than nine
missing items. For the 70 subjects assessed at both time points we
examined correlations between Wave 1 personality domains and
Wave 2 subjective well-being as well as correlations between Wave
1 subjective well-being and Wave 2 personality domains.
Results
Interrater Reliabilities of Items
Personality. The reliability of single ratings (ICC[3, 1]) ranged
from #0.05 for autistic to 0.63 for dominant and had a mean of 0.26.
The reliability of mean ratings (ICC[3, k]) ranged from #0.17 for
autistic to 0.86 for dominant with a mean of 0.52. We excluded the
items autistic and unperceptive from further analysis as unreliable
because their interrater reliabilities were less than zero.
Subjective well-being. All three subjective well-being items
were reliable. The ICC(3, 1) for the items assessing balance of
positive and negative moods, pleasure derived from social inter-
actions, and how “happy” raters think they would be if they were
the monkey were 0.41, 0.44, and 0.43, respectively. The ICC(3, k)
values for the same three items were .72, .73, and .72, respectively.
Personality Structure
Principal-components analysis of the 52 reliable items indicated 10
components with eigenvalues exceeding 1.00. Examination of the
scree plot suggested there were six components and parallel analysis
indicated that only the first six eigenvalues (10.47, 7.21, 7.05, 4.11,
2.74, and 2.24) were greater than expected by chance at the 95%
confidence level. We therefore extracted six components and sub-
jected these components to a varimax rotation (see Table 1).
A promax rotation2 revealed that the correlations among com-
ponents were modest with the mean of the absolute correlations
being .14 (see Table 2) and correlations between the six compo-
nents’ varimax- and promax-rotated loadings were all uniformly
1Previous studies have found that principal-components analysis yields
nearly identical structures as those derived from principal axis factor
analysis (Velicer, 1977; Weiss et al., 2006, footnote 4). For the present
study, use of principal axis factor analysis yielded a virtually identical
personality structure as that derived via principal-components analysis.
2The table of loadings derived via promax rotation is available from
Alexander Weiss upon request.
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high (rs ! 0.97). Inspection of the loadings after promax rotation
revealed some minor differences: three items (vulnerable, imita-
tive, and intelligent) did not have salient loadings on any compo-
nent and eight items (stable, impulsive, gentle, dominant, solitary,
playful, jealous, and persistent) loaded on different components.
Of the latter eight items, only one ( persistent) loaded onto a
component where it did not have a salient loading in the varimax
structure. These changes in loadings did not appear to alter the
Table 1
Comparison of Rhesus Macaque Personality Domains to Those of Humans, Chimpanzees, and Orangutans
Rhesus macaque componentsa Classification in other speciesc
Item Cnf Opn Dom Frd Actb Anxb Humans Chimpanzeesh Orangutansi
Fearful !0.86 #0.13 #0.14 0.03 #0.08 0.21 N"d D# N"
Submissive !0.81 0.10 #0.28 #0.03 0.06 #0.06 A"d D# D#
Timid !0.73 #0.03 #0.07 #0.09 #0.17 0.13 E#d D# N"
Cautious !0.73 #0.22 #0.36 #0.21 #0.01 0.06 E#d D# N"
Stable 0.66 0.15 #0.17 0.25 #0.05 !0.43 N#d N# N#
Distractible !0.56 0.01 0.45 0.05 0.20 0.16 C#e C# —
Disorganized !0.55 #0.14 0.41 0.02 0.04 0.05 C#d C# I#
Dependent/follower !0.54 0.10 #0.26 0.32 #0.37 0.24 N"d D# I#
Vulnerable !0.50 0.43 #0.35 #0.10 #0.06 0.39 N"f D# N"
Inquisitive 0.17 0.85 #0.06 0.14 0.14 0.09 O"d O" E"
Thoughtless #0.04 0.81 #0.02 #0.03 #0.22 0.12 C#g C# —
Innovative 0.15 0.66 #0.09 #0.05 0.50 #0.06 O"e O" —
Inventive 0.18 0.64 #0.17 #0.07 0.49 #0.05 O"d O" E"
Curious 0.10 0.64 0.13 0.42 0.22 0.05 O"g O" E"
Imitative #0.15 0.58 #0.31 0.02 #0.20 0.37 O#d E" E"
Impulsive #0.14 0.55 0.35 0.04 0.09 0.43 E"d C# N"
Bullying 0.18 #0.06 0.87 0.03 0.09 #0.01 A#d D" D"
Stingy/greedy 0.11 #0.15 0.84 0.02 #0.03 #0.07 A#d D" D"
Aggressive 0.09 0.18 0.83 0.01 0.12 0.12 A#d C# D"
Irritable 0.06 #0.28 0.78 #0.10 #0.17 0.22 A#d C# D"
Manipulative 0.01 #0.17 0.75 0.14 0.10 #0.23 A#d D" D"
Defiant #0.05 0.38 0.69 0.06 0.19 #0.09 A#d C# D"
Excitable #0.35 0.09 0.67 0.21 0.12 0.31 N"d N" N"
Reckless 0.20 0.33 0.61 0.00 0.22 0.37 C#d C# D"
Gentle #0.28 0.08 !0.60 0.40 #0.12 !0.44 A"d A" D#
Dominant 0.55 #0.23 0.57 0.20 #0.11 #0.14 A#d D" D"
Independent 0.37 0.05 0.51 #0.19 0.34 #0.22 N#d D" I"
Individualistic 0.19 #0.10 0.41 #0.09 0.32 #0.07 O"e E# —
Helpful #0.08 #0.08 0.17 0.81 0.05 0.04 A"d A" A"
Friendly 0.00 0.24 #0.30 0.73 0.12 #0.26 A"d E" A"
Affectionate #0.05 0.12 #0.28 0.73 0.05 #0.12 A"d E" A"
Sociable 0.30 0.35 0.02 0.70 0.13 #0.04 E"d E" A"
Sensitive #0.34 0.13 #0.01 0.67 #0.14 0.14 A"d A" A"
Depressed !0.48 0.11 #0.13 !0.64 #0.31 #0.04 E#d E# E#
Protective 0.11 #0.21 0.27 0.63 0.13 #0.06 A"d A" A"
Solitary !0.42 #0.08 0.11 !0.58 #0.14 #0.26 E#d E# E#
Sympathetic #0.06 0.45 !0.42 0.55 #0.01 0.08 A"d A" A"
Intelligent 0.22 #0.17 0.30 0.50 0.06 #0.06 O"d D" I"
Persistent 0.40 0.04 0.36 0.50 #0.14 0.00 C"d D" D"
Decisive 0.39 #0.15 0.41 0.44 0.03 #0.20 C"d D" I"
Conventional #0.14 #0.24 #0.18 0.12 !0.75 0.03 O#g A" E#
Predictable 0.11 #0.10 #0.25 #0.06 !0.72 #0.23 C"d C" N#
Lazy 0.14 0.06 0.03 #0.30 !0.71 #0.17 C#d E# E#
Active 0.01 0.11 0.26 0.37 0.69 #0.05 E"d E" E"
Clumsy #0.33 0.36 0.18 #0.25 !0.52 #0.20 C#e C# I#
Playful #0.08 0.42 #0.01 0.42 0.48 0.11 E"d E" E"
Cool 0.40 #0.13 0.12 0.10 #0.23 !0.76 N#e N# N#
Quitting #0.05 0.13 0.02 #0.02 #0.03 0.66 C#g C# —
Anxious !0.48 0.04 #0.17 #0.07 #0.01 0.63 N"f D# N"
Erratic 0.03 0.40 0.14 #0.10 0.38 0.59 C#d C# N"
Unemotional 0.22 0.16 #0.10 #0.18 #0.21 !0.45 N#d N# E#
Jealous #0.08 0.30 0.41 0.12 #0.27 0.44 A#d C# D"
Note. Salient loadings (! !.40!) are in boldface.
a Cnf ! Confidence; Opn ! Openness; Dom ! Dominance; Frd ! Friendliness; Act ! Activity; Anx ! Anxiety. b Loadings were reflected. c N !
Neuroticism; E ! Extraversion; O ! Openness; A ! Agreeableness; C ! Conscientiousness; D ! Dominance; I ! Intellect; " ! positive loadings; # !
negative loadings. d Classification from Goldberg (1990). e Classification from Weiss et al. (2006, 2009). f Classification from Costa and McCrae
(1992). g Classification from McCrae and Costa (1985). h Classification from King and Figuredo (1997) and Weiss et al. (2009). i Classification from
Weiss et al. (2006).
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nature of the components. Given these results, we decided to
interpret and base our scores on the varimax solution.
The first component was defined by negative loadings on items
such as fearful, which described adverse reactions to the physical
or social environment and is related to human Neuroticism (Gold-
berg, 1990). The first component was also comprised of negative
loadings on items such as disorganized, which suggest low focus
and poor self control and is thus related to low human Conscien-
tiousness (Goldberg, 1990). High scoring individuals are thus
seemingly more confident in the presence of potential threats and
stressors as well as more directed and in control of their behavior.
Low scoring individuals are thus more vigilant, highly reactive to
these stressors, and exhibit poorer internal controls. The previously
identified rhesus macaque Confidence domain (Stevenson-Hinde &
Zunz, 1978) described variation along traits similar to or related to
those which define this component. We therefore named this compo-
nent Confidence. When the subjects were assigned unit-weighted
scores as defined by the chimpanzee and orangutan structures (see
Table 3), Confidence was positively correlated with chimpanzee and
orangutan Dominance as well as orangutan Intellect and was nega-
tively correlated with chimpanzee and orangutan Neuroticism.
The second component exhibited positive loadings on items
related to exploratory and inquiring behavior, such as curious
which is related to human Openness (McCrae & Costa, 1985). This
component also loaded on items related to imprudence and poor
behavioral controls, such as thoughtless and impulsive, which are
markers of low human Conscientiousness (McCrae & Costa, 1985)
and either high Neuroticism (Costa & McCrae, 1992) or low
Conscientiousness (Goldberg, 1990), respectively. High scoring
rhesus macaques would therefore be explorers of their physical
and social surroundings, willing to engage in new behaviors, and
curious. These same individuals were also perceived as being more
forgetful and prone to act on impulse. Low scoring rhesus ma-
caques would thus be less curious about their surroundings and
conspecifics but less imprudent and impulse-ridden. Similar do-
mains have not been previously described in rhesus macaques.
However, human (Digman, 1990) and chimpanzee (King &
Figueredo, 1997) Openness are comprised of sets of traits similar
to or related to those making up this domain. Furthermore, the
Openness domain in rhesus macaques closely resembled the one
identified in chimpanzees (see Table 3). We therefore labeled this
component Openness.
The third component was manifested by positive loadings on
items indicating aggressive tendencies, such as bullying and items
related to social potency and Machiavellianism (Maestripieri,
2007), such as dominant and manipulative, respectively. Such
items are typically markers of low human Agreeableness (Gold-
berg, 1990). This component also positively loaded on items
related to unpredictability in behavior or affect, such as reckless
and excitable, which have been identified in human studies as
indicators of low Conscientiousness and high Neuroticism, respec-
tively (Goldberg, 1990). High scoring individuals would therefore
be advantaged in social status competitions; low scoring individ-
uals would be disadvantaged in social status competitions. Similar
dimensions were not previously identified in studies of rhesus
macaque personality. However, this component closely resembles
the chimpanzee (King & Figueredo, 1997) and orangutan (Weiss et
al., 2006) Dominance domains (see Table 3). We therefore named
this component Dominance.
The fourth component was made up of positive and negative
loadings on items related to social engagement, including sociable
and solitary, respectively. Similar items are related to high or low
human Extraversion (Goldberg, 1990). Other loadings were on
items indicating cooperative behavior and positive social interac-
tions, such as helpful and friendly, respectively, which are indic-
ative of Agreeableness in humans (Goldberg, 1990). This domain
also positively loaded on persistent and intelligent, which are
indicative of purposefulness and perception as they are markers of
human Conscientiousness and Openness, respectively (Goldberg,
1990). High scorers would thus be sociable and cooperative. Low
scoring macaques would be more solitary, unresponsive to social
interaction, and inattentive to the dispositions and intentions of
conspecifics. In that this domain captured traits related to sociality,
it resembled the Sociable–Solitary (Stevenson-Hinde & Zunz,
1978) and Sociability (Capitanio et al., 1999) domains previously
identified in rhesus macaques. The domain score for this compo-
nent was highly similar to the Extraversion and Agreeableness
domains of chimpanzees and orangutans (see Table 3). We there-
fore labeled this component Friendliness.
After reflecting the fifth component by multiplying loadings by
#1, it had negative and positive loadings on items related to low
(lazy) and high (active) energy, respectively. Items such as these
are often markers of low human Extraversion (Costa & McCrae,
1992; Goldberg, 1990). This component also negatively loaded on
items related to behavioral and social conformity and consistency,
such as conventional and thus included aspects of low human
Openness (McCrae & Costa, 1985). Individuals high on this com-
ponent would be vigorous, playful, and spontaneous whereas low-
scoring macaques would tend to be inactive, placid, and predict-
able. Comparable dimensions were not previously identified in
studies of rhesus macaque personality. This domain is most similar
to orangutan Extraversion though it also describes a blend of the
six chimpanzee personality domains (see Table 3). We therefore
named this domain Activity.
Table 2
Component Intercorrelations Derived via Promax Rotation




Friendliness 0.06 0.21 0.04
Activity 0.32 0.01 0.30 0.00
Anxiety #0.36 0.15 0.03 0.11 #0.25
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After reflecting the sixth component, it loaded positively on
items reflecting high degrees of anxiety or distress (anxious) and
negatively on items reflecting low degrees of anxiety or distress
(cool). The former item is similar to a facet of human Neuroticism
(Costa & McCrae, 1992) and, based on its behavioral description,
the latter is likely a marker of low Neuroticism. This component
also loaded positively on items reflecting low consistency, such as
erratic, which is a low Conscientiousness marker in humans
(Goldberg, 1990). Unlike Confidence, items loading on this com-
ponent reflect general as opposed to situationally determined lev-
els of anxiety and distress. High scoring individuals would there-
fore be tense, anxious, and generally not calm, whereas low
scoring individuals would be relaxed, calm, and predictable. It is
therefore not surprising that domain scores based on this compo-
nent were highly similar to those based on definitions of chimpan-
zee and orangutan Neuroticism, though it was also similar to low
chimpanzee Conscientiousness (see Table 3). Previous studies
identified a rhesus macaque personality dimension named Excit-
able, which is made up of some similar and related traits
(Stevenson-Hinde & Zunz, 1978). However, because the item
excitable was, in fact, related to Dominance, we felt that naming
this component Anxiety better captured its meaning.
Subjective Well-Being
Principal-components analysis indicated that only the first
eigenvalue (2.50) was greater than 1.00. We therefore extracted a
single component which described individual differences in sub-
jective well-being. The loadings of this component on all three
items exceeded 0.90.
Reliabilities of Personality Domains and Subjective
Well-Being
The interrater reliabilities, internal consistencies, and stabilities
of the personality domains and subjective well-being are presented
in Table 4. For personality domains at both time points, interrater
reliabilities ranged from poor (Anxiety) to good (Friendliness,
Dominance, and Confidence) and internal consistencies were ex-
cellent. Retest reliabilities for the personality domains ranged from
good (Openness and Activity) to excellent (Friendliness, Domi-
nance, and Confidence).
For subjective well-being at both time points, interrater reliabili-
ties and internal consistencies were excellent. The retest reliability
of subjective well-being was also excellent.
Personality Predictors of Subjective Well-Being
Three of the personality domains were consistently related to
subjective well-being in all four sets of analyses (see Table 5).
Higher subjective well-being was related to higher Confidence,
and Friendliness. Lower subjective well-being was related to
higher Anxiety. One explanation for the high correlations among
Friendliness and subjective well-being scores is content similarity.
Namely, the presence of the item depressed in Friendliness, be-
cause of its similarity in meaning to the items making up subjec-
tive well-being, may inflate the correlations between scores. If this
is the case, removing the item depressed from the scale should
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scores without depressed and reran the correlations with concur-
rent and prospective subjective well-being. The correlations did
not change significantly (Hotelling-Williams tests, p’s ! .76–.95).
Discussion
The results of our study suggest that ratings on 52 adjectival
traits in a large sample of free-ranging rhesus macaques could be
reduced to six components named Confidence, Openness, Domi-
nance, Friendliness, Activity, and Anxiety. An oblique (promax)
rotation indicated that the components were modestly correlated.
However, the range of absolute correlations and their mean were in
line with those of chimpanzee (M ! .135; see Table 2 and p. 264
of King & Figueredo, 1997) and orangutan (M ! .18; Weiss et al.,
2006; p. 507) personality dimensions. Moreover, they were lower
than the unweighted mean of absolute correlations from 14 studies
of human personality (M ! .29; computed from Appendix A in
Digman, 1997). Finally, the components and loadings of a promax
solution were highly similar to those of a varimax solution.
The interrater reliabilities of the six components were accept-
able, but somewhat lower than those in prior studies (Capitanio et
al., 1999; King & Figueredo, 1997; Weiss et al., 2006). This might
be explained by the fact that each rater had to rate far more
subjects (M ! 25.2) and knew subjects for a shorter period of time
than raters in previous studies. On the other hand, the retest
reliabilities were excellent.
Confidence, Dominance, Anxiety, and Friendliness were similar
to dimensions identified in previous studies of rhesus macaque
personality that used different questionnaires (Bolig et al., 1992;
Capitanio et al., 1999; Stevenson-Hinde et al., 1980; Stevenson-
Hinde & Zunz, 1978). Specifically, Friendliness matched the So-
ciable dimension, though it was broader, incorporating traits re-
lated to chimpanzee (King & Figueredo, 1997) and orangutan
(Weiss et al., 2006) Agreeableness, such as protective. Traits
indicative of aggression, vulnerability, and competitive prowess,
which were subsumed under Confidence dimensions in previous
studies of rhesus macaques, defined Confidence, Dominance, and
Anxiety in this study. Furthermore, we did not find components
similar to the Equable and Excitable dimensions identified in
previous studies (Bolig et al., 1992; Capitanio et al., 1999;
Stevenson-Hinde et al., 1980; Stevenson-Hinde & Zunz, 1978) as
the traits making up these dimensions were markers of Dominance
in the present study. We also found two previously unidentified
dimensions. The first, Activity, consisted of items usually found in
Extraversion domains in humans (Costa & McCrae, 1992), chim-
panzees (King & Figueredo, 1997), and orangutans (Weiss et al.,
2006). The second, Openness, was similar to the Openness domain
described in humans (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and chimpanzees
(King & Figueredo, 1997).
The dimensions identified in this study also differed in five
ways from those identified in studies of humans (Digman, 1990),
Table 4
Interrater Reliabilities, Internal Consistencies, and Stabilities of Personality Domains and Subjective Well-Being
ICC(3, 1) ICC(3, k)a Alpha
rW1,W2
bWave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2
Confidence 0.35 0.40 0.54 0.60 0.90 0.87 0.75
Openness 0.32 0.20 0.50 0.36 0.86 0.76 0.63
Dominance 0.40 0.47 0.59 0.67 0.90 0.89 0.78
Friendliness 0.45 0.58 0.64 0.76 0.86 0.85 0.71
Activity 0.27 0.32 0.44 0.52 0.81 0.81 0.67
Anxiety 0.10 0.16 0.19 0.30 0.86 0.79 0.70
Subjective well-being 0.45 0.51 0.65 0.70 0.86 0.86 0.77
Note. rW1,W2 ! Correlation between Wave 1 and Wave 2 (N ! 70).
a Based on a mean of 2.31 raters per subject. b All ps $ .05.
Table 5
Correlations Between Personality and Subjective Well-Being
Wave 1 personality Wave 2 personality
SWBW1 SWBW2 SWBW1 SWBW2
Confidence 0.59 (0.45, 0.70)!!! 0.48 (0.28, 0.64)!!! 0.58 (0.40, 0.71)!!! 0.51 (0.31, 0.66)!!!
Openness 0.11 (#0.07, 0.30) 0.17 (#0.07, 0.39) 0.23 (#0.01, 0.44) 0.22 (#0.01, 0.43)
Dominance 0.20 (0.00, 0.37)! 0.19 (#0.05, 0.41) 0.25 (0.01, 0.46)! 0.08 (#0.15, 0.31)
Friendliness 0.60 (0.46, 0.71)!!! 0.48 (0.28, 0.64)!!! 0.57 (0.39, 0.71)!!! 0.63 (0.47, 0.76)!!!
Activity 0.25 (0.06, 0.42)!! 0.12 (#0.11, 0.34) 0.10 (#0.14, 0.33) 0.14 (#0.10, 0.36)!
Anxiety #0.46 (#0.60, #0.30)!!! #0.38 (#0.56, #0.15)!! #0.38 (#0.56, #0.16)!!! #0.46 (#0.63, #0.26)!!!
N 111 70 70 71
Note. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. SWBW1 ! Wave 1 subjective well-being; SWBW2 ! Wave 2 subjective well-being.
! p $ .05. !! p $ .01. !!! p $ .001.
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chimpanzees (King & Figueredo, 1997), and orangutans (Weiss et
al., 2006). First, traits related to Neuroticism in these other species
defined two dimensions in rhesus macaques: Confidence which
was related to reactions to external stimuli and events, including
social events; and Anxiety which could be described as general
levels of distress and unease. These two dimensions can also be
distinguished, as although both were similar to chimpanzee and
orangutan Neuroticism, Confidence was composed of items that in
chimpanzees and orangutans make up Dominance. Second, traits
related to Extraversion in these species defined a dimension related
to sociability (Friendliness) and a dimension related to activity
levels (Activity). These dimensions were thus similar to the Gre-
gariousness and Activity facets of human Extraversion (Costa &
McCrae, 1992). Third, we did not find a Conscientiousness dimen-
sion similar to that of humans or chimpanzees. Items composing
chimpanzee Conscientiousness instead were part of the rhesus
macaque Dominance and Anxiety dimensions. Fourth, unlike
orangutans, but like chimpanzees and humans, we found a clear
Openness dimension. Fifth, unlike humans, but like the great ape
species we have data on, we found a Dominance dimension.
The similarities and differences between personality in rhesus
macaques and those identified in hominoids are informative about
personality phylogeny (see Figure 1). Why would it be useful to
describe the origin and evolution personality dimensions in the
same way that morphological or fixed behavioral traits are char-
acterized, that is, as being ancestral or derived? After all, person-
ality dimensions describe differences between individuals and are
not species-typical characteristics like thumbs or wings. Further-
more, if a personality trait is constructed out of the covariance of
numerous items or behaviors, how does it evolve? Both of these
issues arise out of a limitation in evolutionary theorizing rather
than being problems unique to the evolution of personality struc-
tures. First, every biological trait, whether specific to a species or
differing among individuals, is the result of a host of underlying
Figure 1. Cladogram of the hypothesized patterns of personality evolution in the parvorder Catarrhini.
Personality structures are described as a combination of “basic” or “blended” dimensions, for example,
Friendliness in rhesus macaques is a blend of Altruism and Sociability. The evolutionary transitions are
interpreted as the integration or disintegration of these dimensions, shown by horizontal arrows between groups
of dimensions. The possible transition points, indicated by the dashed lines, are placed according to phylogenetic
parsimony. This picture is likely to change as more species are assessed. The structure of the genus Pan is
represented by chimpanzees and the family Cercopithecidae by rhesus macaques. Figure by the authors, licensed
under a Creative Commons Attribution Unported License and published under the terms of this license.
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genetic and environmental factors (Rice, 2004). Selection can act
directly on the joint distribution of the factors contributing to each
trait as well as to those among traits, allowing traits to become
developmentally integrated or disassociated from one another.
Genetic covariances between traits are both the result of natural
selection and a constraint on evolution. Second, selection does not
operate only on trait means, but can also influence higher moments
of a trait’s distribution, such as variance (Rice, 2004). Thus,
personality differences can evolve within a species. Finally, our
phylogeny, while parsimonious and consistent with the data, de-
scribes only one possible set of evolutionary patterns. Casting
personality dimensions as explicitly ancestral or derived might
hopefully motivate further work in this area, and lead to the
exploration of personality and subjective well-being in additional,
distantly related taxa, permitting formal, comparative analyses.
Given the known primate personality structures, Openness ap-
pears to be an ancestral characteristic present in the ancestor of
Hominoidea and Cercopithecoidea. Finding Openness in rhesus
macaques is not surprising given their relatively large neocortex,
which probably evolved in response to their large group sizes and
complex social system (Dunbar, 1998). The presence of Openness
may have enabled rhesus macaques to survive in a wide range of
habitats including different ecological conditions (Seth & Seth,
1986). Future studies of less widely distributed macaque species
could be used to test whether the presence of Openness is one
explanation for the successful distribution of rhesus macaques as a
species. In contrast, Openness traits in orangutans are more closely
related to traits defining Conscientiousness with which they form
the Intellect domain and to traits defining Extraversion. This
pattern of loadings is likely derived, having evolved in response to
their semisolitary social structures (Galdikas, 1985) as encounter-
ing unrelated conspecifics would be highly novel experiences.
Future studies should test this hypothesis by comparing the per-
sonalities of related solitary and social species. These findings also
support earlier suggestions that Conscientiousness is a derived
domain (Gosling & John, 1999), possibly exclusive to African
apes or at least Pan and Homo (Weiss et al., 2006). To address this
requires studying gorilla and bonobo personality with a similar
questionnaire, which remains to be done.
These findings also suggest that the unidimensional Neuroticism
and Extraversion domains found in humans, chimpanzees, and orang-
utans are derived from multidimensional ancestral variants: Confi-
dence and Anxiety in the case of Neuroticism; Friendliness and
Activity in the case of Extraversion. The presence of lower-order
facets in the human Five-Factor Model (Costa & McCrae, 1992) is
consistent with this possibility. However, research on other macaque
species is needed to determine whether the configuration of traits
responsible for this multidimensionality are a derived characteristic of
rhesus or ancestral and shared with other macaque species.
These results also affirm perhaps the key characteristic of hu-
man personality that sets it apart from that of nonhuman primates,
that is, the absence of a specific Dominance domain in five-factor
personality space (Gosling & John, 1999). This does not mean
humans do not have dominance relationships. In fact, some aspects
of human personality such as the assertiveness facet of Extraver-
sion (Costa & McCrae, 1992), social potency (Patrick, Curtin, &
Tellegen, 2002), and the Dominance factor of Cattell’s 16 PF
(Conn & Rieke, 1994) clearly indicate that individual differences
in human dominance can be assessed. Moreover, a personality
style (Leaders) defined by a combination of high Extraversion and
low Agreeableness (Costa & McCrae, 1998) describes a similar
construct. One possible reason for this difference between humans
on the one hand and nonhuman primates on the other was hinted
at by Hinde (1978) who argued that human dominance may be
context-specific, that is, humans dominant in one domain of life or
society are not necessarily dominant in another. However, this
explanation is unlikely as the dominance rank a rhesus macaque
occupies also varies across contexts (Bernstein & Gordon, 1980).
A second possibility is that the absence of a dominance-related
domain is a consequence of selection for increasing egalitarianism
in human evolution (Boehm, 1999). One way to test this last
possibility is by comparing macaque species that, while occupying
similar ecological niches, vary to the extent to which they are
egalitarian as opposed to despotic (Matsumura, 1999; Sterck,
Watts, & van Schaik, 1997; Thierry, 1985, 2000). A third possi-
bility is that humans might be unique in achieving dominance by
different means, such as intelligence or accrued resources, which
could tap into different personality facets across different domains,
rather than a singular one. A fourth possibility is that human
societies may offer multiple dominance hierarchies in which indi-
viduals can participate (Gosling & John, 1999).
Ratings related to the balance of moods, pleasure derived from
social interactions, and global well-being were highly intercorre-
lated and described a domain similar to human (Diener, Suh,
Lucas, & Smith, 1999), chimpanzee (King & Landau, 2003), and
orangutan (Weiss et al., 2006) subjective well-being. At Waves 1
and 2 this domain displayed high interrater reliabilities; the stabil-
ity of this domain was also high. Higher Confidence and Friend-
liness and lower Anxiety were consistently related to greater
subjective well-being. Thus, like humans (Steel et al., 2008),
chimpanzees (King & Landau, 2003; Weiss et al., 2009), and
orangutans (Weiss et al., 2006), rhesus macaques that are more
social, sympathetic, and equable and less anxious, timid, and
erratic exhibit more positive affect. It therefore appears that the
nexus of positive affect, low Neuroticism, and high Extraversion
are phylogenetically ancestral, and may have been present in the
common ancestor of Old World monkeys, great apes, and humans
some 31 mya (Steiper & Young, 2006).
We also found differences in how positive affect is related to
personality in rhesus macaques. Unlike chimpanzees (King & Lan-
dau, 2003; Weiss et al., 2009) though like orangutans (Weiss et al.,
2006), Dominance and Openness were not consistently related to
rhesus macaque subjective well-being. These results suggest that,
ancestrally, there was no relationship between personality dimensions
similar to Dominance or Openness and positive affect and that the
interrelationship between chimpanzee Dominance, Openness, and
subjective well-being may be evolutionarily more recent.
In addition to possibly being a product of environmental con-
sistency across time, the high correlations between Wave 1 per-
sonality domains and Wave 2 subjective well-being may reflect, as
they do in humans (Lykken, Bouchard, McGue, & Tellegen, 1990;
Lykken & Tellegen, 1996; Nes, Røysamb, Tambs, Harris, &
Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2006), common genetic influences at both
time points. Similarly, as is the case for humans (Weiss, Bates, &
Luciano, 2008) and chimpanzees (Weiss, King, & Enns, 2002), the
relationships between personality and subjective well-being may
also be genetically mediated in rhesus macaques.
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One potential limitation of the present study is that, like other
studies of nonhuman primate personality (e.g., King & Figueredo,
1997), the ratio of sample size to items (2.13) is considerably
smaller than that typically recommended for principal-components
analysis (5.00 or 10.00). However, in a series of simulation studies
Guadagnoli and Velicer (1988) demonstrated that there was little
support for the sample size to ratio rules. Instead they found that
the stability of structures was mostly a function of the size of
component or factor loadings with absolute sample sizes of 150
yielding stable structures in most cases. While the sample size in
the present study fell slightly below 150, items were based on
multiple ratings, thus making them more reliable. However, as in
studies of chimpanzee personality (King, Weiss, & Farmer, 2005;
Weiss, King, & Hopkins, 2007; Weiss et al., 2009), there should be
attempts to replicate this structure in other samples.
Our findings also speak to the validity of using questionnaires to
assess animal personality and subjective well-being. Critics may
argue that questionnaire-based measures are compromised by an-
thropomorphic projection, but we found domains similar to those
found in studies of rhesus macaques using different questionnaires
which also differed from those identified in other species rated on
the same questionnaire. Critics might further claim that differences
reflect situational artifacts, such as the background of the raters or
the environment in which the rhesus macaques were observed.
However, previous research has shown that the same species-
typical domains emerge even in differing environments or when
ratings are made by raters with different cultural backgrounds
(King et al., 2005; Weiss et al., 2009; Weiss et al., 2007). Thus,
these findings build upon a rich set of findings indicating that
personality ratings probably do not reflect anthropomorphic pro-
jections or other artifacts (Capitanio, 1999; Konečná et al., 2008;
Uher & Asendorpf, 2008; Uher et al., 2008; Weinstein & Capi-
tanio, 2008).
In light of findings in humans (Digman, 1990), chimpanzees (King
& Figueredo, 1997), and orangutans (Weiss et al., 2006), our results
indicate that intense sociality may have been a potent selective pres-
sure driving personality trait evolution and coevolution. On the other
hand, these same forces appear not to have impacted the evolution of
positive affect or its coevolution with personality.
Assessing multiple related species using similar instruments is
an effective tool with which to better understand the phylogeny of
personality as well as the relationship of personality domains to
affect. In the future, these measures, together with similarly stan-
dardized measures of behavior, ecology, and social structure, could
help develop a fuller understanding of personality in nonhuman
primates such as macaques, and even ourselves.
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Abstract 
Higher-order factor analyses of human personality dimensions have revealed what appears to be 
a general factor of personality (GFP). We examined whether a GFP was present in chimpanzees, 
orangutans, or rhesus macaques. We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to model 
correlations among first-order factors as arising from a GFP. We then conducted two principal-
axis factor analyses (PFA). In the first we extracted a single higher-order factor from each of the 
first-order factor scores. In the second we extracted two oblique factors from the first-order 
factor scores. Model fit was poor for the CFA in chimpanzees and orangutans, but not rhesus 
macaques. The single higher-order factor extracted via PFA did not resemble the GFP in any of 
the samples. Moreover, the two oblique higher-order factors extracted via PFA were only weakly 
correlated in all three samples. These results do not support the existence of a GFP in nonhuman 
primates. 
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The Big None: No Evidence for a General Factor of Personality in Chimpanzees, 
Orangutans, or Rhesus Macaques 
 There has recently been a renewal of interest in higher-order factors of personality. 
Musek (2007) and others (e.g., Rushton & Irwing, 2008) seemingly uncovered a single higher-
order personality factor (the general factor of personality or GFP) underlying first- or second-
order structures of a variety of personality measures. Figueredo and Rushton (2009) found that 
the GFP was genetically correlated with questionnaire-based measures of life-history strategies 
and that some of the shared genetic effects were nonadditive. These results led Figueredo and 
Rushton (2009) to conclude that the GFP evolved in response to needs for a coordinated suite of 
behavioral and life-history traits related to greater pro-sociality, reduced mating effort, and 
increased offspring investment. 
 This evolutionary explanation of the GFP can be challenged given that balancing 
selection and mutation load are more likely than directional selection to be forces in personality 
evolution (Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007). Critics have also questioned the psychometric 
validity of the GFP and suggested that it is an artifact arising from, for example, common 
method variance (Riemann & Kandler, 2010), self-presentation bias (Bäckström, Björklund, & 
Larsson, 2009), or blends of orthogonal factors (Ashton, Lee, Goldberg, & de Vries, 2009). A 
way to concurrently address both evolutionary and methodological issues stemming from the 
GFP is to test for higher-order factors in closely allied nonhuman species that resemble humans 
in personality structure and life-history patterns. 
 For the present study we conducted a series of analyses to examine whether the GFP was 
present in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), orangutans (Pongo spp.), and rhesus macaques 
(Macaca mulatta).  Its presence in these species would provide evidence that it was present in 
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the ancestor species we share with them. We therefore tested whether correlations among the 
previously described first-order personality dimensions in these species (King & Figueredo, 
1997; Weiss, Adams, Widdig, & Gerald, 2011; Weiss, King, & Perkins, 2006) could be 
explained by a GFP.  
 We shared a common ancestor with chimpanzees approximately 6 million years ago 
(Steiper & Young, 2006). Like humans, chimpanzees live in complex social groups, have a slow 
life-history strategy and exhibit many human-like behaviors, characteristics, and abilities. 
Among others, these include theory of mind, moral behaviors, empathy, cooperative hunting, 
culture, and warfare (Goodall, 1990). In addition, five of the six chimpanzee personality factors 
that were reported in these data are comparable to the five human factors in several respects and 
the sixth factor, Dominance, was a broad factor and likely related to competitive prowess or rank 
(King & Figueredo, 1997). 
 On the other hand, of the great apes, we are most distantly related to orangutans, with 
whom we shared a common ancestor some 18 million years ago (Steiper & Young, 2006). 
Orangutan social structure differs considerably from that of humans and most nonhuman primate 
species in that orangutans are semi-solitary (Mackinnon, 1974). As such, it is not surprising that 
the structure that was reported in this species differed more from that in humans than did that 
reported for chimpanzees. While human-like Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism 
dimensions were reported for orangutans, factors corresponding to human or chimpanzee 
Conscientiousness and Openness were not observed (Weiss, et al., 2006). Instead, Intellect, a 
dimension which loaded on markers of Conscientiousness and Openness was reported (Weiss, et 
al., 2006). Finally, like chimpanzees, there was a Dominance dimension (Weiss, et al., 2006). 
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 Rhesus macaques are Old World monkeys and split from the hominoids, i.e., the great 
apes and humans, 27 to 36 million years ago (Steiper & Young, 2006). While rhesus macaques 
are a social species, their social structure differs from that of humans, chimpanzees, and 
orangutans in that their troops are comprised of descendents of a founding female (Melnick & 
Pearl, 1987). The personality structure reported for rhesus macaques differed even more from 
that of humans than did those reported for orangutans and chimpanzees. The only personality 
factor rhesus macaques clearly shared with humans was Openness; traits related to Neuroticism 
and traits related to Extraversion loaded on two different factors each, and Agreeableness 
markers were related to a factor similar to Extraversion (Weiss, et al., 2011). Finally, like the 
chimpanzees and orangutans, they also exhibited a personality dimension that could best be 
described as Dominance (Weiss, et al., 2011). 
 Given the phylogenetic relationships among these species and humans, comparing 
higher-order factor structures across species is instructive with respect to understanding the 
GFP’s place in personality evolution. If selection for slower life-histories and more sociality led 
to the evolution of the GFP in the primate lineage, we would expect that chimpanzees would be 
most likely among the three nonhuman primates to exhibit it. Moreover, given the differences 
among chimpanzee, orangutan, and rhesus macaque social structures, testing for a GFP in these 
species can provide insight into whether the GFP evolved as a response to selection for 
individuals that were better equipped for the demands of more complex social environments. In 
this case, we might expect a GFP in rhesus macaques as well. 
 To test for the presence of a GFP we conducted a series of confirmatory and exploratory 
factor analyses. We first used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to fit a model that posited a 
single higher-order factor. If the GFP is present in any of the samples we would predict that 
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model fit would be acceptable and that all of the first-order factors would have significant 
loadings. We then used exploratory factor analysis and extracted a single higher order factor. If 
the GFP is present in any of the samples, we would predict that all of the first-order factors 
would have salient loadings on this higher-order factor. Finally, we tested whether the GFP 
emerged from higher-order factors by using exploratory factor analysis to extract two oblique 
higher-order factors. If there is a GFP in any of these samples, we would expect that the 
correlation among the two higher-order factors would be substantial.  
 Finally, studying the GFP in nonhuman primates offers an additional advantage. Because 
the personality dimensions were based on rater-reports, self-enhancement effects are unlikely to 
contribute to any covariation of the first-order factors. Also, the personality ratings of these 
individuals were aggregated across multiple raters, which would cancel out specific rater effects 
(Rushton, Brainerd, & Pressley, 1983). Thus, a GFP in any of these species would not likely 
stem from methodological artifacts. 
Methods 
Samples and Ratings 
 The analyses in the present study are re-analyses of three existing datasets. Previous 
studies using these data have focused on the structure of personality in nonhuman primates (King 
& Figueredo, 1997; Weiss, et al., 2011; Weiss, et al., 2006), though other studies have also used 
these data.  
 Chimpanzees. This sample was comprised of 100 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) housed 
in 12 zoological parks. The chimpanzees ranged in age from 2.4 to 55.2 with a mean age of 18.8 
(SD = 11.9). The mean age for the 41 males was 18.5 (SD = 12.5) and the mean age for the 59 
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females was 19.0 (SD = 11.6). Thus, this sample included individuals ranging from infants to old 
adults. 
 Questionnaire items were 43 adjectives sampled from Goldberg’s taxonomy of the Big 
Five (see King & Figueredo, 1997 for details). Each item was paired with one to three sentences 
that placed the adjective in the context of nonhuman primate behavior. For example, the item 
fearful was “FEARFUL: Subject reacts excessively to real or imagined threats by displaying 
behaviors such as screaming, grimacing, running away or other signs of anxiety or distress.” 
Questionnaires were completed by 53 raters who were zoo employees or volunteers and highly 
familiar with the individuals. Each chimpanzee was rated by a mean of 4.05 raters (King & 
Figueredo, 1997). 
 In the original study of chimpanzee personality using these data, principal axis factor 
analysis was used to extract six orthogonal factors --- Dominance, Surgency, Dependability, 
Agreeableness, Emotionality, and Openness
1
 --- from the 42 items with the highest interrater 
reliabilities (King & Figueredo, 1997). All six factors were reliable across raters (King & 
Figueredo, 1997; Table 3) and subsequent studies have shown that they generalize to other 
chimpanzee samples (e.g., Weiss et al., 2009). In addition to subjecting the factors to a varimax 
rotation, King and Figueredo used a promax rotation to obtain inter-factor correlations, which 
ranged from |.00| to |.45| with a mean of .13 (King & Figueredo, 1997; Table 2). 
 Orangutans. This sample was comprised of 152 orangutans (Pongo spp.) housed in 41 
zoological parks. The orangutans ranged in age from 1.5 to 51.6 years with a mean age of 21.4 
(SD = 11.5). The mean age for the 58 males was 19.1 (SD = 10.7) and the mean age for the 94 
females was 22.9 (SD = 11.8). Thus, this sample included individuals ranging from infants to old 
adults. 
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 The questionnaire items included the same 43 used to rate chimpanzees and 5 additional 
items (see Weiss, et al., 2006 for details). Questionnaires were completed by 105 raters who 
were zoo employees. Each orangutan was rated by a mean of 2.64 raters. In this study, principal-
components analysis was used to extract 5 orthogonal components from all 48 items. The 
components were labeled Extraversion, Dominance, Neuroticism, Agreeableness, and Intellect 
(see Weiss, et al., 2006 for more details). Like the chimpanzee factors, these dimensions were 
reliable across raters (Weiss, et al., 2006, p. 507). As with the study of chimpanzees, Weiss and 
his colleagues used promax rotation to obtain inter-factor correlations, which ranged from .03 to 
.36. The mean of the absolute inter-factor correlations was .18 (Weiss, et al., 2006). 
 Rhesus macaques. This sample was comprised of 111 of the free-ranging rhesus 
macaques (Macaca mulatta) living on Cayo Santiago. They ranged in age from 1.6 to 24.4 years 
with a mean age of 7.3 (SD = 6.3). The mean age for the 45 males was 6.9 (SD = 6.8) and the 
mean age for the 66 females was 7.6 (SD = 6.0). Thus, this sample included individuals ranging 
from infants to old adults, as their lifespan is approximately 25 years. 
 The rhesus macaques were rated on the 48 questionnaire items used to rate orangutans 
and 6 additional items (Weiss, et al., 2011). Questionnaires were completed by 14 raters who had 
been conducting research unrelated to this project and were thus highly familiar with the 
subjects. Each macaque was rated by a mean of 2.31 raters (see Weiss, et al., 2011 for details). 
 Weiss et al. (2011) used principal components analysis to extract six orthogonal 
components from the 52 reliable items. The components were Confidence, Openness, 
Dominance, Friendliness, Activity, and Anxiety (Weiss, et al., 2011; Table 1). The reliabilities of 
these components ranged from poor to good (Weiss, et al., 2011; Table 4). In addition to the 
varimax rotation, Weiss and his colleagues used promax rotation to determine the inter-factor 
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correlations. These correlations ranged from |.00| to |.36| with a mean of .14 (Weiss, et al., 2011; 
Table 2).  
Data Preparation and Analysis
2 
 Different extraction methods were used in the previous studies, though when the results 
of different factor extraction techniques were compared within the same sample or species, they 
were found to yield similar structures (Weiss, et al., 2011; Weiss, et al., 2009; Weiss, et al., 
2006). For the present study we used the differentially-weighted factor scores derived from each 
sample. To derive these factor scores, for each sample we conducted a principal-axis factor 
analysis (PFA) with promax rotations (SAS Institute, 1999) on the mean ratings of the items. 
Communalities were estimated using squared multiple correlations. For the chimpanzee sample 
only, as in King and Figueredo’s (1997) study, we weighted the covariance matrix by number of 
raters.  
 We conducted three analyses on each sample’s factor scores. In the first analysis we used 
Mplus 6.1 (L. K. Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010) to conduct a confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) using a Bayesian estimator. Because the default convergence criterion yielded parameter 
estimates that showed high autocorrelations, for these analyses we ran 200,000 iterations and 
discarded the first half. For each CFA we modeled all first-order factors as being manifestations 
of a higher-order GFP.  
 We switched to Bayesian analysis after encountering estimation problems using 
maximum likelihood. Bayesian analysis combines prior information about model parameters 
with the likelihood of the data to yield a posterior distribution for each parameter estimate 
(Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 2004; B. O. Muthén & Asparouhov, 2010). Bayesian 
estimators offer several advantages over maximum likelihood techniques such as better handling 
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of small sample sizes and flexibility in assessing model fit (B. O. Muthén & Asparouhov, 2010). 
We assessed model fit using posterior-predictive p-values (PPPs) which yield the proportion of 
times that the fit of the estimated model against the data is worse than against data simulated 
from the model. Values close to .5 indicate good fit while low values indicate poor fit.  
 In the next two analyses, we used PFA to extract higher-order factors; communalities 
were estimated via squared multiple correlations (SAS Institute, 1999). Salient loadings were 
defined as those greater than or equal to |.40|. In the second analysis we extracted a single higher-
order factor from the lower-order factors. In the third analysis, we extracted two higher-order 
factors from the lower-order factors. We used exploratory factor analyses to extract two higher-
order factors because we did not have a priori expectations regarding higher-order structures 
other than the GFP. After extracting these factors, we used a promax rotation to estimate the 
correlation between the higher-order dimensions.  
Results 
Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
 Chimpanzees. The GFP model for chimpanzees indicated poor fit (PPP = .000). The 
GFP had significant positive loadings on Agreeableness and a significant negative loading on 
Neuroticism (see top panel of Table 1). 
 Orangutans. The GFP model for orangutans also indicated poor fit (PPP = .000). The 
GFP had significant positive loadings on Extraversion and significant negative loadings on 
Dominance and Neuroticism (see middle panel of Table 1). 
 Rhesus macaques. The GFP model for rhesus macaques had adequate fit (PPP = .203). 
The GFP had significant positive loadings on Dominance and Activity and significant negative 
loadings on Anxiety (see bottom panel of Table 1). 
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Exploratory Factor Analyses 
 Chimpanzees. None of the eigenvalues of the reduced correlation matrix reached 1, 
indicating that any higher-order factor accounted for less than a single first-order factor. The 
results of the first higher-order PFA analysis are presented in the left panel of the top half of 
Table 2. The higher-order factor only had salient and positive loadings on Conscientiousness and 
Agreeableness. The results of the second higher-order PFA are in the left panel of the bottom 
half of Table 2. The first factor had salient positive loadings on Conscientiousness and 
Agreeableness. The second factor had salient loadings on Extraversion and Openness. The 
correlation between these higher-order factors was low and thus suggested there were no further 
higher-order factors. 
 Orangutans. None of the eigenvalues of the reduced correlation matrix reached 1, 
indicating that any higher-order factor accounted for less than a single first-order factor. The 
results of the first higher-order PFA are presented in the middle panel of the top half of Table 2. 
The higher-order factor had a salient, positive loading on Agreeableness and salient, negative 
loadings on Dominance and Intellect. The results of the higher-order PFA are shown in the 
middle panel of the bottom half of Table 2. The first factor had a salient negative loading on 
Dominance and a salient positive loading on Agreeableness. The second factor had a salient 
positive loading on Neuroticism and a salient negative loading on Intellect. The correlation 
between these higher-order factors was low and thus suggested there were no further higher-
order factors.  
 Rhesus macaques. None of the eigenvalues of the reduced correlation matrix reached 1, 
indicating that any higher-order factor accounted for less than a single lower-order factor. The 
results of the first higher-order PFA are presented in the right panel of the top half of Table 2. 
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The higher-order factor only had salient and positive loadings on Confidence and Activity. The 
results of the higher-order PFA are shown in the right panel of the bottom half of Table 2. The 
first factor had salient positive loadings on Confidence, and Activity. The second factor had no 
salient loadings. The correlation between these higher-order factors was low and thus suggested 
there were no further higher-order factors. 
Discussion 
 The results from the CFAs and PFAs did not support the presence of a GFP in 
chimpanzees, orangutans, or rhesus macaques. For the CFAs, only the GFP model for rhesus 
macaques had adequate fit. However, of the 14 freely estimated loadings, only 8 were 
statistically significant. Extracting a single higher-order GFP via PFA yielded similar results, 
namely, of the 17 possible loadings, only 7 were salient. Finally, when we extracted two higher-
order factors via PFA, the correlations between the two higher-order factors we extracted for all 
three species were small. 
 These findings were contrary to the prediction that, given their phylogenetic proximity to 
humans, their slow life-histories, and the fact that, early in their evolutionary history, they may 
have faced many of the same problems as early humans, we would find the GFP in chimpanzees 
and not the other species. One way to reconcile these findings with the findings of GFP in human 
studies is to argue that the GFP is a recent product of evolution, emerging after the chimpanzee-
human split (Figueredo & Rushton, 2009). A second way to reconcile these two sets of findings 
is to argue that the GFP in humans is an artifact. As noted earlier, given that we studied 
independent ratings of individual subjects, there were likely no presentation bias effects. 
Moreover, by aggregating across multiple raters, we reduced artifacts related to either 
presentation bias or shared method variance. Human studies which control for these effects also 
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have not yielded GFPs (Bäckström, et al., 2009; Riemann & Kandler, 2010). Thus, the latter 
explanation accounts for the present findings and those of human studies which do and do not 
find a GFP. Moreover, it is a more parsimonious explanation in that it does not require that such 
large differences among two very behaviorally and genetically similar species arose out of very 
rapid evolution. One shortcoming of this explanation is that we have not been able to test all of 
the alternative evolutionary scenarios for the origins of the GFP. For example,unlike humans, the 
species examined in the present study are not cooperative breeders. Thus, studies of nonhuman 
primates that are cooperative breeders (e.g., marmosets) are needed to provide further evidence 
regarding the evolutionary explanations for the GFP. 
 This paper should not be seen as a critique of the search for higher-order factors of 
personality in humans or nonhuman animals. In fact, we believe that careful studies of higher-
order personality dimensions, and especially those which use multitrait-multimethod data, can 
yield extremely important insights into personality structure and how we judge our own 
personalities or those of other animals. However, our findings do not support the present 
evolutionary explanations for the GFP.  
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Footnotes 
 1
To maintain consistency with other personality studies the chimpanzee personality 
factors named Surgency, Dependability, and Emotionality in this study have since been renamed 
Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and Neuroticism, respectively. 
 2
Correlation matrices of the three data sets are provided in Supplementary Tables A, B, 
and C. 
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Table 1 
Factor Loadings for Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Lower-Order Chimpanzee, Orangutan, 
and Rhesus Macaque Personality Factors 
Chimpanzees 
First-order Factors そ 95% CI p R2 
Dominance -.288 -.578, .105 .073 .084 
Extraversion -.108 -.455, .286 .300 .025 
Conscientiousness
a 
.991 .956, 1.000 .000 .983 
Agreeableness .690 .463, .818 < .001 .477 
Neuroticism -.374 -.632, .004 .026 .140 
Openness -.233 -.543, .166 .124 .057 
Orangutans 
Extraversion .257 .086, .414 .002 .066 
Dominance -.416 -.564, -.257 < .001 .173 
Neuroticism -.180 -.343, -.002 .024 .032 
Agreeableness
a 
.965 .956, 1.000 .000 .931 
Intellect -.107 -.286, .071 .119 .012 
Rhesus Macaques 
Dominance .298 .090, .490 .003 .089 
Confidence
a
 .942 .839, .997 .000 .888 
Openness .083 -.135, .290 .227 .009 
Friendliness .071 -.144, .282 .257 .008 
Anxiety -.379 -.558, -.180 < .001 .144 
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Activity .280 .069, .486 .005 .078 
Note. そ = GFP loading for standardized solutions; 95% CI = 95% Credibility Interval; p = one-
tailed p-value. 
a
The unstandardized parameter estimate of the loading was fixed to 1.  
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Table 2 
Loadings of the Two Higher-Order Chimpanzee, Orangutan, and Rhesus Macaque Personality Factors Onto First-Order Factors 
Chimpanzees   Orangutans   Rhesus macaques 
 Factor   Factor   Factor 
First-order Factors GFP  First-order factors GFP   First-order factors GFP 
Dominance -.129  Extraversion .339  Dominance .351 
Extraversion .258  Dominance -.498  Confidence .597 
Conscientiousness .522  Neuroticism .175  Openness .039 
Agreeableness .554  Agreeableness .483  Friendliness .062 
Neuroticism -.290  Intellect -.471  Anxiety -.380 
Openness .217         Activity .403 
 
 Factors   Factors   Factors 
First-order Factors I II  First-order factors I II   First-order factors I II 
Dominance -.132 -.018  Extraversion .123 .359  Dominance .374 .240 
Extraversion .063 .533  Dominance -.538 -.074  Confidence .598 .010 
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Conscientiousness .621 -.145  Neuroticism -.209 .531  Openness .072 .334 
Agreeableness .549 .119  Agreeableness .603 -.032  Friendliness .084 .230 
Neuroticism -.254 -.145  Intellect -.171 -.499  Anxiety -.346 .353 
Openness .006 .566         Activity .414 .104 
rI,II -.004     .136     -.129 
Note. Loadings are standardized regression coefficients. rI,II = Correlation between factors I and II.  
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Happy Orangutans Live Longer Lives 
 
Alexander Weiss1, Mark J. Adams1, James E. King2 
1Department of Psychology, School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Science, The 
University of Edinburgh; 2Department of Psychology, University of Arizona 
 
 Nonhuman primates show similar aging profiles to humans (1). Is it also the case that 
relationships between psychological factors and mortality are conserved across phyla? Lay 
persons may see happiness, or its scientific cousin subjective well-being, as indicating the 
presence of positive events and the absence of negative events in the lives of individuals. 
Increasingly, studies are showing that this is true, although these same studies are also 
showing that subjective well-being has a genetic basis (2) and foretells better health and 
longevity (3).  
 The link between subjective well-being and longevity is strong and even appears 
when subjective well-being measures are expressions of spontaneous moods in the form of 
the personal diary entries of nuns (4), or the judged smile intensities in photographs of 
baseball players (5). Given that physical and behavioral cues signal subjective well-being, it 
is not surprising that independent judges are consistent in their questionnaire-based ratings of 
‘subjective well-being’ in a great ape (6). 
 To test the hypothesis that orangutan subjective well-being is related to longevity, we 
examined whether ratings of 172 captive orangutans on a 4-item subjective well-being 
measure predicted mortality. The time between the date an animal was rated and either their 
date of death or the censoring date ranged from 217 days to 7.5 years. We examined the 
relationship between measured subjective well-being and longevity using discrete time 
hazard analysis. We statistically adjusted the analysis to control for sex, age, species, and 
number of transfers to new facilities.  
 Male orangutans were more than twice as likely to die as f males over the follow-up 
period (Odds Ratio [OR] = 2.38; 95% Confidence Interval [CI95%] = 1.18,4.82; P = .042). 
Older orangutans were at significantly greater risk with each year being related to a ~10% 
increase in risk (OR = 1.10; CI95% = 1.07,1.14; P < .001). There was no significant difference 
in mortality risk between Sumatran and Bornean orangutans (OR = 1.14; CI95% = 0.75,1.75; P 
= .603) or between purebred and hybrid orangutans (OR = 0.88; CI95% = 0.42,1.82; P = . 772). 
Number of transfers were also not significantly related to increased risk of death (OR = 1.20; 
CI95% = 0.94,1.53; P = .210). 
 After controlling for sex, age, species, and transfer effects, orangutans rated as higher 
in subjective well-being were less likely to die over the follow-up period: each standard 
deviation was associated with a ~40% reduction in risk (OR = 0.58; CI95% = 0.41,0.83; P = 
.012). In terms of risk reduction, this effect was equivalent to being more than 5 years 
younger (Fig. 1). 
 These results demonstrate that, as in humans, indicators of positive affect in 
orangutans are related to longer life. Thus, the relationship between human subjective well-
being and longevity likely has deep phylogenetic roots and that, like humans in fairy tales 
(and real life), orangutans also live happily ever after. 
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Fig. 1: Predicted risk of death over follow-up periods. Solid green line is risk for subjects 
with mean age and mean subjective well-being (SWB). The solid red and blue lines represent 
risk associated with SWB that is one standard deviation below (-1 SD) and above (+1 SD) the 
mean, respectively. The dashed red and blue lines represent risk associated with being older 
and younger in age, respectively.
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Ratings of chimpanzee and orang-utan personality reveal dimensions resembling those found 27 
in humans. Critics have argued that this similarity derives from anthropomorphic projection 28 
or other rater-based effects. We developed two forms of data reduction analyses to determine 29 
whether these dimensions can best be explained by the inherent tendencies of the animals 30 
(e.g., orang-utans that are curious are playful) or anthropomorphic projections of raters (e.g., 31 
believing that orang-utans that are curious should be playful). We found that personality 32 
dimensions derived after differences between rater means and rater by item interactions had 33 
been removed from ratings replicated the previously discovered dimensions. Conversely, we 34 
found a different set of dimensions when analyzing items from which differences between 35 
animal means and animal by item interactions had been removed. Finally, we used multilevel 36 
factor analysis to examine whether the published structure replicated when we extracted 37 
factors based on the within-level animal differences in item scores effects while allowing 38 
between rater differences to covary freely. Again, the personality dimensions were similar to 39 
those described in previous studies. These analyses can be used in combination with interrater 40 
reliability, temporal stability, and correlations between personality and other external 41 
variables to validate animal personality ratings. These analyses confirmed that personality 42 
similarities between humans and great apes are best explained by genetic and phylogenetic 43 




 When Jane Goodall described the personalities of the wild chimpanzees, her 47 
observations were criticized as being anthropomorphic (Goodall 1990). Decades after 48 
Goodall first presented her findings critics continue to warn that ascribing human-like traits 49 
such as personality to animals, including nonhuman primates, is contaminated by 50 
anthropomorphism (Uher 2008; Wynne 2009). This caution is understandable. Attribution of 51 
human characteristics to animals and other nonhuman entities is common among laypersons 52 
and scientists alike and possibly reflects a basic process underlying social cognition 53 
(Andrews 2009; Waytz et al. 2010). However, no empirical studies support claims that 54 
anthropomorphism is always inconsistent with valid scientific inquiry. Moreover, when 55 
anthropomorphism is used to generate testable hypotheses, an approach referred to as 56 
“critical anthropomorphism,” it can lead to a better understanding of complex animal 57 
behaviour (Burghardt 2007) of which personality is one example. The use of critical 58 
anthropomorphism in the study of animal personality has produced findings contrary to what 59 
one would expect if anthropomorphism had an inimical influence upon animal personality 60 
ratings (Gosling 2001; Konečná et al. 2008; Kwan et al. 2008; Maninger et al. 2003; 61 
Pederson et al. 2005; Uher and Asendorpf 2008).  62 
 We examined whether ratings-based personality dimensions of chimpanzees and 63 
orang-utans are products of anthropomorphic projections of individual raters or other rater 64 
biases. Previous studies using ratings to study the personalities of chimpanzees revealed six 65 
dimensions (King and Figueredo 1997). The first dimension was labelled Dominance as it 66 
was apparently indicative of competitive prowess. The five remaining dimensions were 67 
similar to the five personality dimensions found in humans (Digman 1990) --- Neuroticism, 68 
Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness --- and thus labelled 69 
similarly. A study of orang-utans with a slightly expanded rating form yielded only five 70 
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dimensions. One of these dimensions (the second) was labelled Dominance as it appeared to 71 
be a more narrowly defined version of the chimpanzee Dominance dimension. Three 72 
dimensions resembled the human and chimpanzee Extraversion, Neuroticism, and 73 
Agreeableness dimensions. The fifth dimension was specific to orang-utans and labelled 74 
Intellect as it consisted of traits related to Openness and Conscientiousness (Weiss et al. 75 
2006). 76 
 Considerable evidence suggests that these chimpanzee and orang-utan personality 77 
dimensions are real. First, chimpanzee and orang-utan personality dimensions exhibit 78 
interrater reliabilities comparable to those of human personality dimensions (King and 79 
Figueredo 1997; Weiss et al. 2006; Weiss et al. 2007; Weiss et al. 2009). Second, the 80 
chimpanzee personality dimensions are stable over time (Dutton 2008; King et al. 2008). 81 
Third, chimpanzee personality dimensions generalize across samples living in different 82 
environments and raters from different cultural backgrounds (King et al. 2005; Weiss et al. 83 
2007; Weiss et al. 2009). Fourth, these dimensions are related to observed behaviours 84 
(Pederson et al. 2005) and affect (King and Landau 2003; Weiss et al. 2006; Weiss et al. 85 
2009). Finally, chimpanzee and orang-utan personality dimensions are heritable (Adams et al. 86 
under review; Weiss et al. 2000), and chimpanzee personality dimensions are related to 87 
neuroanatomical structures (Blatchley and Hopkins 2010) and genetic polymorphisms (Hong 88 
et al. 2011).  89 
 There is thus little doubt that personality ratings assess real characteristics of 90 
individual animals. However, this does not rule out the possibility that the striking similarities 91 
between human personality dimensions, on the one hand, and those of chimpanzees or orang-92 
utans on the other hand are at least partially products of anthropomorphic projections. This 93 
possibility arises when ratings on multiple items are used. Correlations between items should 94 
reflect individual differences in the personality characteristics of animals. The correlations, 95 
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however, could also reflect prior anthropomorphic assumptions by individual raters about 96 
species-wide characteristics. For example, some raters may believe that chimpanzees in 97 
general are both “active” and “friendly.” This assumption would cause those raters to assign 98 
similar ratings to the “active” and the “friendly” descriptors, thus spuriously increasing the 99 
correlation that would have otherwise have occurred between “active” and “friendly.” In 100 
addition, if the strength of the anthropomorphic belief about the linkage between active and 101 
friendly varied among raters, a rater by item interaction would occur. A similar bias towards a 102 
negative correlation would occur if some raters have an anthropomorphic belief that two 103 
descriptors are negatively related.  104 
 Raters’ species-wide belief about the linkage of paired personality descriptors could 105 
emerge from global assumptions about the personality of chimpanzees or possibly 106 
assumptions about chimpanzees generalized from an implicit personality theory about 107 
humans. A failure to find effects of such biases would support the view that these dimensions 108 
are not mere anthropomorphic artefacts but offshoots of ancestral variants in the common 109 
ancestor of great apes and humans 15 million years ago. 110 
Methods 111 
Subjects 112 
 The first sample (the ChimpanZoo sample) was comprised of 78 male and 124 female 113 
chimpanzees ranging in age from .8 to 55.2 years (M = 16.5; SD = 12.2). This sample was 114 
housed in 17 U.S. zoos and 1 Australian zoo (King et al. 2008) that participated in the 115 
ChimpanZoo project of the Jane Goodall Institute.  116 
 The second sample (the Japanese sample) was comprised of 64 male and 91 female 117 
chimpanzees ranging in age from .2 to 51.7 years (M = 22.3; SD = 10.6). This sample was 118 
housed in 9 zoos, 1 sanctuary, and 2 research centres in Japan. Of this sample, 60 males and 119 
86 females were described in a previous study (Weiss et al. 2009). The additional 120 
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chimpanzees included two males and three females housed in the Higashiyama Zoo and two 121 
males and two females housed in the Fukuoka Zoo. 122 
 The third sample (the orang-utan sample) was comprised of 70 male and 104 female 123 
orang-utans ranging in age from 1.8 to 51.2 years (M = 21.7; SD = 12.1). Of this sample, 58 124 
males and 94 females were housed in 34 U.S., 2 Canadian, and 1 Australian zoo and were 125 
described in a previous study (Weiss et al. 2006). The additional 12 males and 10 females 126 
were housed in the Singapore Zoo.  127 
Personality Ratings 128 
 Raters of all three samples were employees, volunteers or researchers at the 129 
institutions who regularly interacted with the apes. For the ChimpanZoo sample, there were 130 
90 raters. Each chimpanzee was rated by 1 to 8 raters (M = 3.9). Length of time raters knew 131 
the chimpanzees before rating them (M = 5.4 years; SD = 4.2) was available for 43 raters of 132 
141 chimpanzees. 133 
 For the Japanese sample, there were 52 raters. Each chimpanzee was rated by 2 to 5 134 
raters (M = 3.2). Length of time raters knew the chimpanzees before rating them (M = 5.1 135 
years; SD = 4.8) was available for 52 raters of the entire sample.  136 
 For the orang-utan sample, there were 107 raters. Each orang-utan was rated by 1 to 6 137 
raters (M = 2.6). Length of time raters knew the orang-utans before rating them (M = 5.9 138 
years; SD = 5.6) was available for 107 raters of the entire sample. 139 
 Questionnaires instructed raters to base ratings on their impressions of individuals and 140 
to use a seven-point scale in which 1 indicated “Displays either total absence or negligible 141 
amounts of the trait.” and 7 indicated “Displays extremely large amounts of the trait.” The 142 
ChimpanZoo sample was rated on the Chimpanzee Personality Questionnaire (King and 143 
Figueredo 1997). This questionnaire contains 43 personality descriptor adjectives taken from 144 
the human literature (Goldberg 1990). To place adjectives within the context of primate 145 
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behaviour, each was defined by one to three sentences (e.g., “FEARFUL: Subject reacts 146 
excessively to real or imagined threats by displaying behaviours such as screaming, 147 
grimacing, running away or other signs of anxiety or distress.”).  Each orang-utan was rated 148 
on one of two expanded and slightly modified versions the questionnaire used to rate 149 
chimpanzees. Most of these subjects were rated on a 48 item questionnaire that included the 150 
43 original items used to rate chimpanzees and 5 new items. A smaller number of subjects in 151 
this sample were assessed on a questionnaire that included the 48 items used to rate most of 152 
the subjects and 6 additional items. To maximize our sample size, we only used the 48 items 153 
on which all orang-utans in our sample were rated. The Japanese sample was rated on a 154 
Japanese-language version of the questionnaire that included all 54 items (Weiss et al. 2009).  155 
 While the original item set was sampled from markers of the human Five-Factor 156 
Model (Goldberg 1990), the purpose of selecting these items was not to impose the human 157 
personality dimensions on nonhuman species. Instead, these items were chosen because they 158 
represented a broad range of different traits relevant to the behaviour of nonhuman primates. 159 
Moreover, using a common set of items enables one to directly compare the dimensions 160 
arising in different samples and species (Weiss and Adams 2008). 161 
Analyses 162 
 The standard approach to analyzing animal personality ratings involves first 163 
computing each animal’s mean of the ratings across raters. In other words, each subject’s 164 
score on each item is equal to the mean of the ratings by raters on that item. Then, to 165 
determine the personality dimensions of that species, those mean ratings are subjected to 166 
principal-components analysis or factor analysis. This approach has the virtue of eliminating 167 
the effects of individual raters’ non-systematic deviations from the mean of all raters’s scores 168 
for each combination of animal and item (Rushton et al. 1983). However, this approach 169 
cannot reduce the effects of individual differences in raters’ systematic deviations from mean 170 
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ratings as noted in the introduction. In other words, it would not eliminate rater by item 171 
interactions which could lead to spurious between-item correlations. 172 
 The three analyses in the present study differ from this standard approach. These 173 
analyses can be illustrated using a modified version of a framework developed by Cattell 174 
(1966). This framework acknowledges that, because multiple animals are rated on multiple 175 
items by multiple judges (the raters) ratings reflect the animal’s behavioural tendencies, item 176 
content, and rater effects (Fig. 1a). As described below, it is possible to adjust ratings and 177 
remove the effects of individual differences in raters systematic deviations as described 178 
above. It is also possible to remove a comparable effect to obtain correlations based on rater 179 
scores independent of differences among or animals.  180 
 M-Type analysis. The first analysis using Cattell’s (1966) framework is depicted in 181 
Figure 1b. Here, each rating of an animal on an item by a judge is adjusted by subtracting that 182 
judge’s average rating across all animals that they rated on that item (for details see Appendix 183 
A). These adjusted ratings no longer include rater effects, i.e. the mean scores of all raters 184 
across animals will be identical. Therefore, any distortion of between-item correlations 185 
resulting from between-rater differences in overall item means or from rater by item 186 
interactions, as described by the example above, must be zero. Thus, principal-components 187 
analyses or factor analyses of these adjusted ratings yield personality dimensions that are 188 
based on rater discriminations among individual animals and not by between-rater differences 189 
in item means or rater by item interactions. If the personality dimensions derived via the 190 
standard approach were products of anthropomorphism or implicit personality theories about 191 
global prior assumptions about species wide personality correlations then principal-192 
components analysis or factor analysis of the adjusted ratings should derive different 193 
dimensions than the standard approach. On the other hand, if the personality dimensions 194 
derived using the standard approach are based mainly on characteristics of individual animals 195 
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not raters’ implicit or global assumptions about the species in general, then dimensions 196 
derived from adjusted ratings should not differ. 197 
 We conducted four of these analyses to determine whether these anthropomorphic 198 
rater effects were responsible for the previously described chimpanzee personality 199 
dimensions (King and Figueredo 1997; Weiss et al. 2009). In all four we used parallel 200 
analysis to determine the number of statistically significant dimensions derived from the 201 
adjusted scores (Dinno 2008; Horn 1965). If the number of dimensions were the same as the 202 
number of dimensions obtained via the standard approach for that species, we compared the 203 
dimensions based on adjusted scores and dimensions based on the standard approach. In these 204 
cases, we used targeted orthogonal Procrustes rotations (McCrae et al. 1996) to compare the 205 
dimensions. Targeted orthogonal Procrustes rotation provides congruence coefficients, which 206 
indicate the degree to which the two sets of dimensions are similar (Haven and ten Berge 207 
1977). Congruence coefficients greater than .85 indicate that the dimensions are comparable. 208 
If the number of components differed from those derived from the standard approach, we 209 
rotated the dimensions using the promax procedure. In addition, we extracted the same 210 
number of components as derived via the standard approach and used a targeted orthogonal 211 
Procrustes rotation to compare the dimensions based on adjusted scores and those based on 212 
the standard approach. 213 
 In the first analysis we compared dimensions derived via principal-components 214 
analysis of the adjusted ratings of the ChimpanZoo sample to dimensions derived using the 215 
standard approach. We derived the latter dimensions using the same 100 chimpanzees and 216 
factor analysis procedures described by King and Figueredo (1997). In the second analysis 217 
we compared the dimensions derived via principal-components analysis of the adjusted 218 
ratings of the Japanese sample to the dimensions derived using the standard approach for this 219 
sample. In the third M-Type analysis, to conduct a more stringent test, we compared the 220 
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dimensions derived via principal-components analysis of the Japanese sample to the 221 
dimensions derived using the same 100 chimpanzees and factor analysis procedures, i.e., the 222 
standard approach, described by King and Figueredo (1997). This analysis was limited to the 223 
43 items both samples shared in common. In the fourth analysis we compared the dimensions 224 
derived from the adjusted ratings of the 174 orang-utans to the dimensions derived via the 225 
standard approach. We derived the latter dimensions using the same 152 orang-utans and 226 
principal-components analysis procedures as in Weiss et al. (2006).  227 
 G-Type analysis. The second analysis using Cattell’s (1966) framework is shown in 228 
Figure 1c. Here, each rating of an animal on an item by a judge is adjusted by subtracting the 229 
average rating of that item for that animal by all judges that rated the animal (for technical 230 
details see Appendix). These adjusted ratings do not include animal effects. Thus, principal-231 
components analysis or factor analysis of these adjusted ratings yield personality dimensions 232 
defined by characteristics of the judges and not the animals. We interpreted and assessed 233 
these dimensions based on an inspection of the component loadings and likewise compared 234 
them to existing dimensions. If the personality dimensions arrived at using the standard 235 
approach reflected anthropomorphism or implicit personality theories, the dimensions derived 236 
from the adjusted scores should be similar. If the personality dimensions derived using the 237 
adjusted scores differ, it would suggest that the personality dimensions derived via the 238 
standard approach cannot be attributed to anthropomorphism or implicit personality theories. 239 
Finally, by examining whether G-Type dimensions are similar or dissimilar across different 240 
species rated within the same culture (the ChimpanZoo sample and the orang-utan sample) or 241 
the same species rated within different cultures (the ChimpanZoo sample and the Japanese 242 
sample) can lead to insights regarding the sources of rater effects. 243 
 We conducted one such analysis for each of our three samples. In all three we used 244 
parallel analysis to determine the number of significant dimensions (Dinno 2008; Horn 245 
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1965). Moreover, in all three cases, because these analyses were exploratory, we simply 246 
rotated the resulting dimensions using the promax procedure. Similarly, we did not label the 247 
rater-based dimensions because without understanding the processes involved in rating 248 
animal personality that are unrelated to the animal’s dispositions, it would be premature to 249 
interpret these dimensions.  250 
 Multilevel exploratory factor analysis. The third analysis can also be understood 251 
within Cattell’s (1966) framework. However, instead of adjusting scores by holding the 252 
effects of raters or animals constant to determine the dimensions defined by animal or raters, 253 
respectively, this approach uses maximum likelihood to find the parameters at both the 254 
animal and the rater level that best fit the data (Muthén and Muthén 1998-2010; Reise et al. 255 
2005). In other words, this approach enables us to estimate the factor loadings for the animal 256 
effects and the covariances among rater effects simultaneously. 257 
 To allow for model convergence, for each species, we analyzed one dimension at a 258 
time. In addition we combined the ChimpanZoo and Japanese samples into a single sample. 259 
There were thus six analyses on the chimpanzees and five analyses on the orang-utans. In 260 
each analysis we extracted a single within-rater, i.e., animal-based, factor from items that had 261 
been identified as defining that dimension in previous studies (King and Figueredo 1997; 262 
Weiss et al. 2006; Weiss et al. 2009). In the case of chimpanzee Openness, because 263 
exploratory factor analysis requires at least three items, we defined this factor by the two 264 
items (inventive and inquisitive) identified by King and Figueredo (1997) and the item 265 
imitative. 266 
 We compared the animal-based factor loadings obtained via multilevel exploratory 267 
factor analysis to the loadings on dimensions derived from unadjusted ratings (King and 268 
Figueredo 1997; Weiss et al. 2006). We used two methods to compare the dimensions derived 269 
using multilevel exploratory factor analysis and those derived via the standard approach. The 270 
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first method was to compare the two sets of loadings with Tucker’s congruence coefficients 271 
(Gorsuch 1983, p. 285). The second method involved comparing correlations between factor 272 
scores of individual animals generated using factor definitions from the standard approach 273 
and those generated using the animal-based factor definitions derived via the the multilevel 274 
factor analyses (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994, p. 550). 275 
Results 276 
Relation Matrix Analysis 277 
 M-Type analysis. The adjusted ratings of the ChimpanZoo sample defined six 278 
significant dimensions. The Procrustes rotation revealed that four of these dimensions were 279 
clearly similar to those derived via the standard approach (see first row of Table 1). 280 
Neuroticism and Openness were not congruent, probably reflecting the small number of items 281 
defining these dimensions (King et al. 2005, pp. 401-402).  282 
 The adjusted ratings of the Japanese sample defined seven dimensions. The first was 283 
recognizable as Dominance. The second was a blend of Extraversion and Openness. The next 284 
three were recognizable as Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Neuroticism, respectively. 285 
The final two reflected Social Confidence and Negative Affect, respectively. Extraction of six 286 
dimensions from the adjusted ratings of the Japanese sample yielded dimensions that 287 
replicated those derived in the Japanese sample using the standard approach (see second row 288 
of Table 1). Comparison of dimensions derived from adjusted ratings of the Japanese sample 289 
to the dimensions derived from the original 100 chimpanzees using the standard approach 290 
indicated that the entire structure and Dominance, Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and 291 
Agreeableness replicated. Again, Neuroticism and Openness did not clearly replicate (see 292 
third row of Table 1). These congruences were virtually identical to those obtained when 293 
comparing dimensions derived in the Japanese and ChimpanZoo samples using the standard 294 
approach (see Table I in Weiss et al. 2009). 295 
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 For the orang-utan sample, Procrustes rotation revealed that, after adjusting ratings, 296 
principal-components analysis defined the same personality dimensions as those found using 297 
the standard approach (Weiss et al. 2006). In fact, the five dimensions that emerged from 298 
adjusted ratings were almost identical to those derived from unadjusted ratings (see fourth 299 
row of Table 1). 300 
 G-Type analysis. For the ChimpanZoo sample, after adjustment of ratings for animal 301 
effects, the intercorrelations among items defined seven dimensions (see Tables 2 and 3). 302 
Upon inspecting the rater-based structure, the most striking feature was the lack of a 303 
Dominance dimension which had been a pronounced feature of chimpanzee personality in 304 
prior studies (Dutton 2008; King and Figueredo 1997). If the loadings are reflected, i.e. 305 
multiplied by -1, component I resembled the Agreeableness dimensions found in previous 306 
studies (Dutton 2008; King and Figueredo 1997). Component II described individual 307 
differences in aggression or hostility. Component III described individual differences in 308 
timidity. Component IV was seemingly indicative of negative affect. After reflecting its 309 
loadings, component V closely resembled Neuroticism dimensions found in previous studies 310 
(Dutton 2008; King and Figueredo 1997). After their loadings were reflected, components VI 311 
and VII bore similarities to the Conscientiousness and Openness dimensions, respectively, 312 
that were identified in previous studies (King and Figueredo 1997). 313 
 The adjusted ratings of the Japanese sample contained eight dimensions (see Tables 4 314 
and 5). Unlike the rater-based dimensions of the ChimpanZoo sample, there was a 315 
Dominance dimension (component I), which resembled Dominance dimensions in previous 316 
studies (Dutton 2008; King and Figueredo 1997). Component IV was somewhat similar to the 317 
previously described Conscientiousness dimension (King and Figueredo 1997). Components 318 
V and VI could be best described as dimensions related to individual differences in 319 
excitability and timidity, respectively. Component VII, after reflection, and component VIII 320 
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were similar to the Openness and Agreeableness dimensions described in prior studies 321 
(Dutton 2008; King and Figueredo 1997). Components II and III were not easily 322 
interpretable. 323 
 For the orang-utan sample, principal-components analysis of the adjusted yielded six 324 
dimensions (see Tables 6 and 7). Components I, II, and IV were similar to the Dominance, 325 
Agreeableness, and Neuroticism dimensions, respectively, that were identified using the 326 
standard approach (Weiss et al. 2006). Component III appeared to resemble Openness 327 
dimension identified in chimpanzees (King and Figueredo 1997) and partly resembled 328 
Extraversion dimensions identified in orang-utans (Weiss et al. 2006). When reflected, 329 
component V appeared to capture individual differences in tameness, which had been 330 
identified as a subcomponent of chimpanzee Conscientiousness (King et al. 2008). 331 
Component VI was also not previously identified in chimpanzees or orang-utans. This 332 
dimension described individual differences in a combination of low activity and low or 333 
negative affect. 334 
Multilevel Exploratory Factor Analysis 335 
 The animal-based factor loadings replicated those derived using the standard approach 336 
(see Tables 8 and 9). The animal-based loadings defining the combined chimpanzee sample 337 
were highly congruent with unadjusted loadings: .99, 1.00, .98, .99, .98, and 1.00 for 338 
Dominance, Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Neuroticism, and Openness, 339 
respectively. The animal-based loadings defining the orang-utan sample were also highly 340 
congruent: .99, .99, .99, .96, and .93 for Extraversion, Dominance, Neuroticism, 341 
Agreeableness, and Intellect, respectively. 342 
 Comparison of factor scores computed using the animal-based loadings from the 343 
multilevel exploratory factor analysis and factor scores derived from the unadjusted loadings 344 
shows that the factor scores are comparable for chimpanzees and orang-utans (Figs. 2 and 3, 345 
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respectively). The correlations for chimpanzee Dominance (r = 1.00), Extraversion (r = 1.00), 346 
Conscientiousness (r = 1.00), Agreeableness (r = 1.00), Neuroticism (r = .99), and Openness 347 
(r = 1.00) were all significant (all ps < .001). The correlations for orang-utan Extraversion (r 348 
= .81), Dominance (r = .97), Neuroticism (r = .93), Agreeableness (r = 1.00), and Intellect (r 349 
= .98) were significant (all ps < .001). 350 
Discussion 351 
The previously described personality dimensions based on ratings of two great ape 352 
species were not appreciably affected by removal of rater effects via the M-Type analysis or 353 
via multilevel exploratory factor analysis. If the expectations of raters influenced their 354 
assessment of the personalities of nonhuman primates, we would expect a lower congruence 355 
between the animal-based factors and conventionally defined factors. Thus, biases, 356 
preconceptions, and projections (anthropomorphic and otherwise) cannot account for the 357 
personality dimensions in these three samples.  358 
 These findings are consistent with studies which demonstrated interrater reliability 359 
and those showing that ratings are related to behaviours and other outcomes (Freeman and 360 
Gosling 2010). These findings also agree with studies showing that personality dimensions 361 
derived using behavioural observations and measures are comparable to those derived from 362 
ratings (Bergvall et al. 2011; Konečná et al. 2008). Finally, these findings are consistent with 363 
those showing that humans do not project their personalities onto their dogs (Kwan et al. 364 
2008) and that human personality dimensions reflect genetic correlations among lower-order 365 
traits and not implicit personality theories or correlations based entirely on semantic meaning 366 
of items (McCrae et al. 2001; Rowe 1982). 367 
 Our findings therefore suggest that similarities among great ape and human 368 
personality dimensions are most parsimoniously explained as evolutionarily conserved 369 
features. The conservation of behavioural dispositions across species suggests that processes 370 
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of balancing selection (environmental heterogeneity, negative frequency-dependent selection, 371 
and migration) that have been implicated in the evolution of human personality (Penke et al. 372 
2007) have also maintained variation in chimpanzee and orang-utan personality.  373 
 While the present study describes dimensions related to effects related to between 374 
rater-differences, it cannot explain the processes that give rise to these dimensions. One 375 
possibility is that these rater-based dimensions arise via the semantic similarity of the items 376 
(D’Andrade 1965). However, our finding that the rater-based dimensions for the 377 
ChimpanZoo and orang-utan samples differ diminishes the likelihood of this possibility. 378 
Another possibility is that the rater-based dimensions describe raters’ general prior beliefs 379 
about the species that is being rated. However, our finding of different rater-based dimensions 380 
in raters from Western and Eastern cultures seems to rule against this possibility, too. This 381 
difference suggests the possibility is that the rater-based dimensions reflect culturally-specific 382 
views and expectations about the personalities of these species. Future studies comparing the 383 
beliefs about the personalities of great apes in Japan and in English-speaking countries are 384 
needed to test this possibility. 385 
Rater-based dimensions can aid researchers in understanding how people perceive 386 
animal personality in other ways. Because the effects of the animals have been removed from 387 
the rater-based dimensions, they potentially reflect the diversity among raters in their 388 
dispositions and assumptions. Future studies should therefore examine correlations between 389 
rater-based dimensions and characteristics of raters, including their personalities, dispositions 390 
toward primates, or preconceptions concerning the personality structure of given species. 391 
Our study does not suggest that ratings based approaches should replace behavioural 392 
observations or tests. Instead, ratings should be viewed as complementing behavioural 393 
observations or tests and used alongside such tests (Bergvall et al. 2011; Konečná et al. 2008; 394 
Nettle and Penke 2010; Uher and Asendorpf 2008) or used when behavioural observations or 395 
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tests would not be feasible.  396 
 The present study is not without shortcomings. The M-Type factor analysis only 397 
removes the main effects of raters and rater by item interactions. As such, the remaining 398 
covariances describe animal effects and the interaction of rater and animal effects. This 399 
interaction may be responsible for some or all of the consistency of the animal-based 400 
dimensions and those described in previous studies. However, we found similar results using 401 
multilevel exploratory factor analysis, which does not suffer from this shortcoming. Another 402 
shortcoming is that, given the sample size, number of items, and the unbalanced design, 403 
conducting the multilevel exploratory factor analysis required examining one personality 404 
dimension at a time. As such, information about cross-loadings of items onto different 405 
dimensions was lost. We therefore recommend that future studies of this sort use more 406 
subjects and a balanced design. 407 
 These findings strongly rule out the possibility that similarities between the 408 
personalities of humans and great apes derived via ratings are anthropomorphic projections. 409 
Instead, they suggest that Jane Goodall’s (1990) impressions of the human-like personalities 410 
of the chimpanzees she studied reflected the chimpanzees’ individual behavioural differences. 411 
Naturally, researchers should remain leery of attributing human-like personality traits such as 412 
“thoughtlessness” to invertebrates or other distantly related species (Hebb 1946). However, 413 
researchers should also avoid engaging in “anthropodenial” (de Waal 2009), i.e., rejecting, 414 
without evidence, and even in the face contradictory evidence, the possibility that the genetic 415 
similarity of closely-related species may be expressed in behavioural similarities.  416 
 Even though 50 years have passed since Jane Goodall’s observations of chimpanzee 417 
personalities were criticized as being anthropomorphic, critics have not tested their claims. 418 
By conducting this study, we took up the mantle that critics refused to don themselves. In 419 
doing so, we found evidence refuting their worst fears and concerns over anthropomorphism, 420 
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which, in fact, casts nary a shadow over great ape personality. 421 
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Figure Captions 551 
Figure 1. Representation of data using Cattell’s data cube. a) Ratings before adjustment are 552 
comprised of item, subject, and rater effects. b) After rater effects are removed, ratings are 553 
only comprised of subject and item effects. c) After subject effects are removed, ratings are 554 
only comprised of rater and item effects. Figure by the authors, licensed under a Creative 555 
Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License and published under the terms of this license.  556 
 557 
Figure 2. Chimpanzee factor scores. A factor score in each personality domain was calculated 558 
for all individuals weighted by the factor loadings derived via the standard approach or by the 559 
within-rater factor loadings. Raw scores were converted to T-scores (M = 50; SD = 10). 560 
Strong correlations between the two factor scores indicate high congruence in structure 561 
before and after covariances attributable to raters were removed. Figure by the authors, 562 
licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License and published under 563 
the terms of this license.  564 
 565 
Figure 3. Orang-utan factor scores. A factor score in each personality domain was calculated 566 
for all individuals weighted by the factor loadings derived via the standard approach or by the 567 
within-rater factor loadings. Raw scores were converted to T-scores (M = 50; SD = 10). 568 
Strong correlations between the two factor scores indicate high congruence in structure 569 
before and after covariances attributable to raters were removed. Figure by the authors, 570 
licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License and published under 571 
the terms of this license. 572 
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Table 1 
Congruence Coefficients Between Animal-Based Structures Derived via the Standard 
Approach and M-Type Structures and 
Comparison Congruences 
Standard Adjusted Dom Ext Agr Neu Con Opn Int Total 
ChimpanZoo ChimpanZoo .99 .98 .97 .78 .98 .82 --- .95 
Japan (54-item) Japan (54-item) .99 .97 .99 .94 .95 .99 --- .97 
ChimpanZoo Japan (43-item) .89 .92 .90 .75 .90 .69 --- .87 
Orang-utan Orang-utan .99 1.00 .97 .99 --- --- .97 .99 
Note. Dom = Dominance, Ext = Extraversion, Agr = Agreeableness, Neu = Neuroticism, Con 
= Conscientiousness, Opn = Openness, Int = Intellect, Total = Total structure. 
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Table 2 
Rater-based G-Type Structure of Ratings for Chimpanzees (ChimpanZoo Sample) 
 Component 
Item I II III IV V VI VII 
Affectionate -.74 -.02 .05 -.25 -.01 .06 .07 
Sympathetic -.70 -.16 .09 -.05 -.04 -.02 -.14 
Friendly -.68 -.11 .01 -.29 -.08 .04 .03 
Helpful -.65 -.16 -.03 -.04 .07 .02 -.22 
Sociable -.62 .08 -.03 -.50 -.05 .01 .05 
Protective -.62 .05 -.09 -.01 .01 -.05 -.18 
Sensitive -.59 .04 .08 .01 .05 .22 .10 
Gentle -.58 -.43 .16 .07 -.12 .03 .02 
Intelligent -.47 .07 -.15 .00 .06 .47 .04 
Jealous .09 .67 .11 .02 .01 -.03 -.08 
Stingy/Greedy .18 .65 -.01 .16 -.10 .04 .17 
Bullying .14 .63 -.14 -.08 .15 -.05 -.08 
Defiant -.02 .61 -.20 .02 .25 .02 -.22 
Aggressive .23 .60 -.14 -.04 .25 -.14 -.07 
Manipulative -.17 .59 .02 -.20 .02 .03 -.09 
Irritable .18 .56 -.04 .18 .16 -.30 .02 
Persistent -.22 .46 -.26 -.08 .02 .09 -.09 
Reckless .02 .45 -.30 .12 .36 -.16 .13 
Timid .11 .02 .68 .20 -.01 -.20 -.09 
Dependent/Follower -.24 -.02 .66 -.07 .02 -.11 .06 
Fearful .03 .09 .63 .11 .31 -.03 -.06 
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Cautious -.07 -.13 .63 .12 -.15 .12 -.04 
Submissive -.03 -.08 .62 .04 .09 -.09 .11 
Independent -.10 .17 -.53 .13 .04 .26 -.05 
Dominant -.02 .46 -.50 -.08 -.18 .07 -.18 
Solitary .16 -.07 .13 .69 -.03 .03 -.25 
Depressed .19 .13 .11 .64 .03 -.16 -.08 
Active -.16 .29 -.02 -.55 .03 -.01 -.33 
Lazy -.03 .05 .02 .54 -.14 -.25 .23 
Playful -.33 .19 .14 -.48 -.04 .00 -.34 
Excitable -.05 .38 .17 -.04 .61 -.10 .02 
Unemotional .09 .05 .02 .35 -.59 -.16 -.12 
Impulsive -.07 .43 .00 .10 .56 -.17 -.20 
Stable -.33 -.05 -.29 -.02 -.52 .06 .09 
Disorganized .03 .24 .16 .15 .09 -.71 .06 
Decisive -.22 .21 -.29 .06 -.03 .56 .14 
Clumsy -.05 .09 .12 .24 -.02 -.55 .16 
Erratic .05 .43 .01 .16 .35 -.50 -.04 
Inventive -.34 .23 -.13 .07 -.01 .18 -.62 
Predictable -.18 -.11 .04 .15 -.34 .35 .50 
Inquisitive -.45 .27 .03 -.11 -.06 .11 -.46 
Imitative -.21 .34 .30 -.02 -.08 -.09 -.29 
Autistic -.03 .27 .15 .33 -.02 -.09 .25 
Note. Salient loadings (≥ .40) are in boldface.
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Table 3 
Inter-factor Correlations of Rater-Based G-Type Components of Chimpanzees (ChimpanZoo 
Sample) 
Component I II  III  IV  V VI  
I       
II  .09      
III  .02 -.22     
IV  -.11 .12 .02    
V -.18 .22 -.06 .00   
VI  -.33 .13 .22 .18 .28  
VII .08 .18 .02 -.35 .11 .05 
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Table 4 
Rater-based G-Type Structure of Ratings for Chimpanzees (Japanese Sample) 
 Component 
Item I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Aggressive .73 .21 -.03 .02 .11 -.02 -.13 -.11 
Bullying .65 .19 -.02 .04 .05 .18 -.09 -.24 
Dominant .65 .10 -.03 .21 -.14 -.23 -.09 -.08 
Defiant .64 -.02 -.10 -.03 .18 -.11 -.09 -.06 
Irritable .64 -.09 .08 -.15 .11 .12 -.04 -.07 
Jealous .62 -.14 -.03 .07 -.04 .31 -.13 -.07 
Manipulative .59 .23 .00 .19 -.07 -.04 -.31 .13 
Excitable .57 -.21 .05 -.11 .28 .13 .03 .07 
Reckless .55 -.02 .22 -.33 .17 -.01 .04 .17 
Stingy/Greedy .53 -.33 .19 .06 -.01 .04 .06 -.05 
Thoughtless .46 -.23 .12 -.12 .13 .09 .10 .30 
Impulsive .44 -.18 .07 -.19 .34 .10 -.02 .09 
Distractible .43 -.07 .03 -.38 .17 .17 .13 .24 
Cautious -.42 -.03 .13 .35 .02 .37 -.14 -.01 
Unemotional -.14 .58 .12 .03 -.13 .16 -.04 .20 
Cool -.22 .50 .19 .14 -.26 .06 -.18 .10 
Helpful .18 .47 -.15 .12 .05 -.13 -.23 .38 
Clumsy .17 .41 .31 -.25 .27 .19 .03 .11 
Solitary .00 .06 .72 .04 .13 .09 -.04 -.07 
Individualistic .18 .00 .63 -.01 .06 .01 -.02 -.04 
Lazy .02 .21 .46 -.17 .18 .13 .23 .16 
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Sensitive .07 -.05 -.05 .68 -.03 -.06 -.03 .25 
Intelligent .05 .19 -.14 .64 -.05 -.07 -.18 .16 
Decisive .01 .14 .22 .50 -.11 -.01 -.30 .12 
Unperceptive .17 .33 .16 -.46 .02 .33 .06 .11 
Predictable -.23 .29 .29 .42 -.30 .19 .12 .05 
Conventional -.18 .21 .13 .40 -.26 .20 .29 .06 
Erratic .10 -.10 .12 -.08 .73 .04 .02 -.05 
Disorganized .16 .15 .03 -.17 .60 .21 .02 .09 
Anxious .09 .06 .11 -.14 .54 .19 .04 .00 
Autistic .10 -.15 .09 .07 .51 -.13 .01 -.14 
Timid .15 -.04 .09 -.16 .14 .64 .08 -.01 
Vulnerable .09 .15 .11 .00 .06 .57 .00 -.12 
Dependent -.01 .11 -.09 -.08 -.20 .51 -.13 .35 
Fearful .02 -.28 -.09 .25 .35 .44 .06 -.13 
Depressed -.05 -.07 .38 .00 .26 .42 .06 -.08 
Inventive .00 .00 .01 -.02 .00 .01 -.76 .19 
Inquisitive .03 .05 .01 .10 -.13 .02 -.72 .16 
Innovative .13 .26 .06 -.01 -.01 .01 -.68 .21 
Curious .00 -.10 -.11 .23 .08 -.09 -.67 .09 
Playful .16 .42 -.32 .03 -.03 .01 -.44 .25 
Affectionate .03 .08 -.06 .19 .00 -.16 -.14 .70 
Sociable .07 .18 -.28 .15 -.07 -.03 -.21 .61 
Gentle -.29 .14 .19 .08 -.02 -.09 -.16 .61 
Friendly -.31 .04 .13 .13 -.06 .09 -.15 .57 
Sympathetic .00 .42 -.33 .10 .05 -.10 -.14 .54 
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Imitative .17 .13 -.05 -.05 .08 .17 -.34 .50 
Submissive -.06 -.02 .10 -.06 -.12 .44 -.07 .50 
Active .28 .26 -.31 -.02 .13 .19 -.36 .07 
Independent -.10 .36 .25 .19 .39 -.09 -.09 -.01 
Persistent .27 .22 .06 .22 -.16 -.13 -.39 .02 
Protective -.05 .38 -.10 .31 .20 .17 -.09 .20 
Quitting .18 .27 -.05 .06 .28 .37 .21 .13 
Stable -.29 .38 .08 .26 -.29 -.18 -.09 -.02 
Note. Salient loadings (≥ .40) are in boldface.  
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Table 5 
Inter-factor Correlations of Rater-Based G-Type Components of Chimpanzees (Japanese 
Sample) 
Component I II  III  IV  V VI  VII 
I        
II  .19       
III  -.12 .25      
IV  -.26 .17 .21     
V .29 -.03 .03 -.22    
VI  .14 -.09 -.01 -.09 .22   
VII -.03 -.27 -.17 -.07 .03 .25  
VIII .29 .29 .26 -.22 .10 .23 .02 
 33 
Table 6 
Rater-based G-Type Structure of Ratings for Orang-utans 
 Component 
Item I II III IV V VI 
Bullying .64 -.06 -.11 .03 -.07 .02 
Aggressive .62 -.05 -.10 .11 .18 -.14 
Stingy/Greedy .59 -.15 .08 .18 .07 -.03 
Dominant .53 -.01 .09 -.20 -.02 .05 
Jealous .51 .01 .13 .24 .18 -.08 
Manipulative .46 .37 -.07 -.13 .16 -.12 
Independent .47 -.12 .29 -.25 -.08 .21 
Submissive -.46 .16 .00 .33 .09 .10 
Persistent .41 -.09 .35 -.07 .21 -.05 
Sympathetic -.12 .70 .24 -.13 -.14 .00 
Helpful -.12 .68 .08 -.10 -.01 -.19 
Sensitive -.02 .56 .06 .14 -.17 .04 
Protective .12 .54 .15 -.09 .01 -.03 
Affectionate -.34 .51 .43 -.07 .02 -.09 
Gentle -.45 .46 .10 -.27 -.11 -.02 
Imitative -.02 .45 .09 .06 .07 -.06 
Curious .01 .01 .68 -.03 -.04 -.08 
Inquisitive .04 .18 .62 -.15 -.08 -.05 
Inventive .22 .24 .53 .01 -.13 -.05 
Sociable -.23 .27 .52 -.06 -.10 -.11 
Intelligent .14 .35 .46 -.12 -.05 -.09 
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Friendly -.24 .33 .45 .09 -.20 -.18 
Decisive .40 .06 .44 -.13 -.19 .25 
Fearful .08 .02 .00 .74 -.06 .07 
Timid -.11 -.03 -.22 .60 .12 .07 
Cool -.16 .17 .09 -.60 -.03 .29 
Stable -.04 .14 .27 -.59 .17 .12 
Excitable .19 .02 .15 .55 .21 -.26 
Anxious .03 .06 -.06 .54 .21 .16 
Erratic .14 -.10 .00 .15 .71 -.14 
Clumsy .00 .03 -.08 .00 .63 .24 
Disorganized -.02 -.04 -.14 .09 .58 .15 
Irritable .45 -.09 -.16 .09 .52 -.01 
Defiant .43 .09 -.07 -.12 .50 -.14 
Predictable -.03 .13 .06 -.09 -.46 .29 
Impulsive .27 -.01 .18 .33 .40 -.27 
Lazy .00 -.09 -.18 .08 .10 .66 
Active .02 .28 .19 -.09 .17 -.58 
Conventional -.13 -.03 .08 .04 .00 .56 
Unemotional -.06 .01 .02 -.21 .11 .56 
Playful .00 .23 .25 .00 .11 -.45 
Depressed .09 .03 -.42 .28 .16 .44 
Cautious -.14 .29 -.11 .25 -.07 .13 
Autistic .13 .26 -.25 .12 .30 .08 
Reckless .37 .02 -.08 .14 .13 -.03 
Solitary .19 .16 -.36 .07 -.11 .35 
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Vulnerable -.12 .03 -.02 .38 .22 .15 
Dependent -.27 .38 -.11 .19 .23 -.07 
 
Note. Salient loadings (≥ .40) are in boldface.  
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Table 7 
Inter-factor Correlations of Rater-Based G-Type Components of Orang-utans 
Component I II  III  IV  V 
I      
II  .09     
III  .12 .44    
IV  .08 .26 .04   
V .18 -.30 -.13 -.11  
VI  -.13 .18 -.15 .34 -.30 
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Table 8 
Comparison of Within-Rater Factor Loadings and Factor Loadings Derived Using the 
Standard Approach for Chimpanzees (combined ChimpanZoo and Japanese Sample) 
Item Loading 
Dominance Standard Within-Rater 
Dominant .90 .82 
Submissive -.86 -.76 
Dependent -.86 -.70 
Independent .83 .57 
Fearful -.82 -.54 
Decisive .82 .50 
Timid -.81 -.63 
Cautious -.63 -.52 
Intelligent .63 .33 
Persistent .61 .51 
Bullying .58 .55 
Stingy .52 .41 
Extraversion Standard Within-Rater 
Solitary -.85 -.67 
Lazy -.83 -.65 
Active .83 .77 
Playful .81 .78 
Sociable .80 .72 
Depressed -.78 -.59 
Friendly .65 .51 
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Affectionate .60 .52 
Imitative .52 .52 
Conscientiousness Standard Within-Ratera 
Impulsive -.78 -.66 
Defiant -.74 -.71 
Reckless -.73 -.64 
Erratic -.72 -.53 
Irritable -.62 -.64 
Predictable .61 .42 
Aggressive -.60 -.73 
Jealous -.58 -.58 
Disorganized -.53 -.33 
Agreeableness Standard Within-Rater 
Sympathetic .84 .86 
Helpful .74 .70 
Sensitive .74 .53 
Protective .70 .57 
Gentle .61 .62 
Neuroticism Standard Within-Rater 
Stable .73 .60 
Excitable -.71 -.80 
Unemotional .57 .40 
Openness Standard Within-Rater 
Inventive .65 .77 
Inquisitive .64 .89 
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Note. aLoadings were reflected.
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Table 9 
Comparison of Within-Rater Factor Loadings and Factor Loadings Derived Using the 
Standard Approach for Orang-utans 
Item Loading 
Extraversion Unadjusted Within-Rater 
Playful .84 .84 
Active .83 .90 
Lazy -.80 -.85 
Curious .77 .62 
Conventional -.76 -.56 
Inquisitive .70 .58 
Inventive .69 .53 
Depressed -.64 -.56 
Imitative .63 .63 
Solitary -.59 -.54 
Unemotional -.53 -.46 
Dominance Unadjusted Within-Rater 
Bullying .87 .88 
Aggressive .82 .81 
Stingy .78 .72 
Jealous .75 .62 
Dominant .75 .72 
Gentle -.72 -.68 
Defiant .68 .55 
Submissive -.67 -.63 
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Manipulative .66 .46 
Persistent .62 .59 
Irritable .60 .58 
Reckless .56 .37 
Neuroticism Unadjusted Within-Rater 
Anxious .83 .67 
Fearful .82 .72 
Cool -.73 -.77 
Timid .70 .56 
Stable -.66 -.61 
Excitable .58 .62 
Impulsive .56 .53 
Cautious .55 .37 
Vulnerable .48 .38 
Erratic .48 .42 
Predictable -.47 -.48 
Agreeableness Unadjusted Within-Rater 
Sympathetic .82 .71 
Helpful .79 .70 
Protective .73 .35 
Affectionate .67 .81 
Sensitive .63 .47 
Friendly .63 .80 
Sociable .61 .77 
Intellect Unadjusted Within-Rater 
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Intelligent .72 .38 
Decisive .70 .69 
Clumsy -.66 -.37 
Disorganized -.66 -.36 
Independent .64 .79 






































M-Type and G-Type Analysis 
The analyses used are based on the nested nature of the data, i.e., the fact that each animal is 
rated by more than one knowledgeable rater on multiple items. When data are nested in this 
manner, items may correlate with each other for multiple reasons (Cattell 1966). In these 
analyses, we can statistically remove sources of covariance among items related to raters or 
animals. 
The M-Type analysis involves extracting dimensions that describe the animals. We 
calculated the deviation of each rater j’s raw score of animal s on item i (x
sji
) from the rater’s 















where rater j rated n
j
 subjects and x
lji
 is the rater’s rating of their lth subject. Raters’ mean 
















We then subjected the m
sji
 scores to a parallel and principal components analysis. We used a 
corresponding procedure for the G-Type analysis to extract the rater dimensions, subtracting 
each animal’s predicted score on an item from the raw score. This, too, can be derived in a 































For the M-Type analysis, let Scores be a data frame with columns subject and rater 
of type factor and numeric columns with names item.names of the rater’s score of the 
subject on each item. For convenience we massage the vectoritem.names into a list 
 
items <- as.list(item.names) 
names(items) <- item.names 
 
and transform this list into a list of formulae of the form item ~ rater  
 
item.formulae <- lapply(items, 
                 function(x) {formula(paste(x, '~ rater'))}) 
 
We then have a function that runs a linear model using each formula on the Scor s data and 
returns the residuals  
 
m.lm <- function(item.formula, data) { 
 
  model <- lm(item.formula, data=data); 
  m <- model$residuals 
 




We apply this function to each formula and turn the resulting list of residuals back into a data 
frame  
 
M <- as.data.frame(lapply(item.formulae, m.lm, data=Scores)) 
 
The data frame M is then suitable as an input to functions for parallel and principal 





m.pa <- paran(M, graph=TRUE) 
m.pca <- principal(M, nfactors=m.pa$Retained) 
 
The G-Type analysis proceeds as above except that the formula construction is of the 
form  
 
item.formulae <- lapply(items, 
                 function(x) {formula(paste(x, '~ subject'))}) 
 
SAS Code 
For the M-Type analysis, let Scores be a dataset with columns subject and rater 
which are nominal variables and numeric columns with names it m_1, item_2, ... 
item_i of the rater’s score of the subject on each of i items. We will output the residuals to a 
temporary dataset named m_Scores 
4 
 
proc glm data=Scores; 
        class rater; 
        model item_1--item_i = rater; 
                output out=m_Scores r=m_item_1-m_item_i; 
run; 
 
The residualized variables stored in the temporary dataset m_Scores can then be 
subjected to parallel analysis and principal components analyses. 
We can use a similar method to obtain the variables for the G-Type analysis 
 
proc glm data=Scores; 
        class subject; 
        model item_1--item_i = subject; 




For the M-Type analysis, let Scores be a dataset with columns subject and rater 
which are nominal variables and numeric columns with names it m_1, item_2, ... 
item_i of the rater’s score of the subject on each of i items 
 
DATASET ACTIVATE Scores. 
UNIANOVA item_1 to item_i BY rater 
  /METHOD=SSTYPE(3) 
  /INTERCEPT=INCLUDE 
5 
  /SAVE=ZRESID 
  /CRITERIA=ALPHA(0.05) 
  /DESIGN=rater. 
 
The residualized variables, i.e., the m_scores will be stored at the end of the Scores 
data set. These variables can be subjected to parallel analysis and principal components 
analyses. 
We can use a similar approach to obtain the variables for the G-Type analysis 
 
DATASET ACTIVATE Scores. 
UNIANOVA item_1 to item_i BY subject 
  /METHOD=SSTYPE(3) 
  /INTERCEPT=INCLUDE 
  /SAVE=ZRESID 
  /CRITERIA=ALPHA(0.05) 
  /DESIGN=subject. 
 
 Differential Behavioral Ecology 1 






Differential Behavioral Ecology 
 
Alexander Weiss* 
Scottish Primate Research Group 
Department of Psychology 
School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences 
The University of Edinburgh 
 
Mark James Adams 
Institute of Evolutionary Biology 
School of Biological Sciences 
The University of Edinburgh 
 
*Corresponding author:  
Department of Psychology 
School of Philosophy 
Psychology, and Language Sciences 
The University of Edinburgh 
7 George Square 
Edinburgh EH8 9JZ 
United Kingdom.  
Phone: +44 (0) 131 650 3456 
Fax: +44 (0) 131 650 3461 
Email: alex.weiss@ed.ac.uk 
 Differential Behavioral Ecology 2 
Behavioral Variation 
 Behavioral variation is of import to evolution. Behavioral differences in, for example, 
courtship, can lead to reproductive isolation and speciation, a process referred to as 
ethological isolation (Dobzhansky, 1970, ch 10). As such, the study of behavioral variation 
can yield important clues about other kinds of diversity. While the study of human behavioral 
variation in the form of personality research is a mature field with a distinguished record of 
accomplishments, there has only recently been renewed interest in studying individual 
differences in nonhuman animal behavior. Research in this area has appeared under various 
guises, including temperament (Réale, Reader, Sol, McDougall, & Dingemanse, 2007), 
behavioral syndromes (Sih, Bell, Johnson, & Ziemba, 2004), and personality (Gosling, 2001). 
While these frameworks all concern individual differences in behavior, they differ in several 
critical ways. Notably, compared to animal personality research based in human differential 
psychology, animal personality research arising from behavioral ecology prominently 
features evolutionary theory as a unifying theme. Other differences include basic 
assumptions, central research questions, methods, and measurement. Much like behavioral 
differences that act as barriers to reproduction between individuals within a species we think 
that these differences between research programs may lead to a less ‘fruitful’ evolutionary 
science of personality. 
 The realization by scientists that nonhuman primates are individually recognizable 
and behaviorally distinct probably began in early laboratory colonies and preceded the formal 
study of their personality (Crawford, 1938, p. 79; Yerkes, 1939). Later contributions came 
from researchers such as Itani (1957) who considered introversion and extraversion in 
Japanese macaques, and Goodall (1986) who described the personalities of the chimpanzees 
she studied at Gombe. Rather than being simple anthropomorphism (a charge that Yerkes 
anticipated), the assumption that primate personality should resemble our own has a strong 
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phylogenetic basis. Without evidence to the contrary, we assume that closely related species 
will be more similar to each other than more distantly related species (Darwin, 1859, ch 13). 
Thus, how nonhuman primates differ behaviorally should resemble how we differ.  
 Our own research on nonhuman primate personality led us to believe that the 
approaches of human differential psychology can benefit research on personality conducted 
by behavioral ecologists. This revelation came about because nonhuman primates are ideal 
subjects for studies that link approaches from differential psychology and behavioral ecology. 
To wit, compared to other animals, our phylogenetic affinity with nonhuman primates, and 
especially the great apes, makes us more able to ‘read’ a primate’s personality and thus 
provide reliable and valid ratings (Uher & Asendorpf, 2008). This, and the fact that their 
social lives and behaviors are complex and distinct, readily lends these species to more 
comprehensive measures that can educe a whole personality structure. In addition, while 
practical and ethical barriers prevent studying humans with some of the behavioral 
ecologists’ experimental manipulations (see, e.g. Réale et al., 2007) or conducting “field” 
research, such barriers in studying nonhuman primates are few. Finally, this also means that 
tools for assessment adapted from human studies will capture much of the variety present in 
nonhuman primates.  
 Compared to findings in studies of fish or birds, results from nonhuman primate 
personality research are also more likely to be informative to human studies. This point is 
underscored by a study on the genetic correlation of human personality and subjective well-
being (Weiss, Bates, & Luciano, 2008) which replicated the findings of an earlier chimpanzee 
study (Weiss, King, & Enns, 2002). Also, recent studies on the relationship between human 
personality and immune functioning (Ironson & Hayward, 2008; Ironson, O’Cleirigh, Weiss, 
Schneiderman, & Costa, 2008; O’Cleirigh, Ironson, Weiss, & Costa, 2007) were anticipated 
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by studies in rhesus macaques (Capitanio, Mendoza, & Baroncelli, 1999; Maninger, 
Capitanio, Mendoza, & Mason, 2003). 
 We hope to show that, while each of these research programs asks interesting 
questions, to understand the nature of personality, i.e., its ultimate origins in humans and 
other species, requires a combination of approaches. Based on studies of personality ratings 
in humans and in nonhuman primates, we believe that nonhuman personality research in 
other animals would benefit by incorporating approaches from differential psychology 
research. These approaches include more broadly defining and measuring traits, conducting 
epidemiological studies in natural communities, looking at personality profiles, and 
examining the covariance among traits or structure. 
The Study of Personality in Behavioral Ecology 
Research Questions 
Trade-Offs and Life-History Strategies 
 Behavioral ecologists who study nonhuman personality follow the approach outlined 
by Tinbergen (2005); they formulate and test hypotheses concerning ultimate causation or 
how a particular behavior is adaptive. This research program also posits that existing 
behaviors represent an optimal trade-off between fitness costs (e.g., energy expended) and 
benefits (e.g., reproductive outcomes). The study of optimization in classical ethology or 
behavioral ecology has typically been at the species level. For example, one might test 
whether the pattern of foraging within a species is such that individuals switch to another 
patch when the amount of energy from food they gain from one patch is exceeded by the cost 
of continued foraging in that patch (MacArthur & Pianka, 1966). Studies of personality 
variation by behavioral ecologists have brought this focus on trade-offs to the study of intra-
specific behavioral variation. 
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 Behavioral ecology also concerns the study of life-history strategies (Pianka, 1970). 
Life-history strategies comprise a suite of traits that are co-adapted for particular 
environments. These traits reflect trade-offs between reproductive and somatic effort. 
Unstable environments lead to species that are r-selected, that is, characterized by 
reproductive effort. These r-selected species (e.g., rabbits) have short generation times, a 
lower probability of offspring survival, and small body size. On the other hand, stable 
environments lead to species that are characterized by somatic effort or K-selected. 
Individuals within K-selected species (e.g., elephants) possess traits indicative of somatic 
effort, namely larger body size, high parental investment, and greater longevity.  
 Dall, Houston, and McNamara (2004) conceptualized personality as alternative 
behavioral strategies and Wolf, van Doorn, Leimar, and Weissing (2007) placed it within the 
context of life-history evolution. An individual’s optimal behavior depends both on its own 
condition and behavioral history as well as on the behaviors of others in the population. For 
example, an animal with poor body condition and, therefore, a low potential for reproductive 
success, would do better to invest in foraging, even if this increases predation risk. Likewise, 
the advantage of behaviors like aggression depends both on how others are behaving and on 
population density. Normally, aggression leads an individual to out-compete its neighbors for 
resources, but at low population densities with moderate competition, high aggression might 
be counter-productive, leading to lower fitness (Dingemanse, Both, Drent, & Tinbergen, 
2004; Sih et al., 2004).  
 Personality may also become co-adapted with life-history traits such as the trade-off 
between growth and mortality (Biro & Stamps, 2008; Stamps, 2007). As growth rate is 
known to vary consistently between individuals in many different species, individuals that 
require an increased food intake benefit from a personality style suitable for high foraging 
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rates, e.g., by being bold, aggressive, or explorative. The maintenance of variation in both 
productivity and behavioral traits require and reinforce each other. 
 This approach to the study of personality and life-history strategies should be 
distinguished from that typically conducted in humans or other primates. In the study of 
humans and nonhuman primates the focus is typically on how individual differences in some 
personality dimension are related to individual differences in life-history outcomes. In the 
non-primate personality literature researchers are less interested in species-typical behaviors 
or fixed action patterns than in how personality is expressed, the relation between personality 
and fitness, how combinations of personality traits may be adaptations for particular 
ecological niches, how the presence or absence of variation can be explained by ecological 
factors, and the maintenance of heritable genetic variation. On a methodological level, the 
phylogenetically-informed inferences and arguments from theory made by workers coming 
from the tradition of human psychology (Gosling, 2008; Gosling & Graybeal, 2007; Gosling 
& John, 1999; Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007b) are distinct from the heavy lifting of 
measuring the strength and mode of natural selection practiced by behavioral ecologists 
(Dingemanse & Réale, 2005). While both traditions are engaged with evolutionary theory, 
empirical analyses from evolutionary biology are featured more frequently and more 
prominently in behavioral ecology (Dingemanse & Réale, 2005; Open Peer Commentary, 
2007) than in differential psychology (Eaves, Martin, Heath, Hewitt, & Neale, 1990). 
The Persistence of Heritable Variation 
 Personality variation in humans and other animals is, in part, genetic. The heritability 
of personality traits has been estimated for a number of animal species (van Oers, de Jong, 
van Noordwijk, Kempenaers, & Drent, 2005). Both behavioral ecologists and differential 
psychologists have adopted a number of methods for estimating heritability, although a 
method uniquely available to studies of nonprimate animals is realized heritability via 
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selection experiments. Behavioral ecology research has also examined the genetic variance of 
personality in wild populations and has gone beyond estimating heritability by attempting to 
understand how genetic variation in personality traits are maintained within specific 
populations. If personality traits in primates show similar levels of heritability, then 
differential psychologists should share a concern for how this variation is maintained. 
 A review of the literature suggested that approximately 50% of the variance of all five 
human domains was heritable with little to no variance being accounted for by the shared 
family environment (Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001). There have also been several recent studies 
on the genetics of personality in nonhuman primates. One study which examined the 
heritability of personality in 145 zoo chimpanzees found that, of the six personality 
dimensions identified by personality ratings (King & Figueredo, 1997), only Dominance was 
significantly heritable (h2 = .62; Weiss, King, & Figueredo, 2000). A later study of rhesus 
macaques examined the heritability of seven factors derived from reactions to anxiety tests 
(Williamson et al., 2003). They found that individual differences on the Movement (h2 = 
1.00), Distress cues (h2 = .58), Early independence (h2 = .83), Explore familiar environment 
(h2 = .47), and Explore novelty (h2 = 1.00) factors were heritable; neither the Distress 
vocalizations nor Delayed independence factors were heritable. In a study of vervet monkeys, 
Fairbanks et al. (2004) found that Social Impulsivity was heritable (h2 = .35). Fairbanks and 
her colleagues also found evidence for the heritability of the two facets of Social Impulsivity: 
Impulsive Approach (h2 = .25) and Aggression (h2 = .61). Finally, Rogers, Shelton, Shelledy, 
Garcia, and Kalin (2008) found evidence that two measures of behavioral inhibition (likely 
related to Neuroticism) in juvenile rhesus macaques were influenced by additive genetic
effects (freezing: h2 = .38; vigilance: h2 = .91). 
 Molecular genetic research in nonhuman primates supports the findings of 
quantitative geneticists. Bethea et al. (2004) found evidence linking the serotonin transporter 
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linked polymorphic region (5HTTLPR) and reactions to several tests of anxious behavior or 
Neuroticism: monkeys that had two short forms of this allele (s/s) displayed greater anxiety 
than monkeys who had two long forms of the allele (l/l) or who were heterozygous (s/l). A 
molecular genetic study of a heritable phenotype related to Neuroticism (novelty seeking) 
found that latency to approach a novel object was lower in vervet monkeys that had the five- 
as opposed to six-repeat polymorphism of the dopamine D4 receptor gene (Bailey, 
Breidenthal, Jorgensen, McCracken, & Fairbanks, 2007). Interestingly, experimental studies 
of genotyped rhesus macaques suggests that the effects of genetic polymorphisms on 
behavioral indicators of personality differs as a function of early environmental stressors 
(Champoux et al., 2002; Kraemer, Moore, Newman, Barr, & Schneider, 2008; Newman et al., 
2005). 
How this additive genetic variation is maintained remains a puzzle for under 
directional or stabilizing selection, one would expect that the heritable variance in any given 
trait to be negligible (Barton & Turelli, 1989; Falconer & Mackay, 1996). This has led to 
considerable debate. Some theorists have suggested that variation in human psychological 
traits is maintained by neutral selection (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). The neutral theory states 
that most mutations have neither beneficial nor deleterious fitness consequences (Kimura, 
1983, 1986) leading to a balance between the input of new variation by mutation and its 
removal by drift (Lynch & Hill, 1986). Others have taken an adaptationist stance, and see 
individual differences in humans and other animals as arising from mechanisms such as 
frequency-dependent selection, sexual selection, or any number of mechanisms by which 
individual differences emerge because th re are multiple niches or that what is ‘optimal’ 
depends on the social and non-social context (see Open Peer Commentary, 2007 for a 
discussion; Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007a; Penke et al., 2007b).  
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To explore these hypotheses necessitates adopting additional methods from 
behavioral ecology to examine micro-evolutionary trends such as fluctuations in selection 
pressure across time (Dingemanse et al., 2004) or across environments (Dingemanse et al., 
2007). Unlike research on primates, these ecologically informed studies have measured 
selection on temperament (Bell & Sih, 2007; Réale & Festa-Bianchet, 2003) rather than 
relating personality to fitness in only the broadest terms.  
Personality Measures 
 Behavioral ecologists who study personality typically use similar methods as one 
another. While there are notable exceptions (e.g., Réale & Festa-Bianchet, 2003), one 
methodological feature common to much of this research is the use of small numbers of 
subjects that are easily (and safely) subjected to behavioral tests or experimental 
manipulations. Another common methodological feature is a preference for behaviorally-
based measures of personality, which has its roots in the traditional ethological emphasis on 
observation and the aversion to seeming anthropomorphism (Tinbergen, 1951). Finally, these 
studies typically focus on one or two rigidly-defined traits such as boldness, aggressiveness, 
or exploratory behavior. The definitions of these traits does not constrain how they are 
measured, which might include behavioral or physiological (hormonal, serotonergic, etc.) 
indicators. This framework does not assume that intercorrelations among traits are the 
product of underlying latent constructs née personality factors, and leaves this as a question 
to be investigated (Réale et al., 2007). Instead, the approach typically taken by many 
behavioral ecologists is to measure several behaviors thought to indicate a particular 
personality trait and test whether they are correlated (Stamps, 2007). 
 In one example of this approach, Réale, Gallant, Leblanc, and Festa-Bianchet (2000) 
measured boldness (in terms of trappability) and docility (behavior during handling) in 
female sheep, found they were weakly correlated, and concluded that they represented two 
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separate traits. Sometimes a single trait is examined, as in Daniewski's and Jezierski's (2003) 
study of exploratory behavior in rabbits using an open field test.  
 In short, the behavioral differences currently studied by ecologists were never meant 
to be comprehensive. Instead, these studies rely on hypothesis-driven observations and 
experiments that attempt to assess how a few narrowly defined traits are related to ecological 
or social variables. It will be necessary to add further traits to fully define most of the intra-
specific behavioral variation present, particularly in species with more complex social lives.  
The Study of Personality in Differential Psychology 
Personality Measures 
Historical Precedents 
 The study of human—and to some extent primate—personality has different origins. 
While early biographers such as Plutarch (46 AD-120 AD) ascribed personality 
characteristics to their subjects, the study of human personality as a science has a shorter 
history. Research in human personality originated from Francis Galton's (1822-1911) study 
of human individual differences, which also led to the development of modern 
psychometrics, statistics, behavior genetics, and cognitive abilities research. 
 The insight that personality descriptors may be found in natural languages and can be 
used to construct personality inventories came later (Allport & Odbert, 1936), and is still one 
of the most popular way of studying human personality. These data are most commonly 
analyzed using factor or principal components analysis (Gorsuch, 1983), which involve 
examining covariances among variables to determine whether groups of variables cluster 
together, i.e., are indicative of one or more latent underlying constructs (factors or 
components). Each factor or component can be described with respect to the amount of 
variance it accounts for (its eigenvalue) and the degree to which each variable is related to the 
factors or components (loadings). 
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Debates About Traits 
 The study of human personality via ratings was and is still not without debate. The 
most serious charge by critics was that personality traits did a poor job of predicting behavior 
and were inconsistent across situations (Mischel, 1968). In fact, like early (and some 
contemporary) ethologists and behavioral ecologists, Mischel favored using behavioral 
measures. This challenge was later answered by research showing that personality measures 
were related to behavior if behavior was aggregated over time (Epstein, 1979). Personality 
researchers also showed that self-ratings and observer-ratings were correlated (McCrae et al., 
2004), that personality was mostly stable in adulthood (Costa & McCrae, 2002), and that 
personality predicted a broad range of important outcomes (Ozer & Benet-Martínez, 2006; 
Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007). 
 Other debates, many of which are still ongoing, revolved around the number of 
personality dimensions needed to explain human personality differences (Costa & McCrae, 
1992a, 1992b; Eysenck, 1992a, 1992b; Lee, Ogunfowora, & Ashton, 2005). For the purpose 
of this chapter, we will focus our discussion on the Five-Factor Model (FFM; Digman, 1990), 
as it is the dominant model in human personality research, which contends that five normally-
distributed dimensions or domains---Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, 
Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness---describe human personality differences.  
 While it is not possible to comprehensively summarize each of the five personality 
domains, we feel it is useful to highlight some of their cardinal characteristics as described by 
Costa and McCrae (1992c). Individuals on the low end of Neuroticism are emotionally stable, 
well-adjusted, and exhibit low levels of negative affect; individuals on the high end tend to be 
emotionally unstable, have problems with adjustment, and have high levels negative affect. 
Individuals high in Extraversion are more sociable, assertive, active, and experience more 
positive affect whereas those low in Extraversion do not seek out others’ company and are 
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independent, less active, and experience less positive affect. Individuals scoring higher in 
Openness to Experience tend to be curious, value new experiences and feelings, and 
unconventional whereas individuals scoring on the low tend to be less curious, prefer the 
familiar to the novel, and are more conventional in their outlooks and behavior. Individuals 
higher in Agreeableness tend to be helpful, trusting, and more inclined to cooperate rather 
than compete. On the other hand, individuals lower in Agreeableness tend to be less inclined 
to help others, suspicious and cynical, and more competitive. Finally, individuals ranking 
high in Conscientiousness will be reliable, organized, directed, and self-disciplined whereas 
those lower in Conscientiousness will often be less reliable, disorganized, directionless, and 
lacking in self-discipline.  
 While laymen would be inclined to see one end of each personality domain as a 
desirable state of affairs, when considered within the framework of evolution, it is easy to 
imagine the advantages and disadvantages presented by various levels of each of these five 
domains. In fact, Nettle (2006; Table 1) has outlined possible benefits and costs to the high 
end of each domain which we briefly detail. While high Neuroticism could offer benefits 
such as increased vigilance, it might also carry costs including poorer interpersonal 
relationships which are critical in social species. Extraversion, while possibly leading to 
benefits such as mating success might also cost in terms of harm from risk taking behaviors. 
High Openness to Experience, while being related to benefits such as increased creativity 
carries the possible costs of having unusual or even harmful beliefs. High Agreeableness may 
benefit individuals by making them more valued partners in coalitions, though it may also 
lead to individuals being at greater risk from social cheaters. Finally, while Conscientiousness 
may benefit individuals by helping them meet long-term goals, it can potentially cost them 
the benefits of more immediate fitness gains.  
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 This framework offers fascinating possibilities for considering the evolution basis of 
heritable variation in the FFM. Recent research which couches personality differences within 
evolutionary theory has made progress in understanding the ultimate causes of personality. 
Moreover, prior and ongoing research in seemingly unrelated areas has also yielded insights 
relevant to personality evolution. 
Is the Five-Factor Model Related to Life-History Strategies?  
 One reason why the differential psychology approach may appeal to behavioral 
ecologists is that the measures derived using this approach are likely related to evolutionarily-
relevant characteristics such as life-history strategies. Figueredo, Vásquez, Brumbach, and 
Schneider (2004; 2007) argued that, although life-history strategy is typically used to 
differentiate species, it is also a dimension on which individuals within a species differ. In 
other words, while humans are generally suited to a long-term (K-selected) strategy, there is 
still considerable variation. To test whether human personality dimensions were related to 
how K-selected individuals were, Figueredo et al. (2004; 2007) conducted two analyses. In 
the first they showed that factor analysis of either the phenotypic or genetic covariance 
among questionnaire items concerning altruism, reproductive effort, parenting effort, and 
other aspects of life history revealed a single factor, which they named K. Figueredo et al. 
also conducted a second factor analysis on the covariance among K and the five human 
personality factors and found a single higher order factor. These findings are certainly 
suggestive. However, these studies are limited in that they are cross-sectional and do not rule 
out the possibility that correlations may have arisen because personality and outcome 
measures were assessed using the same method, i.e., questionnaires (see Campbell & Fiske, 
1959 for a detailed discussion). 
 Behavioral ecologists used to objectively measured life history variables will be 
understandably skeptical of these cross-sectional questionnaire-based results. However, 
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prospective epidemiological studies linking personality to real-world health outcomes also 
suggest a relationship between human personality dimensions and life-history strategy. This 
is especially true for Conscientiousness, which, of the five human dimensions, is most 
consistently related to a wide variety of health outcomes (Bogg & Roberts, 2004; Roberts et 
al., 2007). One set of findings demonstrates that, across studies of samples differing widely in 
health, age, socioeconomic status, culture, cognitive ability, and other characteristics, people 
who are high in Conscientiousness live longer (Kern & Friedman, 2008). Conscientiousness 
is also related to slower disease progression; research on HIV infected persons has shown that 
higher Conscientiousness was related to reductions in viral load and increases in CD4 counts 
(Ironson et al., 2008; O’Cleirigh et al., 2007). Moreover, recent research has shown that 
higher Conscientiousness is associated with a reduced risk of Alzheimer's disease and 
cognitive decline, suggesting slower senescence (Wilson, Schneider, Arnold, Bienias, & 
Bennett, 2007). 
 The fact that Conscientiousness is a particularly robust and strong predictor of 
mortality and other health outcomes is interesting. More interesting still is the fact that, 
despite the fact that Conscientiousness leads to health behaviors (Bogg & Roberts, 2004), 
these possible mediating variables only explain only part of the relationship between 
Conscientiousness and mortality (Martin, Friedman, & Schwartz, 2007). Thus, the protective 
effect of Conscientiousness may be due to Conscientiousness reflecting a more long-term or 
K-selected orientation, including facets of competence, order, dutifulness, achievement 
striving, self-discipline, and deliberation (Costa & McCrae, 1992c). This suggests that 
Conscientiousness may be particularly well-positioned to capture individual differences in 
life history.  
 If Conscientiousness were the only personality domain related to these variables, it 
would be problematic. This is because, to date, Conscientiousness dimensions have only been 
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identified in chimpanzees and humans (Gosling & John, 1999). It is therefore good that other 
personality domains are also related to health outcomes. Agreeableness is comprised of fac ts 
such as altruism and compliance (Costa & McCrae, 1992c), which are related to the K-
selected end of the life-history strategy spectrum (Pianka, 1970). Epidemiological research 
has generally found that Agreeableness is related to reduced cardiovascular disease risk (see 
Whiteman, Deary, & Fowkes, 2000 for a review) and longevity (e.g., Weiss & Costa, 2005). 
However, these findings have not been replicated in all studies (e.g., Iwasa et al., 2008).  
 Neuroticism, too, may reflect some aspects of life-history strategy, especially in terms 
of short-term orientation, e.g., the impulsiveness facet. However, the relationship between 
Neuroticism and mortality is markedly less clear: some studies show that it is a risk f ctor 
(e.g., Wilson, de Leon, Bienias, Evans, & Bennett, 2004), others have found that it is 
protective (e.g., Weiss & Costa, 2005), and still others find no significant relationship (e.g., 
Iwasa et al., 2008). 
 The reduced fidelity among studies examining the relationship between personality 
domains other than Conscientiousness and mortality should give one pause; it suggests that 
the association between personality and life-history strategy is probably more complex than 
suggested by the results of questionnaire-based studies (e.g., Figueredo et al., 2004; 2007). 
There are several possible explanations for why personality dimensions potentially related to 
life history are not related to health outcomes. Among these explanations are that effect sizes 
are smaller, and, as such, it might be difficult to replicate these findings. However, failures to 
find this effect have occurred in some studies (Almada et al., 1991) that used very larg  
samples. This also does not explain why in some studies of Neuroticism and mortality, the 
effects are significant, but in the opposite direction (e.g., Weiss & Costa, 2005). A final 
possibility is that contextual or environmental factors, such as population density or resource 
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availability may attenuate or modify the way in which human personality domains are related 
to these outcomes. 
How Differential Psychology Can Enrich Studies of Personality in Behavioral Ecology 
 As pointed out by Gosling (see chapter X this volume) and Capitanio (in press), 
researchers can gain insight into human personality from studies of animal personality. We 
echo this sentiment, but add that animal personality studies, especially those conducted by 
behavioral ecologists, can benefit from human personality research. In particular, we 
emphasize the benefits of adopting a multivariate approach to measurement, asking quest ons 
about the impact of multiple dimensions, and examining personality structure. 
Improving Measures 
 As we previously indicated, there are marked differences in how personality is 
measured in these disciplines. While neither approach possesses an absolute advantage, we 
feel that behavioral ecologists could benefit from using the some tools developd by 
differential psychologists. To do so we will first highlight the advantages and disadvantages 
of behavioral measures. we will then offer several recommendations. 
Advantages of Behavioral Measures: Uniformity 
 As noted previously, behavioral ecology research on personality typically relies on 
single ‘item’ measures of one or two aspects of personality. There are multiple advantages to 
this approach. First, these measures are easily replicable within and across species, thus 
facilitating their use by multiple investigators. Second, unlike rating scales, individuals within 
a sample can be quickly assessed. Third, unlike using rating scales, where raters need to 
know individuals for a considerable period of time, responses to behavioral tests can be 
assessed by naïve individuals who have had little or no experience with the individual 
animals. Finally, these measures benefit those wishing to conduct meta-analyses as the 
uniformity in personality measures makes comparing studies straightforward.  
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Disadvantages of Behavioral Measures: The Lack of Context 
 Like all methods, there are drawbacks to this approach. One drawback is that this 
method assumes that a behavior measured in one species has the same meaning in other 
species. While this assumption might very well hold, it is impossible to know unless there are 
multiple measures of multiple personality domains (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Uher, 2008a, 
2008b).  
 To illustrate the problem, consider the bold-timid dimension often studied by 
behavioral ecologists (Réale et al., 2007). Behavioral ecologists usually define this dimension 
as an individual's reaction to risky yet non-novel situations and have drawn broad conclusions 
concerning the evolutionary importance of individual differences in the bold-timi di ension 
based on this definition. However, an examination of a related measure in studies of zoo 
chimpanzees (King & Figueredo, 1997) and orangutans (Weiss, King, & Perkins, 2006) 
suggests that this assumption does not always hold. Both studies used comparable 
questionnaires, which only differed in that the questionnaire used to assess orangutan 
personality included five additional items (for more details see Weiss et al., 2006; pp. 504-
505). The item timid is common to both questionnaires and defined as “Subject lacks self 
confidence, is easily alarmed and is hesitant to venture into new social or non-social 
situations.” In chimpanzees, this item is a clear marker of the Dominance factor, having a 
loading of -.81. By examining the other items that load on Dominance, we see that 
individuals described as timid are also, for example, less persistent and more dependent (see 
Table 1 in King & Figueredo, 1997). On the other hand, in orangutans timid is a clear marker 
of the Neuroticism factor, its loading being .70. Orangutans described as timid are more 
likely to be excitable and impulsive, but less likely to be cool (see Table 3 in Weiss et al., 
2006).  
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 Clearly, without the context of other items, the meaning of timid would be 
misunderstood in chimpanzees, orangutans, or both. Worse for the study of nonhuman 
personality is that, without this context, researchers may be led down blind alleys and 
comparisons of results across studies may be misleading.  
Recommendations 
 It is not our intention to be scolds, and, given their advantages, we think it would be 
foolish for behavioral ecologists to abandon their measures. Instead we advocate that, where 
feasible, researchers use multiple types of measures (e.g., ratings, experimental tests, 
behavioral observations) of multiple personality constructs (e.g., Neuroticism, Extraversion, 
Agreeableness). This method, first advanced by Campbell and Fiske (1959), later expanded 
upon by others (see, e.g. Shadish, 1992; Widaman, 1985), and applied in a study of great ape 
personality (Uher & Asendorpf, 2008) is based on the premise that traits may be correlated 
because they reflect the same underlying trait (e.g., Neuroticism) or method (e.g., an 
experimental paradigm). Thus, by measuring multiple constructs using multiple methods, one 
can better understand and more reliably measure the traits of interest. Once we understand th  
species-specific contexts in which a trait such as timid is expressed, we can begin to place i  
within the behavioral and social ecology of the species. Under what ecological conditions or 
social organizations, for instance, does boldness versus timidity become a facet related to 
social dominance rather than anxiety?  
Adopting Multidimensional and Multivariate Approaches 
 In addition to our recommendations concerning measures, we also feel that behavioral 
ecology could reap great rewards and insights by studying multiple traits. To support this 
suggestion we will highlight research in psychology suggesting that individual traits o  
dimensions do not always act alone. More fundamentally, we will next highlight how studies 
of personality structure may benefit behavioral ecology. 
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Profiles 
 Personality profiles in differential psychology. Until relatively recently, like
behavioral ecology research in personality, human personality research has focused on 
examining a single dimension at a time. However, sometimes it may be useful to study r 
understand the “whole person” (or animal in this case). That is, one wishes to examine how 
the combination of an individual’s traits may be related to important outcomes. At present, 
the study of personality profiles has been focused on mental as opposed to physical health 
outcomes, including subjective well-being and happiness, affective disorders such as 
depression, and personality disorders.  
 The study of subjective well-being or happiness has shown major advances since the 
advent of interest in the area (Diener, Lucas, & Scollon, 2006; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 
1999). While there is also growing evidence from large longitudinal panel studies that 
subjective well-being can be changed by major life events, e.g., marriage (Lucas, Clark, 
Georgellis, & Diener, 2003), a consistent finding across several studies has been that 
subjective well-being is reliably predicted by all five human personality dimensions, 
especially low Neuroticism and high Extraversion (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998; Steel, Schmidt, 
& Shultz, 2008). 
 Some may wish to dismiss the study of happiness and related personality profiles as 
merely reflecting whether fortune (genetic or environmental) smiles upon an individual. 
However, a recent review of the literature suggests that this may be premature as s bjective 
well-being actual predicts numerous positive outcomes such as more successful marriages 
and higher income (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005) as well as longevity (Danner, 
Snowdon, & Friesen, 2001). As such, one could hypothesize that subjective well-being and 
associated personality profiles predict outcomes reflecting adjustment to one’s environment. 
 Differential Behavioral Ecology 20 
 As suggested by its relationship with mortality (Kinder et al., 2008), major depression 
may have high fitness costs or be related to life-history strategy. Prospective studies have 
highlighted the depression risk conferred by high Neuroticism and low Extraversion over 
long periods of time and that this relationship is mediated by common genetic factors 
(Kendler, Gatz, Gardner, & Pedersen, 2006). 
 Even though high Neuroticism and low Extraversion are risk factors for depression, 
many individuals exhibiting either or both of these risk factors do not become depressed. To 
study how other personality dimensions moderate this risk, Weiss et al. (2009) studied the 
relationship between the five personality dimensions and 28 of the personality styles and 
depression in older adults. Their results indicated that, while high Neuroticism and low 
Conscientiousness were risk factors, they only predicted depression in the context of the 
individual’s standing on other personality dimensions. 
 Personality disorders refer to underlying and persistent sets of behaviors, cognitions, 
and affective dispositions that can lead individuals and those close to them to experience 
many difficulties and general impairment (American Psychiatric Association, 2004). Unlike 
personality measures, personality disorders have traditionally been operationalized as 
categories or types. This conceptualization is captured in the major classification manuals 
used by psychiatry, such as the Fourth Edition Text Revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2004). For example, individuals 
exhibiting antisocial personality disorder may encounter repeated legal difficulties because of 
their violation of social norms and rules. The DSM-IV-TR criteria used to classify individuals 
as having antisocial personality disorder are that they demonstrate:  
A. A pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others  
     occurring since age 15, as indicated by at least three of the following: 
    (1) Failure to comform to social norms and repeated lawbreaking. 
    (2) Deceitfulness. 
    (3) Impulsivity of failure to plan ahead. 
    (4) Irritability and aggressiveness. 
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    (5) Reckless disregard for safety of self or others. 
    (6) Consistent irresponsibility. 
    (7) Lack or remorse. 
B. The individual is at least 18 years of age. 
C. There is evidence of Conduct Disorder with onset before age 15. 
 
 It is beyond the present chapter’s scope to detail the problems with this typological 
approach. However, these problems have led to a growing unease with its use and advocacy 
for a dimensional approach based on the FFM (Widiger & Frances, 2002). 
 The research supporting the move toward a dimensional approach suggests that 
personality disorders are, in fact, reflections of maladaptive combinations of extremely high 
or low standings on the five personality dimensions. A recent meta-analysis on the 
relationship between the five human personality dimensions and ten DSM-IV-TR personality 
disorders revealed that high Neuroticism and low Agreeableness were consistent across most 
disorders (Saulsman & Page, 2004). This same meta-analysis also found that, for the most 
part, personality disorders can be distinguished by standings on the other dimensions. For 
example, antisocial personality disorder is also characterized by low Conscientiousness, 
whereas avoidant personality disorder is characterized by low Extraversion.  
 Personality profiles in behavioral ecology. The accumulated research suggests that 
personality profiles are critical to understanding potentially fitness-related outcomes in 
humans such as health and adjustment. Although it might be difficult or impossible to study 
phenomena as complex as personality or affective disorders in many nonhuman species, 
including primates, incorporating personality profiles could expand the scope of nonhuman 
personality research and may yield numerous insights. In the case of the role of different 
environmental or ecological contexts in maintaining genetic personality variance (e.g., 
Dingemanse et al., 2004), personality dimensions other than the one of interest in a particular 
study may be an additional contextual background in which the personality dimension of 
interest operates. This would provide yet another means by which heritable variation may be 
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maintained through selection on correlated traits (Lande & Arnold, 1983; Merilä, Sheldon, & 
Kruuk, 2001). A hypothetical example might be a species with a positive genetic correlation 
between exploratory behavior and boldness (great tits; van Oers, de Jong, Drent, & van 
Noordwijk, 2004). In an environment with a high population density but also significant 
predation, these two traits could be selected in the opposite direction. While a fast exploring 
individual would be able to outcompete conspecifics for access to food, its high boldness 
would raise its risk to predation. Access to food and mates is usually compared with rank, 
which in primates is captured by personality dimensions such as Dominance. For a primate, 
the social networks through which influence operates can be equally effective for contr lling 
group dynamics, so high Extraversion and Agreeableness would be beneficial.  
Structure 
 Why ask questions about structure? Another way in which a multivariate approach 
can advance the study of nonhuman personality research is via the elucidation of personality, 
i.e., the way in which traits cluster together as revealed by their loadings on different factors. 
Instead of focusing on the relationship of each individual’s standing on one or more 
personality traits to life-history strategy or context and how heritable personality variation is 
maintained, the study of personality structure would permit researchers to examine 
personality at higher levels of organization, including species.  
 The universality of structure in humans. Human personality research strongly 
indicates that while variation on any number of personality traits is the norm, the nature of 
the covariance among these traits is a human universal. The majority of this evidence is bas d 
on cross-cultural studies of human personality in which a well-validated measure developed 
in one culture is administered to members of another culture to see whether a similar factor 
structure emerges. The most ambitious study to date examined ratings on a well-validated 
measure of the FFM, the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 
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1992c). The participants were college students who were members of 50 Western and non-
Western cultures spanning six continents and were asked to rate other members of the culture 
whom they knew well (McCrae, Terracciano, & 78 Members of the Personality Profiles of 
Cultures Project, 2005). Overall, McCrae and his colleagues found evidence that the five 
factors found in American samples were reliably replicated in all of the cultures, with poorer 
replicability being mostly attributable to problems with data quality and smaller sample sizes. 
 The universality of structure in chimpanzees. Evidence showing that personality 
structure may also be stable across different populations of nonhuman primates in different 
settings is accumulating. King and Figueredo (1997) obtained ratings from zoo keepers and 
volunteers on 100 zoo-housed chimpanzees. The 43-item questionnaire was based on human 
personality questionnaires and attempted to sample items from all five human domains; factor 
analysis of the ratings revealed a broad chimpanzee-specific factor labeled Dominance as it 
reflected dominance and competitive prowess and five factors similar, though not identical, to 
the five human factors.  
 Three studies using identical or comparable questionnaires have examined whether 
the factor structure derived by King and Figueredo (1997) replicated in different samples. 
The first study used a sample comprised of ratings on 43 chimpanzees living in a naturalistic 
sanctuary in the Republic of the Congo rated on a French-language translation of the 
questionnaire and 74 zoo chimpanzees rated on the same questionnaire (King, Weiss, & 
Farmer, 2005). The second study (Weiss, King, & Hopkins, 2007) involved 175 chimpanzees 
housed at Yerkes National Primate Research Center rated using the same questionnaire as the 
original 100 chimpanzees. The third study was based on ratings of 146 chimpanzees housed 
in zoos, research centers, and a sanctuary in Japan (Weiss, Inoue-Murayama et al., 2009). The 
chimpanzees in this last study were rated on a translated version of the questionnaire and 
their factor structure was compared to that of the original 100 chimpanzees. In all three 
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studies high congruence coefficients (Haven & ten Berge, 1977) suggested that Dominance, 
Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness clearly replicated and that the overall 
structures of the original chimpanzee personality structure was replicated. On the other hand, 
considerably lower congruence coefficients indicated that neither Neuroticism nor Openness 
was replicated in these studies. However, loadings on these two factors were not at odds with 
definitions of Neuroticism or Openness and a follow-up analysis revealed that these factors 
also did not replicate in a second sample of zoo chimpanzees. These findings suggest that th  
failure to replicate the Neuroticism and Openness dimensions is probably attributable to 
properties of the questionnaire and not their absence in other samples (see King et al., 2005 
for more details). 
 Top-down versus bottom-up approaches. Saucier and Goldberg (2001) have argued 
that the apparent universality of personality structure is an artifact reflecting the top-down or 
etic approach used by McCrae and his colleagues (2005), i.e., the structure is imposed by 
virtue of the items within the questionnaire. Saucier and Goldberg favor bottom-up or emic 
approaches, such as the lexical approach, which involve assessing individuals within cultures 
using personality descriptive adjectives derived from within those cultures. A similar 
criticism could, of course, be raised to question the seeming universality of chimpanzee 
personality structure or rating nonhuman primates and other animals on questionnaires based 
on the FFM (Uher, 2008a, 2008b). Uher’s alternative approach is also a bottom-up approach 
in that she recommends that one base measures or questionnaires of nonhuman personality on 
a species’ naturally occurring behaviors. 
 However, there is evidence that these criticisms of the top-down approach may be 
overstated and that use of the same questionnaire items will not obscure species differences. 
For example, while the questionnaire King and Figueredo (1997) used to study chimpanzees 
was based on the FFM, the structure that emerged in chimpanzees differed from the huan 
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structure: it included a sixth factor, Dominance, and the other factors were not identical to 
their human analogues. Similarly, when a slightly expanded version of this questionnaire was 
used to assess orangutan personality (Weiss et al., 2006), the structure differed from that of 
chimpanzees and humans: Conscientiousness and Openness items loaded on a single factor 
named Intellect and Dominance was more narrowly defined. 
 Studies using a personality questionnaire designed by Stevenson-Hinde and Zunz 
(1978) have also revealed differences. A study of rhesus macaque personality found four 
factors: Sociable, Equable, Confident, and Excitable (Capitanio, 1999). On the other hand, a 
study of gorillas found four seemingly different factors: Extroverted, Dominant, Fearful, and 
Understanding (Gold & Maple, 1994). 
 Of course, in the latter example, different names may obscure similarities between the 
rhesus macaque and gorilla personality structures. However, a visual inspection of the 
loadings suggests that these factors differ (Capitanio, 1999, Table II; Gold & Maple, 1994, 
Table 1). To test how similar these factors were, we conducted an orthogonal targeted 
Procrustes rotation on the published results of these studies; this type of factor rotation 
involves rotating the structure derived from one sample so that it maximally resembl that of 
another structure (McCrae, Zonderman, Bond, Costa, & Paunonen, 1996). For the present 
analysis we rotated the gorilla factor structure to the rhesus macaque factor structure using 
only the loadings of the 12 items that were in common between the two studies. Also, 
because exact factor loadings were not provided for the gorilla data, we defined loadings in 
both samples as being equal to 0, 1, or -1 depending on whether the item was not associated 
with the factor, positively associated with the factor, or negatively associated with the factor, 
respectively. The congruence coefficients suggest that rhesus structure was not replicated in 
gorillas (.73); only the Equable factor replicated (.86), and that the loadings of only five items 
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(equable, understanding, sociable, playful, and curious) replicated (see Table 1). In short, this 
analysis suggested that the factor structures of gorillas and rhesus macaques differed. 
 What can be learned from a study of structure? Once a sufficient number of 
personality structures are determined using comparable instruments, researchers can begin 
comparing them in a phylogenetic context to infer the historical patterns (when, where, and 
why) of personality evolution (Gosling & Graybeal, 2007). For example, while the broad 
personality domains found in the great apes are similar, we are still left to puzzle out th
ultimate causes of structural differences, e.g., why orangutans share no domain equivalent to 
Conscientiousness or why humans lack a Dominance domain. Presumably these structural 
differences will be related to adaptations by each species to their ecological and social 
environments. A challenge in phylogenetic inference about personality structures is that 
personality dimensions are not species-typical traits (as a new anatomical feature or behavir 
might be), but rather a feature that differs among individuals. Orangutans lack of a distinct 
Conscientious domain but this does not mean they are unconscientious. The maintenance of 
variation of personality within species can also be informed by the determination of structure. 
If dimensions of a species’ personality structure are genetically correlated, then knowing the 
whole structure (not just one or two dimensions) would be necessary to understand how 
personality traits respond to correlated selection and relate to life-history trade-offs.  
Conclusions 
 We are pleased to see the recent growth and development of research in nonhuman 
animal personality research. However, we think that the relatively minor schism between 
behavioral ecologists and differential psychologists, if allowed to grow wider, can potentially 
threaten progress in this endeavor. If this occurs, such an event would not be without 
precedent in the study of animal behavior (see, e.g., the early rift, now mostly healed, 
between ethology and comparative psychology). As in biological evolution, we think that 
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when research programs become overly-specialized and rigid, i.e., lack diversity, they are 
threatened with extinction, or, at the very least, becoming a degenerating research program 
(Lakatos, 1976). 
 While these potential consequences are dire, preventing this form of ethological 
isolation may be relatively simple. The present chapter and volume represent two such 
efforts. In addition, we suggest that behavioral ecologists and differential psychologists try to 
incorporate each other’s methods, publish in each other’s respective journals, and attend each 
other’s conferences. Also, when appropriate, graduating Ph.D.s in behavioral ecology should 
consider seeking placements in differential psychology labs. 
 Thus, researchers studying personality could opt to follow their own ways and end up 
as the ring-tailed lemurs of animal behavior research, whiling away on isolated scientific 
islands. Alternatively, these researchers could choose to increase their behavioral diversity 
and spread over a wide range of environments, much like rhesus macaques, or even humans. 
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Table 1 
Gorilla Personality Factor Structure Rotated to Rhesus Macaque Factor Structure  
  Factor 
Item Equable Confidence Excitable Sociable Congruence 
Equable .98 .00 .03 .19 .98 
Understanding .98 .00 .03 .19 .98 
Slow .19 .01 -.22 -.96 .19 
Confident -.01 .55 -.81 .19 .55 
Aggressive .01 .83 .54 -.11 .83 
Effective .01 .83 .54 -.11 .83 
Excitable .01 .83 .54 -.11 .54 
Active -.19 -.01 .22 .96 .22 
Subordinate .01 -.55 .81 -.19 .81 
Sociable -.19 -.01 .22 .96 .96 
Playful -.19 -.01 .22 .96 .96 
Curious -.19 -.01 .22 .96 .96 
Congruence .86 .78 .58 .76 .73 
Note. Gorilla structure derived from Table 1 in Gold and Maple (1994). Macaque structure 
derived from Table II in Capitanio (1999). Congruence coefficients ≥ .85 indicate replication 
of factors, item loadings, or the structure. 
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Synopsis:  
Research into animal personality, temperament, or behavioral syndromes is finding that, like 
humans, there are stable individual differences in dimensions related to behavior, affect, and 
even cognitions among a wide array of taxa. While debates about how to best measure 
personality in animals are ongoing, animal models of personality offer intriguing insights into 
the neural, molecular, and genetic bases of human personality as well as the relationship 
between personality and health, well-being, and even psychopathology. Moreover, these 
studies enable researchers to develop new insights into the means by which behavioral 
variation in humans and other animals is maintained.
 
Glossary 
Factor analysis: A data reduction technique to re-describe the correlations among observed 
variables with a smaller set of unobserved latent variables.  
Orthologous genes: Genes in separate species that are descended from a common ancestral 
gene. 
Proximate causation: Genetic, developmental, physiological, and environmental reasons for 
why a particular phenotype exists. 
Quantitative trait locus:  Regions of DNA containing or closely linked to genes or 
transcription regulators that influence a trait.  
Ultimate causation: Evolutionary explanation of why a particular phenotype exists. 
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 That animals, like humans, exhibit consistent individual differences in “character” or 
“personality” has been a long-standing observation among pet-owners and researchers alike. 
Personality refers to mostly stable individual differences in behavioral, affective, and 
cognitive predispositions. More narrow terms used to describe stable individual differences 
include temperament and behavioral syndromes, which emphasize measured or observed 
behaviors to the exclusion of possible cognitive or affective traits. Temperament is an older 
term which derives from human psychology research and is used to refer to individual 
behavioral differences that are stable across time and situations, e.g., activity. The term 
behavioral syndrome is more recent and has its roots in the study of behavioral ecology. 
Behavioral syndromes are defined as sets of correlated behaviors that are consistent across 
multiple situations. This paradigm explicitly ties behavioral variation to differences in 
growth, reproduction, and survival. While the approaches encompassed by these three terms 
differ broadly in the kinds of data considered, the species they are used to study, the traits 
they are compared with, and the background of researches who practice them, they share a 
common goal of understanding and explaining differences on the individual level. 
 One characteristic that distinguishes animal personality, temperament, or behavioral 
syndromes from other aspects of animal behavior include their bases within individuals. That 
is to say, these characteristics of individuals are not elicited or caused by environmental 
situations or schedules of reinforcement, but, instead, indicate how an individual animal 
typically behaves across a variety of situations. A second characteristics is their relative 
stability over time; while there is a considerable amount of debate about how to interpret the 
magnitude of the effects, most researchers studying human personality would agree that, in 
adulthood, while there is some change, an individual's standing on a particular personality 
dimension at one point in time is a fairly good predictor of their standing on that personality 
 
dimension at a later point in time. A final, though not often mentioned, characteristic is the 
emphasis, at least in animal personality or behavioral syndromes research, of studying 
multiple correlated traits or facets that make up broader dimensions, sometimes referred to as 
factors, domains, or dimensions. 
Measurement of Personality, Temperament, and Behavioral Syndromes 
 How to measure dimensions of personality, temperament, or behavioral syndromes as 
well as how to distinguish between relatively good and relatively poor dimensions is crucial 
to the study of personality in all species. Broadly, there are two approaches to assessing 
animal personality: ratings and behavioral coding. 
Rating approaches 
 Ratings-based approaches originate from methods often used in human personality 
research. They share in common a reliance on judges familiar with the individual animals, the 
use of questionnaires for rating personality, and asking judges to base their ratings on their 
overall impressions of the animals. Typically ratings on these questionnaires are made on 5- 
or 7-point Likert scales, true-false questions, or similarly quantitative responses. Some 
questionnaires are based on psycholexical approaches to studying human personality and ask 
judges to rate the degree to which each animal can be characterized by a series of personality 
descriptor adjectives (e.g., anxious). In some questionnaires, these adjectives are 
supplemented by sentences which attempt to resolve ambiguity or define the descriptor 
within the context of the species’ behavior. Other questionnaires are more behaviorally-
oriented, i.e., they ask raters to describe the animal with respect to specific behaviors, such as 
rate of aggressive interactions, as opposed to descriptor adjectives. 
Behavioral coding approaches 
 Behavioral coding is rooted in ethological approaches to the study of behavior and are 
more commonly used in animal personality research than ratings approaches. They involve 
 
actually objectively measuring behaviors, for example by recording their frequency or 
assessing the strength of the response to some stimuli. There are two major subtypes of 
behavioral coding approaches. One approach can be described as naturalistic. Here, observers 
watch an animal in its natural environment or a captive setting and record its spontaneously 
emitted behavior on an ethogram. The second approach can be described as experimental. 
This method involves changing the animal's environment in some way and recording the 
animal's response. For example, in "novel-object tests" a new or unusual object may be 
introduced into an animal's natural environment or enclosure and the reactions of the animal 
to the object as well as how closely it approaches the object are recorded. A similar method 
may categorize the animal's behavior when handled by experimenters. 
Reliability 
 Prior to using a particular measure of animal personality, one must determine its 
reliability. Reliability refers to the proportion of the animal personality score that is 
accounted for by the characteristics of the subject, sometimes referred to as "true score" 
variance. The remaining variance is referred to as "error" and is accounted for by any other 
factors, including specific judges, time of measurement, situational effects, and any other 
effects. 
 A common misconception is that the behavioral coding approaches are more reliable 
than ratings approaches. No studies support this view, and, in fact, a recent study of captive 
chimpanzee personality directly compared the reliabilities of ratings and behavioral coding 
methods. This study found that the mean reliability of ratings was substantially higher than 
the mean reliability of codings derived from focal animal sampling. 
Validity 
 
 In studying animal personality it is also important to show that a personality measure 
demonstrates convergent and divergent validity. That is to say, is a personality measure 
related in expected ways to other measures or outcomes?  
Convergent validity 
 Convergent validity refers to the degree to which a personality measure is correlated 
with measures or tasks that should tap the same construct. For example, we would expect that 
a rating measure of extraversion and a behavioral coding measure of time spent in proximity 
to conspecifics should be positively correlated. In short, measures of the same construct 
should be related.  
Divergent validity 
 Divergent or discriminant validity refers to the degree to which a personality measure 
is not correlated with measures or tasks that reflect different constructs. That is to say, it is 
indicative of the extent to which supposedly different constructs are distinct. For example, we 
would expect that a rating measure of neuroticism should only show negligible correlations 
with measures such as time spent in proximity to conspecifics. 
Comprehensiveness 
 Recently, some have emphasized the importance of comprehensiveness as another 
criterion by which to judge personality ratings. This criteria asks whether a measure captures 
all the personality differences of the animal or is limited to a select number of domains. A 
bottom-up behavioral repertoire approach to studying animal personality is one way to 
address these issues. This method involves behavioral coding and may enable researchers to 
find domains or dimensions of personality differences that are not revealed by the use of top-
down ratings-based approaches, which are seen to impose a personality structure from one 
species (typically humans) onto another. 
Factor analysis 
 
 Factor analysis refers to a family of data analytic methods that can reduce a large 
number of variables into a smaller set of variables. It is based on the premise that the 
relationships among a set of manifest variables or traits arise because of a common 
underlying set of causes or latent variables, which cannot be directly measured. In the study 
of personality, manifest variables refer to the individual items making up the rating scale or 
individual behaviors whereas latent variables are personality dimensions such as five-human 
like domains found in chimpanzees and the chimpanzee-specific domain of Dominance. 
These analyses are used in the study of personality in humans and nonhuman animals, and are 
more commonly used in studies that measure personality via ratings as opposed to behavioral 
codings. 
Exploratory factor analysis 
 Of the two types of factor analytic techniques, exploratory factor analysis is the most 
commonly used. These techniques consist of methods such as principal components analysis 
and principal axes analysis. These approaches have in common that the researcher does not 
pre-specify the nature of the latent variables, i.e., which items they define. Instead, he or she 
determines the number of factors believed to be sufficient to explain the intercorrelations 
among variables, extracts these factors, and then interprets factors based on how strongly 
items reflect or load on which factors. This last procedure often first involves rotating the 
factors, which serves to rescale the loadings so that high loadings are as close to 1 or -1 as 
possible and low loadings are as close to 0 as possible. 
Confirmatory factor analysis 
 An equally important but more seldom used technique is confirmatory factor analysis. 
Here the researcher pre-specifies the nature of the latent variables, i.e., indicates which 
manifest variables they believe will be explained by which latent factors. The researcher then 
tests whether the pre-specified factors adequately explain the intercorrelations among items. 
 
A researcher may also wish to compare multiple sets of pre-specified factors to determine 
which best explains the intercorrelations of the items with the fewest possible parameters.  
 This technique is most commonly used when researchers, based on prior studies using 
exploratory factor analysis, already have strong ideas concerning the nature of the factors or 
if they wish to compare the factors of two different samples or species. For example, 
confirmatory factor analysis was recently used to test whether the rhesus macaque personality 
factors identified in one sample replicated in a new sample. 
Correlates of animal personality measures 
Behavior 
 A fundamental question regarding measures of animal personality, particular those 
based on ratings, is whether they are related to behavior. There is considerable evidence in a 
range of primate species that measures of personality obtained via ratings are, in fact, 
correlated with behaviors in ways consistent with the definitions of the factors. For example, 
extraverted zoo chimpanzees are more oriented towards their conspecifics than they are to 
members of the viewing public whereas this pattern is reversed for introverted chimpanzees; 
langur monkeys rated as more agreeable engaged in less aggressive behavior and more 
grooming; and rhesus macaques rated high in sociability in one context engaged in more 
affiliative behaviors in another context up to 4.5 years later. 
 In non-primate species, because measurements are usually made using behavioral 
coding, the interest instead is finding ecologically meaningful correlates between behavioral 
domains. In stickleback fish, aggression, activity level, and exploratory behavior were 
strongly correlated only in populations that were subject to predation. Recently, this research 
has been extended to include birdsong: male collared flycatchers who scored higher in tests 




 One well-known feature of human personality is its relationship to measures of 
subjective well-being. Although it is correlated with other personality dimensions, too, on 
average, more emotionally stable and more extraverted people are happier than less 
emotionally stable and less extraverted people. The nonhuman work on personality and well-
being has been limited to studies of chimpanzees and orangutans. In the case of chimpanzees, 
greater well-being was positively related to the chimpanzee-specific personality domain, 
Dominance, a broad factor that incorporates aspects of low neuroticism, high extraversion, 
low agreeableness, and low conscientiousness. More extraverted and conscientious 
chimpanzees also were rated as being higher on well-being than their introverted and 
unconscientious counterparts. A later study of orangutan personality revealed that orangutans 
who were rated as extraverted, emotionally stable, and agreeable had higher well-being 
scores than their introverted, neurotic, and disagreeable counterparts. 
Health 
 Human personality is related to health outcomes and in several studies with long 
follow-up periods, personality dimensions have been related to all-cause mortality. In 
particular, low conscientiousness is strongly related to earlier death, though high neuroticism, 
low agreeableness, and low extraversion have also been linked to greater mortality risk. 
Studies of the relationship between human personality and health outcomes are limited in that 
ethical considerations bar the experimental procedures that could elucidate the mechanisms 
underlying the relationships. However, work on this relationship in primate models is making 
progress in revealing the causal mechanisms underlying these associations.1 
Corticosteroids 
 Studies of personality dimensions in nonhuman species have revealed relationships 
between these dimensions and hormone levels. For example, one study examined adult male 
 
rhesus macaques that were assessed on four personality dimensions and plasma cortisol 
concentration. Consistent with some studies of human neuroticism, this study found that 
monkeys rated as being higher in excitability had lower levels of basal cortisol in the PM 
phase. This study also found higher levels of the confidence dimension were related to 
significantly higher levels of cortisol throughout the AM phase and higher levels of cortisol 
throughout the beginning, but not end, of the PM phase. 
 Also, in a study of cortisol and sedation stress in young chimpanzees, individuals who 
scored higher on the behavioral dimension mellow showed higher peak cortisol levels and a 
more substantial increase in cortisol over time. Another study of juvenile chimpanzees 
showed some evidence that the same dimension was related to testosterone levels, though the 
effects of the chimpanzees' actual rank may have been a confound. 
 Studies of great tit lines selected for being fast explorers or slow explorers that were 
exposed to stressors (a social defeat in this case), showed that the fast explorers displayed a 
greater reduction in activity levels than slow explorers. However, slow explorers also showed 
increases in fecal corticosteroid metabolites whereas no such increase was revealed among 
the fast explorers. 
Reproduction 
 Evidence from several studies suggests that personality may be related to variables 
associated with successful reproduction. Captive-born cheetahs that were rated as being 
higher in a dimension named tense-fearful were more likely not to breed than those who were 
rated as being lower on this dimension. Also, in an experimental study, successful mate 
pairings in dumpling squid were those in which females with intermediate or high scores on a 
shy-bold dimension were paired with males who also displayed intermediate or high scores 
on this dimension. On the other hand, shy females were able to successfully mate with shy, 
intermediate, and bold males. A similar boldness-shyness dimension also leads to differential 
 
reproductive success in bighorn sheep; bold ewes exhibit an earlier age at primiparity and 
greater weaning success. Among red squirrels, female activity level was related to their 
offspring's growth rate but did not influence dates of birth or litter size. In common lizards, 
clutch size was found to correlate positively with the ability of females to tolerate 
conspecifics (a measure of sociality). Social females that can deal with high population 





 Human personality dimensions are approximately 50% heritable2, but what does this 
mean? Roughly, heritability is the proportion of variation in a trait between individuals in the 
same population that is due to genes that are passed down from parents. Heritability is not a 
measure of how "biological" a trait is, only how much of the differences between individuals 
can be accounted for by differences in genes. 
 The importance of heritability for the study of personality is in informing both the 
proximate and ultimate causes of individual differences. Low heritability may suggest strong 
selection for a particular level of a personality trait. Estimates of heritability vary wildly 
between species, traits, and even between studies of the same trait in the same species. On the 
low end, boldness and aggression in three-spined sticklebacks has been found to have no 
heritability while dominance in chimpanzees was estimated to be 66%. Like any trait, the 
heritability of personality is a function of both selection and the amount of genetic and 
environmental variability underlying it. 
Genomics 
 
 Two genome-wide scans have been carried out on humans to detect quantitative trait 
loci (QTL) connected with personality differences. One study used linkage with 
microsatellite markers to detect larger regions of each chromosome that explained variance in 
Psychoticism, Extraversion, Neuroticism, and social desirability as measured by the Junior 
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. A second study conducted a genome-wide association 
scan and measured the personality traits Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, 
Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness using the Revised NEO Personality Inventory and 
identified several biologically-plausible genes associated with each dimension.  
 Several other studies have considered personality or personality-like traits 
individually, particularly in conjunction with psychiatric disorders. The inability to replicate 
results from genome-wide association studies is not a fatal flaw for this type of research but 
simply an indication that other physiological and developmental evidence will be needed to 
determine how specific genetic variants result in personality and behavioral differences. A 
larger challenge is that the genes identified thus far explain such a small amount of 
phenotypic variance (on the order of 1%). Personality is indeed a complex trait in this sense, 
a product of many genes interacting with the environment. 
 Because of the complex genetic architecture of personality in humans, researchers 
often turn to model organisms, particularly mice. The strategy is to identify genes in the 
model species that are descended from a common ancestor with humans (that is, the genes are 
orthologs). The assumption is that the orthologous genes carry out the same (or similar) 
functions in both species. Because the ultimate aim of studying individual differences with 
model organisms is usually in understanding psychiatric disorders, the focus is usually on 
traits such as neuroticism (sometimes called emotionality) that have strong correlates with 
anxiety- and depression-related disorders. For example, a region of chromosome 1 associated 
with emotionality in mice (as measured in novel-environment tests) was compared with the 
 
orthologous region that has been implicated in human neuroticism. A key result from this 
comparison was that the exact disease-causing gene variants are unlikely to be shared across 
species. 
 A further outcome of investigations with mice is to separate genetically clusters of 
related behavioral phenotypes such as activity in open-field tests and mazes that all assumed 
to measure a single trait: anxiety. QTL analysis revealed a dimensionality of anxiety-related 
behavors that was lost in a factor analysis of the phenotypic data. 
Neurotransmitters and enzymes 
 There is mixed evidence for the role that variation in specific neurotransmitter 
transporters and receptors and related enzymes play in personality and behavior. Most work 
has centered around a small set of genes and their promotors: serotonin transporter (5-HTT or 
SLC6A4), dopamine receptor D4 (DRD4), and monoamine oxidase A (MAOA). 
Polymorphism in the serotonin transporter gene and its promoter region (5-HTTLPR) have 
been linked to neuroticism in humans and emotion in rhesus macaques. Variation in DRD4 
has been associated with novelty-seeking in great tits, humans, and vervet monkeys, among 
other species. MAOA is a catalyst that breaks down the neurotransmitters serotonin, 
epinephrine, and noepinephrine. It has been linked to aggressive behavior in humans and 
several species of macaques. 
 However, various follow-up studies with humans have failed to replicate a link 
betweeen 5-HTT and neuroticism and DRD4 and novelty seeking or extraversion. Rather 
than completely overturning the behavioral associations of these genes, these mixed results 
suggest that the pathway between genes and behavior is more complicated and not the action 
of single genes. Similarly, populations may differ in which gene variants are responsible for 
differences in personality and behavior. 
Gene × Environment interactions 
 
 The possibility that the environment may moderate the influence of genes on 
personality development has often been discussed and recently been explored. One area of 
emphasis has been on the MAOA gene. Low activity MAOA genotypes have been related to 
aggression, antisocial behavior, and conduct disorder in humans. An orthologous gene 
(rhMAOA-LPR) was subsequently identified in rhesus macaques. A recent study of male 
rhesus macaques suggested that the effect the low activity genotype may be sensitive to the 
early rearing environment: mother-reared macaques with the low activity genotype had 
higher aggression scores than mother-reared macaques with the high activity genotype; peer-
reared macaques with the high activity genotype had higher aggression scores than peer-
reared macaques with the low activity genotype. 
Ultimate causes 
 Understanding variation in personality involves not just dissecting the genetic and 
environmental influences, but in discovering why such differences exist in the first place. 
This is a puzzle, namely because under direct selection one would expect the additive genetic 
the variance of a trait to decrease. As such, multiple hypotheses have been offered to explain 
the maintenance of heritable variation in personality. 
Neutral theory 
 The first possibility is that variation in behavioral, affective, and cognitive 
predispositions is the result of neutral evolution. Under this mode, all differences in a trait are 
due to mutations that are fixed or lost in the population through random genetic drift. The 
phenotypes resulting from each allele all have equal fitness, so there is no selection on the 
trait. However, the evidence connecting personality with differences in reproduction and 
health outcomes makes it unlikely that personality differences have zero fitness costs or 
benefits. Selection would have to be extremely weak to be overcome by genetic drift. More 
directly, there are many cases where, when measured, selection on personality traits have 
 
been found to be moderate. However, the neutral theory is not completely irrelevant for the 
evolution of personality. Firstly, it reminds us that the origin of all genetic variation lies 
ultimately with mutation. Secondly, the neutral theory remains the null hypothesis against 
which all evolutionary propositions are tested. 
Mutation-selection balance and balancing selection 
 After random drift, the next mechanism to consider is a balance between selection and 
mutation. If there is an optimal value of a personality trait (for example, being moderate in 
neuroticism) that maximizes fitness, selection will move the population mean toward that 
optimal value. This elimination of genetic variation in the trait is balanced by the introduction 
of new variation via mutation. However, many characteristics of personality variation do not 
fit with the predictions of this explanation. 
 Another possibility that is better supported by the evidence is that some form of 
balancing selection accounts for the variation in personality traits. Thus, differing levels of 
the personality trait exist because each is related, in some way, to fitness benefits and costs. 
For example, in a species where females favor aggressive males, the benefit of being higher 
in some aggression-related trait may be offset by the higher likelihood of injury or death 
resulting from fights. Another example involves differences in life history within species, i.e., 
that different levels of personality dimensions are related to trade-offs between number of 
offspring reproduced and lifespan of the parent or viability of the offspring. 
Environmental niches 
 Another possible way in which genetic variation in personality might be maintained is 
because the environment offers a multitude of niches in which different levels of personality 
may be successful. Thus, in a population there may be ways for individuals along all levels of 
extraversion or any other dimension to successfully survive and reproduce. Environmental 
heterogeneity can also lead to differing selection pressures among populations, such as 
 
whether stickleback behaviors were correlated resulted from differing predation rates. In 
addition to spatial variation, individual differences can also be maintained by temporal 
variation in selection pressure. For example, bold ewes are less susceptible to predation by 
cougars, but this only results in appreciable fitness differences when predation is high. 
Conclusion 
 The abundance of individual differences is the only clear result that is consistent 
across all species where personality has been examined. The genetic architecture underlying 
personality and how its variation is being maintained are likely to differ between species, and 
a major goal will be to identify the broad patterns that explain the ultimate and proximate 
causes of individual behavioral proclivities. Measuring and validating personality and 
dissecting its complex genetic basis are key challenges in this area. What personality is and 
how best to study it will continue to provide much fuel for debate. 
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Introduction
In animal societies, it is widely expected that social
dominance is positively associated with fitness. This is
because dominant individuals, by definition, should have
greater access to limiting resources such as food (Herber-
holz et al., 2007), mates (Willisch & Neuhaus, 2010) or
territories (Franck & Ribowski, 1993). In organisms that
might loosely be classified as displaying higher levels of
‘sociality’ (Costa & Fitzgerald, 2005), it is also common
for dominant individuals to monopolize reproduction
and receive benefits from subordinate helpers (Clutton-
Brock et al., 2001). Thus, social dominance is generally
viewed as being under positive selection, although
empirical studies have highlighted that exceptions can
and do occur (Ellis, 1995; Qvarnström & Forsgren, 1998;
Verhulst & Salomons, 2004).
A critical requirement for adaptive evolution is that
trait variation within populations is, at least in part,
caused by heritable differences among individuals. If
selection acts on such a heritable trait, then quantitative
genetic theory states that the population mean of that
trait should evolve over time (Falconer & Mackay, 1996).
However, common sense tells us that mean dominance
cannot evolve in this way, because the trait is always
observed through contests with one or more other
individuals in a group (Barrette, 1987; Drews, 1993).
For the case of dyadic interactions, there must be one
‘winner’ and one ‘loser’ in every contest, such that the
mean rate of winning must always be equal to one half.
Here, we conduct a quantitative genetic analysis to
estimate the genetic basis of variation in dominance
among wild red deer, Cervus elaphus, on the Isle of Rum,
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By determining access to limited resources, social dominance is often an
important determinant of fitness. Thus, if heritable, standard theory predicts
mean dominance should evolve. However, dominance is usually inferred from
the tendency to win contests, and given one winner and one loser in any
dyadic contest, the mean proportion won will always equal 0.5. Here, we
argue that the apparent conflict between quantitative genetic theory and
common sense is resolved by recognition of indirect genetic effects (IGEs). We
estimate selection on, and genetic (co)variance structures for, social dom-
inance, in a wild population of red deer Cervus elaphus, on the Scottish island
of Rum. While dominance is heritable and positively correlated with lifetime
fitness, contest outcomes depend as much on the genes carried by an
opponent as on the genotype of a focal individual. We show how this
dependency imposes an absolute evolutionary constraint on the phenotypic
mean, thus reconciling theoretical predictions with common sense. More
generally, we argue that IGEs likely provide a widespread but poorly
recognized source of evolutionary constraint for traits influenced by
competition.
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Scotland. We show that social dominance is both heri-
table and under positive selection, but also that pheno-
typic expression is subject to indirect genetic effects
(IGEs) that arise from interactions among individuals
(Moore et al., 1997). It has previously been argued that
incorporating these IGEs into quantitative genetic models
is essential for understanding the evolution of social
dominance (Moore et al., 2002). Here, we estimate these
effects, show that their presence resolves the apparent
conflict between theory and common sense and provide
an empirical demonstration of a potentially widespread
source of evolutionary constraint.
Social dominance is generally inferred from consistent
differences between individuals in their ability to win
contests (Drews, 1993) and has been studied in wild
populations across a wide range of animal taxa. In some
cases, there is evidence that dominance rank can be
passed from parent to offspring (e.g. ‘maternal rank
inheritance’ in primates and spotted hyenas, Holekamp
& Smale, 1991). However, it has not generally been
possible to demonstrate a genetic basis to such patterns in
the wild, and there is clear evidence that they can arise
from social rather than genetic mechanisms (e.g. East
et al., 2009). Thus, to our knowledge, no study has
demonstrated a genetic basis of variation to dominance
rank per se in the wild, although two strong lines of
evidence suggest that genetic effects are likely. First,
work under laboratory conditions has demonstrated
genetic variance for dominance, for example through
selection experiments (Craig et al., 1965; Moore et al.,
2002) or through directly estimating heritabilities (Nol
et al., 1996). Secondly, dominance is often correlated
with (and believed to be causally related to) aspects of
morphology (e.g. body size, weapon size) and behaviour
(e.g. aggression) that are generally found to be heritable
in natural populations as well as in the laboratory (Horne
& Ylönen, 1998; Kruuk et al., 2008).
Numerous indices have been proposed to rank indi-
viduals within a hierarchy, and while debate continues as
to their relative merits (Bayly et al., 2006; Bang et al.,
2010), a feature common to most is a recognition that
the probability of success in any contest depends on the
relative strengths of the focal individual and the oppo-
nent. Dyadic contest outcomes can therefore be viewed
as arising from the interaction of two phenotypes and by
extension (if there is genetic variance for dominance) of
two genotypes (Moore et al., 1997; Wilson et al., 2009a).
An important consequence of this is that if social
dominance is a heritable trait, then contest outcomes
are likely subject to both direct and IGEs.
Indirect genetic effects, or ‘associative effects’ (follow-
ing, Griffing, 1967), occur when the genotype of one
individual has a causal influence on the phenotype of
another (Moore et al., 1997). As has long been recog-
nized, such effects can have major consequences for the
evolution of phenotypic traits under selection – whether
artificial or natural (Griffing, 1981a,b; Wolf, 2003; Bijma
& Wade, 2008). In the current context IGEs, genetic
variation for competitive ability (or contest winning) is
expected to result in IGEs on the observed phenotype
(i.e. an individual’s success in contests, Moore et al.,
2002). Moreover, there is an expectation of a negative
covariance between direct and IGEs associated with
competition (Wolf, 2003; Bijma et al., 2007b). This is
because a gene that predisposes to winning a contest
when carried by a focal individual will predispose to
losing if that gene is carried by the focal individual’s
opponent instead. Theoretical models show that this
source of negative genetic covariance could provide an
important source of evolutionary constraint, reducing (or
even reversing) the expected phenotypic change for a
trait under selection (Moore et al., 1997; Wolf et al., 1998;
Bijma et al., 2007b). Recent empirical studies on labora-
tory and livestock systems have provided convincing
evidence that IGEs can influence a range of traits (Bijma
et al., 2007a; Mutic & Wolf, 2007; Bleakley & Brodie,
2009; Wilson et al., 2009a). However, apart from the
specific case of maternal genetic effects (e.g. Wilson et al.,
2005), the role of IGEs in natural populations has
received limited empirical scrutiny to date (but see e.g.
Brommer & Rattiste, 2008).
In what follows we perform quantitative genetic
analyses to test the genetic basis of variance in social
dominance, defined as success in pairwise contests, in red
deer on the Scottish island of Rum (Clutton-Brock et al.,
1982). We first test the a priori expectation that social
dominance is positively correlated with fitness in this
population before testing for genetic variation in domi-
nance and IGEs on contest outcomes. Finally, we
parameterize a recently proposed model of IGEs (Bijma
et al., 2007b) to test the hypothesis that IGEs on social
dominance must exist if the trait is heritable, and show
that these provide a source of absolute evolutionary
constraint that resolves the apparent conflict between
common sense and quantitative genetic prediction.
Materials and methods
Phenotypic data
The red deer population in the North Block of the Isle of
Rum, Scotland, has been the subject of an individual-
based study since 1971, with detailed life-history and
behavioural data collected on individually identifiable
animals from birth to death (Clutton-Brock et al., 1982).
Here, we used data from observations of dyadic domi-
nance interactions recorded between 1974 and 1995. The
available data relate to low-level interactions among
females and (predominantly) young males outside of the
breeding season. Adult stags are very poorly represented
in the data as they are largely nonresident in the study
area and spend little time in association with female
groups outside of the annual rut period. Thus, the
available data are limited in that they include neither
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observations of contests between stags during the rut nor
interactions between adult males out with this period.
Across all interactions recorded, the mean age of indi-
viduals observed was 5.57 years in females but just
1.75 years in males.
At the time of observation, one member of each dyad
was scored as the winner based on agonistic behaviours
including nose and ear threats, displacements, kicking,
boxing, bites and chases (see, Clutton-Brock et al., 1982
for a full description of these behaviours). Note that in
what follows we analyse the observed data on contest
outcomes directly, rather than by using these observa-
tions to first estimate a measure of dominance rank for
each individual. Although the latter may seem more
intuitive, our approach is statistically advantageous
because dominance ranks should themselves be recog-
nized as individual-level statistics that are estimated
with error (Poisbleau et al., 2006). Consequently, inves-
tigations into the causes or consequences of dominance
rank variation must find a way to incorporate this error
if statistical analyses are to be considered robust. Here,
we avoid the pitfall of doing ‘statistics on statistics’ by
using a mixed-model framework that allows our
hypotheses to be tested by modelling the observed data
in a single step (see e.g. Hadfield et al., 2010, for further
discussion). In total, the data comprise 10 517 observa-
tions of dyadic interactions (6215 female–female, 3771
female–male, 516 male–male and 15 involving one
individual of unknown sex). About 1278 distinct indi-
viduals were observed in at least one contest, with a
mean of 16.5, and a maximum of 179, observations per
individual.
Pedigree structure
The red deer pedigree has been constructed from a
combination of behavioural observation and molecular
paternity analysis using microsatellite data (full details
are presented in Walling et al., 2010). On average,
individual paternity assignments are made with 97.6%
confidence. Within the entire red deer pedigree, 1336
individuals are informative with respect to the genetics
of dominance, either by virtue of being observed in one
or more phenotypic records from contests (N = 1278)
and ⁄or because their pedigree position provides infor-
mation on the relatedness among phenotyped individu-
als. Among this informative subset, 1184 maternities and
648 paternities are known. With respect to the genetics of
social dominance, the informative portion of the pedigree
is defined by many pairwise pedigree relationships,
including 2459 and 3132 maternal and paternal pairwise
sibling relationships, respectively. The pedigree is highly
convoluted, with many known relationships both within
and among cohorts (Fig. 1). Pedigree statistics and the
graphical representation of the pedigree were generated
using the R package pedantics (Morrissey & Wilson,
2010).
Selection on social dominance
To confirm our a priori expectation that dominance is
under positive selection, we formally tested its relation-
ship with fitness, estimated as the number of offspring
produced by an individual over its lifetime (lifetime
breeding success, LBS). Because the distribution of LBS
differs greatly between the sexes (i.e. the male distribu-
tions are much more highly skewed) analyses were
performed separately for males (N = 456) and females
(N = 579). Note that for males, fitness values were
estimated as the number of offspring assigned in the
pedigree structure on the basis of microsatellite genotype
data. Each individual was assigned an estimate of fitness,
and individuals observed as juveniles were included
regardless of whether they survived to breeding age.
Note, however, that individuals could only be included in
the analysis if they were phenotypically informative (i.e.
had been observed in dominance interactions), and our
data are therefore not informative with respect to the
potential fitness consequences of avoiding interactions.
Any animal known to have died an unnatural death (i.e.
to have been shot) was excluded prior to analysis.
For each sex, selection was estimated in two ways.
First, for each individual i, we simply determined mean









































Fig. 1 The structure of the portion of the red deer pedigree that is
informative with respect to the genetics of variation in dominance
(N = 1336). Numbers on the left-hand side indicate cohort affinities,
some of which are estimated based on age at first known
reproduction and typical sex- and age-specific patterns of repro-
ductive success. Red lines denote maternal links, and blue lines
denote paternal links. Individuals with one or more records
from dominance interactions are denoted with black dots.
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across i’s lifetime in which i was scored as the winner.
We then estimated selection as the ordinary least-squares
regression coefficient of fitness (LBS) on mean contest
success. To facilitate comparison with selection estimates
in the literature, we also regressed relative fitness (i.e.
LBSi=LBS) on mean contest outcome scaled to standard
deviation units to obtain the standardized linear selection
differential (Endler, 1986). Whereas the simple linear
regression is appropriate for estimating the selection
differentials, statistical inference is not valid in the
absence of residual normality. Consequently, we also
fitted negative binomial regressions in each sex to test
the hypothesized positive association between mean
dominance. This approach is appropriate given that LBS
is a count and has positively skewed distributions in both
sexes.
Secondly, we estimated (for each sex separately) the
within-individual covariance between dominance and
fitness using a bivariate linear mixed effects model with
individual identity fitted as a random effect. For each
observed interaction, one (randomly chosen) individual
within the pair of animals was assigned a phenotypic
value of 0 or 1 according to the contest outcome.
Henceforth, we refer to this individual as the focal animal
and the other individual as the opponent. This approach
was taken such that each dyadic observation contributes
a single phenotypic record to the analysis, which is
appropriate as the phenotypic status of the focal com-
pletely determines that of the opponent and vice versa.
We modelled fitness (LBS) and contest outcome as
response variables, with identity of the focal individual
as a random effect on both traits. In addition to
controlling for pseudoreplication, the random effect of
focal individual allows us to model dominance as a latent
individual-level variable that influences observed contest
outcomes and is assumed to vary among animals. It also
allows us to estimate the covariance between this latent
variable (dominance) and fitness.
Our second approach has the advantage of allowing
the fitness-phenotype covariance estimate to be condi-
tioned on known sources of trait variation. Here, we
included age difference (focal individual’s age in years
minus opponent’s age in years) and sex code as fixed
effects on observed phenotype. We included a linear
effect of age difference as older individuals are (on
average) dominant to younger ones (Clutton-Brock et al.,
1982; Thouless & Guinness, 1986; Fig. 2). This represents
a potential source of bias in the first simple regression
estimate of selection because individuals that live longer
will be the older individual in a higher proportion of their
dyadic interactions and will also have (on average)
higher fitness (even if dominance is not causally related
to longevity or fecundity). Thus, the age effect could in
itself be sufficient to cause apparent positive selection on
dominance. Preliminary data analysis also revealed that
while females tended to win more often in cross-sex
contests, this is likely due to the different age distribu-
tions between the sexes. In fact, considering only
interactions between animals of the same age, males
were significantly more likely to win in contests against
females than vice versa (Fig. 2). We therefore included an
additional fixed effect of sex code as a three-level factor
corresponding to the possible dyadic interaction types
(1 = same sex dyad, 2 = female focal with male oppo-
nent, 3 = male focal with female opponent).
A limitation of this analysis is that we are currently
unable to fit the multivariate generalized linear mixed
effect model that would be most appropriate to these
two response variables (as contest outcomes are binary
observations and LBS is best modelled using a negative
binomial or quasi-Poisson distribution). We therefore
fitted the model assuming errors follow a multivariate
normal distribution and note that statistical inferences
drawn from the model should be treated as provisional.
Repeatability and genetic variance for social
dominance
Genetic and environmental components of variance for
social dominance were estimated from phenotypic and
pedigree data. Models were formulated to test for
repeatability of social dominance, the presence of addi-
tive genetic variance and finally the presence of IGEs.
Testing repeatability requires that the total variance in a
trait can be partitioned into within- and among-individ-
ual components. Because this is only possible given
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Fig. 2 Proportion of observed dominance interactions won in
encounters between animals of differing age or sex. Older individ-
uals tend to be dominant to younger ones, and while females are
more likely to dominate males overall, this is because of differences
in average age between the sexes (see text); males tend to dominate
females of the same age. Deviations from null expectations
(i.e. 50 : 50 proportions) are highly significant with binomial
probabilities < 0.0001 for all three comparisons.
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genetic analyses were carried out on the observed data
(i.e. contests) rather than on summary lifetime statistics
for each individual. Dominance was therefore modelled
with generalized linear mixed effect models (GLMM)
using a logit link function to relate binary observations to
an underlying (normal) latent scale.
Models fitted
Each dyadic interaction contributes a single record to the
data analysis. For observation x of focal individual i with




where d is a draw from a Bernoulli distribution with
probability logit)1(lijx), lijx is thus the liability on the logit
scale of i winning the contest. We fitted a series of
models, identical in their fixed effects but differing in
their random effects, to predict lijx:
lijx ' age differenceþ sex codeþ focali þ opponentj
ðmodel 1Þ
lijx ' age differenceþ sex codeþ ðpeFi þ aFiÞ þ opponentj
ðmodel 2Þ
lijx ' age differenceþ sex codeþ ðpeFi þ aFiÞ þ ðpeOj þ aOjÞ
ðmodel 3Þ
Fixed effects included the linear function of age difference
(years) and sex code (as described earlier).
In model 1, we included a random effect of focal
identity focali to estimate the between focal individual
variance (VF). If scaled by the total phenotypic variance,
VF can be interpreted as the repeatability of focal
dominance. Model 1 also contained a random effect of
opponent identity opponentj to estimate the variance in
opponent effects (VO), the extent to which different
opponents have repeatable effects on contest outcomes.
Under model 2, the influence of the focal individual i is
partitioned into an additive genetic effect (aFi) and a
nongenetic ‘permanent environment’ effect peFi, allow-
ing estimation of the corresponding variance components
VF.A and VF.PE Under this model, only direct genetic
effects are included and VF.A is simply the conventional
additive genetic variance. Model 2 is therefore a standard
animal model (Wilson et al., 2009b) for a trait with
repeated measures, in which the opponent effect is
treated as a purely environmental source of variance. In
model 3, we apply a similar decomposition of opponentj to
test for IGEs. This allows partitioning of VO into additive
genetic (VO.A) and nongenetic (VO.PE) components,
where VO.A is the variance attributable to IGEs.
Models 1–3 allow focal and opponent influences to be
estimated and partitioned into genetic and environmen-
tal components and they also contain an implicit but
likely erroneous assumption that no correlations exist
between the direct and indirect effects. As the designa-
tion of focal and opponent individuals is in fact com-
pletely arbitrary for each observation x, it follows that
focal and opponent effects should be perfectly correlated
within individuals. Thus, for any individual i, it can be
argued that focali = )opponenti, and therefore, aFi = )aOi,
and peFi = )peOi. From this it follows logically that we
expect equalities to exist among the variances such that
VF.A = VF.O and VPE.A = VPE.O whereas the correlations
between direct and indirect effects (denoted rG.FO and
rPE.FO for genetic and permanent environment correla-
tions, respectively) should equal )1. To test this expec-
tation, we fitted two further models. Model 4 was
specified as model 3 but with a potentially nonzero
correlation between direct and IGEs directly estimated to
test our expectation that they would equal )1. Finally,
we compared the effect size estimates under model 4
to those in a model constrained to be consistent with our
expectations described elsewhere (Model 5). Thus, we
estimated the magnitude of genetic and permanent
environment effects under the forced conditions that
VF.A = VO.A, rG.FO = )1, VF.PE = VO.PE, rPE.FO = )1.
Random effects were assumed to be drawn from
normal distributions with means of zero and vari-












ponents are as described earlier (note that here we use r2
to denote a true variance as opposed to V to denote its
estimate above) and are assumed to be homogeneous
across sexes. I is an identity matrix with order equal
to the number of individuals; A is the additive numer-
ator relationship matrix containing the individual
elements Aik = 2Qik; and Qik is the coefficient of coan-
cestry between any pair of individuals i and k in the
pedigree.
Validation of quantitative genetic analyses
All quantitative genetic models were solved by penalized
quasi-likelihood (PQL) implemented in the program
ASREML v2 (Gilmour et al., 2006). This method is
appropriate for the binary observations of contest out-
comes but is not without difficulties. First, estimates of
random effects can be biased when GLMMs are solved by
PQL approximations (Goldstein & Rasbash, 1996; Rodri-
quez & Goldman, 2001; Bolker et al., 2009). We therefore
undertook power and sensitivity analyses, using simula-
tion-based approaches advocated by Morrissey et al.,
(2007) to assess the performance of the GLMMs, as fitted
in our dataset. Specifically we sought to determine
whether biases could exist in our analyses, given the
particular conditions of our analyses (i.e. size and
structure of the pedigree, number of observations and
distribution of observations among individuals). A sec-
ond difficulty is that appropriate statistics for hypothesis
tests of random effects in GLMMs solved by PQL are
unknown. We therefore used the simulations to deter-
mine, again under the particular conditions of our
Indirect genetic effects on social dominance 5
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analyses, whether evaluation of the ratio of the estimate
to its estimated standard error, as reported by ASReml,
provided practical means of evaluating statistical
significance.
Full details of these simulation-based analyses are
presented in Appendix 1. In brief, the results indicated
that our estimates of genetic variance components are
likely to be downwardly biased (a known problem with
PQL approximations, Bolker et al., 2009). However,
under simulation conditions designed to mimic the
actual analyses of dominance in red deer, these biases
are not large enough to hinder the biological interpre-
tation of our model-based estimates (see Appendix 1).
Simulations also demonstrated that the common ‘rule of
thumb’ of assuming statistical significance when the ratio
variance ⁄ standard error ‡ 2 is justifiable here (and is
expected to be conservative with respect to a nominal
significance level of a = 0.05). Lacking a method to
generate exact P-values, we have therefore used this
criterion as a de facto test of statistical significance for
(co)variance components in what follows. Note that we
do not advocate the application of this criterion to other
studies unless simulations specifically tailored to the
appropriate data structures can be shown to provide
similar support.
Results
Selection on social dominance
Consistent with our a priori expectation of positive
selection, regression analyses showed positive relation-
ships between fitness and social dominance. Ordinary
least-squares regression analysis of LBS on mean domi-
nance suggested a significant relationship in females
[b = 5.94 (SE 0.466), P < 0.001] though not in males
[b = 1.07 (SE 0.693), P = 0.125]. These estimates corre-
spond to standardized linear selection differential esti-
mates (SE) of 0.400 (0.032) for females and 0.207 (0.135)
for males, respectively. The P-values from simple linear
regression given earlier are not strictly valid given the
deviation from residual normality, but negative binomial
regressions of LBS on mean dominance yielded qualita-
tively similar results (females: coefficient = 1.398
(SE = 0.117), P < 0.001; males: coefficient = 0.647
(SE = 0.511), P = 0.206).
Under the bivariate mixed model we estimated the
within-individual covariance (SE) between focal domi-
nance (conditioned on age difference and sex code) and LBS
as 0.057 (0.032) in females. Although positive as
expected, this effect was marginally nonsignificant under
a two-tailed test (likelihood ratio test comparison to a
reduced model with covariance fixed at zero: v21 ¼ 2:98,
P = 0.084). Dividing by the among-individual variance
estimate for focal dominance yielded a regression
coefficient of b = 2.88 (1.61) and a corresponding stan-
dardized selection differential of 0.333 (0.187). A positive
covariance term was also estimated in males and was
found to be statistically significant using a likelihood ratio
test [within-individual covariance (SE) = 0.139 (0.060);
v
2
1DF ¼ 5:47, P = 0.019], with a regression coefficient of
b = 5.65 (2.45) and a standardized selection differential
of 1.639 (0.712). As a caveat to these results, we reiterate
that the standard assumption of multivariate residual
normality was violated, and P-values associated with
these bivariate models should therefore be treated with
appropriate caution.
Thus, estimates of the strength of selection do differ
under the two approaches used. This is primarily because
of accounting for age effects in the bivariate mixed
model, which were significant predictors of contest
outcome for both focal females [age difference coefficient
(SE) = 0.058 (0.001), F1,7468.1 = 3615, P < 0.001] and
focal males [age difference coefficient (SE) = 0.045
(0.002), F1,2389.4 = 324.7, P < 0.001]. In contrast, sex code
was not a significant predictor of contest outcome for
either sex. For focal females, the predicted mean out-
come (SE) was 0.461 (0.009) against a female opponent
and 0.447 (0.012) against a male (F2,7915 = 1.67,
P = 0.189). For focal males, the corresponding predicted
means were 0.497 (0.020) against a male opponent and
0.453 (0.016) against a female (F2,2279.6 = 2.43,
P = 0.089).
Genetic influences on social dominance
Repeatability and genetic (co)variances for social
dominance
Under model 1, we found evidence for significant effects
on focal dominance of both the focal and opponent
identities (Table 1). Thus, both individuals in the inter-
action have a repeatable effect on the observed pheno-
type consistent with among-individual variance in social
dominance. Furthermore, we found evidence for a
heritable component of variance in focal dominance
(Table 1). Under model 2, the estimated direct additive
genetic variance was estimated as 0.314 (0.106), yielding
an estimated direct heritability of 0.095 (0.032) if we
make the standard assumption for the logit link that
residual variance = P2 ⁄3.
Because it is widely known that social inheritance of
dominance rank can occur (Holekamp & Smale, 1991),
we tested for nongenetic maternal effects that, if present,
are expected to cause upward bias in VA.F by adding a
random effect of maternal identity to Model 2. Maternal
variance was low and nonsignificant [VM = 0.077
(0.061)], and the estimate of VA.F showed virtually no
reduction on the inclusion of VM [VA.F = 0.312 (0.113)].
Based on these results, we concluded that nongenetic
maternal effects are unlikely to represent an important
bias on additive effects here and we did not include them
in subsequent models (but see later for important
discussion relating to this issue). In comparison with
the GLMM results, we also estimated heritability under
6 A. J. WILSON ET AL.
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model 2 using data on the observed (0 ⁄1) scale and a
normal animal model and then transformed this estimate
to the liability scale following Dempster & Lerner, (1950).
This approach gave slightly lower estimates of h2 = 0.041
(0.013) on the observed scale and 0.064 (0.020) for the
liability scale.
Models 3 and 4 indicate that the opponent variance
contains a significantly heritable component consistent
with the presence of IGEs on the expected contest success
of focal individuals (Table 1). Furthermore, under Model
4, we estimated a statistically significant genetic correla-
tion between direct and IGEs of )0.913 (0.065), in close
accordance with our expectation of a negative genetic
correlation of )1. Under Model 4, direct and indirect
additive components were of nearly identical magnitude;
the permanent environment variance components asso-
ciated with focal and opponent individuals were also very
similar (Table 1). These results are therefore quantita-
tively consistent with our logical argument that focal and
opponent effects must be drawn from the same distribu-
tion but be perfectly negatively correlated. Under this
scenario (model 5), additive and permanent environ-
ment variance estimates were again significant with
VF.A = VO.A = 0.346 (0.105) and VF.PE = VO.PE = 0.910
(0.110). Although parameter estimates are very similar
under models 4 and 5, it is difficult to formally compare
models 4 and 5 as likelihood-based methods (e.g.
likelihood ratio test, AIC) are not valid using the PQL
solutions obtained here. As a way to informally compare
model fits, we calculated the variance in working
residuals (on the observed data scale, i.e. observed
contest outcome – predicted contest outcome). For model
4 we estimated Vworking residuals as 0.103 whereas the
corresponding estimate for model 5 was 0.101. Thus,
while the variances in working residuals were almost
identical, a lower estimate was actually obtained under
model 5 despite the fact that fewer parameters were
estimated.
Discussion
Our analyses support the a priori expectation that domi-
nance is positively associated with fitness, estimated here
as LBS, in red deer. This conclusion is qualitatively
consistent across the various complementary selection
analyses that we conducted, although statistical support
was equivocal in some cases. For example, the simple
regression approach yielded an estimate of very strong
directional selection in females, but this may be upwardly
biased by age effects. Specifically, females that live longer
will have higher lifetime fitness (on average), butmay also
have higher mean dominance by simple virtue of being
the older individual in more of their dyadic interactions.
The correlation between age and dominance rank was
previously known in this population (Clutton-Brock et al.,
1982; Thouless & Guinness, 1986) and has also been
reported in other ungulate populations (Festa-Bianchet,
1991). Accordingly,with age controlled for in the bivariate
model of female LBS and focal dominance, the estimated
strength of selection was reduced by approximately half
(though the standardized selection differential estimate of
0.333 remains high relative to the distribution of estimates
in the literature, Kingsolver et al., 2001). Conditioning the
selection estimates on age effects in this way reduces the
potential bias from age effects but will be overly conser-
vative if higher dominance does causally influence life-
time fitness by effects on survival and hence longevity.
In males, the relationship between dominance and
fitness was also positive, although much weaker (and
nonsignificant) when selection on mean dominance was
estimated from simple regression. However, in males, age
effects may induce downward (rather than upward) bias
in the selection estimate given that only young focal males
were included in the data. Accordingly, with age differ-
ence effects accounted for, the estimated strength of
selection on dominance in males was actually stronger in
males (standardized selection differential of 1.639) than
Table 1 Components of variance (on the liability scale) for social dominance estimated from models 1–4.
Model VF VF.A VF.PE VO VO.A VO.PE rG,FO rPE.FO
Parameter
constraints
1 1.02 (0.094) 0.836 (0.082) 0 0 No direct–indirect
effect covariance
2 0.314 (0.106) 0.706 (0.113) 0.849 (0.083) 0 0 No direct–indirect
effect covariance
3 0.366 (0.113) 0.677 (0.113) 0.269 (0.093) 0.575 (0.099) 0 0 No direct–indirect
effect covariance
4 0.364 (0.119) 0.956 (0.129) 0.363 (0.112) 0.819 (0.118) )0.913 (0.065) )1.080 (0.030) No constraints
5 0.346 (0.105) 0.910 (0.110) 0.346 0.910 )1 )1 rG.FO, rPE.FO = )1,
VF.A = VO.A,
VF.PE = VF.PE
Variance components for focal individual (VF) and opponent (VO) estimated under model 1 are partitioned into additive genetic (VF.A, VO.A) and
permanent environment (VF.PE, VO.PE) in models 2–5. Estimated standard errors are indicated in parentheses and indicate statistical significance
at the nominal level (a = 0.05) for all variance component estimates (and the direct–indirect genetic correlation (rG,FO) under Model 4). rPE.FO
denotes the within-individual correlation between direct and indirect permanent environment effects. Absence of a standard error indicates a
parameter is fixed because of a model constraint and is therefore not freely estimated (see text for details).
Indirect genetic effects on social dominance 7
ª 2 0 11 THE AUTHORS . J . E VOL . B IO L . do i : 1 0 . 1 1 1 1 / j . 1 4 20 - 9 1 01 . 2 01 0 . 0 22 1 2 . x
JOURNAL OF EVOLUT IONARY B IOLOGY ª 2 0 11 EUROPEAN SOC I E TY FOR EVOLUT IONARY B IOLOGY
in females, a finding that has been reported elsewhere
(Ellis, 1995). Although direct comparison between the
sexes is complicated by the differing age distributions of
females (all ages) andmales (primarily juveniles), a similar
resultwas obtained if the dominance data for femaleswere
restricted to observations of juveniles (< 3 years; results
not shown). Although adult male–male interactions
during the rut were not included in our study, one
possibility is that strong selection onmale focal dominance
results, at least in part, from a high within-individual
correlation between dominance during feeding interac-
tions as a juvenile and success in adult male–male contests
later in life. The ability to hold a harem and defend it from
other males during the rut is a key determinant fitness in
adult males (Clutton-Brock et al., 1982).
Thus, our results are largely consistent with positive
selection on focal dominance in both sexes although our
data certainly do not allow us to prove a causal
relationship between the trait and fitness (particularly
as we have considered only a single phenotypic trait,
Lande & Arnold, 1983). Nonetheless, plausible mecha-
nistic hypotheses linking dominance to fitness do exist.
For example, previous analyses of female–female inter-
actions in the Rum red deer population have shown that
feeding rate is decreased in subordinates by the close
proximity of dominant neighbours, most likely due to
movements away by the subordinates that require a
break from feeding (Thouless, 1989). Correlations
between feeding time and social rank have also been
shown in female red deer elsewhere (Veiberg et al.,
2004), whereas female–female aggression has been
linked to resource competition in other ungulates
(Festa-Bianchet, 1991; Robinson & Kruuk, 2007).
Our models of focal dominance also provided evidence
that the outcome of dyadic interactions is repeatable
within individuals. In other words, there is evidence that,
after conditioning on age difference and sex, there is
among-individual variance in the likelihood of winning
interactions. This finding is broadly consistent with
earlier conclusions relating to this population (Thouless
& Guinness, 1986). Consistent differences among indi-
viduals may arise from a variety of nonmutually exclu-
sive processes including ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ effects
(when current contest outcome depends on, and is
positively correlated with, prior contest outcomes,
Dugatkin, 1997), differences in morphological traits
(e.g. size) associated with assessment of resource holding
potential (Parker, 1974) or among-individual variation in
agonistic behaviours involved in mediating contest out-
comes. Whereas our data do not allow us to disentangle
these mechanisms, previous analyses have shown a
correlation between female dominance rank and body
size in this population, suggesting that this is likely to be
an important trait (Clutton-Brock et al., 1984).
Our analyses also indicate that a substantial proportion
(approximately 27% under model 4) of the among-focal
individual variance in dominance is attributable to direct
additive genetic effects. Furthermore, our results also
supported the final hypothesis that contest outcomes are
subject to IGEs. Thus, the dominance status of a focal
individual will depend to some extent upon its genotype,
but whether a focal individual wins any given contest
will also depend upon the genotype of the opponent with
which it interacts.
It is important to acknowledge that there is abundant
evidence for social inheritance of maternal dominance
rank in some taxa (most notably primates and hyenas,
Holekamp & Smale, 1991). In the absence of experimen-
tal manipulation, it would be foolish to completely rule
out the possibility of unmodelled mechanisms of social
inheritance upwardly biasing our estimated genetic
parameters. However, we note that the animal model
framework is far more robust in this regard than classical
approaches such as mother–daughter regression. This is
because estimates of the genetic parameters are informed
by distant relatives (including many that share ancestry
through paternal relationships only). Furthermore, the
model can be extended to explicitly model maternal
effects (Kruuk & Hadfield, 2007), allowing a direct test
of the hypothesis that maternal identity explains varia-
tion in contest success. Here, there was no statistical
support for the presence of (nongenetic) maternal effects
and inclusion of maternal identity as a random effect
in the model had little impact on genetic parameter
estimates. We therefore believe our conclusion that
dominance is heritable to be statistically robust.
Accepting that dominance is indeed under direct
selection (i.e. there is a causal relationship between focal
dominance and fitness) and heritable, then the presence
of IGEs provides a resolution to the apparent paradox
that a heritable trait is unable to respond to selection (i.e.
with one winner and one loser in each contest, the mean
contest outcome must always equal 1 ⁄2). Recent theo-
retical work has shown that the expected response to
selection depends not just on the conventional additive
genetic variance, but also on the indirect genetic vari-
ance, the genetic covariance between direct and indirect
effects and the relatedness structure among interacting
individuals (Wolf et al., 1998; Bijma et al., 2007b; Bijma
& Wade, 2008). We have argued that in a contest
between two animals there is only one independent
observation. If the focal individual is observed to win the
contest, then it follows that the opponent must have lost.
As our designation of focal and opponent individuals is
arbitrary, it is necessarily true that if the focal genotype
influences contest outcome (i.e. there are direct genetic
effects), then so must the opponent genotype (i.e. there
must be IGEs). This argument is supported by the results
of our empirical analyses.
Furthermore, if direct and IGEs on dominance must
have equal variances and a perfect negative correlation,
the sum of VA.F and COVA.FO must equal zero. For the
case of two interacting individuals, the sum of VA.F and
COVA.FO determines the amount of heritable variation on
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which selection among individuals can act (from equa-
tion 15 of Bijma & Wade, 2008, for n = 2). Under the
constraints imposed in model 5, this sum must necessar-
ily equal zero, whereas under model 4 we estimated this
sum (with SE) as 0.032 (0.052). Note also that under
model 5 the variance in total breeding values (sensu,
Bijma et al., 2007b) is also zero, and therefore, a response
in the mean phenotype is not expected, regardless of
whether multilevel selection is present and irrespective
of the relatedness structure (Bijma & Wade, 2008). Thus,
model 5 posits a zero-sum game in which the perfect
negative correlation between direct and IGEs creates an
absolute constraint on mean contest winning rate, a trait
that is both heritable and under selection. We note that
although formulated and parameterized somewhat dif-
ferently, model 5 is essentially equivalent to a theoretical
model proposed by (Wolf et al., 2008) as a resolution for
the lek paradox. In both contexts, competition among
individuals is predicted to cause maintenance of additive
genetic variance and an absence of observable pheno-
typic evolution.
While there is an absolute constraint on the evolution
of mean observed phenotype (i.e. contest outcome), this
should not be taken to mean that a constraint on genetic
change is present. Neither does it follow that the
phenotypic means of traits contributing to dominance
are evolutionarily constrained (discussed further later).
In fact breeding values for, and gene frequencies at loci
influencing, dominance are free to evolve. Verbally, the
argument here is that a gene predisposing a focal
individual to dominance should be selected and so
increase in frequency. However, while a focal individual
in a subsequent generation will be more likely to carry
that gene, it will also be more likely to encounter an
opponent carrying it (thus negating any advantage with
respect to contest outcome). This represents a particular
case of ‘environmental deterioration’ (Fisher, 1958;
Frank & Slatkin, 1992) or the ‘treadmill of competition’
(Wolf, 2003), which occurs when the phenotypic gains
naively expected from selection on (and spread of) a
more competitive genotype are not realized because of
increased competition in the social environment (Bijma,
2010; Hadfield, J. D., Wilson, A. J. and Kruuk, L. E. B.,
submitted). Although it is not feasible to conduct such an
experiment in red deer, the phenotypic consequences of
an underlying genetic response can be made apparent if
individuals are transplanted to a different social environ-
ment. This was demonstrated by Moore et al. (2002)
who found that despite little change in agonistic behav-
iour within selected lines of cockroaches, after seven
generations individuals from high-selected lines were
consistently dominant in trials against individuals from
low-selected and control lines.
In providing an explanation for what we already know
must be true (i.e. that the mean proportion of contests
won cannot evolve), it could be argued that our analyses
provide relatively little biological insight into the evolu-
tionary dynamics of social dominance in red deer on
Rum. We also note that quantitative genetic models of
the sort developed here are intended to predict the per
generation selection response for a phenotypic mean, not
changes in higher-order moments (e.g. variance or
skew in dominance), or evolutionary stable strategies
(Maynard Smith & Price, 1973).
However, aside from the point that we are now able to
empirically estimate the genetic components of (co)var-
iance and so recover this ‘truth’, we hope that the
present result also highlights the need for wider recog-
nition of IGEs and their consequences. For instance,
although indirect effects (genetic or otherwise) must
exist for dominance interactions, the same logic can be
extended to any resource-limited trait where phenotype
is determined, at least in part, by competitive interactions
among individuals. Thus, if competitive ability (i.e.
ability to acquire and ⁄or monopolize a limited resource)




































Fig. 3 Evaluation of (a) bias and (b) power in penalized quasi-likelihood solutions to generalized linear mixed model analyses of dominance
in red deer, Cervus elaphus. Each cluster of four bars with decreasing shading represents results from simulations with values of
nongenetic repeatable variance (Vb) and within-individual variance (Ve) set to (i) Vb = 0, Ve = 0, (ii) Vb = 0.5, Ve = 0, (iii) Vb = 0,
Ve = 0.5, (iv) Vb = 0.5, Ve = 0.5. The 1 : 1 line on panel (a) indicates where unbiased estimates should lie.
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constraints on resource-limited traits (e.g. growth).
Under the IGE modelling framework employed here
(i.e. Muir & Craig, 1998; Bijma et al., 2007b), genetic
variance in competitive ability should be manifest as
a negative covariance between direct and IGEs on
resource-limited traits.
We also note that the advantages of directly modelling
the observed data using mixed effects models are
certainly not limited to genetic studies. For example, in
contrast to derived dominance metrics, the observed data
come from a defined and known distribution, whereas
effects such as age or sex are readily incorporated as
explanatory covariates. Furthermore, by testing the
causes and consequences of dominance interactions
directly, we can avoid the widespread, but statistically
unfortunate practice of analysing dominance metrics
under the assumption they are known without error
(Poisbleau et al., 2006).
A further point of interest is that if dominance (or in a
more general context simply competitive ability) is under
selection, then the evolutionary consequence of IGE-
based constraints will vary among correlated traits
according to their causal relationships. For instance,
consider a (purely hypothetical) situation in which a
morphological trait (e.g. weapon size) was a strong
determinant of success in contesting for access to a
limited food resource and therefore a strong determinant
of growth. If weapon size were heritable, then we would
expect positive (direct) genetic correlations between it
and both dominance and growth rate. Consequently, we
might naively predict that direct selection on dominance
would induce positively correlated responses in the other
two traits. However, with an IGE-based constraint on
dominance recognized then this expectation changes.
Whereas the trait causal for dominance (i.e. weapon size)
would still evolve as a correlated response to the
selection, the downstream trait dependent on contest
outcomes (i.e. growth) would be constrained.
In conclusion, our results highlight that social domi-
nance can be a heritable trait. However, it is also a latent
trait that, rather than being directly measured, is inferred
through observations of contest outcomes. Winning or
losing a contest is not a phenotypic observation that can
be treated as belonging to a single individual. Rather
contest outcomes result from interacting phenotypes
and – so by extension – from interacting genotypes
(Moore et al., 1997). If the outcomes of these interactions
are influenced by additive genetic effects, then they must
also be influenced by IGEs. It has been argued that IGEs
arising from competitive interactions could represent a
widespread, but poorly recognized source of evolutionary
constraint for resource-limited traits under natural selec-
tion (Cooke et al., 1990; Hadfield, J. D., Wilson, A. J. and
Kruuk, L. E. B., submitted). For the particular case of
dominance as defined here, we know a priori that no
amount of selection can result in an increase in the mean
observed phenotype, but it is only by explicit recognition
and estimation of IGEs that we can demonstrate the
genetic basis of this constraint.
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Appendix 1: validation of GLMM
methodology
Simulation approach
We simulated varying rates of additive genetic variance,
repeatable among-individual variation and within-indi-
vidual variation (essentially overdispersion in the context
of GLMM analyses) for social dominance. The currently
available pedigree for the red deer system has an
estimated overall confidence level of 97.6%, and because
most remaining null assignments are likely to unsampled
individuals from outside of the study area (Walling et al.,
2010), we simulated breeding values over the available
pedigree, assuming that it is complete and correct. In
doing so, we effectively treat all null parentage links in
the pedigree as links to unrelated founders, and we
deemed this a safe approximation because the population
outside the study area is relatively large compared to the
number of immigrants to the study area. We composed
simulated outcomes of each contest in the real data
according to the probabilistic formula
zijx ¼ d½logit
#1ðlijxÞ&
where zijx is the observed phenotype on the 0 ⁄1 scale, d is
a draw from a binomial distribution, and lijx is the latent
scale probability of that individual i wins contest x against
opponent j and is calculated as
lijx ¼ ai þ bi þ eix # aj # bj # ejx
where a represents breeding values, b represents nonge-
netic repeatable individual effects, and e represents a
residual error on the latent scale. We simulated data for
100 replicates of each of 16 parameter sets, comprising all
possible combinations of Va, Vb and Vewith the following
values: Va of 0, 0.125, 0.25 or 0.5; Vb of 0 or 0.5; and Ve
of 0 or 0.5. We analysed each simulated data set using
model 4 (as described above). For every replicate anal-
ysis, we recorded the estimate of Va and the ratio of the
estimate to its estimated standard error, so that we could
subsequently evaluate both bias in Va and the utility of
comparison of the magnitudes of the estimate to its
estimated standard error for hypothesis testing.
Simulation results
We observed an overall trend for estimates of Va to be
downwardly biased by about 10% across all nonzero
simulated levels of additive genetic variance for domi-
nance (Fig. 3a). The presence of simulated environmen-
tal variation had a tendency to very slightly increase this
bias (Fig. 3a). These two patterns in bias are expected for
PQL solutions to GLMMs of a binary trait (Bolker et al.
2009, Rodriquez & Goldman, 2001; Goldstein & Rasbash,
1996), but under the conditions of our analyses of
variation in dominance in red deer, these biases are not
large enough to hinder the biological interpretation of
our model-based estimate.
Under the null hypothesis with respect to additive
genetic variance, the ratio of estimated Va to the
estimated standard error of Va proved to be a conserva-
tive test statistic. Application of the common ‘rule of
thumb’ that ratios over 2 are statistically justifiable, no
false positives occurred in the simulated data for the four
combinations of magnitudes of nongenetic sources of
variance that we simulated. Given that hypothesis testing
of Va is a one-tailed test, i.e. we typically do not attach
biological meaning to negative Va, threshold Z-value of
1.64 corresponds to a = 0.05 may be justifiable. At this
threshold significance level, false-positive rates ranged
between 0% and 3%. When we simulated the presence
of additive genetic variation for dominance, our study
design proved to provide substantial power to detect even
modest levels of Va (Fig. 3b). Whereas estimates of Va
were largely unbiased by Vb (Fig. 3a), the presence of
nonzero Vb did reduce power to detect Va (Fig. 1b). At
the lowest level of Va that we simulated (i.e. Va = 0.125),
average power (i.e. the rate of significant tests) was
estimated as 1 in the absence of repeatable among-
individual variation and 0.755 when Vb = 0.5, at the
threshold values of the ratio of the estimate to estimated
standard error of 1.64. The corresponding estimates of
power were 1 and 0.655 at the ‘rule of thumb’ threshold
of 2 for this ratio.
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